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The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to theoretical knowledge and help investors, 
fund administrators, financial regulators and database vendors. Its chapters examine 
hedge fund performance attribution and fund persistence under changing market 
conditions, and issues of hedge fund index engineering, using a rigorously constructed 
unified database (U.S. dataset, from 1990 to 2014).  
The core of my modelling approach is a custom piece-wise parsimonious multifactor 
model with predefined and non-defined structural breaks, flexible enough to capture 
differences in asset and portfolio allocations. This is implemented on a strategy, 
fundamental, and a mixed level. Concerning funds’ persistence, I use several parametric 
and non-parametric techniques whereas I develop a framework with mixed trading 
strategies for investors’ conditional high returns. I examine the classification problem of 
hedge funds by implementing several classification techniques used by database 
vendors, on the same dataset. 
The findings are robust, showing that during stressful market conditions most hedge 
fund strategies do not provide significant alphas to investors as fund managers are more 
concerned about minimizing their systematic risk and there is a switch from equity to 
commodity asset classes. Directional strategies have more common exposures than non-
directional strategies under all market conditions. Falling stock markets are harsher than 
recessions for hedge funds. Moreover, during stressful conditions, small funds suffer 
more than large funds, young funds outperform old ones and funds that do not impose 
restrictions (and survive) outperform funds with no lockups. There are cases where 
funds can deliver significant negative alpha to investors conditional on stressful market 
conditions. In general, stressful market conditions have a negative impact on all types of 
funds’ persistence whereas my zero investment “synthetic” trading strategy can bring 
conditional high returns to investors. Furthermore, I found that the differences between 
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1 Chapter: Introduction 
This chapter begins with an introduction about the nature of the hedge fund and its 
difference from other traditional investments, and the current state of the hedge fund 
industry. Then it deals with the background of the problems that the hedge fund 
literature is associated with and are examined in this PhD thesis. It proceeds by 
identifying the gaps, why these are important and the motivation behind this study. 
Then it clearly states the research objectives and the research questions that this thesis 
deals with. In the research design and theoretical framework section, it briefly informs 
the reader about the methodologies and techniques used in order to deal with the 
research questions. Afterwards, it informs the reader about this PhD thesis structure and 
closes with a short conclusion. 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 The nature of hedge funds 
The term hedge fund means a usually aggressive portfolio of investments that can 
engage in a broader range of trading and investments activities than other conventional 
funds. It uses state-of the art investment strategies in markets using leverage, 
derivatives, short and/or long positions internationally and domestically with a target to 
generate high returns. This may be absolute returns or returns above a certain market 
benchmark. In legal terms, hedge funds are usually constructed as private investment 
partnerships that are available to a limited number of investors requiring a very large 
initial minimum investment. The investors are typically high wealth individuals, and 
institutions such as pension funds, life insurance companies, university endowments and 
foundations. Today, most hedge funds usually have four different groups of service 
providers (in-house or usually firms). These are a lawyer, a prime broker, an audit 
accounting firm, and very often an administrator. 
Hedge funds have a private nature and all the other characteristics derive from it 
(Lhabitant, 2004). As the general public has no access to this pool, regulators regard this 
pool as not a traditional investment vehicle such as mutual funds, portfolio stocks, 
bonds or cash, so there is no need to regulate them nor any need for disclosure. Hedge 
fund managers are not obliged to disclose their underlying investment practices and 
there is no obligation to conform to the requirements of registered investment 
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companies. Moreover, the manager may pursue a wide range of financial instruments 
and any type of investment strategy even if this include short selling, derivatives, 
leverage, real-estate, non-listed or illiquid securities. Low liquid placements mean that 
the financial products are difficult to liquidate or sell in a reasonable time interval with 
available pricing. 
1.1.2 Differences with traditional investments 
Hedge funds differ from traditional investment vehicles such mutual funds in terms, 
first, of transparency as they are not bound by regulation by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and they also are not bound by limitations concerning 
permitted instruments and portfolio make-up. Secondly, hedge funds, contrary to mutual 
funds, are flexible to design and implement every financial instrument or strategy that is 
appropriate to achieve their goals (usually high absolute returns). Third, there is a 
difference in the customer target group. As it is already mentioned, hedge funds are for 
accredited only investors, contrary to mutual funds that are for the general public and 
being advertised. Fourth, is the compensation structure; whereas hedge funds’ total fees 
consist of a management fee plus an incentive fee, in mutual funds there is a 
management fee only equal to a fixed percentage of assets. In the hedge fund industry 
the typical management fee is between 1% and 2% whereas the incentive fee is around 
twenty percent on returns. Fifth, hedge funds typically have a higher attrition rate than 
mutual funds as presented by many studies (e.g. Baba and Goko, 2009; Xu, Liu, and 
Loviscek, 2011, Getmansky, 2012). Sixth, due to volunteer reporting and the lack of 
transparency there are different kind of biases such as survivorship, backfill, sample 
selection from database vendors, that have been examined by many authors (e.g. Fung 
and Hsieh, 1997, Liang, 2001) hence the researcher should handle them properly by 
minimizing them.     
1.1.3 The current state of the industry 
Despite the fact that hedge funds gained mainstream popularity from the mid ‘90s and 
onwards, they have been in existence for almost 70 years. A hedge fund was developed 
and first used in 1949 by Alfred Winslow Jones. He is credited with initiating the first 
hedge fund partnership. As of the third quarter 2015 hedge funds count for more than 
$2.7 trillion ($2.9 according to the HFR) not including $0.5 trillion for funds of funds 
and $334 billion for CTAs (commodity trading advisors). The number of hedge funds is 
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currently more than 10,000 globally and almost 70% are U.S. funds. During the early 
2000 there was a substantial growth in the industry, reaching its peak before the 
financial crisis in 2008. However, after the 2008-2009 losses, the significant growth in 
assets continued. Concerning returns, from late 1999 to 2015(Q3) the average investor 
could have earned between 3.1 and 4.4 times her initial capital (please see chapter 2 for 
a detail discussion). 
As of the first half of 2016, important issues are the hedge fund performance as hedge 
fund managers try to dig themselves out from problems resulting from the devaluation 
in China, the global regulatory environment that fund managers are expecting to 
confront, and achieving size and scale as it seems that firms need to offer multiple 
products to investors in order to grow. Opportunities for growth and innovation could 
be pension plans and direct lending to business as banks have pulled back on the 
lending in the wake of the financial crisis. Disruptions for the hedge fund industry could 
be the various geopolitical issues, the merging of hedge funds resulting in fewer but 
larger players in the hedge fund industry, the cost and transparency pressures, the 
governance and stress-testing or risk management issues (Deloitte U.S., Hedge Fund 
Trends, 2016).    
After a brief discussion about hedge funds, this introductory chapter deals with the 
background of the problems that the hedge fund literature is associated with and are 
examined in this PhD thesis. I proceed by identifying the gaps, why these are important 
and my motivation behind this study. Then I clearly state my research objectives and 
research questions that I deal in this thesis. In the research design and theoretical 
framework section, I briefly inform the reader about the methodologies and techniques 
that I used in order to deal with my research questions. Afterwards, I inform the reader 
about this PhD thesis structure. 
1.2 Background of the problem 
1.2.1 The return generating process 
One aspect of hedge funds that the literature deals with is the return generating process 
of hedge funds. Early studies (such as Sharpe, 1992) tried to explain hedge funds in a 
linear framework. However, these studies are more appropriate for long only funds 
giving more weight to the asset categories or where the fund manager trades. They 
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provided a static representation of hedge fund performance attribution. Afterwards, 
there was a development toward non-linear models that tried to explain hedge funds’ 
performance as option portfolios (e.g. Fung and Hsieh, 2004; Agarwal and Naik, 2004). 
There are also studies that showed that the so called market neutral strategies are not 
really neutral for investors (Duarte, Longstaff, and Yu, 2007). Although these studies 
following the down-up approach are important, nevertheless they do not capture the 
dynamic nature of the exposures that change over time. There are other studies that 
follow the up-down approach such as Bali, Brown and Caglayan (2011, 2014), 
Avramov, Barras, and Kosowski (2013), Racicot and Theoret (2016) or Namvar, 
Phillips, Pukthuanthong, and Rau (2016) that tried to explain hedge fund performance 
attribution through time. There is also another group of studies following the up-down 
approach that addressed different methodological issues and tried to identify structural 
breaks in hedge fund returns. These studies confirmed earlier studies that hedge funds 
have nonlinear returns and exposures and these are changing over time (for more details 
about the up-down, down-up, and alternative approaches, please see chapter 2).  
All the previous studies are important for performance attribution, however, there are 
important issues that constitute problems for the investors and have not examined 
accordingly. First, regarding the macroeconomic environment, the current knowledge is 
fragmented (focusing on only one crisis or economic event) hence cannot be generalized 
(e.g. the behaviour for stressful conditions). Second, there is no direct link between 
market conditions and fund performance as some studies (e.g. Bollen and Whaley, 
2009; Jawadi and Khanniche, 2012) focus on the internal change of funds’ exposures, 
and the macro variables used by other authors (e.g. Avramov et.al., 2013 or Bali et.al., 
2014) or the macro uncertainly represented by specific variables (e.g. Racicot, and 
Theoret, 2016) do not necessarily represent the different states of the economy (there is 
a specific definition by the NBER and ECRI about business cycles – please see chapter 
3). Thus, investors still have not get a clear picture concerning hedge fund behaviour in 
relation to market conditions. Third, the market condition is presented in the current 
literature in different ways (e.g. uncertainly, down market regimes, financial crisis) and 
there is no distinction and comparison between them. Fourth, the single models used 
corresponding to all hedge fund strategies or market conditions are over-simplistic and 
do not efficiently capture the exposures and the excess returns delivered to investors. 
Fifth, many models containing commodities contain one general commodity factor that 
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insufficiently captures individual commodities as they have different behaviour over 
time.   
1.2.2 Cross-Sectional differences 
Concerning hedge fund performance and fund specific characteristics (fundamental 
level), despite the contradictory results, the majority of the studies (e.g. Schneeweis, 
Kazemi, and Martin, 2002; Hedges, 2003; Harri and Brorsen, 2004; Ammann and 
Moerth, 2005; Meredith, 2007; Joenvaara, Kosowski, and Tolonen, 2012) found that 
there is a negative relationship between fund performance and size. There are also 
studies (e.g. e.g. Howell, 2001; Amenc and Maertellini, 2003; Meredith, 2007; Frumkin 
and Vandegrift, 2009) showing that there is a negative relationship between age and 
fund performance. Concerning the lockup periods studies showed that there is a positive 
relationship with hedge fund performance (Aragon, 2007; Joenavaara, Kosowski, and 
Tolonen, 2012). All the previous studies are important for understanding hedge fund 
behaviour; however, investors are still confused with hedge fund complexity as these 
associations are investigated on fundamental-only or strategy-only levels, without also 
examining the relationship between them and the conditional changes over time. There 
is no a holistic approach between performance, and elements such as fundamental 
factors, strategies, and market conditions. Also, the issues mentioned in the previous 
paragraph (e.g. focusing on one only crisis or economic event, over-simplistic models 
for all hedge funds or under all changing conditions) are still valid, when examining 
hedge fund at the fundamental or mixed level. 
1.2.3 Performance persistence 
A large part of the hedge fund literature examines hedge fund performance persistence 
and there is strong evidence that there is at least short term performance persistence 
(e.g. Agarwal and Naik, 2000a; Harri, and Brosen, 2004; Eling, 2009; Joenvaara, 
Kosowiski, and Tolonen, 2012; Hentati-Kaffel and Peretti, 2015). Nevertheless, there 
are studies (e.g. Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov, 2010; Ammann, Huber, and 
Schumid, 2013) that challenge the above studies showing that there is long term 
persistence which can be over a year. All the previous studies are valuable however 
there are two issues that cause problems for investors and constitute a gap in the 
literature. First, there is a lack of clear definition and distinction between different kinds 
of persistence. Most studies deal with the fund persistence within its group such as 
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whether top (bottom) performer funds continue to be top (bottom) performers. 
However, there are other aspects of persistence such as the smoothness (how constant 
are raw or risk-adjusted returns), and the persistence of out or over performance against 
a specific benchmark that need to be addressed. Second, previous studies do not 
consider persistence with regard to different market conditions thus investors are 
ignorant about this matter. In addition, there is no study helping investors how to deal 
with these persistence issues so as to gain higher returns.  
1.2.4 Classification issues 
Another issue is that in the hedge fund industry there is no a universal classification 
scheme for hedge fund strategies. Most authors have used predefined classification 
schemes from the database vendors as “consumers”. Also, some authors grouped hedge 
funds into broader styles or categories. The issue is that, none of those who used the 
predefined classification schemes focused on the vendors’ classification process. There 
is little or no examination in the extant literature of the issues arising from the various 
vendors’ different hedge fund classification processes, and more specific the 
examination of the quantitative techniques used by these vendors. Hence, in the 
literature there is a significant gap regarding hedge fund index construction methods and 
how this can have an impact on hedge funds’ performance evaluation. On the other 
hand, investors struggle to find the appropriate benchmarks to assess their portfolios, 
and little is known about the differences in indices that they use. It is not clear whether 
the differences in hedge fund indices are due to the different datasets that private 
database vendor’s use or due to their different classification techniques.     
1.3 Motivation and significance 
1.3.1 Motivation 
Based on the above background of the problems, my motivation for this PhD thesis is to 
contribute to the existed theoretical knowledge by covering the gaps and assisting 
investors in their investment decision process. I apply a holistic approach focusing on 
the “big” picture so as to generalize having results that can help investors in a practical 
way. My motivation also is to help fund administrators by applying more flexible fee 
policies in fund managers’ performance. Another motivation is to have a research with 
impact on financial regulator policies and on database vendors regarding index 
benchmarking practices. Last but not least, there is a big problem with the data in the 
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hedge fund industry and I noticed that in the literature there is no integrated guidance 
about data assurance quality. Therefore, I followed a strict and transparent approach in 
data management (e.g. database merging and cleaning processes) that can be considered 
as a benchmark and can be followed by other authors, as well.       
1.3.2 Significance of the study 
Overall, this study is significant because it covers gaps in the literature that are 
important for researchers and investors. I justify this by discussing the significance of 
my study for each chapter separately, so as to crystallize it to the reader in a better way.  
Before this study, there were specific gaps in the literature having to do with the lack of 
generalization, the absence of a direct link between market conditions and fund 
performance, the absence of a distinction and comparison between different “kinds” of 
market conditions, the use of one only commodity factor, and the over-simplistic 
models (all these analyzed in the previous section). All these issues that I take into 
consideration in this PhD thesis, created confusion for investors thus not having a clear 
and big picture about the behaviour of hedge funds. There was no study following a 
holistic approach that confronted the above issues so as to be a guide to investors or 
researchers when examining hedge funds. The first empirical chapter in this study is 
important as it helps resolve these issues that investors struggle with. 
The second empirical chapter deals with fund performance at the fundamental (fund 
characteristics) and mixed level (strategies and fund characteristics together). Thus, 
beyond dealing with the above issues described before (e.g. generalization, absence of a 
direct link between market conditions and performance etc.) it also covers other 
important gaps regarding the cross-sectional differences in hedge funds (for that reason 
I use an extra dataset covering assets under management, and redemption restrictions 
forming several portfolios of funds with different strategies and fund specific 
characteristics). More specific, before this study the existing studies examined hedge 
fund performance at a strategy only or at the fundamental only level. There was no 
study examining funds at a mixed or fundamental only level under changing market 
conditions. All these issues that I take into consideration in this study, created ignorance 
to investors not having a deep knowledge of funds’ performance taking into 
consideration all these interactions. The investor was not conscious of hidden dangers 
e.g. paying a fee for a negative alpha for specific funds conditional on stressful market 
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conditions as he/she was taking for granted that hedge funds always provide superior 
returns to investors. In other words, there was an illusion or myth about hedge fund 
performance.    
The third empirical chapter deals with hedge fund persistence. The persistence was 
another issue that was problematic for investors as till now there was not a clear 
definition and distinction between different kinds of persistence. This is essential as 
most investors in their capital allocation process rely on past performance. However, 
which kind of persistence? There was an obscure issue. Moreover, there was no 
examination of persistence during changing market conditions as this is dynamic (as I 
found and describe in the third empirical chapter). Hence, investors one more time were 
in the darkness. In order to resolve these issues I used several parametric and non-
parametric tests. Another important thing that was missing and it is addressed in this 
PhD thesis is the investigation of how investors can exploit the persistence and form 
trading strategies for higher returns. Hence, having that into consideration I created a 
framework for mixed trading strategies that investors can use for conditional high 
returns.        
Another significance of this study is the examination in the final empirical chapter of 
the classification issues of hedge funds as, unfortunately, there is not a universal 
classification scheme for hedge fund strategies. In this thesis I use the strategies 
disclosure by fund managers, however there are studies that simply use hedge fund 
indices that depends on vendors’ index construction techniques without any further 
investigation of potential side effects. It was a surprise to me that there has been not 
statistical work dealing with the different classification methods of hedge funds in a 
practical way. Until now, investors and most of the authors used the existing 
classification of hedge funds by the database vendors as it is (just as “consumers”), 
without investigating why different database vendor indices are different even when 
they represent the same hedge fund strategy. Identifying and using the appropriate 
benchmark indices is a difficult task and can have a significant impact on the asset or 
portfolio allocation process of the investors. This study deals with these important 
issues and shed light on the index construction methodologies and in particular on the 
classification processes.    
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1.4 Objectives – research questions 
This doctoral thesis has as a prime purpose to understand and explain the attribution of 
returns of different hedge fund strategies under changing market conditions, using the 
longest period to date, from 1990 to 20141. In other words, to examine the return 
generating process of the hedge fund strategies under changing market conditions. The 
first objective is to examine what the impact is of multiple business cycles and different 
market conditions on hedge fund strategies under a holistic approach, focusing on the 
North America region due to the use of three full U.S. business cycles. Beyond this, the 
North American hedge fund industry represents more than $1.9 trillion of assets under 
management corresponding to almost 72% of worldwide total (Preqin Global Hedge 
Fund Report, 2014). I use the terms multiple business cycles and market conditions so 
as to examine hedge fund behavior in a more comprehensive way and not just isolating 
one or two economic periods or financial crisis events. I make the distinction between 
business cycles and different market conditions so as to shed light on the difference 
between them in hedge fund strategies, assisting investors in their decision process. By 
using a piece-wise parsimonious model (see empirical chapter 1), I focused on hedge 
funds that invest primarily in the North America region due to my use of three full U.S. 
business cycles.  
The second objective of this study is an extension of the first objective where I examine 
hedge funds’ performance at fund fundamental (hedge fund characteristics such as size, 
age, and redemption restrictions) and mixed level (strategy and fundamental levels 
together). This is important as there is an interaction between these levels taking into 
consideration changing market conditions, as well. The third objective is to examine 
hedge fund performance persistence in different aspects and more specifically 
persistence in terms of the smoothness of returns, the persistence against the market 
benchmark, and the persistence within each strategy. I also examine how investors can 
utilize the differences in persistence in hedge fund strategies so as to gain higher 
returns. The fourth objective is to examine the differences between hedge fund indices 
from different database vendors even though they are supposed to represent the same 
strategy. On the same dataset, I apply specific classification techniques used by database 
                                                 
1 When selecting hedge fund databases I had strict specification criteria such as those concerned with pre-
1994 data as the majority of the databases for commercial use came into existence early/mid 1990s. 
Contrary to other studies, this dataset contains pre-1994 dead funds so as not to have the type of 
survivorship bias. However, in the findings I have additional robustness checks that excluded the prior 
1994 period so as to verify my results.     
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vendors so as to examine whether the differences in hedge fund indices are a result of 
the different classifications or the different datasets used by the vendors.  
Based on the above, my research questions are:  
1. How and what is the impact of the (multiple) business cycles and different market 
conditions on hedge fund strategies in terms of performance (alphas and exposures)? 
 2. How and what is the impact of the (multiple) business cycles and different market 
conditions on hedge funds at the fundamental and mixed level in terms of performance 
(alphas and exposures)?  
3. What is the impact of multiple business cycles and different market conditions on 
hedge fund performance persistence at a strategy level and how investors can exploit 
the persistence?  
4. Why there are such large differences between hedge fund indices from different 
vendors, even when they are supposed to represent the same strategy?     
1.5 Research design - methodology 
My research methodology converges to the positivist realm as being purely quantitative. 
I follow a deductive approach as I start with the implicit hypothesis that hedge funds 
have different behaviour within different market conditions and business cycles and also 
there are some fundamental factors that contribute to the alpha creation of hedge funds. 
Also the exposures are constantly changing and vary between hedge fund strategies. In 
this thesis I examine and test all these issues with data analysis using appropriate 
methods and techniques, discussed later. I use secondary data in this study and I used a 
mono-method (quantitative) approach due to the use of only one method collection 
(secondary data from databases) exploiting several quantitative techniques in my 
analysis. Concerning the time horizons I deal mostly with time-series as I involve the 
time dimension when analyzing “one entity per round’ (e.g. hedge fund strategy).  
Similar to the most recent studies (e.g. O’Doherty, Savin, and Tiwari, 2015; Racicot and 
Theoret, 2016; Namvar, Phillips, Pukthuanthong, and Rau, 2016) I examine hedge 
funds’ performance in a non-linear framework. The core of my modelling approach is a 
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custom piece-wise parsimonious multi-factor model with predefined and non-defined 
structural breaks. The predefined structural breaks are the U.S. business cycles whereas 
the non-defined are computed through a Markov switching process. This proposed 
parsimonious model is flexible enough to capture differences in portfolio and asset 
allocation of hedge funds as it uses a technique (stepwise regression) to capture the 
most suitable factors per each fund group (e.g. strategy) within each specific time 
period. 
In the second empirical chapter, I include also the portfolio approach by forming groups 
of hedge funds at a strategy and fundamental level, as well. In the third empirical 
chapter, I use several parametric and non-parametric tests so as to examine hedge fund 
performance persistence at different aspects and in many cases I use more than one test 
so as to have even more robust results. I also developed a framework about mixed 
trading strategies that investors can exploit for higher returns conditional on changing 
market conditions. In the last empirical chapter (hedge fund indexing) I used several 
classification techniques similar to that used by popular database vendors to investigate 
the differences between hedge fund indices. In this thesis I used robustness checks (e.g. 
examining simpler models, out-of-sample tests, excluding the first four years of data 
etc.) so as to verify the results. 
Last but not least, as the database merging and cleaning processes are not trivial tasks I 
provide the reader with the algorithms and processes that used so as to have the best 
possible data quality. Contrary to many other authors I followed a transparent approach 
when dealing and preparing the data for the further analysis. In addition, I managed 
issues that may affect the data quality (e.g. outliers, consecutive zeros in the dataset) 
with a special care which are disclosed in this study so as to ensure the best possible 
transparency in the data management processes.      
1.6 The thesis structure 
The rest of this doctoral thesis is organized in chapters (papers) regarding the four 
research questions that are discussed above. Every chapter has its own structure with an 
introduction, methodology, empirical analysis, and conclusion section. The next chapter 
(chapter 2) which is the literature review chapter, examines hedge funds’ return 
generating process (part 1- first paper), performance persistence, and hedge fund returns 
and funds’ characteristics (part 2 – second paper). In the next four chapters I mostly 
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cover the gaps identified in the literature review. More specifically, the third chapter 
examines the first research question (funds’ performance at strategy level), the fourth 
chapter examines the second research question (funds’ performance at fundamental and 
mixed level), the fifth chapter examines the third research question (persistence and 
mixed trading strategies), and the sixth chapter examines the last research question 
(hedge fund indexing). Finally, the last chapter (chapter 7) presents the conclusions.  
1.7 Conclusion 
This doctoral thesis examines gaps in the hedge fund literature that constitute problems 
for investors and researchers. These problems are related with the hedge fund return 
generating process, the cross-sectional differences in hedge funds, the performance 
persistence, and the classification issues of the hedge fund industry. Overall this thesis 
is significant because it covers gaps in the literature having to do primarily with the lack 
of generalization, the absence of a direct link between market conditions and fund 
performance, the absence of a distinction and comparison between different “kinds” of 
market conditions, the use of one only commodity factor, and the over-simplistic 
models (all these analyzed in the previous section). My motivation is to contribute to the 
existed theoretical knowledge by covering the gaps and assisting investors in their 
investment decision process.  
I apply a holistic approach focusing on the “big” picture so as to get results that can help 
investors, researchers and financial regulators in a practical way. Hence, researchers are 
familiar with different aspects of hedge fund behaviour under changing market 
conditions and they can exploit the avenues for further research that are revealed; 
investors know what to expect from hedge funds with different strategies and different 
characteristics thus helping them in their investment decision process; fund 
administrators and financial regulators can apply more flexible fee policies or have a 
better understanding of the hedge fund industry in case there is a need for a closer 






2 Chapter: Literature review 
This literature review chapter consists of two parts (papers): the first part (a version of 
this paper is published at the International Review of Financial Analysis journal) deals 
with the hedge fund return generating process and the second (a version of this paper is 
under re-review at the Global Finance Journal) deals with hedge fund performance 
persistence, including the relationship between fund characteristics and performance.  
The first part surveys articles covering how hedge funds returns are explained, using 
largely non-linear multifactor models that examine the non-linear pay-offs and 
exposures of hedge funds. It provides an integrated view of the implicit factor and 
statistical factor models that are largely able to explain the hedge fund return-generating 
process. Their evolution through time is presented by discussing pioneering studies that 
made a significant contribution to knowledge, and also recent innovative studies that 
examine hedge funds exposures using advanced econometric methods. This is the first 
review that analyses very recent studies that explain a large part of hedge fund variation. 
It concludes by presenting some gaps for future research.  
The second part surveys articles on hedge funds’ performance persistence and 
fundamental factors from the mid-1990s to the present. For performance persistence, 
some pioneering studies are presented that contradict previous findings that hedge 
funds’ performance is a short term matter. Recent innovative studies are discussed that 
examine the size, age, performance fees and other factors to give a 360° view of hedge 
funds’ performance attribution. Small funds, younger funds and funds with high 
performance fees all outperform the opposite. Long lockup period funds tend to 
outperform short lockups and domiciled funds tend to outperform offshore funds. All 
these factors should be taken into consideration to optimize investment results. This 
review is important because it is the first survey of recent innovative and challenging 
studies into hedge funds’ performance attribution.  
2.1 Introduction – First part 
A large and growing body of literature has investigated hedge fund performance 
attribution through the use of implicit or statistical factor models (e.g. Akay, Senyuz, 
and Yoldas, 2013; O’Doherty, Savin, and Tiwari, 2015, Racicot and Theoret, 2016). 
Investors want to know what is behind hedge fund return variation and what to expect 
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from different hedge fund strategies or funds with different styles. Furthermore, it is 
essential for investors to be familiar with the principles that enable them to understand 
hedge fund performance behaviour. Although there is a large volume of published 
studies describing the role of factors or exposures of hedge funds in delivering high 
excess return to investors, nevertheless, there is no survey that summarizes and 
discusses the results, thus leading to uniform conclusions. This issue creates confusion 
to investors who do not have a clear picture or a holistic interpretation the dynamics of 
hedge fund performance attribution.  
Therefore, the present study closes an important gap. The aim of this study is to survey 
the literature and investigate the hedge fund return generating process within implicit or 
statistical factor models. This is the first survey and synthesis of older literature to yield 
a historical perspective, along with surveying in more detail recent innovative studies to 
depict advances in hedge fund performance attribution2. Hence, readers will have an 
integrated view and a deeper understanding of hedge funds. The findings both facilitate 
hedge fund investors and untangle opportunities for further research, as I present later.  
The main conclusions are that early studies (e.g. Sharpe, 1992), through the use of 
Principal Component Analysis and Common Factor Analysis (which is the most 
common statistical approach) dealt mainly with linear factor models giving weight to 
the asset categories or where the fund manager trades. They depicted a static 
representation of hedge fund performance attribution. Then, there was a development 
toward non-linear models that tried to explain hedge funds’ performance as option 
portfolios (e.g. Fung and Hsieh, 2004; Agarwal and Naik, 2004). Nevertheless, in later 
years there have been several studies (e.g. Patton and Ramadorai, 2013; Bali, Brown 
and Caglayan, 2014; O’Doherty, Savin, and Tiwari, 2015) using more advanced models 
regarding hedge fund exposures. They confirmed previous studies that hedge funds 
have nonlinear returns in relation to the market return but they moved further and 
showed how these nonlinear exposures change over time according to financial 
conditions. Different strategies frequently have different exposures. However, there are 
a few exposures that are valid for virtually every hedge fund strategy (equity market, 
volatility, liquidity). Furthermore, systematic and more specific macroeconomic risk has 
a significant role in explaining hedge fund performance for nearly all strategies. Higher 
moment factors provide extra explanatory power to the models. 
                                                 
2 Although older literature is known, it is important to include some key studies so as to integrate and 
analyse with newer studies.   
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This paper makes a number of important contributions to the understanding of the hedge 
fund literature. First, it covers a significant gap by presenting a survey that summarizes 
and discusses studies examining hedge fund performance attribution within statistical 
factors and exposures. Moreover, it demonstrates a historical perspective by combining 
earlier and more recent innovative studies, with their strengths and weaknesses. 
Therefore, the reader is able to look at the dynamic nature of the literature explaining 
hedge fund returns. This study assist investors in their asset allocation process in two 
ways; it facilitates the deeper understanding of what is behind hedge fund return 
variation and it also enables them to know what to foresee from funds with different 
strategies or fund styles. Last but not least, this study has identified some gaps for future 
research. An example is the absence of a unified framework that takes into 
consideration the comprehensive macroeconomic environment along with the internal 
structure of the hedge fund industry in explaining returns, or identifying the proportion 
of alpha affected by each of the underlying factors.     
In the part one, section 2.2 depicts different general approaches in measuring the 
performance of all hedge fund strategies3. Section 2.3 briefly reviews earlier linear 
studies. Section 2.4 reviews in detail the most recent nonlinear models within the down-
up, up-down, and alternative modeling approaches, as I describe later. The final section 
2.5 presents and summarizes the key conclusions and reveal some gaps that should be 
addressed in future research.   
2.2 Model categories 
This section presents two general categories of models which are the absolute pricing 
models and the relative value models. Then there is a focus on two different statistical 
approaches: Principal Component Analysis and Common Factor Analysis.   
Generally speaking, asset pricing models are divided into two main categories: (i) 
absolute pricing models and (ii) relative value models (Lhabitant, 2004 and 2007). The 
first category consists of fundamental equilibrium models and consumption-based 
models in combination with many macro-economic models. They use asset pricing 
theory and price each asset individually taking into consideration its exposures. They 
give an economic interpretation of why prices are what they are and why exposures are 
                                                 




what they are. In addition they are supposed to predict price changes due to economic 
structure changes. The second category of asset pricing models explores the evidence of 
the different asset pricing rather than trying to fit an explanation of the financial 
markets. They price each asset by taking into consideration the prices of some other 
assets that are extraneous. In other words, they provide a plain illustration of how the 
financial world works. A typical well known example is the Black-Scholes (1973) 
formula that computes an option price in regard to its underlying asset price, 
disregarding whether that asset is fairly priced by the market. The factor models that I 
mention belong to the category of relative price models. They price or evaluate hedge 
funds in regard to the market or any other risk factors. They do not concentrate on what 
induces the primitive factors, the market or factor risk premium, or the risk exposures 
accepted by the fund managers.  
The majority of factor (or relative price) models use a two-stage approach: At the 
beginning, they hypothesize that hedge funds returns are specific functions of macro-
economic and micro-economic factors (variables). Second, they test those initial 
assumptions and assess the sensitivity of hedge funds returns to those assumptions. 
Factor models determine the relationships between a large number of variables (for 
instance fund returns) and describe these relationships in terms of their common 
underlying dimensions, so called ‘factors’. Hence, there is the advantage of 
dimensionality reduction because it sums up the information that is contained in a large 
number of original values (hedge funds returns) into a smaller set of factors with a 
minimum loss of information. In other words, via factor models the covariance matrix 
(correlation or covariance among the returns of all hedge finds) can be simplified.  
Amenc, Sfeir and Martellini (2002) report four types of factor models. These are: (1) 
Explicit macro factors: These are macro-economic variables that are calculated either as 
predictive variables or adopted ex-post to measure market sensitivities in relation to 
some macroeconomic parameters. (2) Explicit index factor model: In these models each 
factor is investable and represents some index or fund available as an ETF (Exchange 
Trading Funds) or futures contract. (3) Explicit micro factor models: These 
microeconomic parameters (or variables) that refer to fund-specific features are 
estimated and forecast in a comparable manner as the explicit factor models. (4) Implicit 
factor models: These implicit factors are mainly derived through Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) or Common Factor Analysis (CFA) and are regarded as a merely 
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statistical approach. An analogous classification is suggested by Connor (1995) with the 
use of three types of factor models that are available for examining asset returns, named 
as: Macroeconomic factor models, Fundamental factor models and Statistical factor 
models.  
In this part of the literature review I deal with statistical or implicit factor models. 
Regarding those factor models there are two widely-used methodologies that are used to 
distinguish the underlying factors: (i) Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and (ii) 
Common Factor Analysis (CFA). I explain and analyse those two methodologies and 
studies with regard to hedge funds. 
2.2.1 Principal components analysis 
The PCA methodology was first described by Pearson (1901). Implicit factors are 
obtained via this approach. The purpose is to explain the return series of observed 
variables via a smaller group of non-observed implicit variables. Those implicit factors 
are extracted from the time series of returns. In other words, the main objective of PCA 
is to explain the behaviour of a number of correlated variables using a smaller number 
of uncorrelated and unobserved implied variables or implicit factors called principal 
components.  
Fung and Hsieh (1997) used PCA to extract implicit factors in order to provide a 
quantitative classification of hedge funds based on returns alone. They took into 
consideration the location (market) as well the strategy (investment style) followed by 
managers. The returns are supposed to be correlated to each other even though they 
might not be linearly correlated to the returns of asset markets. They used a database 
(1991-1995) from Paradigm LDC and from TASS Management. They found that five 
principal components jointly accounted for 43% of the return variance of hedge funds. 
They assigned concise names to these components: (1) Trend-following strategies on 
diversified markets such as managed futures and CTAs (Commodity Trading Advisors), 
(2) Global/macro funds, (3) Long/short equity funds, (4) Funds with trend-following 
strategies specialized in major currencies, (5) Distressed securities funds.  
Later, Amenc, Martellini and Faff (2003) used PCA in creating a passive hedge fund 
index or index of indices. Their method was a natural generalization of the equally 
weighted portfolio of indices. Using PCA they created a portfolio of indices with 
31 
 
appropriate weights so that the combination of indices captured the largest possible 
amount of information contained in the data (time-series returns) of those indices. The 
first component was a candidate for a pure style index. This component caught a large 
percentage of cross-sectional variation due to the fact that those competing indices tend 
to be highly positively correlated. They proved mathematically that an index of indices 
is always more representative than any competing index upon which it is based. 
Furthermore, an index of indices is consistently less biased than the average of the set of 
indices it is derived from.   
Additional authors who used PCA are Christiansen, Madsen and Christiansen (2003) so 
as to identify the minimum number of components needed to describe the returns of 
hedge funds from the CISDM database (1999-2002). They found that there were five 
components, and by comparing these with the qualitative self-reported classifications of 
hedge funds they identified five different strategies that could explain greater than 60% 
of hedge fund return variation (Opportunistic/Sector, Event Driven, Global Macro, 
Value and Market Neutral Arbitrage). It is evident from the above papers that using four 
to five components is sufficient to explain a large part of hedge fund returns.  
2.2.2 Common factor analysis 
The second statistical approach that is used more often in the literature is the Common 
Factor Analysis (CFA). Its goal is identical to PCA, which is to transform a number of 
correlated variables into a smaller number (dimensionality reduction) of uncorrelated 
variables, that is, factors. Nevertheless, there is a great difference with PCA. Here, the 
underlying factors are observable and clearly stated by the researcher carrying out 
explanatory and/or confirmatory analysis. They are not just implied by the data. As with 
PCA, the number of factors should be as small as feasible in order to have the 
advantages of dimensionality reduction. However, the researcher is making a trade-off 
between the dimensionality reduction and the accuracy she wants to maintain. 
It is very common in factor analysis to choose factors on an ad hoc basis. The basic 
principle is to pick up variables that are considered most probably to influence asset 
returns. A researcher should take into consideration quantitative and qualitative 
approaches in order to decide which factors to use. Furthermore, a researcher should 
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look for evidence from the empirical asset pricing literature. For many years researchers 
looked for factors4 that explained and influenced the cross-sections of expected returns.  
Certain models that are extensions of the basic CAPM model have heavily influenced 
hedge funds models. These are Fama and French (1993), using the size and book to 
price ratio and Carhart (1997) that included the momentum as a fourth factor. Other 
more recent models are Fung and Hsieh’s (2004) seven factor model, or Capocci’s 
(2007) fourteen factor model. In the following two sections I present some earlier and 
some more recent studies using implicit factor models that are useful to reveal hedge 
funds exposures and explain their returns. A branch of the CFA approach is Asset-
Based Style (ABS) factors, where the factors are constructed by trading in the 
appropriate securities within the underlying conventional assets (e.g. bonds or equities) 
that mimic the returns of hedge funds (please see section 2.4.1). 
Last but not least, one important application of factor models is hedge fund replication. 
There is a distinction between traded factors (e.g. market and size factors) and non-
traded factors (e.g. volatility or liquidity), the latter of which are not readily tradeable. 
Investors may therefore encounter problems in their replication. In general, the same 
issues arise in the context of non-linear models where some of them do not allow for 
easy replication of hedge funds.   
2.3 Linear factor models 
In this section I briefly discuss some linear multi-factor models that are considered to be 
key studies in the hedge fund literature. It is known that linear multi-factors models are 
based on the general linear equation model (Ross, 1976). In addition to the market 
factor (Sharpe, 1964) the most popular is the Fama and French (1993) model with the 
SMB (small minus large) and HML (high minus low book to market ratio) factors. 
Carhart (1997) was the first who used the momentum factor (Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993) as the fourth factor – a zero investment portfolio that is long in past winners and 
short in past losers. His model is an extension of the Fama and French factor model. All 
these previous factors are extensively used in the hedge fund academic literature. 
                                                 
4 These include, for example, market value or equity capitalization size proposed by Banz (1981) and 
Reinganum (1981), and earnings-to-price ratio proposed by Basu (1983). Other examples are leverage, 
mentioned by Bhandari (1988) and stock liquidity as mentioned by Amihud (2002). 
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I first consider style analysis-trading factors so as to introduce the reader gently to 
further linear and non-linear models. Therefore, I start from Sharpe (1992). Sharpe used 
an asset class factor model implementing style analysis as a substantial complement to 
other methodologies designed to assist investors achieve their targets in a cost-effective 
manner. He used a model composed of twelve asset classes to analyse the performance 
of funds between 1985 and 1989. The twelve asset classes were: (1) T-bills, (2) 
Intermediate-term Govt. Bonds, (3) Long-term Govt. Bonds, (4) Corporate Bonds, (5) 
Mortgage-Related Securities, (6) Large Cap Value Stocks, (7) Large Cap Growth 
Stocks, (8) Medium Cap Stocks, (9) Small Cap Stocks (10) Non-U.S. Bonds, (11) 
European Stocks and (12) Japanese Stocks. The variation of fund returns in any specific 
period could be associated with the combined effects of their exposures to these asset 
classes and the realized returns on these classes. Those investors’ exposures to asset 
classes were a function of, first, the proportion of the investor’s portfolio invested in the 
various funds and second the exposures of each given fund to the asset classes. The 
exposures of a fund to wider asset classes depended on two elements: the amount of 
money that the fund had invested in various securities and the exposures of the 
securities to the asset class. 
Sharpe’s (1992) style analysis can be used to appraise the behaviour of a fund 
manager’s exposures to asset classes over a specific time period. Moreover it can be 
used to measure a fund manager’s relative performance, in other words the value added 
by her skills (alpha). A passive hedge fund manager provides investors with an 
investment style whereas an active hedge fund manager provides both style and 
selection. Thus the terms active and passive management can be defined. An investor 
may choose a set of asset classes that is superior to the performance of the ‘standard’ 
static mix and fulfils the requirement for higher fees. As a result, fund selection return 
according to Sharpe (1992) is denoted as the difference between the fund’s return and 
that of a passive mix with the same style. Once the styles of an investor’s funds have 
been estimated it is possible to estimate the effective asset mix. The effective asset mix 
reflects the style of the investor’s overall portfolio.   
The model for explaining the results of traditional mixed funds (composed of equities 
and bonds) first introduced by Sharpe (1992) is limited to funds that pursue a long-only 
strategy. However, hedge funds are much more flexible and can also use short selling 
and leveraging. These trading strategies of hedge funds lead to option-like structures 
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that are not covered by the basic Sharpe model or other similar models. Confronting that 
problem, Fung and Hsieh’s (1997) study is presented in section 2.4.1 dealing with non-
linear factor models.   
Schneeweis and Spurgin (1998) used factors designed to capture the trading 
opportunities available to CTAs or hedge funds as a means of forecasting return 
performance. They used the databases of HFR, EACM, MAR and Barclays from 1990 
to 1995. They considered the following factors to examine the returns to active 
management of hedge funds, CTAs and mutual funds: (1) a natural return to owning 
financial and real assets, (2) the use of both short and long positions, (3) the exploitation 
of the indices’ intermonth volatility and (4) the exploitation of market inefficiencies that 
result in temporary trends in prices. These factors were able to significantly explain the 
differences in investment returns within each investment grouping. Using multivariate 
regressions they showed that CTA returns are positively related to commodity market 
trends. Hedge funds were related to the returns of the index which they were investing 
whereas they offer higher returns than CTAs for any given level of risk.     
A few years later, Capocci and Hubner (2004) examined hedge funds’ behaviour from 
1984 to 2000 (HFR, MAR) using various asset pricing models. Those included an 
extended form of Carhart’s (1997) model, combined with the Fama and French (1998) 
and Agarwal and Naik (2000) models plus one more factor that takes into consideration 
the fact that hedge funds may invest in Emerging Markets. According to the authors, 
that combined model better explained variations of hedge funds over time than other 
studies, especially for Event Driven, U.S Opportunities, Global Macro, Equity non-
hedge and Sector Funds. The performance analysis showed that one quarter of 
individual hedge funds delivered significant positive excess returns. The majority of 
them preferred to invest in smaller stocks and also invest in emerging markets bonds. 
Nine out of twelve strategies offered significantly positive returns. Most Event Driven, 
Market Neutral and US Opportunistic funds prefer stocks with high book-to-market 
ratios.      
To sum up, there are several studies (e.g. Sharpe, 1992; Capocci and Hubner, 2004) that 
examined hedge fund performance under a linear framework. However, linear models 
are more suitable for traditional mixed funds (investing in equity and bonds). Moreover 
they cannot capture the time variation of funds’ exposures. Some of these issues 
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addressed with non-linear factor models that are presented in the following section5. For 




                                                 
5 The return of any portfolio is a linear average of the returns of its assets. However, the definition of a 
(non-) linear model is not an easy task because the term linear can be interpreted into different ways. 
First, it may be the linearity in variables, although if the independent variable appears with a power 2 then 
it can be interpreted as a non-linear function. Second, it may be the linearity in parameters, although it 
may or may not be linear in the independent variable(s), thus being a linear (in the parameters) regression 
model. Third, it may be the case that the linearity between the dependant and independent variables 
changes over time. A model with structural breaks can be regarded (as a whole) as a non-linear model. 
 
 
Table 1 Performance Attribution – Linear Studies 
This Table presents the main characteristics and findings of the linear studies of hedge fund performance attribution. Abbreviations:  CTA: Commodity Trading Advisors, EACM: Evaluation Associates 
Capital Market, HFR: Hedge Fund Research, MAR: Managed Account Reports. Some databases (e.g. Lipper and TASS, MAR and CISDM) have been merged. 
Study Sample Methodology Findings 
Capocci and Hubner (2004) HFR, MAR, 1988-1995 Regression based and 
portfolio construction 
One quarter of individual hedge funds deliver significant positive excess returns. The majority 
of them invest in smaller stocks and emerging market bonds having also exposure to the US 
bond market. Nine out of twelve strategies deliver significant positive returns. Most Event 
Driven, Market Neutral, and US Opportunistic funds prefer stocks with high book-to-market 
ratios 
Scheneeweis and Spurgin (1998) HFR, EACM, MAR, Barclays, 
1990-1995 
Regression based CTA returns are positively related to commodities and currency movements whereas hedge 
fund returns are related to the index returns invested. Hedge funds systematically offer higher 
returns than either mutual funds or CTAs for any given level of risk 




Focus on traditional mixed funds (composed of equities and bonds). Fund returns depend on 
their exposures to the investable assets and their realized returns. Exposures to assets classes 
are a function of the proportion of the investor’s portfolio invested in various funds and 








2.4 Non linear factor models 
Beyond the linear factor models that were used for explaining hedge fund returns during 
the earlier years there is a development toward non-linear models. These try to capture 
exposures and the non-linear payoffs of hedge fund returns in relation to their risk or 
market returns. In general, there are two different approaches: down-up (or indirect) and 
up-down (or direct). The former starts with the underlying assets (e.g. stocks or bonds) 
to find the sources of hedge funds’ returns. It involves replicating hedge fund portfolios 
by trading in the correspondent securities. These trading constructed factors are defined 
as asset-based style (ABS) factors (Fund and Hsieh, 2002a). The latter approach starts 
with identifying the sources of hedge fund returns and relates pre-specified risk factors 
for hedge fund performance attribution. It uses additional factors that better explain 
hedge fund returns. I also present a third approach (an extension of the up-down) that 
deals with methodological issues and tries to identify funds’ structural breaks. For the 
reader’s convenience the studies of the above three approaches are presented in Tables 
2, 3, 4.  
2.4.1 Down-Up approach 
2.4.1.1 Option portfolios and trend followers 
In this sub-section, I begin with Fung and Hsieh (1997) who provided a useful 
characterization of the type of option strategy that one should expect when analysing 
hedge fund returns. Then I proceed with the Fung and Hsieh (2001) study which 
showed how to model hedge funds returns by concentrating on the ‘trend-following’ 
strategy. Examining futures and option futures, they demonstrated empirically that the 
returns of trend-following funds resemble lookback straddle returns6. Fung and Hsieh 
(2002a) extended their 2001 study to construct asset-based style factors. They 
demonstrated a model that could predict the returns behaviour of trend following 
strategies during certain market conditions. Fung and Hsieh (2004) was another 
extension of their previous work in 2001 and 2002a on asset-based style (ABS) factors. 
It proposed a model of hedge funds returns that is comparable to models depending on 
arbitrage pricing theory with dynamic risk coefficients. Huber and Kaiser (2004) 
                                                 
6 A lookback straddle is an option strategy that is a combination of a lookback call plus a lookback put 
(options that are traded in Over-The-Counter markets). The first component grants the holder the right but 
not the obligation to buy an asset at the lowest price identified during the lifetime of the option. The 
second component grants the holder the right but not the obligation to sell an asset at the highest price 
observed during the lifetime of the option. 
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confirmed Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2001) that CTAs have a payoff profile similar to a 
long straddle7. 
The authors Fung and Hsieh (1997) raised the issue of considering hedge funds as 
option portfolios. Their study is an extension of Sharpe’s (1992) style analysis as 
beyond the “location” component or factor of returns (which tell us the asset categories 
or where the manager trades using a static buy and hold policy) they added two other 
components: ‘Trading strategy factors’ (the way the manager trades, denoting the type 
of dynamic strategy) and the ‘leverage factor’ (a scaling factor, the quantity that is 
invested and regarded as a component of the return). In order to quantify their statement 
(modelling hedge funds as option portfolios) and identify the location and trading 
strategy factors, the authors used a relatively simple method that is equivalent to non-
parametric regression. They compared the performance returns of hedge funds strategies 
versus U.S. equities (S&P 500) in five different economic conditions (from worst to 
best). As suspected the short-only strategy had no option-like feature and behaved 
almost exactly the opposite of equities. The CTA strategy had a return profile close to a 
straddle on equities. The global macro strategy performed like a short put on the S&P 
500 and had an approximately linear profile with regard to the USD/JPY exchange rate. 
Finally, the distressed securities and risk arbitrage strategies also behaved like short puts 
on the S&P 500. Ultimately, Fung and Hsieh (1997) provided a convenient 
characterization of the type of option strategy that one should anticipate when dealing 
with funds’ returns, as hedge fund strategies are highly dynamic (e.g. using derivatives, 
short-selling etc.). Moreover, their study showed that there are five dominant strategies8 
in hedge funds having lower correlations with standard asset returns and mutual fund 
returns.  
A few years later, Fung and Hsieh (2001) showed a way to model hedge funds returns 
by concentrating on the well-known ‘trend-following’ strategy. They examined futures 
and option futures from the Futures Industry Institute (FII), The Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME) and Datastream. They used a general methodology for understanding 
hedge fund risk by modelling a specific trading strategy which is widely referred as 
“trend following” within the industry. They demonstrated empirically that the returns of 
trend-following funds resemble lookback straddle returns. They explored hedge funds 
                                                 
7 A long straddle is a combination of a long call and a long put with the same strike price. 
8 These are: Systems/Opportunistic, Global/Macro, Value, Systems/Trend Following, and Distressed. 
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returns through modelling the differences between trend-following and market-timing 
as trading strategies. 
Given the market prices in any specific time period, the optimal pay-out of any trend-
following strategy should be equal to the one that bought at the lowest price and sold at 
the highest price. It was for this reason that Fung and Hsieh (2001) suggested using a 
lookback straddle. Indeed, the lookback straddle is of specific interest due to its close 
connection to the return profiles of trend-following hedge funds. The majority of CTAs 
or managed futures funds are in fact ‘trend-followers’ (or primitive trading strategies). 
The payoff of a perfect market timer who may take long only positions should be very 
similar to the payoff from holding a call option. However, if the flawless market timer 
may take long or short positions, this would correspond to a perfect trend follower who 
could ‘buy low and sell high’. This is equivalent to the payoff of a lookback straddle. 
Therefore, the lookback straddle can be regarded as a primitive trading strategy 
exploited by market timers.  
Fung and Hsieh (2001) showed that a lookback straddle is better fitted to capture the 
principle of trend following strategies than simple standard asset benchmarks. Trend-
following funds have a systematic risk that cannot be captured by linear-factor models 
applied to standard asset benchmarks. Also, trend-followers or portfolios of lookback 
straddles can reduce the volatility of a typical bond and stock portfolio during severe 
market downturns. However, it is important to mention that it is not possible to have a 
unique benchmark that can be used to model the performance of every trend follower. 
That is because there are significant dissimilarities in trading strategies among trend-
following funds. 
Extending their 2001 study, Fung and Hsieh (2002a) used previously-developed models 
to build asset-based style factors. They demonstrated a model that can predict the 
returns behavior of trend following strategies during certain periods and particularly 
during stressful market conditions such as those of September 2001. In this study the 
authors added almost four years of data (1998 to 2001) since their publication of 2001. 
Hence, they provided out-of-sample validation for their finding that trend followers 
have returns characteristics that mimic the payout of a lookback option on traditional 
assets. They showed that it is beneficial to model hedge funds strategies using asset-
based style factors. Hedge fund directional strategies can be modelled with “long only” 
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asset-based style factors and the “directional component” represents more than 50 
percent of the hedge fund return variation.   
Fung and Hsieh’s 2004 study was an extension of their previous 2001 and 2002 papers 
on asset-based style (ABS) factors. It proposed a model of hedge fund returns that is 
comparable to models based on arbitrage pricing theory, with dynamic risk coefficients. 
They examined data from HFR and TASS databases for 1998 to 2002 and identified 
seven ABS factors to create hedge fund benchmarks that capture hedge funds’ common 
risk factors. The seven ABS factors were two equity factors (market and size), two fixed 
income factors (change in bond yield and change in credit spread yield), and three 
trend-following factors (lookback straddles on bonds, commodities, and currencies). 
Using funds of funds as a proxy for hedge fund portfolios these factors were able to 
explain up to 80 percent (as represented by the R-squared and depending on which time 
period they used) of monthly return variations. Regarding the average hedge fund 
portfolio (using as proxy the HFR fund of funds index), they found that it had 
systematic exposures to directional equity and interest rates odds (bets), but they also 
had exposures to long equity and credit events. The authors also used the Kalman 
Filtering technique with a set of exogenous market events (e.g. LTCM, 09/11) for result 
verification. There are more studies that are based on the same initial ABS-creation 
mechanism, describing other strategies. For example, Mitchel and Pulvino (2001), Fund 
and Hsieh (2002a) and Fung and Hsieh (2000c) developed factors for risk arbitrage, 
convergence traders and long-short equity funds, respectively. 
The final paper that it is covered in this section on non-linear models is Huber and 
Kaiser (2004). They supported Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2001) in that, because hedge 
funds trade in a flexible way, their strategies lead to option-like structures that cannot be 
covered by the classic Sharpe model. They explained how these option-like structures 
come about. Thus hedge funds and CTAs using certain trading strategies generate 
returns similar to options. In particular, the structures of CTAs have a payoff profile 
similar to a long straddle. In their research, the authors presented an investigation of the 
risk factors affecting the nine Standard & Poor’s Hedge Fund Indices. Daily data about 
hedge funds indices were available from 1998 to 2003. The highest return was achieved 
by the Equity Long/Short basket (23.6% p.a.) followed by Convertible Arbitrage 
(21.8%) and Managed Futures (19.2%). The poorest performers were Fixed Income 
Arbitrage (3.9%) and Merger Arbitrage (6.9%). The authors used the classical Sharpe 
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model equation using several factors 𝐹𝑘. The empirical section of their study explained 
the risk factors of the Standard & Poor’s Hedge Fund Indices taking the option-like 
futures into account. For instance merger arbitrage had a significant determinant similar 
to a short put on the S&P index, and managed futures, a long straddle on the S&P 500 
index. 
2.4.1.2 Option-Based buy and hold strategies 
This sub-section presents the other line of research originating from Agarwal and Naik 
(2000), who suggested a general asset factor model consisting of excess returns on 
passive option-based strategies and on buy-and-hold strategies. In a later study (2004) 
they focused on the systematic risk exposures of hedge funds practicing buy-and-hold 
and option-based strategies. A more recent discussed study is from Duarte, Longstaff, 
and Yu (2007) that focused on fixed-income strategies showing that “market neutral” 
strategies imposed substantial risk exposures on investors. 
Agarwal and Naik (2000) suggested a general asset factor model consisting of excess 
returns on passive option-based strategies and on buy-and-hold strategies. Despite the 
fact that many hedge funds implement dynamic strategies, they found that a small 
number of simple option writing/buying strategies were sufficient to explain a large part 
of the variation in hedge fund returns over time. Using the Hedge Fund Research 
Database from 1990 to 1998 (hedge fund indices), they evaluated the performance of 
hedge funds that adopted different strategies (especially Event Driven and Relative 
Value Arbitrage) using a general asset class factor model composed of excess return on 
Location (buy-and-hold) and on Trading Strategy (option writing/buying) factors. 
Agarwal and Naik presented four main findings: first their model composed of Trading 
Strategy factors and Location factors was able to interpret a significant amount (up to 
93%) of hedge funds’ returns over time. Second, non-directional strategies displayed 
more significant loadings on Trading Strategy factors whereas directional strategies 
displayed significant loadings on Location factors. They found that in the early 1990s 
38% of hedge funds added significant value (excess return or alpha) compared to 28% 
of hedge funds that added value in the late 1990s. Last but not least, leveraged funds did 
not consistently perform better or worse than funds that did not use leverage.  
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Likewise, in 2004 the same authors examined the systematic risk exposures of hedge 
funds practicing buy-and-hold and option-based strategies. They used data from HFR 
and TASS (hedge fund indices, 1990-2000). They found that a large number of equity-
oriented hedge funds strategies had payoffs similar to a short position in a put option on 
the market index. This was in alignment with findings from other studies such Awargal 
and Naik (2000) and Fund and Hsieh (1997) concerning the payoff style of some hedge 
funds strategies. They found that a short position in a put option on the market index 
brought a significant left-tail risk that was not captured sufficiently in the mean-variance 
framework. Hence, they used a mean-conditional value-at-risk framework and they 
demonstrated the degree to which the mean-variance framework underestimated the tail 
risk, also showing that the last decade is not representative of long term hedge fund 
performance. 
In order to identify the linear and non-linear risks of a wide range of hedge funds 
strategies they used buy-and-hold and option-based risk factors. They followed a three-
step approach: first they considered the loading coefficients (betas) using the returns of 
standard asset classes and options on them as factors. Then they constructed replicating 
portfolios that best explained the in-sample variation in hedge funds returns. Finally 
they examined how well those replicating portfolios caught the out-of sample 
performance of hedge funds. They conducted an analysis not only at the index level, but 
also at the individual hedge fund level. As well as their characterization of a nonlinear 
risk-return relationship between portfolio return and its risk when examining hedge 
funds, Agarwal and Naik (2004) found that hedge funds exhibited significant exposures 
to Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model and Carhart’s (1997) momentum 
factor. 
A more recent study using the ABS approach was from Duarte, Longstaff, and Yu 
(2007) that examined the return and risk characteristics of fixed-income strategies using 
the CSFB/Tremont and HFR databases from 1994-2004. Implementing isotonic 
regression and linear-kernel regressions, they found all five strategies exhibited positive 
excess returns. Some strategies such as yield curve arbitrage, mortgage arbitrage and 
capital structure arbitrage presented significant positive alphas (even after taking fees 
into consideration) as they required the most “intellectual capital” to implement. They 
also found that, with the exception of the volatility arbitrage strategy, the returns had 
positive skewness. Moreover, several so called “market-neutral” arbitrage strategies 
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imposed substantial risk exposures such as equity and bond market factors on investors. 
However, they found little evidence that these strategies exposed investors to substantial 
downside risk.  
All the studies that have been covered in this sub-section have been non-linear models 
that tried to explain hedge funds’ performance as option portfolios. Fung and Hsieh 
(1997) provided a useful characterization of the type of option strategy that one should 
expect when analyzing hedge funds returns. Fung and Hsieh (2001, 2002a) 
demonstrated empirically that returns of trend-following strategies resemble lookback 
straddle returns. The same authors in 2004 presented the seven factor model that was 
able to capture the common risk ABS factors in hedge funds. Huber and Kaiser (2004) 
verified Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2001)’s results. They also showed that hedge funds 
(especially those using a convergence strategy) also have option-like return structures. 
Agarwal and Naik (2000 and 2004) suggested a factor model based on passive option-
based strategies and buy-and-hold strategies to benchmark the performance of hedge 
funds. Their findings were consistent with Fung and Hsieh (1997) concerning the payoff 
style of some hedge fund strategies. Duarte, Longstaff and Yu (2007) found that the so-
called market neutral strategies were not so neutral for investors and some fixed income 
strategies required the most “intellectual capital” to implement. 
Although these studies are important to conceptually explain hedge funds returns using 
non-linear models, there is a weakness as those perspectives may not help investors in a 
practical way to choose and evaluate hedge funds. This is because, first, these exposures 
are not static and change very often (see section 2.4.3) and, second, these factors are not 
for an investor easy to replicate. Moreover, some strategies (such as global macro or 
multi strategy) are not well defined, hence they are difficult to replicate. I discuss this 
issue further in section 2.4.3.  
 
 
Table 2. Performance Attribution – Non-linear Studies 
This Table presents the main characteristics and findings of the nonlinear studies (down-up approach) of hedge fund performance attribution. Abbreviations: CSFB/Tremont: Credit Suisse First Boston, 
CME: Chicago Mercantile Exchange, FII: Futures Industry Institute, HFR: Hedge Fund Research, Lipper/TASS: Tremont Advisory Shareholders Services, PCA: Principal Component Analysis. Some 
databases (e.g. Lipper and TASS, MAR and CISDM) have been merged.   
Study Sample Approach/Methodology Findings 
Agarwal and Naik 
(2000) 
HFR, 1990-1998 Down-Up/Regression based, portfolio 
construction 
Trading strategy and location factors are able to interpret a significant amount (up to 90%) of hedge fund 
returns. Non-directional strategies present more significant loadings on trading strategy factors. 
Directional strategies present significant loadings on location factors. Only 35% of the hedge funds have 
added significant excess returns to investors. Funds that use leverage do not necessarily perform better or 
worse than funds that do not use leverage 




Down -Up/Regression based, portfolio 
construction 
Hedge fund strategies have payoffs similar to a short position in a put option on the market index and 
significant exposures to the size, value, and momentum factors. A short position in a put option on the 
market index delivers a significant left-tailed risk that is not captured sufficiently in the mean variance 
framework. The expected tail losses of mean-variance optimal portfolios can be underestimated and the 
performance during the last decade is not representative of hedge fund long-term performance 
Duarte, Longstaff, 
and Yu (2007) 
CSFB/Tremont, 
HFR, 1994-2004 
Down -Up/Isotonic regression, Linear-
Kernel regression 
In general, fixed income arbitrage strategies deliver positive excess returns which are positively skewed. 
However, they expose investors to substantial levels of market risk. After adjusting for equity and bond 
factors, the Swap spread arbitrage and the Volatility Arbitrage strategies deliver insignificant alphas. In 
contrast, some "intellectual capital" intensive strategies such as Yield curve arbitrage, Mortgage arbitrage 
or Capital structure arbitrage produce significant alphas (even after taking fees into consideration) 




Down -Up/Regression based, portfolio 
construction, PCA 
There are certain types of option strategies corresponding to specific strategies. There are five dominant 
strategies: Systems/Opportunistic, Global/Macro, Value, Systems/Trend Following, and Distressed. 
Beyond the “location” component of return they focus on “how the manager trades” and leverage. 
Dynamic trading strategies can improve the performance of a traditional stock-bond portfolio without 
substantially increasing its risk 





Down -Up/Regression and portfolio 
based 
Trend-following fund returns resemble lookback straddle returns. Trend followers or portfolios of 
lookback straddles can reduce the volatility of a typical bond and stock portfolio during severe market 
conditions. Trend-following funds do have systematic risk, although this risk cannot be observed in the 
context of a linear model applied to standard asset benchmarks. In addition, during stressful market 
conditions trend-following funds can reduce the volatility of a typical stock and bond portfolio 





Down -Up/Regression and portfolio 
based 
Trend followers mimic the pay-out of a lookback option on traditional assets. It is beneficial to use asset-
based style factors for modelling hedge funds. Hedge fund directional strategies can be modelled with 
“long only” asset-based style factors (e.g. conventional indices). The “directional component ” can 
represent more than 50% of the hedge fund return variation 
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Table 2. Performance Attribution – Non-linear Studies (continued) 




Down-Up/Regression based, PCA, and 
Kalman filter 
The proposed model of hedge funds returns is similar to arbitrage pricing theory models with dynamic 
risk coefficients explaining up to 80 % of monthly returns variation. Their seven ABS risk factors are 
found in 37% of HFR hedge funds and 57% of those in the TASS database 
Huber and Kaiser 
(2004) 
S&P Hedge Fund 
Indices, 1998-2003 
Down-Up/Regression based, portfolio 
construction 
Hedge funds and CTAs using certain trading strategies generate returns similar to options. The structures 
of CTAs have a payment profile similar to a long straddle. The Merger arbitrage strategy can be 
determined with a short put option on the S&P 500 index whereas the Managed futures strategy can be 
determined by a long straddle in the S&P 500 index   
 
 
2.4.2 Up-Down approach 
This sub-section deals with up-down approaches that in general use additional factors 
that better explain hedge fund returns and also statistical techniques refining these risk 
factors within the multi-factor models. Later studies use more advanced econometric 
techniques. I begin with two studies of Patton (2009) and Bali, Brown, and Caglayan 
(2012) that have examined hedge funds’ claim of market neutrality. Given the evidence 
that hedge funds contain systematic risk I proceed further to studies that attribute hedge 
fund performance to various risks.   
2.4.2.1 Market neutrality 
An in-depth study of the dependence between hedge fund returns and the S&P 500 
index was carried out by Patton (2009) using the HFR and TASS databases from 1993 
to 2003. He proposed five new neutrality concepts: mean neutrality, variance neutrality, 
value-at-risk neutrality, tail neutrality, and complete neutrality. The neutrality tests 
showed that about one quarter of funds in the market neutral category were significantly 
non-neutral. For other fund styles the proportions of non-neutral funds are from 50% for 
fund of funds to 85% for equity non-hedge. However, market neutral style funds were 
more neutral to market returns than other categories such as equity hedge, non-equity 
hedge, or event driven funds. Overall, even for market neutral funds there was 
significant and positive dependence between hedge fund returns and market returns.  
A closely related study to the above came from Bali, Brown, Caglayan (2012) who 
examined how much the market risk, residual risk and tail risk justified the cross-
sectional dispersion in hedge fund returns, using the Lipper/TASS database from 1994 
to 2010. The authors separated the total risk into systematic and fund-specific or 
residual risk components. Using cross-sectional regressions, univariate and bivariate 
portfolio analysis they found that systematic risk was more powerful than residual risk 
in predicting the cross-sectional variation in hedge funds even after taking into 
consideration various fund characteristics (e.g. fees, size and age). Furthermore, funds 
within the highest systematic risk quintile generated on average 6% higher annual 
returns than funds within the lowest systematic risk quintile. These results remained 
when using risk-adjusted returns as well. In addition the relationship between residual 
risk and future fund returns was insignificant.      
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2.4.2.2 Dealing with systematic risk 
As has been mentioned, given that hedge fund strategies are not as neutral as they claim 
(at least for the so-called market neutral strategies), there are studies that have examined 
the systematic risk that hedge funds impose on investors due to the market and the 
general macroeconomic environment that funds operate within. Ibbotson, Chen and Zhu 
(2011) examined hedge funds’ alphas, betas and costs in a common framework. They 
used the TASS database and the sampling period was from 1995 to 2009. Fees were 
based on median fees - normally a 20 percent incentive fee and 1.5 percent management 
fee. Using regressions against the S&P 500, U.S. intermediate-term government bond 
returns and U.S Treasury bills, they broke down average hedge funds annual returns of 
11.3% into alpha (3.0%), beta (4.7%) and costs (fees, 3.43%). Their results showed that 
alphas were positive even during the financial crisis in 2008. The only exception was in 
1998. A typical fund manager could add value in both bear and bull markets and their 
betas were in general reduced during bear markets. For example, during the technology 
bubble collapse fund managers underweighted equities in their portfolios. 
A comparable study is from Bali, Brown and Caglayan (2011) who examined how 
hedge funds’ exposures to various financial and macroeconomic factors could justify 
the cross-sectional variations in hedge fund returns. They used the Lipper/TASS 
database from 1994 to 2008. Their most important finding was that there is a positive 
relation between hedge fund exposure to default risk premium and hedge fund future 
returns. This could be interpreted as meaning that risk premia on risky assets are 
negatively correlated with present economic activity. For example, investors demand 
higher expected returns in recessions and lower expected returns in booms when 
holding risky assets. In a recession period, the default risk spread is high, so hedge 
funds with higher exposure to the default premium are expected to give higher returns. 
They also found that hedge funds with lower exposure to inflation derived higher 
returns in the future. This has to do with uncertainty. As inflation rises, there is 
uncertainty in the economy (as investors have changing expectations) and they expect to 
observe a decline not only in hedge fund values but also in other financial instruments. 
When inflation is stable and uncertainty is low then investors expect those hedge funds 
and other financial instruments to have attractive returns. Overall, non-directional 
strategies (such as Fixed Income Arbitrage and Convertible Arbitrage) had lower 
variation and spreads in their exposures (beta factors) than directional strategies such as 
Global Macro and Emerging Markets.  
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Extending their 2011 work, Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2014) proposed custom 
measures of macroeconomic risk that could be regarded as measures of economic 
activity, using the Lipper TASS database from 1994 to 2012. The macroeconomic 
variables that the authors used were the default spread, term spread, short-term interest 
rates changes, aggregate dividend yield, equity market index, inflation rate, 
unemployment rate, and the growth rate of real gross domestic product per capital. By 
using cross sectional regressions and portfolio analysis, they showed that uncertainty 
betas can describe a significant proportion of cross section return differences between 
hedge funds (two exceptions were unemployment and short-term interest rate changes). 
More specifically, funds in the highest uncertainty index beta quintile delivered 0.80% 
to 0.90% higher monthly returns and alphas compared to funds in the lowest uncertainty 
index beta quintile. Moreover, the macroeconomic risk was a more powerful 
determinant of hedge fund returns than other commonly used financial risk factors (e.g. 
market returns, size, high minus low and momentum). In addition, through the use of 
principal components analysis, the authors constructed an aggregate or broad index of 
macroeconomic risk where the first principal component explained about 62% of the 
corresponding hedge fund return variance. Moreover, directional strategies had direct 
exposure to the underlying macroeconomic risk factors and non-directional strategies 
did not have significant macro-timing ability.     
Analogous to that study but emphasizing forecasting more was the study by Avramov, 
Barras, and Kosowski (2013). They developed a unified methodological framework to 
assess both in-sample and out-of-sample hedge fund returns predictability based on 
macroeconomic variables, using the Barclayhedge, TASS, HFR, CISDM, and MSCI 
databases from 1994 to 2008. Beginning from in-sample analysis, approximately 63% 
of the sample funds had expected returns that changed according to business conditions. 
They used five macro variables (default spread, dividend yield, VIX index, net 
aggregate flows in the hedge fund industry) and found that returns predictability was 
widespread across different hedge fund strategies, consistent with economic intuition A 
conditional (singe-predictor) strategy that forecast each macro variable (and selecting 
the top decile of funds with the highest return mean) was able to deliver superior 
performance. By diversifying across forecasts, the combination strategy is more 
sufficient when return forecasts are not sufficiently accurate, thus avoiding a poor fund 
selection.      
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Racicot, and Theoret (2016) using strategy indices from the Greenwich Alternative 
Investment database from 1995 to 2012 examined the behaviour of the cross-sectional 
dispersions of hedge funds’ returns, market betas and alphas during times of 
macroeconomic uncertainty. In their model they used the three Fama and French (1993) 
factors and the Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2001, 2004) lookback factors. Macroeconomic 
uncertainty was included by relying on the conditional variances of six macro and 
financial variables (growth on industrial production, interest rate, inflation, market 
return, growth of consumer credit, and the term spread). Using the Kalman filter 
technique they found that hedge fund market beta reduces with macro uncertainty. This 
makes their strategies more homogeneous, resulting in a contribution to the increased 
systematic risk of the financial system. The dispersion of hedge funds returns and 
alphas increases during times of rising macroeconomic uncertainty. 
Relevant to the above study is one from Namvar, Phillips, Pukthuanthong, and Rau 
(2016) who used the CISDM and TASS Lipper databases from 1996 to 2010. Using 
Fung and Hsieh’s (2004) factors in their model with PCA, time-series and panel 
regressions they examined the prevalence and the determinants of the systematic risk 
management (SRM) skill of fund managers and its consequence on funds’ performance 
over time. They used the spread between the AA and BB corporate bond index yield to 
define the strong, medium and weak market state. They found that during weak market 
states skilled fund managers maintain low systematic risk via active adjustments to 
return factor loadings even though they provide low excess return. In strong market 
states, skilled fund managers provide incremental higher alpha than low skill managers 
through superior asset selection ability. More experienced or more educated fund 
managers present higher SRM skill, Moreover, SRM is lower for managers who 
manage fund with distress indicators (e.g. low investor flows or poor performance).    
2.4.2.3 Higher moment risk and refined factors 
This sub-section presents some studies that try to explain hedge fund performance 
attribution based on higher moment risk. For example, Agarwal, Arisoy and Naik 
(2016), using the Eurekahedge, HFR, Lipper TASS and Morningstar databases from 
2006 to 2012 investigated whether uncertainty about volatility of the market portfolio 
could explain the performance of hedge funds, both in the cross-section and over time. 
They measured uncertainty about volatility of the market portfolio using the volatility of 
the aggregate volatility (VOV) of equity market returns. They constructed an investable 
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version of this measure by calculating monthly returns on lookback straddles on the 
VIX index. They found that there was negative relationship between VOV exposures 
and hedge fund risk adjusted returns; however, this was not homogenous across all 
hedge fund strategies. They also found that the VIX negative exposure was a significant 
determinant of hedge funds returns at the general index level, at different strategy 
levels, and at the individual level as well. Strategies with less negative VOV betas 
outperformed strategies with more negative VOV betas during banking crisis period. 
Conversely, strategies with more negative VOV betas delivered superior returns when 
the uncertainty in the market was less. Also funds’ VOV betas had a significant ability 
to predict excess returns one month ahead. 
Related to the above study was one from Hubner, Lambert and Papageorgiou (2015), 
who modelled hedge fund returns on a conditional asset pricing model using the 
information content of market skewness and kurtosis. They used the HFR database from 
1996 to 2009. They described the dynamics of the equity hedge, event-driven, relative 
value and fund of funds styles and in their model considered the location, trading and 
higher-moment factors. Within this framework they investigated the effect of the 
implied moments retrieved from the US equity markets and more specifically from the 
option-implied higher moments. The implied skewness and kurtosis of index portfolios 
increased the model’s explanatory power and reduced the specification error for the 
majority of strategies. Market Neutral, Relative Value and Fund of Funds change their 
market exposure during financial crises. The authors recognized that an extension of 
their framework to other market types and locations would provide extra explanatory 
power to their model.  
There are studies that use high frequency econometrics or refined statistical methods to 
choose the appropriate factors. For instance, Patton and Ramadorai (2013) proposed a 
new performance evaluation method that was based on Ferson and Schadt’s (1996) 
model (a customized conditional model for mutual funds incorporating lagged 
information variables). That model was able to capture higher-frequency variations in 
hedge funds’ exposures. They used the HFR, CISDM, TASS, Morningstar and Barclays 
databases and the sample period was from 1994 to 2009. In their factor model that 
included a simulation process, they used daily hedge fund (index) returns in relation to 
monthly hedge fund (individual) returns. They observed similar parameter estimates 
across the two sampling frequencies. Furthermore, hedge funds exposures varied across 
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and within months. Moreover, they discovered patterns where the exposure variation 
was higher early in the month (immediately after the reporting date) and then got 
progressively lower until the reporting date. In addition, they found changes in portfolio 
allocations (weights) (that ultimately led to exposure changing) rather than changes in 
exposures to different asset classes and also a tendency to cut positions in response to 
significant market events (such as sharp changes in market returns or volatility). The 
authors’ results showed that hedge funds, contrary to mutual funds, responded very 
quickly, were very flexible and adapted to any market triggers. 
Brown (2012) proposed a specific framework for hedge fund return and risk attribution. 
He used the HFN and HFR databases and the sample period was from 1997 to 2010. In 
order to better estimate hedge funds fees, betas and alphas he suggested a framework 
that monthly returns be drawn from the following influences: fees (management and 
incentive fees) and four simple systematic risk factors. Those were volatility, leverage 
and two other more traditional factors such as equities, credit, interest rates, or 
commodities. For most fund strategies, volatility is the most important source of 
systematic risk. Brown applied stepwise regressions to various style or aggregate 
indices because of the need to customize performance benchmarks to different styles. 
He found that many hedge fund styles carried significant exposures to traditional 
systematic risk factors such as equities, interest rates or credit. Due to the fact that 
incentive fees are computed on total returns, there is a potential that abnormal returns 
attributed to those systematic exposures may overwhelm hedge fund alpha. Thus, fund 
managers may get paid for simple passive market exposures. Those problems of 
charging incentive fees on simple market exposures extend to most hedge fund styles 
and therefore constitute a barrier to their efficient usage.  
Lastly, Slavutskaya (2013) improved the out-of-sample accuracy of linear factor models 
by combining cross-sectional and time-series information (panel data methods) for 
groups of hedge funds with similar investment strategies. She used the TASS, HFR, 
CISDM, and Alvest databases from 1994-2009. She suggested that current factor 
models are over-parameterized which results in unstable estimates. The “shrinkage” 
estimate, which is the trade-off between the individual estimates and the common mean 
estimate (the average risk exposure of a particular hedge fund style) provided a more 
accurate estimate. More specifically, she found that the root mean squared monthly 
error in panel data models was 10-15% smaller than in linear regressions, and the rate of 
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decrease was significant. Nevertheless, she pointed out that the use of cross-sectional 
beta estimates assumed that all funds had the same risk exposures for a given time.  
2.4.2.4 Holdings/SEC filings 
A study that focused on the funds’ security holdings and stock-picking was that of 
Chung, Fung, and Patel (2015). They examined whether hedge funds deliver consistent 
superior performance by focusing long-equity holdings. They used four databases: 
GOEF, CRSP, data from French’s website, and that of Orissa Group from 1997 to 2006. 
By focusing on the characteristics of returns associated with long-equity picks of hedge 
funds and other institutional investors, they showed that hedge funds presented stock-
picking superiority on their loading on the market risk factor compared to other 
institutional investors across three different market eras: bubble, deflation, and 
recovery. Moreover, high information acquisition (high churn rate) and active portfolio 
management (high active share) appeared to be necessities for the superior returns of 
hedge funds relative to other institutional investors. 
Related to the above study is the paper by Agarwal, Jiang, Tang and Yang (2013) who 
examined the “confidential holdings” from hedge funds which are amendments to Form 
13F (SEC’s requirement of quarterly holdings report for funds with over $100 million in 
qualifying assets), using the SEC’s EDGAR database (1999-2007). The authors 
incorporated and compared confidential holdings’ performance to original holdings’ 
performance of fund managers’ portfolios providing a clear picture of the stock-picking 
ability of hedge funds. They showed that confidential treatment provides an incentive 
for active portfolio managers and also relieves fund managers from having to reveal 
their private information before reaping the full benefits of their investments. Funds 
managing large risky portfolios with nonconventional strategies (e.g. higher 
idiosyncratic risk) pursue confidentiality frequently and confidential holdings exhibit 
superior performance from 2 to 12 months. Although the conventional 13F databases 
which ignore confidential holdings may be biased, this bias is small when considering 
aggregate institutional holdings in public companies. However this is a significant 
omission when analyzing position changes of individual institutions or in response to 
certain events. 
The above studies using additional factors and statistical techniques examined in detail 
systematic risk and performance, and the way they change according to financial 
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conditions or holdings. However, more work is needed look at the time variation of 
hedge fund performance attribution. This is an issue that can better be captured with the 










Table 3. Performance Attribution – Non-linear Studies 
This Table presents the main characteristics and findings of the nonlinear studies (up-down approach) of hedge fund performance attribution. Abbreviations: CISDM: Centre for International and 
Securities Markets, CRSP: Centre from Research in Security Prices, GOEF: Global Equity Ownership Feed of Thomson Financial, HFN: Evestment Com (database), HFR: Hedge Fund Research, 
Lipper/TASS: Tremont Advisory Shareholders Services, MSCI: Morgan Stanley Capital International, VOV: Volatility of the aggregate volatility. Some databases (e.g. Lipper and TASS, MAR and 




Agarwal, Arisoy, and 
Naik (2016) 
Eurekahedge, HFR, 





Hedge funds have a significant negative VOV (volatility of aggregate volatility) exposure especially during 
financial crises. Funds’ VOV betas have a significant ability to predict excess returns one month ahead. 
Funds with low VOV betas outperform funds with higher VOV betas during the financial crisis period. 
Strategies with more negative VOV betas deliver superior returns when uncertainty in the market is less 
Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, 
and Yang (2013) 
SEC’s EDGCAR 
database, 1999-2007 
Up- Down /Probit-Tobit model, 
logistic regression, portfolio 
construction 
There is evidence of managerial skill in stock picking. Funds running large risky portfolios with 
nonconventional strategies pursue confidentiality frequently and confidential holdings exhibit superior 
performance up to 12 months. Confidential treatment provides an incentive for active portfolio managers, 
whereas it relieves fund managers from having to reveal their private information, not having exploited the 
full benefits yet 
Patton (2009) HFR, TASS, 1993-
2003 
Up- Down /Regression based, 
bootstrap methods 
About one quarter of funds in the market neutral category are significantly non-neutral. For other fund styles 
the proportions of non-neutral funds are from 50% for fund of funds to 85% for equity non-hedge style. 
Market neutral style funds are more neutral to market returns than other categories such as equity hedge, non-
equity hedge, or event driven funds 








Approximately 63% of the sample funds have expected returns that change according to business conditions. 
Out-of-sample, a simple strategy that combines the fund's return forecasts obtained from individual investors 
produces superior performance. A conditional (singe-predictor) strategy that forecasts each macro variable 
(and selecting the top decile of funds with the highest return mean) is able to deliver superior performance. 
Another option is to diversify and use the average forecast from each predictor that avoids a poor fund 
selection when there is no accuracy in the return forecasting 





regressions, quintile portfolios 
There is a positive relationship between default risk premium and hedge fund future return. More specifically, 
funds with higher exposure to the default risk premium in the previous month deliver higher returns in the 
following month. Hedge funds with lower exposure to inflation deliver higher returns in the future. In 
particular, funds with lower exposure to inflation in the previous month deliver higher returns in the 
following month 





regressions, portfolio analysis 
Systematic risk is more powerful than residual risk in predicting the cross-sectional variation in hedge funds 
even after controlling for various fund characteristics (e.g. age, size and fees) and risk factors. Funds within 
the highest systematic risk quintile generate 6% more average annual return compared to funds within the 
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regressions, portfolio analysis, 
PCA 
There is a positive and significant relationship between uncertainty beta and hedge fund returns even when 
taking into consideration fund characteristics and risk factors. Macroeconomic risk is a better determinant of 
hedge fund returns than common financial risk factors. Directional strategies have a high exposure to the 
underlying macroeconomic risk factors. Non-directional funds and mutual funds do not have significant 
macro-timing ability 
Brown (2012) HFN and HFR, 
1997-2010 
Up- Down/Stepwise regressions For most hedge fund strategies, volatility is an important source of systematic risk. Volatility measures based 
on equity market returns are more robust than volatility measures based on commodity market or fixed 
income. Many hedge fund styles carry significant exposures to traditional systematic risk factors such as 
equities, interest rates or credit. There is some evidence that fees may overwhelm hedge fund alpha 






Up- Down/Regression based, 
cross-sectional regressions 
Hedge funds present stock-picking superiority for their loading on the market risk factor compared to other 
institutional investors across three different market eras: bubble, deflation, and recovery. A high churn rate 
and a high active share appear to be necessities for superior hedge fund returns. In addition, hedge funds load 
negatively on an illiquidity factor compared to other institutional investors. The robust superiority of hedge 
funds aligns with the use of active information acquisition (high churn rate) and active portfolio management 
(high active share) 
Hubner, Lambert and 
Papageorgiou (2015) 
HFR, 1996-2009 Up- Down/Higher moment 
regression based 
The implied skewness and kurtosis of index portfolios increase models' explanatory power and reduce the 
specification error for the majority of hedge fund strategies. Market neutral, Relative value, and Fund of 
funds styles change their market exposure during financial crises. If fund managers use the volatility, 
skewness, and kurtosis implied by US options as tools for anticipating market movements then they should 
adjust their market exposure according to these movements 
Ibbotson, Chen and Zhu 
(2011) 
TASS, 1995-2009 Up- Down/Regression based Hedge funds have positive alphas even during the 2008 financial crisis. Their exposures are generally 
reduced during bear markets. During the technology bubble collapse, fund managers on average 




CISDM and TASS 
Lipper, 1996-2010 
Up- Down/PCA, time-series, 
panel regression 
During weak market states skilled fund managers maintain low systematic risk via active adjustments to 
return factor loadings even providing with low excess return. In strong market states, skilled fund managers 
provide incremental higher alpha than low skilled managers through superior asset selection ability. Over a 
two-year period, only 30% of funds remain in the same risk quintile. Systematic risk management skill is 
higher for better educated fund managers and lower for fund managers who manage funds with poor 
performance, low investor flows, and greater performance volatility 






Up- Down/Dynamic high 
frequency econometrics 
Hedge fund risk exposures change across and within months. Exposure variation is higher early in the month 
and then gets progressively lower until the reporting date. There are changes to portfolio allocations and to 
exposures in different asset classes, however changes in portfolio allocations are the main drivers of the 
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Up-Down/Kalman filter, time- 
series and cross-sectional 
regressions 
The macroeconomic uncertainty is relied on conditional variances of six macro and financial variables 
(growth on industrial production, interest rate, inflation, market return, growth of consumer credit, and the 
term spread). Hedge funds’ market beta reduces with macro uncertainty. This makes their strategies more 
homogeneous, resulting in a contribution to increased systematic risk in the financial system.  The dispersion 
of hedge funds returns and alphas increases during times of rising macroeconomic uncertainty   
Slavutskaya (2013) TASS, HFR, 
CISDM, Altvest, 
1994-2009 
Up- Down/Cross-sectional and 
time-series regressions  
By combining cross-sectional and time-series information there is an improvement in the out-of-sample 
accuracy of the linear factor model. The root mean squared prediction error in panel data models is 
significantly smaller (10%-15%) than linear regressions. The “naïve shrinkage” beta estimates correspond to 
weighted averages of individual fund and mean strategy betas 
 
 
2.4.3 Alternative approach  
This section presents studies that have addressed different methodological issues and 
tried to identify structural breaks in hedge fund returns. These studies focus on model 
uncertainty and its different behaviour when describing hedge fund returns. As with the 
up-down approach, these studies also tend to use more advanced econometric 
techniques.   
I begin with Bollen and Whaley (2009) who used the CISDM database from 1994 to 
2005. They ran an optimal change-point regression model that allowed risk exposures to 
change-switch (although they implemented it using just one change-point) and a 
stochastic beta model that used an autoregressive process for risk exposures. In order to 
select the most appropriate subset of available factors they first selected a subset of 
factors that maximized the explanatory power of a constant parametric regression by 
using the Bayesian Information Criterion. The change-point regression model 
performed better overall compared to the stochastic beta model, showing that 
approximately 40% of the hedge funds in their sample presented a significant shift in 
risk exposures. Moreover, for live funds, switches tend to take place early in the fund’s 
life, whereas switcher funds tend to outperform non-switchers funds. Overall, time-
varying risk exposures presented better estimates of funds’ alphas and could make better 
hedge fund returns predictions.     
Giannikis and Vrontos (2011) used the HFR database from 1990 to 2009 to examine the 
nonlinear risk exposures of hedge funds to various risk factors. Their analysis revealed 
that different strategies exhibited non-linear relationships to different risk factors and 
that a threshold regression model incorporating a Bayesian approach improved the 
ability to appraise hedge fund performance. They used the Bayesian approach to 
identify the relevant risk factors (instead of stepwise regression or performing other 
statistical criteria) and at the same time detect possible thresholds in the model. The 
Bayesian methodology solved two problems of the regression models: first, the 
uncertainty of the set of the risk factors and, second, the number and the values of the 
appropriate thresholds. This was a probabilistic approach incorporating prior 
information – inferences appropriate to the underlying datasets. Finally, different hedge 
fund strategies presented different timing abilities.   
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One more recent innovative study was from Jawadi and Khanniche (2012). They used 
the CSFB/Tremont database (hedge fund indices) over the period 1994 to 2009. They 
examined the adjustment dynamics of hedge fund returns and their exposures in a non-
linear framework, and more specifically the smooth transition regression method. They 
found that the dynamics of hedge funds returns realized significant asymmetry and 
nonlinearity in relation to the market return, showing that they changed and differed 
asymmetrically with respect to different financial conditions. Furthermore, hedge funds 
exposures varied over time depending on the strategy and regime. They advocated the 
superiority of nonlinear models to capture the evolution of hedge funds exposures, 
especially during periods of financial crisis.       
In the same year, Billio, Getmansky and Pelizzon (2012) examined hedge funds 
exposures using regime-switching beta models on data from the Credit Suisse/Tremont 
database from 1994-2009 (hedge fund indices). They noticed that hedge funds had non-
linear exposures not only to the equity market risk factor, but also to the liquidity risk 
factor, volatility, credit, term spreads and commodities. Also, hedge funds changed their 
exposures when dealing with up, down, or tranquil regimes. Furthermore, they found 
that the S&P 500, Credit Spread, Small-Large and VIX (measure of volatility in S&P 
500 index options – Chicago Board Options Exchange) were common hedge fund 
factors, especially in a falling market. The estimated exposures were unaffected even 
when authors de-smoothed the returns.  
Related to the above study was one from Akay, Senyuz and Yoldas (2013) who 
examined hedge fund industry contagion and time variation in risk adjusted return 
(alpha), using the Dow Jones Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Indices database from 1994 to 
2010. They used a Markov regime switching model and found three regimes that could 
capture hedge fund returns dynamics: the first was the crash state with large negative 
mean and extreme volatility, the second regime was a low mean and high volatility 
state, and the third regime was a high mean state with minimal volatility. They also 
found evidence for a decline in risk adjusted returns for most investment strategies 
especially after the stock market crash in 2000. Moreover, they found that co-movement 
in hedge funds returns, after counting for common risk factors, was not only restricted 
to times of extreme financial turbulence. Last but not least, they linked the probability 
of observing the crash state to liquidity proxies and panic, measured by the VIX index 
and found that both played a significant role in leading to contagion. 
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A final study is from O’Doherty, Savin, and Tiwari (2015), using the Lipper TASS 
database from 1994 to 2011, implementing a pooled benchmark model by combining 
(with different weights) five linear models: five equity factors, three fixed income and 
commodity factors, three global factors, the five Fung and Hsieh (2001) trend following 
factors, and the four Agarwal and Naik (2004) option-based factors. Their optimal pool 
was based on the score log which was a measure of the conditional performance of a 
factor model, regarding its ability to track the monthly return for a given hedge fund. 
The authors verified that the above factors of the models capture hedge funds’ 
exposures; in addition, their optimal pooled benchmark mitigated the (benchmark) error 
of these factor-based attribution models. Also the model pooling approach had more 
predictive power for failures among the funds in their sample than other performance 
attribution models. 
To sum up, several non-linear studies that follow the down-up approach have examined 
hedge fund performance as a non-linear payoff of hedge fund returns in relation to 
market returns. However this replication is not easily understood or implemented by 
investors. Moreover, there are some hedge fund strategies (such as multi-strategy and 
global macro) that are less well-defined, thus making their return replication through 
security trading a challenge. On the contrary, studies that follow the up-down and 
especially the alternative approach have as a strength higher flexibility in explaining 
hedge fund performance attribution. They supported previous studies that hedge funds 
have nonlinear returns and exposures and they studied how these nonlinear exposures 
change over time, explaining hedge funds’ behaviour. In addition, different strategies 
usually have different exposures although there are a few exposures that are valid for 
nearly every hedge fund strategy (e.g. equity market, volatility). 
 
 
Table 4. Performance Attribution – Non-linear Studies 
This Table presents the main characteristics and findings of the nonlinear studies (alternative approach) of hedge fund performance attribution. Abbreviations: CISDM: Centre for International and 
Securities Markets, CSFB: Credit Suisse First Boston, HFR: Hedge Fund Research, Lipper/TASS: Tremont Advisory Shareholders Services. Some databases (e.g. Lipper and TASS, MAR and CISDM) 
have been merged.   
Study Sample Approach/Methodology Findings 
Akay, Senyuz, and Yoldas 
(2013) 
Dow Jones Credit Suisse Hedge 
Fund Indices, 1994-2010 
Alternative/Markov regime 
switching model 
There are three regimes that describe hedge fund returns. When accounting for common 
risk factors, there is hedge fund return co-movement across different time periods. When 
considering common risk factors, the co-movement in hedge fund returns is not limited to 
periods of extreme financial turmoil. The TED spread (margin requirement on the S&P 
500 contract) and the VIX index play a significant role in leading to contagion in hedge 
fund returns    
Billio, Getmansky and 
Pelizzon (2012) 
CSBF/Tremont, 1994-2009 Alternative/Regime switching 
models 
Beyond market exposure, hedge funds have non-linear exposures to liquidity, volatility, 
credit, term spread, and commodities. Hedge funds change their exposures when dealing 
with different regimes. Hedge fund exposures depend on whether the equity market is in 
the up, down or tranquil regime 
Bollen, and Whaley (2009) CISDM, 1994-2005 Alternative/Optimal change-point 
regression 
Through change-point regression (allowing for a single shift in parameters for each fund), 
there are significant changes in risk factor parameters in about 40% of the sample hedge 
funds. For live funds, switches tend to occur early in the fund's life whereas switcher 
funds tend to outperform non-switcher funds 
Giannikis and Vrontos (2011) HFR, 1990-2009 Alternative/Threshold regression 
with Bayesian approach 
Different hedge fund strategies exhibit non-linear relations to different risk factors. A 
Bayesian approach improves hedge fund performance appraisal. Different hedge fund 
strategies exhibit different timing abilities 
Jawadi and Khanniche (2012) CSFB/Tremont, 1994-2009 Alternative/Smooth transition 
regression 
Hedge funds returns change and differ asymmetrically during different financial 
conditions. Hedge fund exposures vary over time according to strategy and regime. Also, 
the relationship between hedge fund returns and risk factors varies over time and depends 
on regimes (e.g. expansion, crisis) 
O’Doherty, Savin, and Tiwari 
(2015) 
Lipper/TASS, 1994-2011 Alternative/Pooled benchmark 
model approach, portfolio 
construction 
By using the pooled benchmark approach, there is a reduction in the (benchmark) error of 
the factor-based attribution models. The model pooling approach has more predictive 





2.5 Conclusion – First part 
This part has demonstrated how hedge funds returns can be explained using implicit or 
statistical factor models. It has presented a combination of older literature to give a 
historical perspective and recent papers to reveal advances in those topics. This review 
is important because is the first that presents and analyses very recent studies that 
explain a large part of the hedge fund return generating process, showing and discussing 
how the research has evolved.  
Principal Component Analysis and Common Factor Analysis are the two widely-used 
statistical approaches that are used to distinguish the factors underlying hedge fund 
returns and these are presented in detail. Concerning the CFA, which is more common 
in the literature, early studies dealt mostly with linear factor models. Then there was a 
consiserable amount of work done in a movement toward non-linear models that tried to 
explain hedge funds’ performance as option portfolios. Non-linear studies may follow a 
down-up, an up-down, or alternative approach (that is an extension of the up-down 
approach). Recently, there have been several studies using more advanced models 
regarding hedge fund exposures that have contributed a great deal to hedge fund 
knowledge. They confirmed previous studies that hedge funds have nonlinear returns in 
terms of market returns, and they studied how these nonlinear exposures change over 
time according to financial conditions. Different strategies usually have different 
exposures. However there are a few exposures that are valid for nearly every hedge fund 
strategy (e.g. equity market, volatility, liquidity). Macroeconomic risk has a significant 
role in hedge fund performance for nearly all strategies. Moreover, higher moment 
factors can provide extra explanatory power to the models, and hedge fund managers in 
general show superior stock-picking ability than other institutional investors.  
In this review I have presented and analyzed studies that try to explain hedge funds 
returns using implicit statistical factors. It is crucial for an investor or researcher to 
understand how hedge funds exposures change over time, taking into consideration their 
styles as well as the economic environment in which they operate. That environment is 
very dynamic, thus the researcher should incorporate those external variables into her 
model for more robust and reliable results. It is also helpful to understand the evolution 
and advances in hedge fund implicit factors so as to better evaluate hedge funds or at 
least know what to expect from different hedge fund strategies or fund styles. I believe 
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that this study adds value to investors and uncover opportunities for further research, 
presented later.  
A limitation of this study is that I do not consider other aspects of hedge funds, for 
instance, specific characteristics (e.g. fundamental factors such as size, lockup periods 
etc.) that affect fund performance, fund performance persistence9 or qualitative 
performance criteria (e.g. fund investment policies, management experience); this is 
because this study specializes in the return generating mechanism of hedge funds within 
implicit or statistical factor models. Another limitation is that there are differences in 
studies due to industry heterogeneity and authors use different sample periods, datasets, 
and methodologies. However, this is a common issue faced by other authors. Even with 
this limitation, there are some consistent trends and conclusions that can be helpful to 
investors.   
Possible directions for future research include, first, the external macroeconomic 
environment that hedge funds operate and, second, the internal structure of the hedge 
fund industry. Concerning the former, there is a need for a general comprehensive 
framework that includes the impact of economic policies (e.g. monetary and fiscal) on 
hedge funds’ performance or examining the impact of different market conditions in a 
holistic approach not isolating one or two only stressful economic events. However, this 
depends on hedge fund data availability for the earlier years. Concerning the later, there 
is a need to examine the return generating mechanism within the hedge fund market 
microstructure. For example, the way that the working processes in the hedge fund 
industry relate to transaction costs, quotes, volumes, prices and trading behavior needs 
to be considered. Those elements have an impact on hedge fund exposures and returns.  
2.6 Introduction- Second part 
In the hedge fund literature there are many studies dealing with performance 
persistence10 along with other studies that investigate the relationship between fund 
returns and fund specific characteristics such size, age and fees11. Although these 
studies use different databases and time periods, they can nevertheless provide a useful 
guide to investors. Investors expect performance to be stable over time and that some 
                                                 
9 I provide a relevant survey in another paper, Stafylas, Anderson, and Uddin (2016).  
10 For example Ammann, Huber and Schimid (2013) and Hentati-Kaffel and Peretti (2015). 
11 E.g. Frumkin and Vandegrift (2009); Joenvaara, Kosowski and Tolonen (2012); Bae and Yi (2012). 
63 
 
fund managers outperform their peers. Also funds may show an association between 
their returns and characteristics such as size, age, fees or other fundamental factors.  
Until now, there has been no survey summarizing all the results and there is no uniform 
conclusion on these issues, thus creating confusion for investors. Consequently, the 
present study closes an important gap. The aim of this paper, is to survey the literature 
and investigate hedge fund performance in terms of (i) return persistence and (ii) the 
relation of fund returns to fund characteristics (fundamental factors) such as size, age, 
fees and other factors (e.g. lockup and domicile factors as explained in section five). 
This is the first survey and synthesis of older literature to provide a historical 
perspective, together with information from recent innovative studies to delineate 
advances in performance persistence and the attributes of individual hedge funds. The 
findings both assist hedge fund investors and unravel opportunities for further research, 
as I describe later. Despite the difference in studies, there are some consistent trends and 
patterns that reveal useful aspects about hedge fund behaviour in terms of performance 
persistence and the relation between performance and fund characteristics. 
The main conclusions are that early studies (e.g. Agarwal and Naik, 2000a, Bares, 
Gibson and Gyger, 2003) showed that there is short term persistence (less than a year). 
Moreover, there is evidence that some non-directional strategies (e.g. e.g. Convertible 
Arbitrage or Merger Arbitrage strategies) present more persistence than directional 
strategies (e.g. Long Only or Short Bias strategies). The difference in persistence is 
mainly related to the type of strategy each fund follows. However, some later studies 
(e.g. Kosowski, Naik and Teo, 2007; Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov, 2010; 
Amman, Huber and Schmid, 2013) have challenged the above studies and showed that 
there is persistence beyond one year and possibly up to five years. Concerning the 
fundamental factors and fund returns, most studies show that there is a negative 
relationship between fund size and performance. Regarding the age factor there is a 
clear negative relationship between age and performance. There is also a positive 
relationship between incentive fees and fund performance. Funds imposing lockups 
outperform funds that do not impose lockups and on-shore funds outperform off-shore 
registered funds.   
This study makes a number of important contributions to the understanding of the 
literature. First of all, I close a gap by presenting a survey that summarizes all the 
results concerning hedge fund return persistence and the relation between fund 
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characteristics and fund returns. In addition, I present a historical perspective by 
combining older and newer, innovative studies. Thus the reader is able to observe the 
dynamic nature of the literature in explaining fund return persistence and fund returns 
according to the underlying fundamental factors. This study helps investors in their 
asset allocation process as it enables them, firstly, to assign the appropriate weight 
(according to their needs) in fund selection based on their past returns. Secondly, it 
enables them to know what to expect from funds with different characteristics. Last but 
not least, I have identified some gaps for future research such as the absence of a unified 
framework that examines fundamental factors-attributes on hedge fund performance and 
their interactions.         
In this part 2, Section 2.7 provides a necessarily brief overview of the hedge fund 
industry. Section 2.8 describes the different categories of models for hedge fund returns. 
Section 2.9 surveys the literature on hedge funds’ performance persistence and section 
2.10 covers the literature that seeks to explain hedge fund returns using their 
characteristics. In these two parts I review all these issues and then discuss some logical 
observations about the underlying studies. In the final section 2.12 (overall conclusion) 
I present and summarize the key conclusions and reveal some gaps that should be 
covered in future research. 
2.7 The hedge fund industry 
This section briefly introduces the reader to the hedge fund industry, as an extensive 
analysis would be outside the scope of this paper. It first looks at some issues to do with 
the nature of hedge funds and their different characteristics in relation to more 
traditional investments. It then presents the composition and growth of the hedge fund 
industry in terms of assets under management and returns.  
2.7.1 An idiosyncratic industry 
Hedge funds are private in nature and all the characteristics of the hedge fund industry 
derive from this. These investment vehicles are not accessed by the general public and 
are largely unregulated by the SEC. Therefore fund managers are not obliged to disclose 
information to investors and authorities as other conventional investments (e.g. mutual 
funds) are. Consequently, there is no transparency and as far as the compensation 
structure is concerned, hedge funds rely mostly on incentive fees. On average, fund 
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managers receive a one percent annual management fee on AUM (assets under 
management) and 20 percent annually on any profits. Most funds use a bonus incentive 
fee (called the “high-water mark”). 
Fund managers are able to exploit a wide range of “toolkits” such as buying and selling 
using a cash account, buying on margin, short selling and securities lending, leverage 
(borrowing) and derivatives. A cash account is the simplest and most common form of 
transaction because there is no further commitment, as such transactions do not involve 
any loan or require any collateral.  
The hedge fund industry is very competitive and demanding as it focuses on providing 
accredited investors with the best possible performance. There are many categories and 
strategies of hedge funds depending on their investment style/strategy and/or region that 
invest in. Unfortunately, there is no universal classification scheme for hedge funds. In 
the literature there are several classification schemes (e.g. Tran, 2006; Kosowski, Naik 
and Teo, 2007 or Bali, Brown and Caglayan, 2011) or those provided by the various 
private database vendors. A hedge fund may have many structures (e.g. Limited 
Liability Company or Partnership, Onshore or Offshore) and require many service 
providers to operate. 
The hedge fund industry is complex by its nature and investors cannot easily cope with 
this when evaluating hedge funds unless they have specialized knowledge and access to 
specific information. Hedge funds do not provide full information disclosure (not only 
about the fund itself but sometimes about the fund management team, as well) and there 
are many benchmark indices in the market, thus making investors’ decision processes 
even more difficult. However, one aspect that investors try to rely on in their asset 
allocation process is fund performance persistence and the relation between fund returns 
and fund characteristics. Hence, this survey summarizes all the results concerning hedge 
fund return persistence and the relation between fund characteristics and fund returns, 
which should be particularly useful for investors trying to choose between hedge funds.     
2.7.2 Industry growth in assets under management 
The decade to 2015 has seen considerable growth in the hedge fund industry. Except for 
2008 and 2011 all the other years were profitable. As of 2015Q2 total assets under 
management for hedge funds were more than $2.7 trillion. This figure does not include 
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Fund of Funds and Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) that account for 
approximately $500 billion and $330 billion respectively. Figure 1 provides some 
numbers for assets under management (AUM) as of 2015Q2. It can been seen that four 
strategies (Fixed Income, Multi-Strategy, Emerging Markets and Event Driven) account 
for 51 percent of the total AUM. On the contrary, the four least popular strategies 
(Convertible Arbitrage, Merger Arbitrage, Equity Market Neutral and Other) account 
for only seven percent of the total AUM. As it will be shown in section four, some non-
directional strategies (e.g. Convertible Arbitrage, Merger Arbitrage, Relative Value or 
Event Driven) and Emerging Market strategies demonstrate more persistence than 
aggressively directional strategies (e.g. Global Macro, Long Short, Long Only or Short 
Bias strategies).  
  Figure 1. Assets Under Management (USD Billions) 
 
Assets allocated per strategy (source: BarclayHedge, 2015)  
 
Currently the number of hedge funds is more than 10,000 globally. The growth in the 
hedge fund industry is due to the appreciation of assets and new money entering the 
industry. Figure 2 presents the historical growth of the assets for non-directional 
strategies. During the early 2000s there was substantial growth in the industry, reaching 
its peak before the financial crisis in 2008. After the 2008-9 losses the significant 
growth in assets continues.  
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  Figure 2. Hedge Fund Industry AUM – Non Directional Strategies 
 
Non-directional strategies Assets Under Management (source: BarclayHedge, 2015) 
 
Figure 3 presents the historical growth in assets for directional strategies. During the 
early 2000s there was substantial growth in the industry (more than in non-directional 
strategies) that reaching its peak before the financial crisis in 2008. Again, the 2008-9 
losses have largely been made up (or more) by 2015.  
Figure 3. Hedge Fund Industry AUM – Directional Strategies 
 
Directional strategies Assets Under Management (source: BarclayHedge, 2015) 
 
2.7.2.1 Returns 
Figure 4 presents accumulated returns for indicative non-directional strategies. (In 
general, figures in this section provide indicative-only information on the hedge fund 
industry as an extensive representation and analysis would be out of the scope of this 
paper.) From late 1999 to 2015(Q3) the average investor could have earned between 3.1 
and 4.2 times her initial capital. The indices were moving upwards for the whole period 
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except for 2008 (financial crisis) and 2011 (Eurozone crisis). This reduction in returns 
coincides with the reduction in AUM, particular in 2008.  
 
Figure 4. Hedge Fund Industry Returns – Non-Directional Strategies 
 
Strategy Indices, Base=100 (Dec 99) (source: Eurekahedge, 2015) 
 
Finally, Figure 5 presents accumulated returns for indicative directional strategies. From 
late 1999 to 2015(Q3) the average investor could have earned between 3.8 and 4.4 times 
her initial capital. These returns are higher than those of non-directional strategies 
because directional strategies are usually more aggressive, having higher volatility than 
non-directional strategies. As for non-directional strategies, the indices were moving 
upwards for the whole period except for 2008 and 2011. 
Figure 5. Hedge Fund Industry Returns- Directional Strategies 
 
Composite Index, Base=100 (Dec 99) (source: Eurekahedge, 2015) 
 
2.8 Categorising models of hedge fund returns 
This section provides a general overview of the various types of hedge fund models that 
are applied to all hedge funds. Each type of model represents a different approach to 
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measuring the performance of all hedge fund strategies. In general, asset pricing models 
are divided in two main categories (Lhabitant, 2004): (i) absolute pricing models and 
(ii) relative value models. The first category includes fundamental equilibrium models 
and consumption-based models in conjunction with many macro-economic models. All 
the models that I mention in this section refer to the category of relative price models 
which price or evaluate hedge funds relative to market or any other risk factors.  
The reader is reminded that Amenc, Sfeir and Martellini (2003) recorded four categories 
of factor models. These are: (1) Explicit macro factors, (2) Explicit index factor model: 
(3) Explicit micro factor models (I discuss this perspective in this part). (4) Implicit 
factor models through the use of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) or Common 
Factor Analysis (CFA). A similar classification is proposed by Connor (1995) with 
three categories of factor models that are available for examining asset returns. These 
are: Macroeconomic factor models, Fundamental factor models and Statistical factor 
models.  
Regarding the statistical or implicit factor models there are two widely-used 
methodologies that are used to identify the underlying factors: (i) Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) and (ii) Common Factor Analysis. PCA was invented by Pearson 
(1901). The purpose is to justify the return series of observed variables via a smaller 
group of non-observed implicit variables or principal components. The second 
methodology, common factor analysis, is similar to PCA in that it transforms a number 
of correlated variables into a smaller number (dimensionality reduction) of uncorrelated 
variables, that is, factors. However, there is a great difference with PCA. Here, the 
selected factors are observable and clearly decided by a combination of confirmatory 
and/or explanatory analysis. They are not just implied by the data. As with PCA the 
number of factors should be kept as small as feasible in order to have the advantages of 
dimensionality reduction.  
Explicit micro-factor models are selected factors that refer to fund specific features, 
such as size, age, fund manager tenure and performance fees. As I discuss below 
(section five), there are many studies that deal with that issue (for more details on 
category models please see section 2.2). 
70 
 
2.9 Performance persistence 
Performance persistence is one perspective by which an investor evaluates hedge funds. 
Other perspectives include hedge funds biases that are inherent from various databases, 
hedge funds as portfolio diversifiers and hedge funds’ survivability. Other authors have 
tried to explain and evaluate hedge funds using risk-adjusted returns and volatility, and 
also multi-factor models (that they are mentioned earlier) showing their low or negative 
correlation with market indices. This section reviews studies that cover performance 
persistence.       
2.9.1 Evaluating performance persistence 
The term ‘Performance Persistence’ is used to denote how steady hedge funds’ 
performance is. In other words, how constantly hedge funds perform in a positive or 
negative manner. Performance persistence is usually measured in the short term (less 
than or equal to a year) and long term (more than a year).  
There are many studies concerned with hedge fund performance persistence and some 
of them are presented. Most pre-2007 findings argued that there is short term 
performance persistence (from one to three months). At most persistence lasts up to one 
year. However, beyond this there appears to be no persistence. Also some strategies 
appear to be more consistent than others. This is intuitive especially for non-directional 
strategies. However, during the last five years some studies, using more advanced 
econometric methods, have found that there is long term performance persistence. In 
some cases the performance persistence reaches up to five years. Below there is an 
analysis and critique of the relevant studies in detail. They are examined short-term 
persistence in returns, long-term persistence and then how researchers or investors can 




Table 5. Performance Persistence 
This Table presents the main characteristics and results of the studies on hedge fund performance persistence. 
Abbreviations:  CISDM: Centre for International and Securities Markets, GMM: Generalized Method of Moments, 
GR: Generalized Runs Tests, HFR: Hedge Fund Research, Lipper/TASS: Tremont Advisory Shareholders Services, 
MSCI: Morgan Stanley Capital International, SDI: Strategy Distinctiveness Index. Some databases (e.g. Lipper and 
TASS) have been merged.     
Study Sample Methodology Results 
 
 
Agarwal, V. and 
Naik, N. (2000a)  
HFR, 1982-1998 Regression, chi square, cross 





Agarwal, V. and 
Naik, N. (2000b)  




Huber, O. and 
Schmid, M. (2013) 
Lipper/TASS and CISDM, 1994-
2008 
Panel probit regression  Persistence up 
to three years 
Bae. K.H. and Yi, 
J. (2012) 





Gibson, R. and 
Gyger, S. (2003)  
FRM, 1992-2000 Regression, benomial 
representation, comparison of 
rankings 
Persistence up 
to three months 
Brown, S. and 
Goetzmann, W. 
(2003) 
TASS, 1989-1999 Regression Persistence at 
less than a year 
Capocci, D. (2009)  HFR, MAR, TASS, Barclays, 
1995-2002 
Regression, comparison of 
rankings 
Persistence at 
less than a year 
Capocci, D. and 
Hubner, G. (2004) 
HFR and MAR, 1984-2000 Regression, comparison of 
rankings 
Persistence at 
less than a year 
Eling, M. (2009) CISDM, 1996-2005 Regression, chi square, cross 
product ratio, Spearman, 
Kolmogorov Smirnov 
Persistence up 
to six months 
Harri, A. and 
Brorsen, B. (2004) 
LaPorte Asset Allocation, 1977-
1998 
Regression, Spearman Persistence up 
to four months 
Hentaki-Kaffel, R. 
and Peretti, P. 
(2015) 
HFR, 2000-2012 Regression, GR tests Persistence less 
than a year 
Jagannathan, R., 
Malakhov, A. and 
Novikov, D. (2010) 
HFR, 1996-2005 Regression-GMM Persistence over 
three years 
Joenvaara, J., 
Kosowski, R. and 
Tolonen, P. (2012) 
BarclayHedge, EurekaHedge, 
HFR, Morningstar and TASS, 
1994-2011 
Contingency table, regressions, 
comparison of rankings 
Persistence up 
to one year 
Koh, F., Koh, W. 
and Teo, M. (2003) 
Eurekahedge and AsiaHedge, 
1999-2003 





Naik, N. and Teo, 
M. (2007) 
TASS, HFR, CISDM and MSCI, 
1990-2002 




Park, J., Staum, J. 
(1998) 
TASS, 1986-1997 Chi square, Spearman Persistence at 
yearly horizon 
Wang, A. and 
Zheng, L. (2008) 
TASS, 1994-2007 Regression, SDI  Persistence up 





2.9.1.1 Short-Term persistence 
In their early study Park and Staum (1998) examined hedge fund performance 
persistence using the TASS database from 1986 to 1997. They used regressions taking 
into consideration non-adjusted returns for the risk-free rate. More specifically they 
used the ratio α σ⁄  where α is the return in excess of an index benchmark and σ the 
standard deviation of the fund. They found that there is performance persistence for a 
year. That element could give some indication of future performance. However, the 
strength of the persistence seemed to vary substantially from year to year. Similar 
results were also found for CTAs (Commodity Trading Advisors).     
In their research, Agarwal and Naik (2000a) investigated the extent of pre-and post-fee 
hedge funds persistence from 1982 to 1998 using the Hedge Fund Research database. 
They used a multi-period framework and the traditional two-period framework. Within 
the former there is less likelihood that the observed persistence will be by chance. They 
also measured whether the persistence is sensitive due to returns measured over quarters 
(short term) or over years (long term). Finally, they investigated whether fees affect the 
degree of persistence observed among hedge funds.  
Regarding their methodology, they used regression-based (parametric) and table-based 
(non-parametric) methods. In the first approach, they regressed alphas (appraisal ratios) 
during the current period against those of the previous period. A positive slope 
coefficient meant that a hedge fund that performed well in the previous period, 
performed well also in the given period. For the second methodology they constructed a 
contingency table of winners and losers. In this table, a hedge fund was considered a 
winner if the alpha of that fund was higher than the median alpha of all the hedge funds 
that follow a comparable strategy, in that specific period. Otherwise that hedge fund 
was a loser. The techniques were a cross-product ratio/CRP and Chi-square statistic.   
Agarwal and Naik (2000a) found a substantial amount of persistence at the quarterly 
horizon. This characteristic weakened as they moved to yearly returns. Hence, hedge 
fund persistence is mainly short term in nature. The persistence did not appear to be 
related to the type of strategy followed by the hedge fund. The degree of persistence 
realized in a multi-period framework was significantly smaller than that realized based 
on the traditional two-period framework. Moreover, the multi-period framework had 
73 
 
almost no persistence when examined in relation to yearly returns. Short term 
persistence was not affected by the imputation of performance fees. 
In the same year, Agarwal and Naik (2000b) using the HFR database from 1995 to 1998 
examined hedge fund persistence using parametric and non-parametric methods. More 
specifically, they used similar approaches in their (2000a) study such as regression-
based (appraisal ratios) and contingency-table-methods of winners and losers with the 
cross-product-ratio/CPR statistic. They had similar results to their previous study, 
showing that there is persistence mainly at a quarterly horizon in various hedge fund 
strategies: fund losers continue to be losers instead of winners continuing to be winners.   
Similarly, Bares, Gibson and Gyger (2003) examined the performance persistence of 
hedge funds across short and long term investment horizons using the Financial Risk 
Management (FRM) database from 1992 to 2000. They relied on non-parametric tests. 
They regarded a fund as a winner a fund if its performance was above average for a 
given period and the opposite for a loser. They found that the Specialist Credit and 
Relative Value strategies were the most persistent strategies (they contained the highest 
percentage of managers who were consistently outperforming their median peers). This 
is different from Agarwal and Naik (2000a) who found that persistence did not pertain 
to any type of strategy. Nevertheless, that persistence disappeared rapidly as the time 
horizon extended. The authors also analysed the duration of performance persistence. 
They observed significant short term (one to three months) persistence.  
In the same year, an interesting study from Koh, Koh and Teo (2003) examined Asian 
hedge funds regarding their style, fund characteristics and persistence. They used the 
databases of EurekaHedge Advisors Pte Ltd (now Eurekahedge) and HedgeFund 
Intelligence (hereafter AsiaHedge). The data sample was from 1999 to 2003. Using two-
period and multi-period tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic), they found that Asian 
hedge funds’ returns persisted more vigorously at monthly periods to quarterly periods. 
That persistence diminished considerably after lengthening the measurement time 
interval beyond a quarter did not seem to be because of the charging of fees.      
Harri and Brorsen (2004) used data from 1977 to 1998 provided by LaPorte Asset 
Allocation. They examined hedge fund persistence and the relation between fund size 
and performance. They identified seven styles of hedge fund strategy: global, global 
macro, sector, market neutral, short sales, event driven and long only. Also, there were 
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two categories of Fund of Funds (FoF): U.S. and offshore FoF. The authors used three 
alternative methodologies: (i) a regression between current returns and past returns, (ii) 
a style analysis resembling Sharpe (1992) and Fung and Hsieh (1997) and (iii) a sample 
test using Spearman rank correlation. They found an indication of short-term 
performance persistence for almost all styles apart from short sales. However, the 
performance persistence was small. There was a need for a large number of 
observations and rigorous techniques were necessary to detect it despite the fact that 
they used data covered a long period of time and used three alternative methodologies. 
Their results were very similar to those of Agarwal and Naik (2000a) who similarly 
found some performance persistence in hedge funds except from short-sales strategies. 
The styles that showed the largest persistence were market neutral and the two FoF 
styles (U.S and offshore FoFs). Global, global macro and event driven also showed 
some performance persistence. Agarwal and Naik (2000a) also discovered that some 
hedge fund styles exhibited greater performance persistence than others.   
In the same vein, one study considering a long period of hedge funds returns was by 
Capocci and Hubner (2004). They examined hedge fund performance using the HFR 
and MAR databases from 1984 to 2000. They found (using 10 and 14-factor regression 
models) that the top performer funds followed momentum strategies whereas the bottom 
performers followed contrarian strategies (and significantly invested in emerging 
markets bonds, unlike top performers). Also, there was no performance persistence for 
the best and worst performing hedge funds. By contrast, there was performance 
persistence in the middle quintile of funds. In addition, funds that experienced average 
returns often bought high book-to-market stocks. Conversely, those funds that were the 
best and worst performers were in favour of low book-to-market stocks. Concerning 
strategies, they found that two of them systematically out-performed markets: Global 
Macro and Market Neutral, which out-performed the market for 1994 to 2000. 
However, there was a concern about the statistical reliability of return observations for 
the period from 1984 to 1993 due to survivorship and instant history biases (there is 
lack of data for funds that were dissolved prior to 1994 in the databases).   
Extending his previous study (Capocci and Hubner, 2004) and using the same 
methodology but adding two more databases (TASS and Barclays), Capocci (2009) 
considered criteria that enable hedge funds to outperform equities and bond indices over 
bull and bear markets. The period was 1995-2002 (that contained the peak of the 
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NASDAQ composite index). The evaluations used include the returns, the volatility, the 
Sharpe score, the alpha, the beta, the skewness and the kurtosis. He found that hedge 
funds with stable returns and low volatility and/or low exposure to the market were able 
to significantly outperform the market indices in a consistent way under all market 
conditions. 
In the same year, another very important study of performance persistence was from 
Eling (2009). He reviewed a number of studies into hedge funds’ performance 
persistence. Jointly evaluating these results showed him that there was hedge fund 
persistence for short time periods of up to six months. However, the longer the time 
period, the lower the significance of hedge fund performance persistence. Eling 
additionally presented an empirical study of hedge funds’ performance persistence.  
Eling used data from CISDM and six different methodologies (cross-product ratio test 
(CPR), chi-square test (CS), rank information coefficient (RIC), Spearman rank 
correlation (SRC), cross-sectional regression (CSR) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
(KS)). The data sample was from 1996 to 2005.  He considered 18 hedge fund strategy 
groups with six time horizons: monthly, bimonthly, quarterly, half-yearly, yearly and 
two-yearly. He also considered six performance measures (raw returns, Sharpe ratio, 
two versions of alpha and the two associated appraisal ratios).  
Most of the tests showed high levels of persistence for horizons of up to six months. 
The persistence levels weakened slightly as the time horizon was extended beyond six 
months. However it is important to mention that the level of persistence varied widely 
depending on the methodology. Eling confirmed the conclusions of Agarwal and Naik 
(2000a) that the level of performance persistence realized in a multi-period framework 
is substantially smaller than that noticed in a two-period framework.  
Eling found differences in performance for different hedge fund strategies. The 
Convertible Arbitrage and Emerging Markets strategies had very high levels of 
persistence. In contrast, strategies such as Equity Long Only had smaller levels of 
significance. Furthermore, Merger Arbitrage and Sector strategies preserved their high 
levels of significance across time horizons, contrary to all the other strategies where the 
significance level decreased as Eling extended the time horizon. Eling concluded that 
hedge funds’ performance persistence is related to the specific style of fund 
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management (he found that 20% of the cross-sectional variability of funds’ returns can 
be attributed to the style management).  
Concerning the performance measures and their relation with performance persistence, 
Eling found that there are small differences in the levels of significance among these 
different performance measures. The persistence significance levels weakened as he 
extended the horizon. However, the appraisal ratios keep a very stable level of 
significance. It appears that the level of hedge fund performance persistence is not 
associated with the choice of performance measure.    
An important study that first challenged all the above studies is from Kosowski, Naik 
and Teo (2007). They used four databases: TASS, HFR, CISDM and MSCI. The sample 
period was from 1990 to 2002. Exploiting a bootstrap procedure, they found that the 
best hedge fund performance cannot be justified by chance. Furthermore, there is hedge 
fund performance persistence at annual horizons. In addition, using Bayesian measures 
they overcame the negative issue of the short sample period (many of the top funds have 
very short return histories so produced alphas overestimate the performance of top 
funds and underestimate the performance of the bottom funds). Kosowski et al. argued 
that early researchers imprecisely measured performance and relied too much on the 
frequency probability of returns in short periods. That is, they focused too much how 
returns behaved in short time periods.    
The authors took into consideration other explanations of the persistence results 
(persistence in fees or short-term serial correlation in returns), but found evidence of 
inconsistency in these justifications. For example the evidence for persistence is weaker 
for hedge funds with high inflows. Last but not least, hedge fund performance 
persistence is stronger for some hedge funds strategies such as Long/Short Equity, 
Directional Traders, Relative Value and Fund of Funds. 
A recent comprehensive study with similar results to Kosowski et al. (2007) is from 
Joenvaara, Kosowski and Tolonen (2012) that used five databases from 1994 to 2011. 
The databases were BarclayHedge, EurekaHedge, HFR, Morningstar and TASS. They 
considered three periods: quarterly, semi-annual and annual. They found marginally 
significant performance persistence at annual horizons. In detail, small funds showed 
persistence even at an annual horizon, whereas short-term persistence was difficult to 
exploit due to share restrictions (lockup, notice and redemption periods). Larger funds’ 
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persistence is much weaker. They emphasized the effects of database differences and 
biases in hedge funds’ average performance persistence and cross-sectional 
relationships between funds’ characteristics and risk-adjusted returns. They documented 
that hedge fund performance, persistence and cross-sectional differences are sensitive to 
the choice of database. Also, performance persistence is sensitive to share restrictions, 
fund size, rebalancing frequency and weighting schema. 
Hentati-Kaffel and Peretti (2015) used the HFR database from 2000 to 2012 to analyse 
the statistical properties of hedge fund returns in terms of randomness. They used the 
generalized runs test which allows checking for the null of randomness (i.e. no 
persistence), against a broad and undefined alternative including structural breaks or 
first and second-order dependence. They found that less than 50 percent of the sample 
was based on independent, identically distributed random variables but that this 
behaviour depended on the strategy. Under their new framework which deal with 
randomness and the persistence of hedge fund returns, greater persistence allowed some 
strategies (e.g. Relative Value or Event Driven) to be clustered better than other funds 
(e.g. Equity Hedge and Macro Strategies).   
To sum up, the overall view is that short term persistence exists (Agarwal and Naik, 
2000a; Bares et al., 2003) but it seems that non-directional strategies show persistence 
more clearly (Bares et al., 2003; Eling, 2009). More details concerning the nature of this 
short-term persistence are still emerging, for example there is differential persistence 
between different strategies (Harri and Brorsen, 2004; Eling, 2009) and between 
different fund characteristics such as size (Joenvaara, Kosowski and Tolonen, 2012). 
2.9.1.2 Long–Term persistence 
An innovative study came from Wang and Zheng (2008) who first introduced the 
‘Strategy Distinctiveness Index’ (SDI). They examined the TASS database from 1994-
2007 using regression analysis (with the Fung and Hsieh 7-factor model, the Carhart 
model and Fama-MacBeth analysis). The SDI index is a measure of a hedge fund’s 
distinctiveness and is based on historical return data. They found a substantial cross-
sectional variation in SDI and a strong persistence in fund SDI for up to five years. 
Their results also showed that, on average, higher SDI is linked with better 
performance. Furthermore, their results showed that smaller funds, younger funds and 
funds containing higher incentive fees display higher SDI. Ultimately, there is evidence 
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that the SDI index is an indicator of the fund manager’s innovation and could be used 
by investors.   
A recent study that is related closely to the previous study is from Ammann, Huber and 
Schmid (2013). They examined hedge fund performance over time horizons between 6 
to 36 months, using the Lipper/TASS and CISDM databases from 1994 to 2008. They 
used the probit regression method to distinguish the fund characteristics that 
significantly affect hedge funds’ performance persistence. They also used two-way 
sorted portfolios (depending on past performance and fund characteristics). In this 
model the dependent value can only take two values (i.e. persistent or non-persistent HF 
performance) and the purpose is to estimate the probability that an observation with 
particular characteristics (i.e. size, age, leverage) will fall into a specific category. They 
found that there is alpha persistence for up to three years. The persistence in raw returns 
was substantial for two years although statistically significant only over a six-month 
period. Ammann et al. also examined fund characteristics such as: fund size, age, flows, 
the length of the notice and the redemption period, management and intensive fees, 
leverage, a pseudo variable for whether the fund is closed to new investments, and a 
pseudo variable for whether the fund manager is personally invested in the fund. An 
additional variable was used: ‘Strategy Distinctiveness Index’ (SDI). This index was 
first introduced by Wang and Zheng (2008) and measures the extent to which a fund’s 
strategy differentiates from the strategies of peer funds. Ammann et al. showed that all 
these characteristics are significantly associated with performance persistence but the 
SDI index has the ability to systematically enhance performance persistence up to a 
two-year horizon. However, the high score SDI are indications linked with lower 
returns in the crisis of 2008. This means that these funds took larger risks during the 
crisis and delivered lower returns.     
An important study that also challenged the results regarding short term persistence was 
from Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov (2010). They measured performance 
persistence using hedge fund style benchmarks using Getmansky, Lo and Makarov 
(2004) methodology and the HFR database from 1996 to 2005. They developed a 
method for evaluating hedge funds’ performance based on an appropriately-constructed 
peer group, taking into consideration the fact that hedge funds strategies have option-
like features and serial correlation (or autocorrelation) in their returns due to 
investments in illiquid assets. They also took into consideration the backfill bias and 
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illiquid assets (e.g. the chance that a hedge fund may be liquidated or closed and exit the 
data set). Jagannathan et al. found evidence of hedge fund performance persistence over 
a three-year horizon, particularly among the top performing funds. However, they found 
little evidence of persistence among bottom performing funds. Furthermore, they argued 
that the estimation period of performance persistence should be at least three years. This 
is because many hedge funds have issues that are related to illiquidity such as lockup, 
redemption and notice periods.    
An additional perspective on the above studies was given by the pioneering study (in 
terms of using in-out flow restrictions) of Bae and Yi (2012), which used the TASS 
database from 1994 to 2008. Like Ammann et al. (who also examined fund 
characteristics such as size and age) they examined the impact of flow restrictions on 
hedge funds’ performance persistence. They used non-parametric methods (based on a 
contingency table) and parametric methods (based on regression). They found that flow 
restrictions resulted in superior performance persistence in hedge funds. In detail, they 
found that not only money outflow restrictions such as redemption notice period, payout 
period and lock period, but also inflow restrictions such as minimum investment 
amount, close-ended funds (those that do not issue or redeem shares) and closing to 
individual investors were positively associated with winner persistence. However, 
between outflow and inflow restrictions, the first was considered a more important 
factor than the second. Managerial incentives also had a positive relation to winner 
persistence. 
To sum up, the above innovative strategies (in terms of econometric methods) showed 
that there is long-term returns persistence in hedge funds. As for short-term persistence, 
the details depend on individual fund characteristics. More specifically, Wang and 
Zheng (2008) found long term persistence that depends on different fund 
styles/innovation strategies. This is similar to Ammann, Huber and Schmid (2013) who 
also found long term persistence that is affected by strategy/style innovation and fund 
specific characteristics (e.g. size, inflows/outflows and fees). Likewise, Jagannathan, 
Makakhov and Norvikov (2010) found long term persistence especially for top 
performing funds. Bae and Yi (2012) found long term performance persistence for 
funds that impose flow restrictions, with outflows being the more important factor. 
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2.9.1.3 Exploiting performance persistence 
An initial conclusion to draw from the above studies is that the different methodologies 
are one of the major reasons for the different results found in the hedge fund literature. 
Moreover, different databases and different time horizons play an important role. 
Several studies such as Joenvaara, Kosowski and Tolonen (2012) have examined results 
from four or more different databases. Another issue that certainly does not facilitate 
comparisons is the different time periods that various studies examine. Most pre-2007 
findings indicate that there is some persistence but it is mainly in the short run (for 
instance one to three months). Nevertheless, if this length of time is extended then there 
appears to be no persistence. Also, Agarwal and Naik (2000b) suggested that 
performance persistence appears to be driven more by losers continuing to be losers 
rather than winners persisting being winners. This is contrary to Capocci and Hubner 
(2004) that there is performance persistence in the middle quintile funds. Another 
important element is that some strategies appear to be more consistent than others 
(Eling, 2009; Brown and Goetzmann, 2003; Harri and Brorsen, 2004). This is a point 
that is intuitively logical, especially for non-directional strategies. 
However, during the last five years there have been a few innovative studies (Kosowski 
et al., 2007; Jagannathan et al., 2010; Wang and Zheng, 2008) that used more advanced 
econometric methods (e.g. a Bayesian approach or a probit regression approach) and 
converged on the same opinion: there is persistence in hedge fund performance beyond 
one year and possibly up to five years. It is evident that with the use of more advanced 
econometric tools, along with the introduction of other innovative parameters (e.g. 
Strategy Distinctiveness Index - SDI), they were able to produce results that cannot be 
achieved by older methods and definitions. As an example, the Bayesian method is an 
approach to stock (or fund) assessment that facilitates taking fuller account of the 
uncertainties related to models and parameter values. On the contrary, the majority of 
other methods are based on maximum likelihood (or least squares) estimation involving 
fixed values of parameters that may have an important influence in the outcome about 
which there is a considerable uncertainty. One of the major benefits of the Bayesian 
approach is the ability to incorporate prior information (from historical data or expert 
knowledge) about the underlying parameters of the model.   
Furthermore, an important aspect is fund characteristics (e.g. Amman et al., 2010). For 
example, young and emerging funds realized strong performance persistence. Also, 
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funds not open to new investments are more likely to be persistent winners. In addition, 
some strategies such as Emerging Markets, Equity Market Neutral, Event Driven and 
Managed Futures exhibit alpha persistence over a twelve month horizon. In general it is 
intuitive that non-directional strategies have more persistence rather than aggressively 
directional strategies with higher volatility. Also, Bae and Yi (2012) found that flow 
restrictions resulted in superior performance persistence in hedge funds. However 
outflow restrictions were considered a more important factor that the inflow restrictions.    
There are also two important elements that a researcher or a practitioner should 
consider. First, short term performance persistence is affected by the smoothing of 
returns and by liquidity restrictions (e.g. lockups periods) that hedge funds impose on 
investors. The former can distort the results because of returns manipulation by the fund 
manager. The latter has great impact because the fund manager has to re-balance her 
portfolio’s net positions, especially in the case of redemptions. There are many studies 
(e.g. Bollen and Pool, 2006; Eling, 2009) that deal with that issue. These are presented 
in the next section.     
2.9.2 Concerns about performance persistence 
2.9.2.1 Managing prices  
The term smoothing returns mean the mitigation of the unexpected returns (surprise) 
either upwards either downwards. It is exploited (i) either by investing in illiquid assets 
or (ii) by managing prices (returns). Concerning (i), when fund managers invest in 
illiquid assets they subjectively evaluate these assets because there are no objective 
prices in the market. Furthermore when they invest in non-marketable securities in over-
counter-markets (OTC) there is again no objective market price for these securities. So 
in both cases there is either no objective price evaluation, or lagged prices at best. 
Regarding (ii), fund managers are managing prices in a way that is more palatable to 
investors. It is not easy to do that in marketable securities where there is a known 
market price. However, this is possible when there is some flexibility on the valuation 
(exploiting spreads from various brokers) of the asset traded by the funds. Table 6 




Table 6. Performance Smoothing 
This Table presents the main characteristics and results of the studies on performance smoothing. Abbreviations:  
CISDM: Centre for International and Securities Markets, CRSP: Centre for Research in Security prices, HFR: Hedge 
Fund Research, Lipper/TASS: Tremont Advisory Shareholders Services, MSCI: Morgan Stanley Capital 
International.  
 
Smoothing returns might help to explain the short-term persistence of hedge funds. 
These non-synchronous pricing problems, either because of stale or managed prices, are 
an important matter in monthly hedge funds returns that can underestimate hedge funds’ 
risk. Also, they overestimate the delivered alpha within any period (Asness, Krail and 
Liew, 2001). As a result, funds that act in illiquid markets such as Convertible securities 
or mortgage-backed securities show high persistence whereas other more liquid funds 
such as equity markets demonstrate less persistence. Artificial smoothing of hedge fund 
returns can be observed in the form of serial correlation coming from illiquidity 
exposures and smoothed returns (see Getmansky, Lo and Makarov, 2004). Likewise, 
according to Eling (2009) the highest serial correlation (or autocorrelation) is found in 
illiquid markets. These were Convertible Arbitrage, Relative Value Multi Strategy and 
Fixed Income Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and showed high persistence. On the 
other hand the lowest serial correlation is found in liquid markets. These were in Global 
Macro, Equity Long Only and Short Bias and showed low levels of persistence. 
However, Huang, Liechy and Rossi (2009) found that even relatively liquid strategies 
(such as Equity hedge funds) can have smoothed returns causing an upward bias in 
excess performance measures and a downward bias in risk measures.   
Study Sample Methodology Results 
Agarwal, V. Daniel, N. 
and Naik, N. (2011) 




Regression Return manipulation, 
December spike, timing in 
reporting earning and losses  
Bollen, N. and Pool, V. 
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Eling, M. (2009) CISDM, 1996-2005 Regression, descriptive 
comparisons 
Return manipulation, serial 
correlation 
Getmansky, M., Lo, A. 
and Makarov, I. (2004) 
TASS, 1977-2001 Regression Return manipulation, serial 
correlation 
Huang, Liechy and Rossi 
(2009) 
CISDM, 1994-2005 Bayesian approach, 
regression 
Return manipulation, serial 
correlation 
Itzhak, B.D., Franzoni, F., 
Landlier, A. and 








Malkiel, B.G. and Saha, 
A. (2005) 
TASS, 1996-2003 Chi square, comparison 
of rankings 
Return manipulation, 
survivorship and instant 




Eling (2009) explored the four factors that could generate artificial performance 
persistence. These are the use of: first, option-like strategies, second, return smoothing, 
third, survivorship bias and fourth, backfilling or instant history bias. Concerning the 
first factor, he examined 250 hedge funds that were using option-like strategies and 
found that, whatever the time horizon, these strategies had no performance persistence. 
Concerning the second factor (return smoothing) Eling measured the serial correlation 
strategy by strategy and found that it is possible to explain the high levels of short-term 
persistence realized by some strategies (e.g. Convertible Arbitrage).  
Concerning the third and fourth factors (survivorship and instant history biases) he 
found that they can at least partially explain the performance persistence, confirming the 
findings of other authors (such as Malkiel and Saha, 2005) who examined hedge funds 
biases and found that they affect funds’ performance persistence. In detail, the level of 
persistence was slightly higher when only surviving funds were examined. Living funds 
tended to have higher returns and lower standard deviations compared to dead funds. 
On the other hand, dead funds had lower levels of persistence. Even though 
survivorship bias can have an impact on the level of persistence, it is nevertheless not 
able to explain the differences among hedge fund strategies.  
As far as the backfilled bias is concerned, Eling reproduced the investigation for the 
level of hedge funds’ performance persistence after he had dropped the first 24 months 
of returns for each hedge fund from the database. He found a lower level of persistence. 
Thus, it appears that survivorship and backfill bias at least partially explains 
performance persistence.   
2.9.2.2 Other smoothing returns techniques 
This sub-section presents some recent studies about smoothing return techniques that 
can distort performance persistence: conditional correlation and critical reporting dates.   
Illustrating conditional correlation, Bollen and Pool (2006) found that if a fund manager 
distributes true returns but fully reports gains and delays reporting losses, then the 
reported returns will display conditional serial correlation. They also found evidence 
that conditional serial correlation is a prominent indicator of fraud because it indicates 
price management or other illegal activities by fund managers. Hedge funds with 
conditional serial correlation tended to have greater volatility of fund flows resulting in 
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higher risk. In addition, funds which have been investigated for fraud by the SEC 
(Security Exchange Commission) are more likely to display conditional serial 
correlation than other funds. Hence regulators should develop statistical techniques (e.g. 
filters) to focus on hedge funds with an increased risk of fraud. 
An important related study is from Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2011). They used five 
databases: CISDM, HFR, MSCI, TASS (now Lipper) and Eurekahedge with a sample 
period from 1994 to 2006. They found that during December hedge funds returns are 
significantly higher (December spike) than returns during the rest of the year. This 
applied to funds that have high incentive fees and more opportunities to artificially 
increase returns. Thus, hedge funds manage their returns upwards in an opportunistic 
way so as to have higher fees. Furthermore, they found strong evidence that funds 
artificially increase their returns in December by underreporting returns earlier in the 
year. However, there is only weak evidence that hedge funds “borrow” from next year’s 
(January) returns.   
In relation to the above study, Itzhak, Franzoni, Landlier and Moussawi (2013) used the 
TASS hedge fund database from 2000 to 2013, while they used CRSP and Compustat 
for daily stocks returns and stock characteristics. They used also the NYSE TAQ (Trade 
and Quote) intraday trades data to compute the intraday return and volume information. 
They found that hedge fund managers manipulate stock prices during critical reporting 
dates. Stocks in the top quartile of hedge fund holdings showed abnormal returns of 
0.3% on the last day of the quarter and a reversal of 0.25% on the following day. An 
analysis of an intraday volume and order imbalance showed that a significant part of the 
return is earned during the last minute of the trading. 
Having discussing the above smoothing related studies, it is clear that it is very difficult 
to evaluate hedge funds’ performance persistence. Earlier studies showed that the 
persistence is short term in nature but studies using more advanced quantitative 
techniques revealed that there is long term persistence even for five years. However 
there are important issues that have to do with hedge funds’ illiquidity and managing 
returns. There is a need for more advanced techniques to allow the researcher to manage 
these problematic issues. The hedge fund industry evolves very quickly and fund 
managers are able to find ways to maximize their performance in an artificial way, 
especially in the short term, thus increasing apparent persistence.  
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Consequently, the researcher or the investor should use more advanced econometric 
tools using delayed time (lag) variables in order to capture those smoothing techniques. 
Investors should always be sceptical when dealing with hedge funds’ performance 
persistence. The situation would be much better if all hedge funds had independent 
administrators for their NAV (net asset value) calculations and performance reporting. 
However, in order to do this there would need to be increased transparency and a stricter 
regulatory framework for the hedge fund industry.        
2.10 Hedge funds returns and characteristics 
Having discussed performance persistence, I now continue the review of modelling 
hedge funds. As presented in part two of this chapter, there are alternative perspectives 
to explain hedge fund returns. I refer here to the fundamental factor models or explicit 
factor models (size assets under management, age, fees and liquidity/restrictions) that 
are able to explain hedge funds returns using individual hedge funds characteristics. 
Regarding size and performance, the majority of studies conclude that there is a 
negative relationship, i.e. smaller hedge funds perform better. Age and performance 
seems to have a positive relationship, i.e. older funds outperform younger ones. Fees 
and performance also appear to have a positive relationship.  
The next subsections analyse and critique the relevant studies for each characteristic 
(size, age and performance fees). They also briefly cover other micro factors such as 
lockup periods and fund domicile. 
2.10.1 Size 
The term ‘size’ in hedge funds refers to the Assets under Management (AUM). A 
typical categorization is small (less than $100 million), medium (between $100 million 
and $500 million) and large (over $500 million) (Pertrac Corp., 2012).  Many scholars 
deal with the size of the fund and the performance but the findings are contradictory 
with a slight tendency in favour of small size. I discuss this below in detail, with the 




Table 7. Performance and Size Factors 
This Table presents the main characteristics and results of the studies on performance and the size factors. 
Abbreviations: CAPCO: Financial Institution, CISDM: Centre for International and Securities Markets, FAV: 
Favorable Positioning Metric, HFR: Hedge Fund Research, Lipper/TASS: Tremont Advisory Shareholders Services, 
ZCM/MAR: Zurich Capital Markets.  
2.10.1.1 Small hedge funds outperform 
This section present papers demonstrating evidence that there is negative relationship 
between hedge fund performance and size. Performance measurement is mainly on fund 
returns, risk and risk-adjusted returns.  
Schneeweis, Kazemi and Martin (2002) examined the impact of fund specific factors 
such as size, age and performance fees on Value, Growth and Small styles using the 
HFR database (hedge fund indices) from 1996 to 2000. They presented results of fund 
Study Sample Methodology Results 
Agarwal, V., Daniel, N. 
and Naik, N. (2004) 




Small funds outperform 
large funds 
Amenc, N. and 
Martellini, L. (2003)  
CISDM, 1996-2002 Regression, comparison 
of rankings 
Large funds outperform 
small funds 
Ammann, M. and 
Moerth, P. (2005) 
TASS, 1994-2005 Regression, comparison 
of rankings 
Small funds outperform 
large funds 
Getmansky, M. (2012) TASS, 1994-2002 Regression, Monte 
Carlo simulations, 
comparison of rankings 
, FAV 
Large funds outperform 
small funds 
Gregoriou, G. and 
Rouah, F. (2002) 





Harri, A. and Brorsen, 
B. (2004) 
LaPorte Asset Allocation, 
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Regression Small funds outperform 
large funds 
Hedges, J. (2003) CAPCO, 1995-2002 Descriptive comparison 
of rankings 
Small funds outperform 
large funds, but mid-size 
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Joenvaara, J., 
Kosowski, R. and 
Tolonen, P. (2012) 
BarclayHedge, 
EurekaHedge, HFR, 





Small funds outperform 
large funds 
Koh, F. Koh, W. and 





Large funds outperform 
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Meredith, J. (2007) HFR, HedgeFund.net, 
Altvest and Barclays Global 
HedgeSource, 1996-2006  
Comparison of 
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Investment Research, 





Small funds outperform 
large funds 
Schneeweis, T., 
Kazemi, H. and Martin, 
G. (2002)  
HFR, 1996-2000 Regression, comparison 
of rankings 




size compared to fund return, risk and risk adjusted performance. In particular, they 
computed the correlation between fund size and fund return, risk and risk adjusted 
returns. In general, smaller funds out-performed larger funds but had a higher risk.    
There were further interesting details if the data were disaggregated into sub-strategies. 
For example, small risk arbitrage funds had higher returns but lower risk. Those results 
are consistent with smaller asset size funds that benefit the risk arbitrage strategies, 
unlike large size funds that may lack flexibility. This indicates that high returns may not 
always come at the expense of higher risk. 
Two years later, Harri and Brorsen (2004) (see section 2.9.1 for more information) 
found similar results. Their results showed a strong negative correlation between hedge 
fund size and return. This was consistent with the author’s assumption that small hedge 
fund managers benefit from market inefficiencies. The reason for this is that the profit 
to be made from market inefficiencies is relatively fixed; hence allocating more money 
to exploit those inefficiencies causes the returns to decrease. 
Another case in favour of small funds is the research from Agarwal, Daniel and Naik 
(2004) that used one comprehensive database culled from three commercial databases: 
HFR, TASS and ZCM/MAR. The sample period was from 1994 to 2000. They analysed 
how money inflows are affected by future performance and discovered that larger funds 
with greater inflows were linked to lower future performance, a consequence that is 
consistent with decreasing returns to scale.  
Similarly to the above, another important study was from Ammann and Moerth (2005) 
that used data from 1994 to 2005 on the TASS database and examined the influence of 
fund size on returns, Sharpe ratios and alphas generated from a multi-asset class factor 
model. Using cross-sectional regression techniques they showed a negative relationship 
between returns and fund size. However, they found that very small funds underperform 
on average. One possible explanation of this given by the authors is that very small 
hedge funds suffer from higher total expense ratios.  
Ammann and Moerth (2005) also discovered a negative relationship between standard 
deviation and fund sizes. In most cases, larger hedge funds tended to have lower 
volatilities but similar Sharpe ratios. Consequently, very small hedge funds suffered a 
handicap when competing with medium and larger-sized funds. 
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Two years later, Meredith (2007) examined the impact of fund age and size on hedge 
fund performance from 1996 to 2006. He used the Hedge Fund Research, 
HedgeFund.net, Altvest from InvestorForce and Barclays Global HedgeSource 
databases. This study is referenced in detail in section 2.10.2 when discussing hedge 
fund age and performance. Using Monte Carlo simulations, his final conclusion is that if 
investors want to maximise return then they should search for younger and smaller 
funds. If they want to maximise capital preservation they should search for larger, older 
funds.   
Except for academic studies there are also some commercial studies on how these micro 
factors affect hedge fund performance. The Pertrac Corporation (2012) examined the 
impact of size and age on hedge fund performance from 1996 to 2011. They used fifteen 
databases from eight different data providers, a number that it is obviously an advantage 
over other papers. These were: BarclayHedge, Channel Capital Group, Cogent 
Investment Research, Eurekahedge, Hedge Fund Research, Lipper (A Thomson Reuters 
Company), MondoHedge and Morningstar.  
As far the size factor is concerned, the Pertrac Corporation found that the average small 
fund outperformed the average mid-sized and large fund for all years except for 2008, 
2009 and 2011. However the average large fund outperformed the average small and 
medium sized fund in the negative performance years of 2008 and 2011. Also, small 
funds outpaced the mid-size and large funds with regard to the number of months that 
their returns were above 2%.  
Similarly, Joenvaara et al. (2012) in their research (please see section 2.9.1.1 for more 
details) showed that smaller firms and funds outperformed their larger peers.      
2.10.1.2 Large hedge funds outperform 
Amenc and Martellini (2003) examined the alphas of hedge fund managers and their 
risks, taking into consideration different models and examining many funds’ 
characteristics (for instance fund size, age, performance and incentive fee). They used 
the CISDM database from 1996 to 2002.  
Concerning the size factor, the authors investigated the effect of a fund’s size on 
performance. For each fund they calculated the average assets over the time period used 
for that research. Afterwards, they divided the funds into two equally-sized groups. For 
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each class they calculated the average alpha obtained with each method. For all methods 
the mean alpha for large funds significantly exceeded the mean alpha for small funds. 
Furthermore, in most of the methods the difference in mean alpha between large and 
small funds was statistically significant. This demonstrated that, on average, large funds 
do in fact outperform small funds.   
Similarly to the above, Koh, Koh and Teo (2003) examined Asian hedge funds (please 
see section 2.9.1.1. for more information). They argued that there is evidence that there 
are economies of scale in the hedge fund industry. Consequently, funds managed by 
larger holding companies tend to outperform funds managed by smaller ones.  
Getmansky (2012) using the TASS database from 1994 to 2002 and regressing between 
monthly returns on asset size, found a positive but concave relationship between current 
performance and past asset size. In other words, there are decreasing returns to scale. He 
found also that there is an optimal asset size for obtaining best returns. Hence, investors 
should seek to invest in hedge funds that are closest to their optimal size. It is important 
to mention that the asset size / performance relationship exhibits various forms for 
different hedge funds strategies. For example the relationship is curved and the optimal 
size can be obtained for more illiquid strategies such as ‘Emerging markets’ and 
‘Convertible arbitrage’. Those hedge funds strategies realize high market impact and are 
contingent on limited opportunities. On the other hand, Funds of Funds are less affected 
by negative economies of scale than individual funds. 
According to these results Getmansky suggested that fund managers with large assets 
should decide to close the fund to new investors in preference to suffering a decrease in 
returns and an increase in the probabilities of liquidation. As far as an investor is 
concerned, he suggested choosing hedge fund strategies that do not have as asset size 
greater than the optimum. However, in practice it is difficult for investors to calculate 
this optimum, unless they have private information.   
2.10.1.3 No relationship – Other approaches 
Other papers have found no evidence for a size – performance relationship.  
Gregoriou and Rouah (2002) used data from 1994 to 1999 exploiting the Zurich Hedge 
Fund Universe and LaPorte Asset Allocation Systems. They focused on the connection 
between the size of hedge funds and their performance. The size of the hedge fund was 
90 
 
denoted by the total asset amount at the beginning of their calculation period. The 
authors found no evidence of relationship between the size of the hedge fund (or FoF) 
and its performance, either unadjusted or adjusted (Sharpe and Traynor ratios). 
A year later, an interesting study that provided slightly different results to the majority 
of authors was from Hedges (2003). He examined the size versus performance issue 
from 1995 to 2002 using three size-mimicking portfolios of equally weighted monthly 
returns. He classified hedge funds based on assets under management into three 
buckets: small, medium and large. Hedges showed that smaller funds outperformed 
larger funds. However, mid-sized funds performed the worst. This fact suggested the 
notion of ‘mid-life crises’ for hedge fund managers as mid – size firms tend to be 
inefficient in terms of exploiting opportunities and processes to reach optimum 
performance.   
2.10.1.4 Summary 
Several papers deal with the size/performance relationship of hedge funds, but there are 
some contradictory results. Amenc and Martellini (2003) and Koh et al. (2003) found 
that there is a positive correlation. Getmansky (2012) found that there is a positive and 
concave correlation and suggested that there is an optimal asset size. In contrast, 
Gregoriou and Rouah (2002) found no evidence of any relationship either for 
unadjusted or for adjusted returns (Sharpe and Traynor ratios). It is important to 
mention that Gregoriou and Rouah used the AUM at the inception date of each fund, 
and not the average that is most commonly used by the other authors. Agarwal et al. 
(2004) have completely opposite results to those of Koh et al. (2003), although Koh, 
Koh and Teo considered only Asian hedge funds. The former found that there is a 
negative correlation and diseconomies of scale whereas the later found positive 
correlation and economies of scale. The results may well be different because they use 
different time periods, databases and different methodologies. Nevertheless, the 
majority of studies conclude that there is a negative relationship between hedge fund 
size and performance. These results are in alignment with commercial studies (e.g. 
Pertrac Corp.) So it can be summarised that there is some negative correlation between 
size and hedge fund performance. However, for an investor it is one of many factors to 




The term ‘age’ when applied to hedge funds has to do with when the fund was 
launched, or the time that it was introduced in to the database, or (most commonly) the 
time it is considered to have existed for, if backfill or instant history bias are eliminated. 
The majority of scholars come to the conclusion that there is a negative relationship 
between age and performance, i.e. younger hedge funds outperforms older ones. Table 8 
shows the relevant studies on fund age. 
Table 8. Performance and Age Factors 
This Table presents the main characteristics and results of the studies on performance and the age factors. 
Abbreviations:  CISDM: Centre for International and Securities Markets, HFR: Hedge Fund Research, Lipper/TASS: 
Tremont Advisory Shareholders Services. 
 
Howell (2001) emphasized the relationship between hedge fund age and performance. 
His data were from 1994 to 2000 and used the TASS/Tremont database. He defined 
younger hedge funds as those that had a track record of less than three years. Howell 
sorted the funds into deciles in regard to their maturity. On the basis of unadjusted 
returns, the youngest deciles realized 23.2% whereas the median returned 13.4%.  
However the percentage was rather overestimated because it did not take into account a 
potentially higher failure rate. In order to proceed, Howell (2001) adjusted the returns 
by applying the likelihood of failure to report to the surviving funds. He also adjusted 
the returns by applying the likelihood of future survival to the survivor’s returns by age 
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decile. But the adjusted results were similar to the non-adjusted results: the youngest 
decile delivered a return of 21.5% whereas the whole sample median showed a return of 
13.9%.   
It is clear that hedge funds’ performance becomes worse with age, even when the risk of 
failure is taken into consideration. Therefore, the youngest funds appear especially 
attractive.   
Similarly, Amenc and Martellini (2003) (please see section 2.10.1) defined the age as 
the length of time in operation before the beginning of their study. In order to 
investigate the impact of a fund’s age on its performance they divided the funds into 
two categories: (i) newer funds (age of one or two years) and (ii) older funds (age 
greater than two years). For each category, they computed the average alpha using many 
different methods.  
It is noticeable that for all methodologies they used, the mean alpha for newer funds 
exceeded the mean alpha for older funds. The range was from 1.16% to 3.66%. Those 
differences varied in significance across the methodologies. The most significant 
findings were obtained with the CAPM and Explicit Factor models. 
Meredith (2007) (please see section 2.9.1) studied the impact of fund age and size on 
hedge fund performance: whether smaller, younger hedge funds offer higher 
performance than larger, older hedge funds. He studied the performance, volatility and 
risk profiles of different fund groups, using indices compounded from six subsets of 
hedge fund data (small, medium, large, young, mid-age and old) as well as Monte Carlo 
simulations. According to his results, if an investor wishes to maximise returns, she 
should start by aiming for younger and smaller funds. On the other hand, if the investor 
wishes to maximize capital preservation, she should start seeking larger and older hedge 
funds. However, the author suggested that an investor should also take into 
consideration the qualitative aspects of a given fund. It is evident from this study that 
younger and smaller hedge funds have greater prospects for maximising returns but on 
the other hand are more risky. Hence the risk-averse investor should search for hedge 
funds that are less risky and able to preserve capital.  
Two years later, Frumkin and Vandegrift (2009) analysed the effects of beta, fund size 
and age as a consequence of Rule 203 (b) (3)-2. This regulation requires hedge funds to 
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be registered with the SEC, resulting in an increase of the net worth requirement to $1.5 
million for accredited investors who are more educated (or ill-educated but rich) 
providing hedge funds with a more stable asset base. They exploited a fixed-effects 
panel data model to better perceive the effects of regulation across the entire hedge 
funds industry from 2005 to 2007 (over nine quarters) using the Bloomberg database. 
Age had a negative relationship to hedge fund returns. In addition, as a hedge fund’s age 
increases, its managers suffer from style drift, leading to lower returns.  
Pertrac Corporation (2012) classified young funds as those that were less than two years 
old, mid-age those that were between two and four years old and tenured those that were 
older than four years. They found that the average young fund outperformed both the 
average mid-age and tenure funds. In addition to that young funds kept a lower 
volatility profile.    
An exception to the above studies was that of Schneeweis, Kazemi and Martin (2002) 
(please see section 2.10.1) who examined the age / performance relationship using the 
TASS database because of its wide coverage, with much data on ‘dead’ funds and 
comprehensive data coverage from 1991 to 2000. It is intuitive that funds which start in 
different market environments may have very different track records. The authors 
computed the 12-month average information ratio for all funds within a specific style 
that started in the same month. The cyclical variation in information ratios was an 
indication of possible issues in comparing funds that performed under different market 
conditions. When the authors disaggregated data into strategies, they found that some 
strategies (e.g. small risk arbitrage) delivered higher returns and lower risk. To my 
knowledge, this in the only study that takes into consideration the same starting month 
for funds and shows a positive relationship between age and performance but on the 
aggregate level.   
Summarizing the findings, there is a clear negative relationship between hedge fund age 
and performance. However, a question that arises is whether indeed there is any point in 
comparing hedge funds with different lengths of tracks records that started in different 
market environments. This concern is important because the results of these 
comparisons are misleading and are not likely to give a real picture of hedge funds’ 
performance. At least, the evaluator should take into consideration the market 
conditions and make some adjustments to her appraisal regarding hedge funds’ 
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performance. Ultimately, examining the above studies, the general conclusion (negative 
relationship) holds true.  
2.10.3 Performance fees 
It is commonly known that hedge fund managers charge performance and 
administration fees to investors. An administration or management fee is the percentage 
rate of compensation and is very often reported to vendors’ databases for each fund. The 
fee is a fixed percentage (set at the fund’s launch) of the assets under management, is 
calculated monthly and is deducted from the fund’s performance reported to the 
database. The performance fee is a fixed percentage rate on the fund’s profits and is 
payable to the manager, often at the end of each month. Usually performance fees are 
approximately 20% of profits whereas administration fees are 1%-2% of assets under 
management. However the important question that arises is whether there is any 
relationship between performance fees and hedge fund performance. Below, some 
studies are presented that deal that with that issue. It is concluded that a positive 
relationship between incentive fees and fund performance exists and the extra returns 
outweigh the extra costs. This result is rather intuitive and easily explicable as there is 
alignment between fund managers’ interests and investors’ interests. Table 9 lists all the 
studies that research performance fees. 
Table 9. Performance and the Fee Factor 
This Table presents the main characteristics and results of the studies on performance and the fee factor. 
Abbreviations: CISDM: Centre for International and Securities Markets, HFR: Hedge Fund Research, Lipper/TASS: 
Tremont Advisory Shareholders Services, PCA: Principal Component Analysis. 
Study Sample Methodology Results 
Ackermann, C., McEnally, 
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2.10.3.1 Higher fees, higher performance 
Starting the survey, Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) found that incentive 
fees were related to high performance using the MAR and HFR databases from 1988 to 
1995. This was, they claimed, because of incentive alignment between their interests 
and investors interests. However performance fees were not able to explain the 
increased total risk that hedge funds included compared to other ‘traditional’ 
investments.  
Arguing for a positive relationship between fees and performance, Amenc and 
Martellini (2003) examined the impact of fees on hedge fund performance. They 
investigated incentive fees as well as management fees. With respect to incentive fees 
that are expressed as a percentage of profit, they divided the funds into two categories: 
those that had incentive fees greater or equal to 20% and those that charged less than 
20%. For each category they calculated the average alpha (each with many methods).  
For all methodologies the mean alpha for high incentive funds exceeded the mean for 
low incentive funds. The highest different was 7.72% whereas the lowest was 1.44%. 
The significance in the differences was high for all the methods except for the implicit 
factor method, that is, PCA (Principal Component Analysis). The lack of significance in 
the PCA method suggested a possibility that the fund managers of high-incentive funds 
may take some risks that were not captured by the other nine methods/models.  
When the authors looked at management fees they followed a similar approach. They 
divided the funds into two groups: those funds that had administration fees greater or 
equal to 2% and those funds that had administration fees lower than 2%. There was no 
significant difference at the 5% level between funds with higher or lower administration 
fees.  
A few years later, Joenvaara et al. (2012) also found that hedge funds with greater 
managerial incentives produced superior performance. This is in alignment with Bae 
and Yi (2012) who found that management fees and managerial fees such as incentive 
fees or high water mark awards had an influence on winners’ persistence. 
An extension of the above studies is from Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach (2016) who 
examined the direct and indirect incentives of fund managers. More specifically, using 
the TASS database from 1995 to 2010 they examined a positive relationship between 
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hedge fund performance and fund manager’s lifetime income not only directly through 
incentive fees earned at the time of performance but also indirectly through higher 
future fees. These future fees come from the increased flows of new investments to the 
fund and from the increase in the fund’s asset base. They found that the indirect fees are 
notably large for hedge fund managers, accounting for approximately 50% of the 
expected fund manager lifetime income.     
2.10.3.2 No relationship between fees and performance 
Other authors have however found no evidence in favour of performance fees.  
Schneeweis et al. (2002) examined the impact of performance fees (along with other 
fund specific factors mentioned before) for Value, Growth and Small styles using the 
HFR database from 1996 to 2000. Their results showed that fees had little effect on 
performance. For most hedge funds (hedged equity) there was little evidence of the 
impact of performance fees. Similarly, there was a small effect for lockup affecting 
overall performance. What was more important was whether the funds belonged to the 
growth, value, or small firm strategies. Overall, the difference in return (before fees 
were charged) between the value, growth and small fund hedged equity funds with 20% 
incentive and those with less than 20% were tiny. Hence, Schneeweis et al. could make 
no conclusion from these results concerning the effects of fees on performance.  
Another substantial piece of research was by Koh, Koh and Teo (2003), which explored 
Asian hedge funds in terms of return persistence, style and fund characteristics (please 
see section 2.9.9.9 for more details). They also found no evidence to support the idea 
that hedge funds with higher management or performance fees attained higher returns.  
2.10.3.3 Performance fees summary 
Most studies show that there is a positive relationship between performance fees and 
hedge funds’ performance. The exceptions are Koh et al. (2003) and Schneeweis et al. 
(2002) who found that no conclusion could be drawn as to the effects of fees on 
performance. Maybe in some very specific situations such as growth equity hedge funds 
there was a positive relationship but it was small. Ackermann et al. (1999) found a 
positive relationship between incentive fees and performance. Similarly, Amenc and 
Martellini (2003) found a positive relationship between performance fees and hedge 
funds’ performance. However, it is important to mention that they found no significant 
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differences using the PCA method, which means that high-incentive fund managers 
may take some risks that are not captured by the other methods. Concerning 
management fees, they found no significant difference between funds with higher or 
lower administration fees. Later studies such as Joenvaara et al. (2012) and Bae and Yi 
(2012) also found a positive relationship between incentive fees and performance. In 
addition, studies such as Lim et al. (2016) considered the high importance of the 
indirect incentive on hedge funds’ performance.   
It is intuitively correct for an investor to expect that a higher performance fee means 
implicitly that the manager has high abilities (you get what you pay for). On the other 
hand she should know that in other cases these fees are excessive and do not justify 
managers’ skills. Those skills are based on alpha, in other words the excess return due 
to managers’ abilities (e.g. stock picking) and not on premia derived from hedge fund 
exposures (e.g. liquidity, credit risk). In addition to that, high performance fees do not 
guarantee future success (with respect to absolute returns). Last but not least, 
management and incentive fees are very often high thus eroding investors’ capital and 
gains. Ultimately, the rule of ‘you get what you pay for is’ valid in the hedge fund 
industry and the extra costs deserve the extra returns (particularly regarding 
performance fees). Last but not least, investors who care about fund managers’ 
incentives should pay attention not only to their direct incentives but also to their 
indirect incentives. 
2.10.4 Other micro factors      
Several other micro factors (such as lockup or notice redemption period and domicile) 
should be taken into account when someone try to attribute hedge funds returns. Table 
10 shows the two studies that have researched this area.  
Table 10. Performance and Other Micro Factors 
This Table presents the main characteristics and results of the studies on performance and other micro factors. 
Abbreviations: HFR: Hedge Fund Research, Lipper/TASS: Tremont Advisory Shareholders Services. 
Study Sample Methodology Results 
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comparison of 
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BarclayHedge, 
EurekaHedge, HFR, 






Onshore funds outperform 
offshore funds and lockup 
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Lockup periods are important because they impose restrictions to investors. Long 
lockup periods means that fund managers are able to invest in more illiquid assets with 
a liquidity premium that results in higher returns. Aragon (2007) found that funds with 
lockup restrictions outperformed funds with non-lockups restrictions. However, 
Joenvaara et al. (2012) found that hedge funds imposing lockups did not produce 
significantly higher risk-adjusted returns compared to hedge funds with no lockup 
periods. Nevertheless, these two studies are close showing that there is a positive 
relationship between lockup periods. Ultimately, it is important for an investor should 
consider the balance of high lockup periods and liquidity premium that she may receive.  
The domicile effect might indicate a relationship with fund performance. In their study 
Joenvaara et al. (2012) took into consideration the domicile aspect of hedge funds’ 
performance. They found that on-shore hedge funds delivered higher performance than 
that of offshore-registered funds. However, investors invest in onshore or offshore 
hedge funds depending on their tax-exempt status. Certainly, from an economic 
perspective, no tax-exempt investor is willing to pay taxes through investing in an 
onshore hedge fund unless there is a very strong reason.  
2.10.5 Returns and characteristics summary 
Concluding, examining the micro-factors (specific to fund) it is considered that there is 
a negative correlation between size and hedge fund performance. However, an investor 
should not choose the appropriate hedge fund based only on the size factor. Regarding 
the age, it seems that younger hedge funds tend to outperform older hedge funds. 
Nevertheless, different market conditions should be also taken into consideration. 
Concerning performance fees there appears to be a positive relationship but again the 
investor should not rely only on that criterion. Long lockup period funds tend to 
outperform short lockups.   
One important issue is that each fund should have an appropriate track record (at least 
two years) in order to have sufficient data to make calculations and judgments. Many 
private database vendors (such HFR) require at least two years of tracking records so as 
to include them in investable indices (HFRX). Furthermore, it is intuitively valuable to 
have at least two or three years of data in order to apply different econometrics and 
statistical models with reliable results.    
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2.11 Conclusion – Second part 
This review has discussed two important topics that can help explain observed hedge 
fund returns: hedge fund performance persistence in the short and long term, and the 
factors idiosyncratic to individual hedge funds where a significant work has been done 
by many authors. It presented a synthesis of older literature to provide a historical 
perspective together with information from recent papers to illustrate advances in those 
topics. The findings both help hedge funds investors and make clear the opportunities 
for further research. 
Contrary to earlier studies, a few later studies using advanced econometric methods 
showed that hedge funds do have long term performance persistence. However, further 
research is needed to confirm the results of these recent advanced studies. Furthermore, 
there is evidence that some non-directional strategies (e.g. Convertible Arbitrage or 
Merger Arbitrage strategies) demonstrate more persistence than aggressively directional 
strategies (e.g. Long Only strategy or Short Bias). However the difference in persistence 
is mainly related to the type of strategy each fund follows. Another important issue is 
that there is strong evidence that illiquidity and smoothing returns practices are 
widespread. This constitutes an essential element that a researcher that should take into 
consideration when examining short term persistence. Further research is needed to 
examine all these practices and use the appropriate quantitative models to identify and 
handle them. The question arises whether fund managers are able to handle hedge funds 
returns in a ‘sophisticated way’ to make their manipulation invisible to current models 
or techniques (e.g. autocorrelation identification).  
As far the fundamental factors are concerned, they are able to explain a large part of 
hedge fund returns. There is also a relationship between certain hedge funds 
characteristics and performance. In particular, there is a negative correlation between 
size and hedge fund performance. Younger hedge funds tend to outperform older hedge 
funds. Concerning performance fees it appears to be a positive relationship. Long 
lockup period funds tend to outperform short lockups and domicile funds tend to 
outperform offshore.  
In this survey, it is provided a framework to the investor to help her understand and 
evaluate funds with different characteristics. Ultimately, the investor should 
acknowledge all the above things together (e.g. performance persistence and micro-
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factors) and consider the factors that are important to her to get a deeper understanding 
of hedge fund performance attribution. She should get at least two years of track records 
so as to have sufficient basis for her calculations. She can use all the above factors as a 
guide in her investment decision process, knowing what to expect from hedge funds 
with certain micro-characteristics. For even better results, already having the broader 
picture, she should examine her underlying short–listed hedge funds with other 
complementary performance measures such as risk-adjusted returns and exposures. She 
should incorporate my findings in to her due diligence process so as to maximize her 
benefits. All the above results are useful to investors; however, a limitation of this 
survey is that there are differences in studies due to industry heterogeneity and authors 
using different hedge fund databases and time periods. This is a common issue for other 
authors as well, when they compare their results with earlier authors using different 
samples, methods and time periods. As is said in the fund management industry, “Past 
performance is no guide to future performance, but it’s all we’ve got.” Despite this 
limitation, there are some consistent trends and patterns that can reveal useful 
dimensions about hedge fund behaviour.  
Identifying gaps for future research, there is not yet any unified model that is able to 
include all these factors and to quantify how they influence hedge fund performance and 
interact. This could include identifying the proportion of alpha for a given strategy that 
it is generated by each of these factors (e.g. including trading in illiquid securities, 
leverage and lockup periods). The performance persistence should be examined not 
considering one only dimension (such as only hedge fund strategy/style or only to 
specific attributes) but on a unified framework that utilizes all these dimensions together 
exploiting their interactions. Similarly, hedge fund performance (in terms of alphas and 
exposures) should be regarded not only on specific factors or hedging strategies/styles 
separately, but in an integrated framework.  
Even though there are in the future more robust research results regarding performance 
persistence or the explanations of hedge funds returns based on fundamental factors, 
every investor should evaluate hedge fund performance on an individual basis. This is 
simply because what appears to be valid in the past does not guarantee a successful 
decision on an individual hedge fund basis. Beyond quantitative analysis there are many 
important qualitative criteria. For example, an investor should access other resources 
and, where possible, interview fund managers to verify the fund’s risk management 
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practices, investment policies, operational capabilities and management experience. 
Reviewing hedge funds’ financial statements and business procedures and getting them 
certified by a reliable external firm, are pre-requisites for a successful investment 
decision.  
2.12 Overall conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed two topics about hedge fund performance. The first part 
deals with how hedge funds returns can be explained using implicit or statistical factor 
models. The second part deals with hedge fund performance persistence in the short and 
long term, and the factors idiosyncratic to individual hedge funds. I presented a 
synthesis of older literature to provide a historical perspective together with information 
from recent papers to illustrate advances in those topics. The findings form each part 
(please see Conclusion sections) both help hedge funds investors and makes clear the 
opportunities for further research. Some of these opportunities are utilized in the next 
empirical chapters. More specific, there are specific research questions that emerge 
through my literature review.  
The first is “how and what is the impact of the (multiple) business cycles and different 
market conditions on hedge fund strategies in terms of performance?”.  
The second is “how and what is the impact of fundamental factors in hedge fund 
strategy performance within (multiple) business cycles and different market 
conditions?”.  
The third is “what is the impact of multiple business cycles and different market 
conditions on hedge fund performance persistence at strategy level and how investors 
can exploit this?”.  
The fourth is “why there are such large differences between hedge fund indices from 
different vendors, even when they are supposed to represent the same strategy?”.  




3 Chapter: Performance at a strategy level 
This chapter (paper) examines the first research question that deals with the impact of 
the (multiple) business cycles and different market conditions on hedge fund strategies 
in terms of performance (alpha and exposures). This is an empirical chapter and its 
structure has its own introduction, methodology, empirical analysis, and conclusion 
sections (a version of this paper is under review at Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis).     
I investigate US hedge funds’ performance across different economic and market 
conditions for 1990-2014. I use a piece-wise multi-factor parsimonious model with pre-
defined and undefined structural breaks, based on a regime switching process 
conditional on different states of the market. During difficult market conditions the 
majority of hedge fund strategies do not provide significant alphas to investors. At such 
times hedge funds reduce both the number of their exposures to different asset classes 
and their portfolio allocations while some strategies even reverse their exposures. 
Directional strategies share more common exposures under all market conditions 
compared to non-directional strategies. Factors related to commodity asset classes are 
more common during these difficult conditions whereas factors related to equity asset 
classes are most common during good market conditions. Falling stock markets are 
harsher than recessions for hedge funds. 
3.1 Introduction 
The last financial crisis raised doubts about the hedge fund industry which has long 
been considered as being able to produce positive returns irrespective of the market 
conditions (Hentati-Kaffel and de Paretti, 2015). However this cannot be completely 
answered with strong comprehensive evidence as the existing knowledge cannot 
sufficiently explain hedge fund performance under different market conditions 
including any financial crisis. This paper investigates what the impact is of multiple 
business cycles and different market conditions on hedge fund strategies in a holistic 
approach, focusing on the North America region. I use the terms multiple business 
cycles and market conditions so as to examine hedge fund behavior in a more 
comprehensive way and not just isolating one or two economic periods or financial 
crisis events. There is a distinction between business cycles and different market 
conditions so as to shed light on the difference between them in hedge fund strategies, 
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assisting investors in their decision process. By using the piece-wise parsimonius 
model, I focused on hedge funds that invest primarily in the North America region due 
to the use of three full U.S. business cycles. The North American hedge fund industry 
represents more than $1.9 trillion of assets under management corresponding to almost 
72% of worldwide total (Preqin Global Hedge Fund Report, 2014).  
This study’s novelty lies in the use of multiple business cycles/market conditions in a 
holistic approach, in the exploitation of specific commodity factors including a factor 
related to the agriculture/food industry, in the use of a piece-wise parsimonious model 
which accurately captures changes in asset and portfolio allocations for each hedge fund 
strategy within a specific cycle/regime, and finally, the use of a systematic database 
merging and cleaning algorithm that can be used for a benchmark in future studies. The 
most important findings of this study are, first, that during stressful market conditions 
most hedge fund strategies do not provide significant alpha to investors (as during these 
times it is difficult to find opportinities) while fund managers are more concerned with 
minimizing their risk. At such times hedge fund strategies have fewer exposures in 
terms of different asset classes and portfolio allocations, and some strategies even 
reverse their exposures. During good times fund managers exploit the upward market 
movements by increasing their systematic risk but also deliver high alphas as well 
through availing themselves of opportunities. Second, as more directional strategies 
have by nature more systematic risk, they have more common exposures within 
different market conditions compared to less directional strategies. Third, during 
periods of market stress there is some switching of risk loadings from equity factors 
towards commodity related factors. Fourth, market volatility appears to affect hedge 
fund performance more than business cycle volatility.       
Early studies (such as Sharpe, 1992) explained hedge funds in a linear framework. 
However there was soon a development toward non-linear models that explained the 
non-linear payoffs of hedge fund returns following the down-up approach. This 
approach begins with the underlying assets to find the sources of hedge fund returns and 
involves hedge fund replication portfolios by trading in the corresponding securities. 
These trading constructed factors are specified as asset-based style (ABS) factors (Fund 
and Hsieh, 2002a). I discern studies that explained hedge funds through option 
portfolios and trend followers (Fung and Hsieh 2001, 2002a, 2004) and option-based 
buy and hold strategies (Agarwal and Naik, 2000, 2004) or studies that showed that the 
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so-called market neutral strategies are not so neutral for investors (Duarte, Longstaff, 
and Yu, 2007). Although important, these studies do not significantly help investors to 
choose and evaluate hedge funds for three reasons. First, these exposures are not static 
and change over time (as I show later). Second, the factors are not easy for investors to 
replicate (e.g. lookback straddles12). Third, some strategies (e.g. global macro or multi-
strategy) are not well defined, and thus are difficult to replicate.  
Another approach begins with identifying the sources of hedge fund returns and relates 
pre-specified risk factors for hedge fund performance attribution, and consists of two 
streams: the first uses additional refined factors that better explain hedge fund returns 
whereas the second stream, which can be regarded as an extension of the first, deals 
with methodological issues and funds’ structural breaks. Although both streams use 
more advanced econometric techniques (e.g. regime-switching models) and confirmed 
previous studies that hedge funds have nonlinear returns and exposures, there remain 
significant gaps in many of the non-linear models mentioned above which I address in 
this paper. In particular, these non-linear models do not sufficiently describe the 
changing exposures across different business cycles and market conditions (many of 
them just use specific macro variables or isolate a specific crisis/event). Moreover a 
single model is not sufficient to describe all hedge fund strategies or conditions because 
it is over-simplistic. The single general commodity factor used to date is very broad, 
and (as it is showed later) hedge fund managers following many strategies switch from 
equities into commodities during hard times. Using a piece-wise parsimonius model 
with structural breaks, I show that hedge funds do not offer significant alpha during 
difficult times despite switching their holdings, as their primary concern is to minimize 
their risk exposures. The opposite holds for “good” times. Moreover, fund managers 
and investors have more to fear from falling markets than from economic recessions. 
These results, which are based on the longest period to date, will be valuable both to 
investors wanting to more accurately model hedge fund returns as economic conditions 
change, and to hedge fund principals who want to more accurately reward good 
investment performance.   
In the first stream of the up-down approach, distinguished studies are from Bali, Brown 
and Caglayan (2011, 2014) and Avramov, Barras, and Kosowski (2013). Bali et al. 
                                                 
12 A lookback straddle is a combination of a lookback call plus a lookback put. Both options are traded in 
Over-The-Counter markets. These respectively grant the holder the right but not the obligation to buy 
(sell) an asset at the lowest (highest) price identified during the lifetime of the option. 
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(2011) found that there is a positive correlation between hedge fund exposure to default 
risk premium and hedge fund returns, meaning that risk premia on risky assets are 
negatively correlated with present economic activity. Moreover, hedge funds with lower 
exposure to inflation derive higher returns in the future. Extending their previous work 
of 2011, Bali et al. (2014) found that macroeconomic risk factors such as default spread, 
term spread, short-term interest rates changes, aggregate dividend yield, equity market 
index, inflation rate, unemployment rate, and the growth rate of real gross domestic 
product per capital, are more powerful determinant on hedge fund returns compared to 
other common risk factors such as market, momentum, high minus low, especially for 
directional strategies. Similarly, Avramov et al. (2013), although focusing more on 
forecasting, showed that macro variables such as default spread, dividend yield, VIX 
index, and net flows in the hedge fund industry can assist in fund return predictability. 
Ibbotson, Chen, and Zhu (2011) examined hedge fund alphas, exposures and cost in a 
common framework. Their results showed that the average fund could add value both in 
bull and bear markets and their exposures were, in general, reduced during bear 
markets. Similarly Brown (2012) suggested a framework where hedge fund returns 
could be explained by their fees and systematic risk factors such as volatility, leverage, 
equity, credit, interest rates and commodities. He found that many hedge fund styles 
present significant exposures to traditional systematic risk factors such as equities, 
interest rates or credit. He observed (as I do) that exotic factors such as lookback 
straddles are not easy to replicate in practice or easily perceived by the average investor. 
Finally, Patton and Ramadorai (2013) discovered patterns where the exposure variation 
was higher early in the month and then got progressively lower until the reporting date. 
Concerning the second stream of the up-down approach, which identifies structural 
breaks in hedge funds through the use of advance econometric methods (e.g. optimal 
change-point regression, regime-switching beta models, pooled benchmark models and 
the Bayesian approach) tremendous work has been done. An important study is that of 
Bollen and Whaley (2009). They showed that risk factors change over time and funds 
that switch their exposures over time outperform their peers. Their model examined just 
one change-point of hedge fund exposures, in a probabilistic manner. Another 
interesting study is from Billio, Getmansky and Pelizzon (2012), who found that hedge 
funds have non-linear exposures beyond the market factor, such as liquidity, volatility, 
credit, term spreads and commodities. Moreover, during the down regimes, market, 
credit spread and the spread between small and large cap stock returns are the most 
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common hedge fund factors. Similarly, Jawadi and Khanniche (2012) showed that 
hedge fund returns are dynamic, realizing significant asymmetry and nonlinearity in 
accordance with different market conditions. At the same time, hedge fund exposures 
change over time depending on the strategy and the regime. Giannikis and Vrontos 
(2011), in accordance with the above studies, showed that different strategies present 
non-linear relationships to different risk factors. Meligkotsidou and Vrontos (2014) 
found that the market equity factor and the spread between small and large cap stock 
returns were the most significant factors. O’Doherty, Savin, and Tiwari (2015) 
confirmed that a selection of specific factors (e.g. equity, global and fixed income 
factors) is able to model hedge funds return with a lower error. Finally, Racicot and 
Theoret (2016) showed that macroeconomic uncertainty represented by the conditional 
variances of six macro and financial variables (growth on industrial production, interest 
rate, inflation, market return, growth of consumer credit, and the term spread) reduces 
hedge funds’ market beta and increases the dispersion of hedge funds’ returns and 
alphas.    
Although there are studies that examine funds’ variability over time, there is a need to 
examine hedge fund strategy behaviour in a more comprehensive way. More 
specifically, the direct impact of different business cycles and market conditions on 
hedge fund behaviour needs to be examined in a holistic approach. The current 
knowledge is fragmented (e.g. focusing on only one crisis or economic event). Also 
within current models there is no direct link between fund performance and market 
conditions, as some studies (e.g. Bollen and Whaley, 2009; Jawadi and Khanniche, 
2012) focus on the internal change of funds’ exposures, and the macro variables used by 
other authors (e.g. Avramov et al., 2013, Bali et al., 2014, and Racicot and Theoret, 
2016) do not necessarily represent the different states of the economy. According to the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), a recession has as an attribute a 
significant decline in the economic activity lasting more than few months usually 
visible in the real GDP, industrial production, employment, real income, and wholesale-
retail sales. Moreover, the single models used to describe all hedge fund strategies or 
conditions are over-simplistic and do not efficiently capture the exposures and excess 
returns delivered to investors.  
This study uses multiple business cycles/regimes (not isolating one crisis/event) to 
examine the direct link between market conditions and hedge funds. The proposed 
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modelling approach differs from the studies cited here, as it uses a parsimonious model 
that is flexible enough to accurately identify for each strategy changes in asset and 
portfolio allocations, within each of the underlying market conditions. In addition, it 
covers hedge funds that are directly affected by these cycles/conditions. This study 
closes an important gap and since there is a need to focus on one region as different 
regions of the world have different business cycles, I choose the most important 
economically: North America. This study covers three full U.S. business cycles, 
focusing in funds that invest primarily in the North America region. Because I examine 
hedge funds that focus the North American region the underlying changing economic 
conditions have a direct impact on these hedge funds. Hedge funds that invest only in 
the emerging markets do not have a direct exposure to these economic conditions.  
Another important gap is the lack of an investigation of hedge fund behaviour within 
different business cycles and market conditions together (within a holistic approach) as 
these two different states do not necessarily coincide and they have different 
implications for hedge funds, causing confusion to investors. Thus, for the first time, 
there is a comparison of hedge funds’ behavior under these two states that present 
different attributes (as shown later). Furthermore, instead of using one general 
commodity factor, I use specific ones (agriculture/food, energy, industrial and precious 
metals) for more accurate results. For the first time it is used a commodity factor related 
to the agricultural/food industry that caters specifically for hedge funds that invest in 
this “traditional” sector. 
There are some important findings that contribute to the literature beyond those that 
agree with the authors discussed above, in terms of the dynamic nature of hedge funds 
(e.g. Bali, Brown and Caglayan, 2011, Jawadi, Khanniche, 2012 and Giannikis and 
Vrontos, 2011), common risk factors among strategies (e.g. Billio, Getmansky and 
Pelizzon, 2012) the changes in asset classes and portfolio allocations (e.g. Patton and 
Ramadorai, 2013) or high significance of specific factors (e.g. Meligkotsidou and 
Vrontos, 2014). First, during stressful market conditions the majority of hedge fund 
strategies do not provide significant alphas to investors and fund managers concern 
about minimizing their risk. Hedge fund strategies during these conditions have fewer 
exposures in terms of different asset classes and portfolio allocations (e.g. equity 
classes) and some strategies (e.g. Long Short and Market Neutral strategies) even 
reverse their exposures. Second, more directional strategies have, on average, more 
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common exposures within different market conditions compared to less directional 
strategies that by nature have more systematic risk. Third, factors related to commodity 
asset classes (e.g. agriculture, energy, and industrial metals factors) are more common 
(in addition to the market factor) during these stressful conditions whereas factors 
related to equity asset classes (e.g. market, momentum, small minus big, high minus 
low factors) are most common during “good” market conditions. Fourth, down regimes 
are harsher than recessions for hedge funds (in terms of alpha and number of 
exposures). The findings are robust even when the pre 199413 period is excluded from 
the analysis. 
The contribution of this study further lies in the fact that it provides the first 
examination of hedge funds within multiple U.S. business cycles and different 
(up/down) market conditions, using a holistic approach, to get a more comprehensive 
explanation of hedge fund performance. In addition, unlike previous studies, I do not 
use only one general commodity factor but many specific ones. This is important 
because commodities cannot be considered to behave in the same way in the market, as 
suggested by Bhardwaj and Dunsby (2014). In particular I use a commodity factor 
related to the agriculture/food industry. This study uses a custom-made multi-factor 
model that can accurately identify changes in asset and portfolio allocations for each 
strategy within different conditions, thus helping investors in their decision process as it 
enables them to know what to expect from different strategies, especially during 
multiple stressful financial conditions. Moreover, I perform a systematic database 
merging and cleaning approach that can be used as a benchmark for future studies since 
this is not a trivial process that can be followed easily. Finally, fund administrators can 
benefit by applying more flexible fee policies that more accurate reflect fund managers’ 
performance under changing market conditions.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section is the theoretical 
framework that provides the methodologies that used in the analysis. After that is the 
empirical analysis section presenting the data and discussing the results. The final 
section is the conclusion providing a summary of the discussion findings. Several 
appendices detail the data cleaning rules and give full model results, but due to space 
limitations these are available in the appendix. 
                                                 
13 As I mention in more detail in section 3.2.2, I excluded pre-1994 data. The majority of studies use post-
1994 data due to the limited data availability from most private hedge fund database vendors, as well as 




3.2.1 Theoretical framework 
Linear factor models such as the CAPM model (Sharpe, 1964) and its extensions are 
represented by the APT model (Ross, 1976) are the foundation of most of the theoretical 
and empirical asset pricing literature. Within the linear multi factor model the rates of 
returns of funds are dependent via a linear relationship on several variables, that is, 
factors: 
𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,1𝐹1 + 𝛽𝑖,2𝐹2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖                               (1)
       
or equivalently: 
𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗𝐹𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑘
𝑗=1                                  (2)
         
Where 𝑅𝑖 denotes the return on the ith fund (or strategy), K>0 is the number of factors, 
𝐹1, … , 𝐹𝐾 are the values of the factors, 𝛽𝑖,1, … . , 𝛽𝑖,𝐾 are the relevant sensitivities and 𝜀𝑖 is 
a zero mean random variable.  
However, this theory constrains the factors to be linearly related to the fund (or security) 
returns. It cannot price funds where the payoffs are non-linearly related to risk factors, 
as in the case of hedge fund returns that characterized by the implementation of 
dynamic strategies. For this reason and in the spirit of other authors such as Fung and 
Hsieh (1997) and Agarwal and Naik (2004) I examine the hedge funds so as to capture 
dynamic strategies but in a different way. I propose a twin piece-wise parsimonious 
model14 containing structural breaks so as to capture hedge funds’ non-linearity. The 
                                                 
14 In my analysis I move one step further towards other authors (mentioned in this section) by 
implementing the stepwise regression technique at a regime/cycle level (this represents the “agile” term) 
for more accurate results. The term“twin” refers to the fact that I examine different business cycles and 
different market conditions as they do not necessarily coincide. This custom model is not a typical non-
linear model (e.g. non-linear in parameters). However the definition of a linear model is not an easy task 
because the term linear can be interpreted into different ways (e.g. in terms of parameters, independent 
variables, or structural changes). 
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first model contains pre-defined structural breaks that depend on the growth and 
recession periods of multiple business cycles15. The first twin-model takes the form of: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑆 = 𝛼𝑖𝑆 + 𝛽𝑖,1𝐹1(𝑆) + 𝛽𝑖,2𝐹2(𝑆) + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑆) + 𝜀𝑖(𝑆)                           (3)
     
Where 𝑆 =  {
𝐺
𝑅
  is the state taking values of the vector G when we are in the growth 
period or values of the vector R when we are in recessions     
    (4) 
Where vector 𝐺 = [𝐺1, 𝐺2 … 𝐺𝑛] or 𝑅 = [𝑅1, 𝑅2 … 𝑅𝑛]       (5) 
Hence, the first twin-model contains pre-defined structural breaks dependent on the 
state of the U.S. economy and is able to adjust itself taking into consideration only the 
variables (dependent and non-dependent) that belong to a particular stage of the 
economy. Employing a combination of statistical method and empirical judgement I use 
in this agile model the most appropriate factors for a given strategy under a specific 
state of the economy. 
Within each state of the economy I apply a step-wise regression technique to limit the 
final list of factors for each strategy. This technique has been used by many authors 
such as Dor, Dynkin and Gould (2006) and Jawadi and Khanniche (2012). In this 
technique the variables are added or removed from the model depending on the 
significance of the F-value. 5% significance is used for both inclusion and exclusion. 
The single best variable is chosen initially. This initial variable is then paired with each 
of the other independent variables, one at a time; next, a second variable is chosen and 
so on, until no further variables are included or excluded from the estimation. Stepwise 
regression allows me to examine the importance of a large set of variables, even if there 
is a relatively small number of observations16.  
                                                 
15 These business cycles are officially denoted by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
and the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI). The growth periods are: 01/1990-07/1990, 04/1991-
03/2001, 12/2001-12/2007 and 07/2009-03/2014, and the recession periods are: 08/1990-03/1991, 
04/2001-11/2001, and 01/2008-06/2009. We note that the prediction of business cycles or different 
market conditions is out of the scope of this paper. 
16 It is important to mention that the independent variables should be uncorrelated (as they have been 
already examined) otherwise the results would be spurious.     
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The second twin-model has structural breaks that are specified by a statistical stochastic 
process using a Markov regime-switching model (Hamilton, 1989, 1990). This is in the 
spirit of other authors such as Meligkotsidou and Vrontos (2014) and Billio, Getmansky 
and Pelizzon (2012) who measured the structural breaks of hedge fund returns and 
volatility. However, in the proposed model I measure the exposures of hedge funds 
returns taking into consideration the different states of the market index. I use the 
Wilshire 5000TRI including dividends, represented by two different states: up regime 
and down regime, covering a 24 year period17.  
Under the Markov switching model, systematic and un-systematic events may affect the 
output because of the presence of discontinuous shift in the average return and 
volatility. The change in regime should be regarded as a random and not as a predicable 
event. The model can be represented as: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽(𝑆𝑡)𝐼𝑡 + 𝜔𝑢𝑡 ,            (6) 
𝐼𝑡 = 𝜇(𝑆𝑡) + 𝜎(𝑆𝑡)𝜀𝑡,                        (7) 
Where 𝑆𝑡 is a Markov chain with n states and transition probability matrix P. Where 𝑢𝑡 
and 𝜀𝑡 are independent and both normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance. 
Each states of the market index I has its own mean and volatility. Hedge fund returns 
are related to the states of the market index. They are defined by a parameter α plus a 
factor loading β, on the conditional mean of the factor. Also, hedge fund volatilities are 
related to the states of the market index I. They are defined by the factor loading β on 
the conditional volatility of the factor plus the volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor 
ω. In both cases β could be different conditional on the state of the risk factor I.   
For n = 2 (states are denoted as 0 or 1) the model is expressed as: 
𝑅𝑡 = {
𝛼 +  𝛽0𝐼𝑡 + 𝜔𝑢𝑡  ,            𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑆𝑡 = 0
𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑡 + 𝜔𝑢𝑡 ,            𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑆𝑡 = 1
         (8) 
Where the state variable S depends on time t, and β depends on the state variable as: 
                                                 
17 The time period under examination is divided in to up regimes (01/1990-06/1990, 11/1990-10/2000, 





𝛽0 ,            𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑆𝑡 = 0
𝛽1 ,            𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑆𝑡 = 1
                     (9) 
The Markov chain 𝑆𝑡 (the regime-switching process) is described by the following 




]                       (10) 
Where 𝑝𝑖𝑗 the transition probability from regime i to regime j with 𝑝00 = 1 − 𝑝01 and 
𝑝11 = 1 − 𝑝10. Where 𝑝00 and 𝑝11 stand for the probability of being in regime zero, 
given that the system was in regime zero during the previous period, and the probability 
of being in regime one, given that the system was in regime one during the previous 
period, respectively. 
In case where there are m states, the transition probabilities are best expressed in a 


















]                                    (11)
       
Where 𝑝𝑖,𝑗 is the probability of moving from regime i to regime j. Since, at any given 
time, the variable must be in one of the m states, it must be true that: 
∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑗 = 1 ∀𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1                                    (12)
           
A vector of current state probabilities is then denoted as 
𝜋𝑡 = [𝜋1 𝜋2 … 𝜋𝑚]                                   (13)
          
Where 𝜋𝑡 is the probability that the variable y is currently in state i. Given 𝜋𝑡 and P, the 




𝜋𝑡+1 = 𝜋𝑡𝑃                                    (14)
           
Similar to the first twin-model, within each regime of the market index I apply a step-
wise regression technique to limit the final list of factors for each strategy. Employing a 
combination of statistical method and empirical judgement I am able to use a 
parsimonious model using the most appropriate factors for a given strategy under a 
specific market regime. Unlike many authors, I did not rely on a single model just 
adding one or more factors on existing models. The reason is that I take a holistic 
approach selecting the most appropriate candidate factors for hedge funds, following 
other authors (e.g. Jawadi and Khanniche, 2012). Furthermore, many authors use a 
single model for all hedge fund strategies, mentioning nothing about the statistical 
properties of these factors (e.g. correlation between two or more factors). I take this 
issue into consideration. Due to the multifaceted nature of the hedge fund industry it is 
unwise to use exactly the same model when trying to explain hedge fund strategies. 
Different hedge fund strategies have different behavior and investment characteristics.  
3.2.2 Data 
I use three hedge fund databases (one with live/dead funds, one with live funds and one 
with dead funds) from two database vendors. These are EurekaHedge and 
BarclayHedge covering the period from January 1990 to March 201418. To my 
knowledge, this is the longest period under examination in any hedge fund study. After 
the merging and cleaning process (such as removing records containing consecutive 
returns of zero, N/A and null) I select funds that invest primarily in the North America 
region. After the selection process, the total number of funds (live and dead) is 7,541. I 
remove outliers by implementing a “winsorizing” technique. The final dataset consists 
of 6,373 funds19. Details of all these procedures can be found in the appendices. Many 
authors do not give full details of their merging and database cleaning processes, but I 
believe that the used merging and elimination of duplicates algorithms can be regarded 
as benchmarks in the literature. 
                                                 
18 I include at least three business cycles so as to enable my analysis to be as comprehensive as possible. 
The majority of the databases for commercial use came into existence in the early/mid 1990 with a few 
exceptions such as EurekaHedge and BarclayHedge databases that came earlier. Moreover, my dataset 
contains pre 1994 dead funds hence I do not have this type of survivorship bias. However, in my 
robustness checks I have excluded the prior 1994 so as to verify my results.  
19 Similar to other authors (such as Ramadorai, 2012) I treat multiple share classes of funds as separate 
funds; this is to eliminate selection bias due to variations in liquidity restrictions, returns, and fee 
structures that describe different share classes of the same fund. 
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I adopt the strategies that fund managers reported in these databases20. I implement a 
mapping between database strategies that has been used by other authors (e.g. 
Joenvaara, Kosowski and Tolonen, 2012) using these two databases. Hence, I end up 
with eleven hedge fund strategies: Short Bias (SB), Long Only (LO), Sector (SE), Long 
Short (LS), Event Driven (ED), Multi Strategy (MS), Others (OT), Global Macro (GM), 
Relative Value (RV), Market Neutral (MN) and CTAs (CT)21.  
The fourteen candidate factors are selected according to specific criteria (availability, 
what other authors used based on their significance, the collinearity between them and 
correlation with strategies). They are related to different asset classes: equity factors, 
real estate factors, commodity factors, credit factors, currency factors and option 
factors. I take into consideration:  
 Wilshire 5000 Total Return Monthly Index (MAI) 
 MSCI World Excl. US U$ - Tot Return Index (GEMI) 
 S&P GSCI Energy - Total Return Index (COEN) 
 S&P GSCI Precious Metals - Total Return Index (COPM) 
 S&P GSCI Industrial Metals - Total Return Index  (COIM) 
 S&P GSCI Agriculture Total Return Index (COAG) 
 Differences in Promised Yields - Term Spread Premium (TERM) which is the 
spread between 10-year U.S. government bonds and 3-month U.S. treasury rate  
 Differences in Promised Yields - Default Premium (DEF) which is the spread 
between Moody’s corporate AAA and BAA bond yields 
 DJ US Select Real Estate Sec - Tot Return Index (RLE) 
 US Trade-Weighted Value of US Dollar Against Major Currencies (EXCH) 
 CBOE SPX Volatility VIX (DVIX) - Price Index 
 Small Minus Big (SMB) 
 High Minus Low (HML) 
 Momentum (MOM) 
                                                 
20 Unfortunately, there is no universal classification scheme for hedge funds’ strategies. Although fund 
managers may change their investment style over time, they are legally obliged to proceed according to 
the offering memorandum (used for private placements, contrary to the prospectus that is for publicly-
traded issues) that describes the fund, its strategy, how it trades and operates, as well as the details of the 
organization. 
21 The Others strategy contains all hedge funds that do not belong to any of the other strategies mentioned 
in my paper. It does not include Emerging Markets hedge funds. I give more information about the Others 
strategy in section 3.3.4. CTA means Commodity Trading Advisors funds. This strategy makes extensive 
use of derivatives and commodity trading or uses systematic trading. 
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The first eleven factors are sourced from Datastream whereas the last three are derived 
from Fama and French’s online data library (Ibottson Associates). I have not considered 
lookback straddles that according to the literature (e.g. Fung and Hsieh, 2001) are 
highly appropriate to the CT strategy. Unfortunately, there was no data available for the 
early examined period (early 1990s). However these are covered in the sub-section that 
details with the robustness tests. 
Equity factors have been used widely in measuring the general market exposure of 
hedge funds. I use the most comprehensive index, the Wilshire 5000 index, as do Dor, 
Dynkin and Gould (2006) and Amenc, Goltz (2008). Fung and Hsieh (2004), Billio, 
Getmansky and Pelizzon (2009, 2012) and Patton and Ramadorai (2013) used the S&P 
500, but that is mainly a large cap index. Commodity related factors have also been 
used by many authors such as Capocci and Hubner (2004), Agarwal and Nail (2000) to 
explain hedge funds’ behaviour. Others such as Giannikis and Vrontos (2011) and 
Jawadi and Khanniche (2012) have also used commodity factors represented by the 
GSCI commodity index. In this study I do not use the composite GSCI total commodity 
index, or Gold-only indices as Billio, Getmansky and Pelizzon (2009, 2012) used. 
Instead, I use sub-indices related to energy, metals and agriculture for more precise 
results. 
Credit factors have been also examined by many authors using the term and credit 
spread as proxies. For example Billio, Getmansky and Pelizzon (2009 and 2012) used 
the 10-year T-Bond rate minus 6-month LIBOR, and the difference between BAA and 
AAA indices provided by Moody’s. Credit spread has also been examined by Ibbotson, 
Chen and Zhu (2011) using also the Moody’s index. Giannikis and Vrontos (2011) used 
the Barclay high yield index as a credit spread factor. Bali, Brown and Caglayan (2011) 
also used these credit factors when analyzing hedge funds’ risk exposures. Similar to 
Capocci (2009), I consider exchange rates by using the currency factor which is the 
Federal Reserve Bank Trade Weighted Dollar Index. 
Following Billio, Getmansky and Pelizzon (2009 and 2012), I use as an option factor 
the VIX CBOE volatility index. This index is widely used as a measure of market risk. 
It represents market expectations of near term (30 days) volatility of the S&P 500 stock 
index. The VIX index is currently investable through various ETFs products.  
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It is known that fund managers reduce their leverage during crises, however in this 
dataset there is no sufficient information about it as there are funds that simply mention 
yes/no on the leverage field and there are many others that do not give this information. 
Moreover, there is no leverage information for different time periods so as to compare 
and analyse hedge fund responses under different conditions. In addition, there is no 
information about fund holdings to compute the net leverage, which is the difference 
between long and short exposure per share divided by the NAV (Net Asset Value), or 
the gross value of assets controlled (long plus shorts) and divide by the total capital 
(Gross Market Value/Capital). Prior work on hedge fund leverage (e.g. Duarte, 
Longstaff, and Yu, 2007) only estimates leverage, or relies on static leverage ratios or 
static yes/no leverage as reported in the databases (e.g. Agarwal and Naik, 2000). 
Nevertheless, not allowing for leverage can be regarded as one of the limitations of this 
paper. 
3.3 Empirical analysis 
In this section I set out some basic statistics on the data, give details of the regime 
switches I arrived at, then report the results from the one-factor and my multi-factor 
models. 
3.3.1 Basic statistics  
Following Bali, Brown and Caglayan (2011), I first present the results using the simple 
classification technique of dividing hedge fund strategies into directional, semi-
directional and non-directional. I classified them according to their correlation with the 
market index Wilshire 5000TRI, including dividends. This index is more representative 
of the whole market than the S&P 500 since it captures almost all firms within the U.S. 
economy. Table 11 presents the correlation of each strategy and its corresponding 
classification. The most directional strategies are at the top of the table whereas the 
most non-directional strategies lie at bottom of the table. As expected, SB (Short Bias) 
has a large negative correlation with the market index of -0.924. The market neutral 
strategy MN has a very low correlation of 0.059. CT (CTAs) also has a very low 
correlation to market index of 0.048, which is not significantly different from zero.  
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Table 11.  Simple Hedge Fund Classification and Market Correlation 
This table presents for each strategy the correlation with the Wilshire 5000TRI including dividends over the entire 
period under examination (01/1990-03/2014). I rank conditionally on the correlation with the market index, from 
extreme directional strategies (Short Bias) to completely non-directional strategies (CTAs). Each strategy is a 
representative-average time series of all the relevant hedge funds. In results not tabulated, all correlations are 
significantly different from zero at the 0.01% level except for CTAs, with a t-statistic of 0.739 and a p-value of 0.46. 
Directional Strategies Code Coefficient Std. Error 
Short Bias SB -0.924 0.042 
Long Only LO 0.707 0.023 
Sector SE 0.637 0.026 
Long Short LS 0.550 0.019 
Semi-Directional Strategies    
Event Driven ED 0.338 0.019 
Multi Strategy MS 0.271 0.021 
Others OT 0.232 0.018 
Global Macro GM 0.223 0.026 
Non-Directional Strategies    
Relative Value RV 0.211 0.015 
Market Neutral MN 0.059 0.013 
CTAs CT 0.048 0.048 
 
Table 12 provides basic statistics on the raw returns of the eleven hedge fund strategies. 
Each strategy is a representative-average time series of their relevant (equally weighted) 
hedge funds. There are some strategies (e.g. Sector, Long Short, Others, CTA) that 
provide high monthly mean returns (more than 1.1%) and are more aggressive than non-
directional strategies (e.g. Event Driven, Market Neutral). On the other hand some 
strategies (e.g. Short Bias) provide low monthly mean returns (0.1%). On average, 
directional strategies have more volatile returns than all the non-directional strategies 
except the CTA strategy. Full statistical information (with raw and excess returns) along 




        Table 12. Raw Returns by Strategy 
             This table provides the basic statistics of monthly raw returns for each hedge fund strategy. 
Strategy Mean Standard 
Deviation 




0.050% 5.197 Others 1.349% 1.091 
Long 
Only 
0.999% 3.437 Global Macro 0.934% 2.017 
Sector 1.151% 3.259 Relative Value 0.821% 1.238 
Long 
Short 
1.125% 2.663 Market Neutral 0.525% 0.874 
Event 
Driven 
0.937% 1.839 CTA 1.184% 3.415 
Multi 
Strategy 
1.062% 1.713    
  
It is important to comment on the assumptions needed for the parametric techiques used 
(t-values, etc.). As presented in the appendix, hedge fund data are typically not normally 
distributed (but stationary as there is no trend in their mean and volatility); this is an 
issue that is shared by many other authors as well. However the large number of 
observations does not affect the significance of the tests and the use of the winsorizing 
technique for the extreme outliers mitigates this issue. Serial correlation (also see the 
appendix) is another common problem when dealing with time-series data, hence, with 
hedge funds too (this is shared by many other authors too). The estimation regression 
coefficients (see section 3.3.3 and 3.3.4) are still unbiased and consistent but may be 
inneficient. This means that the standard errors of the estimate of the regression 
parameters can be underestimated. Taking that into consideration I have used the 
HAC/Newey-West estimator for verification purposes (see appendix).     
3.3.2 Regime switching model 
From January 1990 to March 2014 there are three official business cycles. Hence the 
period under examination is divided into growth periods (01/1990-07/1990, 04/1991-
03/2001, 12/2001-12/2007 and 07/2009-03/2014) and to recession periods (08/1990-
03/1991, 04/2001-11/2001, and 01/2008-06/2009). I implement the Markov Switching 
process in order to identify the regimes (up and down) based on the mean and volatility 
of the Wilshire 5000TRI. I select two regimes so as to compare the two different stages 
with business cycles.  
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Table 13 shows the results of the Markov Switching process. Both up and down regime 
coefficients are highly significant. The second panel shows the probabilities of the 
transitions between the regimes. For example, if, at time t, we are in regime one (down) 
then the probability of staying in the same regime at time t+1, is 38.02%, whereas the 
probability of moving to regime two (up) is 61.98%. The third panel shows that up 
regime periods lasted on average almost 12 times as long as down regimes during this 
generally benign period for the U.S. economy. An up regime could be expected to last 




       Table 13. Different Market Conditions 
This table shows the two regimes calculated for the market index (Wilshire 5000TRI including       
dividends) using the Markov Switching model.   
Panel A: Regime coefficients   
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
Down regime -8.6530 1.2982 
Up regime 1.5804 0.2166 
Panel B: Transition probabilities   
 Down Up 
Down regime 0.3802 0.6198 
Up regime 0.0532 0.9468 
Panel C: Regime duration   
Constant expected durations: Down Up 
  1.6135 18.7934 
 
Figure 1 presents the business cycles and the down regime probabilities. With only two 
regimes, P(up) = 1 – P(down). The down regime is not simply the result of splitting of 
the data sample into periods of positive or negative returns, but captures periods when 
the market volatility was high and there were substantial return downturns, not 
necessarily just a single shock22. In all these different regimes there might be positive or 
negative returns. The period is divided into four up regimes (01/1990-06/1990, 11/1990-
10/2000, 10/2002-05/2008 and 03/2009-03/2014) and three down regimes (07/1990-
10/1990, 11/2000-09/2002 and 06/2008-02/2009). Down regime periods cover higher 
oil prices in summer 1990 due to the Persian Gulf crisis, the Japanese down market in 
March 2001, 9/11 and the financial crisis 2008-2009. There are other negative shocks 
outside my identified down regimes, however the Wilshire 5000TRI was not then 
characterized by high volatility and substantial return downturns.  
  
                                                 

















Probabilities for the down regime: This figure demonstrates the probabilities of being in the down regime. The 
vertical axis shows the probabilities between 0 and 1 and the horizontal axis is the time period under examination. 
The shadow areas represent the business cycle recession periods.         
        
 
3.3.3 One –Factor model 
I first examine hedge fund strategies’ alphas23 and exposures using the basic market 
model within multiple business cycles and different market conditions. The market 
index MAI is the Wilshire 5000 TRI, including dividends. This is to be able to compare 
the market model to the used multi-factor model and judge its robustness, which is 
implemented in the next section. 
Table 14 shows the results of the market model when applied in the growth periods. 
Contrary to the recession periods, the majority of the hedge fund strategies deliver 
strongly significant alpha to investors. All hedge fund strategies except the CTA have 
strongly significant exposures to the MAI factor. As expected, the directional strategies 
have, on average, higher exposures compared to the non-directional strategies. On 
average, all hedge fund strategies have higher exposures than in the recession period, 
meaning that fund managers adjust their portfolios to benefit from the upward market 
movement. Regarding the recession period, the majority of the hedge fund strategies do 
not deliver significant alpha to investors. The majority of the hedge fund strategies have 
significant exposures to the MAI (market index) factor.  
                                                 
23 The alpha is the intercept of the equation. Also called Jensen’s alpha (1968), it is usually interpreted as 
a measure of out-or under- performance relative to the market proxy used. In the subsequent tables of this 












All strategies deliver strongly significant alpha to investors during the up regime. 
Almost all strategies have strongly significant exposures to the MAI, as with the growth 
period. During the down regime the majority of hedge fund strategies do not deliver 
significant alpha to investors, which is similar to the recession period. Overall, hedge 
fund managers adjust their market exposures lower during the down regime to get lower 
risk or minimize their losses.  
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Table 14. Market Model Results 
This table shows the results of the market model for the growth (G), recession (R), up (U) and down (D) regimes. The market index (MAI) used is the Wilshire 5000 TRI including dividends (excess 
risk free returns). The risk free return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data library (Ibbotson Associates). Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free 
return. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. In this and subsequent tables, the left hand columns contain more directional strategies (Short Bias is extremely 
directional) and as I move to the right I deal with non-directional strategies (CTA strategy is extremely non-directional). For space reasons, I do not present standard errors and t-statistics.   
Dependent variable Short Bias Long Only Sector Long Short Event Driven Multi Strategy Others Global Markets Relative Value Market Neutral CTAs 
C(G) (excess return) 0.5149** 0.4306** 0.5097** 0.4498** 0.5851** 0.7119** 0.7261** 0.4747** 0.5086** 0.2534** 0.9233** 
C(R) (excess return) -0.6242 -0.1918 0.5461 0.3387 -0.0111 0.4118 0.6500** 0.6509* 0.3688 -0.0383 0.7073 
C(U) (excess return) 0.5399** 0.3789** 0.5303** 0.3969** 0.5447** 0.6914** 0.7235** 0.4267** 0.5149** 0.2083** 0.8187** 
C(D) (excess return) 0.2721 0.1401 0.2851 0.2719 0.1011 0.5698 0.7894** 0.7417** 0.3621 0.0703 0.7828 
                        
MAI(G) -0.9785** 0.6554** 0.6188** 0.5362** 0.2831** 0.2173** 0.1893** 0.2522** 0.1426** 0.0605** 0.0167 
MAI (R) -0.9769** 0.7614** 0.5782** 0.4869** 0.3555** 0.2599** 0.1902** 0.0278 0.2839** -0.0359 -0.1189 
MAI (U) -1.0364** 0.6740** 0.6148** 0.5546** 0.3010** 0.2232** 0.1842** 0.2403** 0.1584** 0.0601** 0.0394 
MAI (D) -0.8386** 0.7077** 0.5685** 0.4448** 0.2879** 0.2411** 0.2094** 0.1009* 0.2246** -0.0273 -0.1497* 
                        
Adj. R-squared(G) 0.6333 0.7406 0.6403 0.7233 0.5171 0.3105 0.3506 0.2349 0.3486 0.0843 0.0004 
Adj. R-squared (R) 0.7901 0.8171 0.7454 0.8075 0.5596 0.4376 0.5271 0.0110 0.5459 0.0186 0.0487 
Adj. R-squared (U) 0.6284 0.7323 0.6111 0.7161 0.5017 0.2879 0.3185 0.1890 0.3634 0.0693 0.0018 
Adj. R-squared (D) 0.7628 0.7362 0.7173 0.7707 0.4232 0.4011 0.5178 0.1433 0.3481 0.0032 0.0827 
                        
F-statistic(G) 443.0553 731.9991 456.7479 670.1322 275.1056 116.2779 139.231 79.6289 137.989 24.5709 0.0908 
F-statistic (R) 125.215 148.4602 97.5917 139.4363 42.9395 26.6813 37.7866 0.3554 40.6694 1.6259 2.6893 
F-statistic (U) 430.4875 695.8302 400.083 641.5502 256.7249 103.7361 119.7107 60.2157 145.9832 19.9029 0.458 
F-statistic (D) 113.5508 98.6913 89.8181 118.6361 26.6769 24.4423 38.5827 6.8546 19.6888 1.1127 4.157 
                        
Prob (F-stat)(G) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7634 
Prob (F-stat) (R) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5553 0.0000 0.2115 0.1108 
Prob (F-stat) (U) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4992 
Prob (F-stat) (D) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0131 0.0001 0.2989 0.0493 
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The single factor (market) model, while simple, demonstrates that hedge funds present 
different behaviour in terms of the alphas and exposure to the market factor. As 
expected, directional strategies are more sensitive to business cycles and market 
conditions. Nevertheless, these strategies are able to deliver, on average, higher excess 
returns to investors. It is important to mention that the market model is over-simplistic 
in this context and cannot capture a large part of hedge fund strategies’ behavior. Other 
well-known models (e.g. Fama and French model or Carhart model) might be more 
efficient than the single factor model, using my framework. However, hedge funds are 
complex vehicles and need more advanced techniques with more factors representing a 
wider range of different asset classes within multiple business cycles/regimes.  
 
3.3.4 Multi-Factor model 
This sub-section presents the results for the multi-factor twin-model. First, I discuss 
some key findings concerning the general behaviour of hedge funds during each of the 
underlying periods under examination. I then describe hedge fund behaviour for each 
strategy (briefly since there 11 of them), followed by a detailed exposure analysis at the 
strategy group level.     
3.3.4.1 Growth periods 
Table 15 presents the findings for growth periods. All hedge fund strategies deliver 
strongly significant alpha to investors and increase their exposures so as to benefit from 
the overall market movement. Thus, in terms of exposures the most common factor 
across all strategies is the MAI factor, as expected. The second most common factor is 
the MOM factor and the third is the SMB factor. The MOM factor is the essential factor 
when the market is in a growth state as fund managers keep up their investments’ 
momentum. The SMB factor is also an important element as when there is market 
growth, small companies tend to outperform large companies, being more sensitive to 
market conditions. The DEF factor is negative for five strategies as the uncertainty and 
therefore the spread between promised yields are lower during growth periods. Hence, 
strategies that have strongly negative DEF deliver high alpha to investors. In total there 
are fifty exposures to the various asset classes. Overall, within the growth period, hedge 
fund managers trying to benefit from the upward market movement and have relatively 
high asset class and portfolio exposures for higher hedge fund returns. Fund managers 
pay more attention to returns than the systematic risk derived from investing in equity 
asset classes.   
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Table 15. Multi-Factor Model During Growth Periods 
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model for growth periods. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. The Risk free (RF) return is the 
one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF returns. * denotes significance at 
P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. For space reasons, I present only the t-statistics in parentheses.   
Dependent variable Short Bias Long Only Sector Long Short Event Driven Multi Strategy Others Global 
Macro 
Relative Value Market Neutral CTAs 
C (excess return) 0.5741** 0.2903** 1.5764** 1.4655** 0.4965** 1.4297** 1.4816** 0.3725** 0.2545** 0.5242** 0.8174** 
  (3.3184) (3.4816) (3.8089) (5.4502) (8.5422) (4.5960) (6.1593) (3.2733) (3.1474) (2.9978) (3.7917) 
Market Index-MAI -0.8544** 0.6725** 0.5930** 0.5279** 0.3045** 0.2198** 0.1552** 0.3057** 0.14826** 0.0684** 
   (-13.3174) (31.7104) (22.6857) (29.9863) (20.4472) (10.7826) (6.5516) (8.3602) (12.5996) (6.2038) 










Small minus Big-SMB -0.2556** 0.2502** 0.1562** 0.2006** 0.1638** 0.0910** 
  
0.0703** 
    (-4.9304) (9.7241) (4.9638) (9.1875) (9.0695) (3.6407) 
  
(4.8214) 
  Global Market Index (excl. 
U.S.)-GEMI 
-0.1941** 
     
0.0725** 
      (-3.3394) 
     
(3.5418) 
    Comm. Industry Metals-COIM 0.1126** 
            (3.3252) 




0.0666** 0.1774** 0.0580* 
  
0.0676** 




(2.8075) (8.8007) (2.1147) 
  
(4.2406) 
  Comm. Energy-COEN 
 
0.0226* 0.0436** 0.0316** 
         
 
(2.2440) (3.3348) (3.7329) 




























 Term Spread-TERM 
   
-0.1649** 
    
0.1235** 
    
   
(-2.9027) 
    
(3.3405) 
  Real Estate Index-RLE 
      
-0.0371* 
      
      
(-2.3581) 
    Change in VIX-DVIX 
       
0.0214** 
     
       
(2.6184) 
   Exchange Rate-EXCH 
          
-0.4015** 
 (-2.9292) 
Adj. R-squared: 0.6971 0.8250 0.7201 0.8253 0.6699 0.3757 0.4287 0.2873 0.4507 0.2576 0.0417 
F-statistic: 118.8076 242.3137 110.7509 152.1313 174.1677 26.6785 39.4161 35.3934 53.5171 30.6072 6.575 
Prob (F-stat): 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0016 
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3.3.4.2 Recession periods 
Table 16 shows that the majority of hedge fund strategies do not deliver significant 
alpha during recessions as fund managers are trying to minimize their exposures. All 
hedge fund strategies have less exposure compared to the growth period. Moreover 
there are differences in exposures in terms of asset allocation and portfolio allocation. It 
is clear that hedge fund managers adjust their portfolios by minimizing their exposures 
during recessions in terms of asset and portfolio allocations. Again, MAI is the most 
common factor across all hedge fund strategies. However, the average exposure is 0.147 
compared to 0.214 to the growth period. Furthermore, only seven strategies have 
exposure to MAI compared to twelve within the growth period. The second and third 
more common exposures are COAG (agriculture total return index) and COEN (energy 
total return index) respectively. This is interpreted as fund managers moving towards 
more counter-cyclical industries using agricultural/food or energy commodities. Indeed, 
agricultural/food commodities are obvious essentials for people. Food consumption 
cannot easily be disturbed by “bad” economic conditions, thus its demand can be 
considered as inelastic. Energy can be also regarded as an essential service or good, 
with an inelastic demand. In general, cycles in economic activity are not the main 
drivers of the evolution of commodity prices (Cashin, McDermott, Scott, 2002). Thus, 
fund managers have an incentive to increase their exposures to these factors during bad 





Table 16. Multi-Factor Model During Recessions 
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model during recession periods. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. The Risk free (RF) return 
is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF returns. * denotes 
significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. For space reasons, I present only the t-statistics in parentheses.   











C (excess returns) -0.4633 -0.4417 0.5627* 0.3497 0.0696 0.3990 2.0808** -1.1783 0.3688 0.1356 0.8365 
  (-0.9518) (-1.2102) (2.0864) (1.4670) (0.2082) (1.3481) (3.6397) (-1.5418) (1.2350) (0.7977) (2.0359) 
Market Index-MAI -1.0123** 0.6094** 0.5409** 0.4663** 0.2892** 




  (-13.8966) (9.4005) (12.4293) (12.1225) (5.2282) 




Comm. Energy-COEN 0.1302** 




  (3.9577) 




Small minus Big-SMB 
 
0.4291** 
    
0.1491** 
      
 
(3.5949) 
    
(2.9841) 
    Comm. Agriculture-COAG 
 
0.1118* 0.1445** 0.0781* 




   
 
(2.2248) (3.8158) (2.3317) 




 High minus Low-HML 
  
-0.3843** -0.2013** 
         
  
(-5.0381) (-2.9864) 
       Comm. Industry Metals-




     




   Change in VIX-DVIX 
     
-0.0613** 
       
     
(-5.0613) 
     Global Market Index (exc. 
U.S.)-GEMI       
0.1349** 
      
      
(6.7292) 
    Term Spread-TERM 
      
-0.6613* 0.9206* 
     
      
(-2.6003) (2.6859) 
   Momentum-MOM 
         
0.0559** 
           (2.8421)  
Adj. R-squared: 0.8561 0.8727 0.8830 0.8608 0.6323 0.5677 0.7258 0.5326 0.5459 0.2324 0.3261 
F-statistic: 99.1289 76.4402 84.0448 69.0318 29.3702 22.6712 22.8366 10.4024 40.6694 5.9962 8.9853 
Prob (F-stat): 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0063 0.0008 
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3.3.4.3 Up regime 
Table 17 shows the performance behaviour of hedge fund strategies when the Wilshire 
5000 is rising. Almost all strategies deliver strongly significant alphas to investors. 
Similar to the growth period, almost all hedge fund strategies are trying to increase their 
exposures so as to gain higher returns. Similar also to the growth period, fund managers 
take advantage of the upward market movement and invest in more risky assets such as 
small cap equities in order to have higher returns. They pay more attention to returns 
than to systematic risk during these conditions. On average, less directional strategies 
deliver lower alpha to investors as they benefit less from the upward market movement. 
However, they have fewer exposures compared to the other strategies, as by nature 
these are less risky strategies. In total, there are fifty one asset class exposures across all 
strategies. As for growth periods, the most common exposures across all strategies are 




Table 17. Multi-Factor Model During a Rising Market 
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model for the up regime. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. The Risk free (RF) return is the 
one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF returns. * denotes significance at 
P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. For space reasons, I present only the t-statistics in parentheses.   









C (excess returns) 0.4899** 0.2880** 0.4838** 0.6267** 0.4967** 0.6387** 1.2702** 0.2970* -0.2192 0.1528** 0.8312
**   (2.6382) (3.3733) (4.4458) (4.6581) (7.9609) (7.5211) (6.7701) (2.4371) (-1.3816) (3.0690) (3.851
5) Market Index-MAI -0.9337** 0.6690** 0.5878** 0.5737** 0.2523** 0.2256** 0.1482** 0.2846** 0.1505** 0.0751** 
   (-13.7157) (30.2888) (20.9548) (23.0726) (10.9270) (10.3531) (5.9860) (7.3072) (12.0191) (5.9065) 
 Small minus Big-SMB -0.2704** 0.2581** 0.1428** 0.1990** 0.1639** 0.0949** 
  
0.0696** 
    (-4.8304) (9.4069) (4.3638) (8.2788) (8.3147) (3.4741) 
  
(4.3992) 




0.0503* 0.0237* 0.0751** 




(2.0351) (2.1054) (7.2279) 
 Comm. Industry Metals-COIM 0.1067** 
            (3.1326) 
          Global Market Index (exc. U.S.)-
GEMI 
-0.1477* 




      (-2.5269) 








0.0856** 0.1838** 0.0853** 
  
0.0760** 0.0347* 




(3.0792) (7.9487) (2.6828) 
  
(4.2019) (2.0222) 
 Comm. Energy-COEN 
 
0.0338** 0.0468** 0.0420** 0.0187* 
  
0.0341* 
     
 
(3.3503) (3.5352) (4.8566) (2.5082) 
  
(2.3862) 


















4) Term Spread-TERM 
   
-0.1829** 
    
0.1114** 
    
   
(-3.0336) 
    
(2.7577) 
  Change in VIX-DVIX 
   
0.0111* 
   
0.0176* 
     
   
(2.1083) 
   
(2.0842) 
   Default Spread-DEF 




    




  Real Estate Index-RLE 
      
-0.0318* 
      
      
(-2.1332) 
    Adj. R-squared: 0.6787 0.8182 0.6942 0.8082 0.6633 0.3499 0.3829 0.2761 0.4795 0.2260 0.0302 
F-statistic: 108.3144 229.6584 116.2964 153.948 101.056 28.3362 40.3992 20.3706 40.0062 25.7152 8.9304 
Prob (F-stat): 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0031 
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3.3.4.4 Down regime 
Table 18 presents the findings for when the Wilshire 5000 is falling. Similar to the 
recession period, most hedge fund strategies do not produce significant alpha for 
investors as fund managers are more concerned about risk. Similarly to business cycles, 
during the down regimes there are fewer exposures compared to the up regimes. On 
average there are 29 asset class exposures across all hedge fund strategies compared to 
51 for the up regime. This is because fund managers during difficult market conditions, 
are trying to minimize their exposures and consequently their losses. The most common 
exposure across all hedge fund strategies is MAI. This is consistent with all the other 
regimes and business cycle conditions. There is almost the same number of exposures 
across all strategies for both stressful market conditions (28 exposures for the recession 
periods and 29 exposures for the down regimes). However, in the down regimes there is 
a lower average number of factors within groups compared to the recession periods (see 
Table 16). This means that during down regimes, fund managers are trying even harder 
to minimize their exposures than they do during recessions. Last but not least, similar to 
recessions, during bad market conditions fund managers have an incentive to invest in 
counter-cyclical industries and more specifically in agriculture/food and energy 
commodities. This is interpreted as commodities constitute essential goods or services 
for people and economy, and the driving forces have more to do with global demand 
and supply shocks or supply risks (Gleich, Achzet, Mayer and Rathgeber, 2013). 
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Table 18. Multi-Factor Model During a Falling Market 
This table shows the exposures of my multi-factor model for when the Wilshire 5000 is falling. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. The Risk free (RF) return is the one-month 
Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF returns. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 
and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. For space reasons, I present only the t-statistics in parentheses.   
Dependent variable Short Bias Long Only Sector Long Short Event Driven Multi Strategy Others Global Macro Relative Value Market Neutral CTAs 
C (excess returns) 0.3522 -0.3603 0.4854 -0.0660 0.1776 0.5781* 0.7432** 0.8767** 0.0502 0.1579 0.8324 
  (0.7968) (-0.8730) (1.4854) (-0.2702) (0.5356) (2.3134) (3.6741) (4.3127) (0.1900) (1.3120) (1.7790) 










Comm. Energy-COEN 0.1091** 




  (4.1149) 









    
0.1987** 











      
0.0445* 
   
 
(2.0826) (2.7412) 
      
(2.5907) 
 
High minus Low-HML 
  
-0.2175** 




   
  
(-3.8436) 





Change in VIX-DVIX 






    






  Comm. Industry Metals-
COIM 




    




  Global Market Index (excl. 
U.S.)-GEMI 
     
0.0919* 
       
     
(2.1294) 
     
Exchange Rate-EXCH 
      
-0.2678** 
      
      
(-3.3022) 
    
Momentum-MOM 
         
0.0780** 
   
         
(4.7392) 
 
Adj. R-squared: 0.8385 0.8281 0.8218 0.8429 0.5600 0.6302 0.6266 0.4938 0.5639 0.4396 0.1962 
F-statistic: 91.8462 57.2018 54.7957 63.6048 23.275 20.8836 30.3635 12.3816 16.0859 10.1524 5.2707 
Prob (F-stat): 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0103 
132 
 
3.3.4.5 Analysis by strategy 
This sub-section presents an overview and a brief analysis of the most important 
findings for each of the 11 hedge fund strategies. See Table 19. 
The Short Bias strategy does not deliver significant alpha during “bad” market 
conditions. It was expected that this strategy would perform well when the market goes 
down. However, this strategy was very successful in the early 1990s with high returns24. 
This strategy delivers high returns from specific unexpected negative events and not 
necessary only during stressful market conditions. During the growth and up regimes 
this strategy provides frequent small losses accompanied with less frequent large gains 
that provide significant alpha to investors. There are many negative exposures compared 
to all the other strategies, as expected. The Long Only strategy does not deliver 
significant alpha during stressful conditions and behaves similarly to other 
“conventional” investments. It is not surprising that it has one of the highest correlations 
with the market index across all hedge fund strategies and one of the lowest alphas. The 
Sector strategy delivers significant alpha during “good” times and recessions. It seems 
that at such times hedge fund managers are able to identify the most profitable 
companies/sectors, or at least those that are less affected by recession. An interesting 
point (explained later in the sub-section on opposite/reverse exposures) is the negative 
exposures for DEF and HML. The Long Short strategy also has negative exposures to 
DEF and HML. This strategy has on average higher alphas and fewer exposures 
compared to the Long Only strategy when investing in the same asset classes, because it 
utilizes short-selling tools. Nevertheless, this strategy is unable to provide significant 
alpha to investors during recession periods and down regimes.  
The Event Driven strategy, similar to most hedge fund strategies, does not provide 
significant alphas to investors during recessions and down regimes. By nature, it has 
relatively few exposures. The Multi Strategy, due to the fact that is a mixture of other 
strategies, is able to provide significant alpha to investors even in down regimes, 
whereas during growth periods it delivers one of the highest alphas across all hedge 
fund strategies. It also has negative exposure to the DEF factor during growth periods, 
as other strategies have (e.g. Sector and Long Short). Similarly, the Others strategy has 
                                                 
24 I went through the Short Bias time series and found that during the early 1990s, the returns were much 
higher compared to other time periods. During the first nine months of 1990 the average monthly raw 
return was 5.94% (only May’s return was negative). Practitioners made high returns from specific events 
such as the Russian default in 1998, the technology bubble crash in 2000, the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy in 2008 and the Eurozone debt crisis in 2010. 
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negative exposure to the DEF factor during “good” times (see opposite/reverse 
exposures section). This strategy has a GEMI exposure, meaning that a part of its 
portfolio is invested in global markets for higher returns. The Others strategy contains 
all hedge funds that do not belong to any of the other ten strategies (not including 
Emerging Market hedge funds). Thus, funds with strategies reported as “PIPES”, “No 
Category”, “Close-End funds” or “Other” belong here25. Beyond different styles/tools 
(e.g. PIPES, Close-End), the Others strategy may use allocations (such as start-up 
companies financed by venture capital) that are not used anywhere else. Hence, this 
strategy has styles/tools (PIPES, Close-Ended strategies) or allocations (start-ups) that 
allow them to invest in promising shares or utilizing illiquidity premia. The Global 
Macro strategy delivers higher alpha in down compared to up regimes. This may have 
to do with the fact that Global Macro strategies are able to invest in other regions 
beyond the North America region. Hence, when there are stressful market conditions 
they are able to switch to other regions for a relatively short period of time as their main 
focus is on North America.  
The Relative Value along with the Market Neutral strategy is trying to exploit market 
pricing anomalies between similar assets and to minimize the risk exposure for 
investors, thus having very few exposures compared to other strategies. The Relative 
Value strategy delivers significant low alpha during growth periods as not being able to 
exploit upward market movement during “good” times. Similarly, the Market Neutral 
strategy has few exposures compared to other strategies having one of the lowest alphas 
during “good” times. Contrary to other strategies, it has a positive MOM exposure 
during down regimes (moreover it is unable to deliver significant alpha). It is not also a 
trivial task to keep a market neutral portfolio balanced for all market conditions. The 
CTA strategy has an extensive use the trend-trading and derivatives thus it has one of 
the fewest exposures across all hedge fund strategies. Their exposures are related to 
lookback straddles. During recessions and down regimes CTA does not deliver 
significant alpha to investors.   
 
                                                 
25 PIPES (Private Investment in Public Equity) funds purchase of stock in a company at a discount to the 
current market value of share for the purpose of raising capital. With PIPES there are fewer regulatory 
issues with the SEC, it is less time consuming, and there is no need for an expensive IPO roadshow. Thus, 
it is more efficient for small to medium sized businesses. The allocation of shares is directly to private 
investors and not through a public offering on a stock exchange. 
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Table 19. Exposures per Strategy 
This table is a summary of Tables 15, 16, 17, and 18. It shows the exposures of my multi-factor model for all hedge fund strategies across all market conditions. The up-left side contains more 
directional strategies whereas the down-right side contains more non-directional strategies. The exposures (in each strategy and according to each market condition) are presented according to their 
importance (the intensity in absolute terms) from left (more intense) to the right (less intense). In order to facilitate the reader I mention again the acronyms of the factors: COAG: Commodity 
Agriculture/Food, COEN: Commodity Energy, COIM: Commodity Industrial Metals, COPM: Commodity Precious Metals, DEF: Default Spread, TERM: Term Spread, DVIX: Change in VIX, EXCH: 













Growth 0.574 -MAI, -SMB, -GEMI, -
MOM, -COIM 
Growth 0.290 MAI, SMB, HML, 
MOM, COEN 
Growth 1.576  -DEF, MAI, SMB, 
MOM, COPM, 
COEN Recession - -MAI, COEN Recession - MAI, SMB, COAG Recession 0.563 MAI, -HML, 
COAG 
Up 0.490 -MAI, -SMB, -GEMI, -
MOM, COIM 
Up 0.288 MAI, SMB, HML, 
MOM, COEN 
Up 0.484 MAI, SMB, MOM, 
COPM, COEN 
















Growth 1.466 -DEF, MAI, SMB, -
TERM, MOM, HML, 
COPM, COEN 
Growth 0.497 MAI, HML, SMB Growth 1.430 -DEF, MAI, SMB, 
HML, MOM, 
COPM Recession - MAI, - HML, GOAG Recession - MAI, COIM Recession - MAI, COIM, -
DVIX 
Up 0.627 MAI, SMB, -TERM, 
MOM, HML, HML, 
COEN, DVIX 
Up 0.497 MAI, HML, SMB, 
COEN 
Up 0.639 MAI, SMB, HML, 
MOM, COPM 






Table 19. Exposures per Strategy (continued) 
7. Others Significant 
alpha 










Growth 1.482 -DEF, MAI, GEMI, 
MOM, -RLE 
Growth 0.373 MAI, COPM, DVIX Growth 0.255 MAI, TERM, 
SMB, HML 
Recession 2.081 -TERM, SMB, GEMI, 
COEN 
Recession - TERM, COAG, -
COIM, COEN 
Recession - MAI 
Up 1.270 -DEF, MAI,  GEMI, -
RLE 
Up 0.297 MAI, COPM, MOM, 
DVIX, COEN 
Up - DEF, MAI, TERM, 
HML, SMB, MOM 





Significant Exposures 11. CTA Significant 
alpha 
Significant Exposures    
Growth 0.524 -DEF, MOM, MAI Growth 0.817 -EXCH, MOM    
Recession - GOAG, MOM Recession - -MAI, COEN    
Up 0.153 MAI, MOM, HML Up 0.831 COPM    








The next subsections present an MAI exposure analysis, alpha analysis, and exposure 
analysis, followed by a discussion. 
3.3.4.6 MAI exposure analysis 
Table 20 presents the MAI exposure changes for all hedge fund strategies comparing 
growth to recession periods and up regimes to down regimes. Almost all hedge fund 
strategies have low or negative exposures stressful market conditions as fund managers 
try to minimize their risk. This suggests that fund managers are able to hedge market 
exposures at such times. Comparing growth to recession periods, most hedge fund 
strategies decrease their exposures to MAI during recessions. The Short Bias strategy in 
the growth period already has negative exposure, however during recession periods its 
exposure becomes more negative so as to benefit from expected downward market 
movement. Relative value has one of the lower exposures during the growth period but 
it is almost double that during recession periods. This is unusual; however, this strategy 
during the recession period has the lowest exposure to the MAI factor across all hedge 
fund strategies. Furthermore, during the growth period this strategy has three more 
factor exposures (SMB, HML and TERM) and these may interact positively overall 
(e.g. this portfolio with these asset class exposures is better in terms of risk incurred and 
alpha produced to the investor).  
Regarding the up-down regimes all the strategies decrease their exposures to the market 
factor during falling markets. The largest decrease is by the Global Macro strategy, 
equal to 72%, whereas the smallest decrease is by the SB strategy at 9%. This is 
because during stressful market conditions, Global Macro strategies are able to switch 
to other regions (relying on the top-down approach) for a relatively short period of time 
as their main focus is in North America. Hence they can demonstrate a high decrease in 
their MAI exposure. On the contrary, the Short Bias strategy already has a negative 
correlation with MAI, thus there is no need for a large change in their position. 
Moreover, during down regimes the SB strategy has only two exposures, compared to 
the five within the up regimes as it tries to reduce its exposures (to protect themselves 




Table 20. Exposures to the Market 
 This table shows the exposures to the MAI market index for all hedge fund strategies during growth and recession 
periods as well as the up and down regimes. Since the growth periods and up regimes times are the longest I use them 
as the base to measure the percentage change of the exposure.  










Short Bias -0.854 -1.012 18% -0.934 -0.849 -9% 
Long Only 0.672 0.609 -9% 0.669 0.551 -18% 
Sector 0.593 0.541 -9% 0.588 0.502 -15% 
Long Short 0.528 0.466 -12% 0.574 0.312 -46% 
Event Driven 0.304 0.289 -5% 0.252 0.203 -20% 
Multi-Strategy 0.219 - - 0.226 - - 
Others 0.155 - - 0.148 0.186 - 
Global Macro 0.306 - - 0.285 0.081 -72% 
Relative Value 0.148 0.284 91% 0.151 - - 
Market Neutral 0.068 - - 0.075 - - 
CTAs - -0.147 - - -0.156 - 
 
3.3.4.7 Alpha analysis 
Before I move to the common factor analysis, there is a brief discussion of the alphas 
for all strategies. Within business cycles all strategies except CTA provide average 
alpha for growth periods of 0.847 while for the up regime this is 0.558. This is because 
during growth periods some strategies (e.g. Sector, Others) provide extra alpha 
compared to the up regime. For recession periods the average alpha is 1.322 compared 
to 0.733 for the down regime; the difference has to do with the excess high alpha 
produced by some strategies (e.g. the ‘Others’ strategy) during recession periods. CTA 
during growth and up periods provides 0.817 and 0.831 respectively. During recessions 
and down regimes CTAs’ alphas are not significant, meaning that this strategy performs 
well only in good times (one of the highest alphas across all strategies). Overall, 
concerning bad economic or market conditions, down regimes seem to be harsher for 
hedge fund strategies in terms of excess returns. Fund managers are more concerned 
with minimizing their risk in down regimes than in recessions, even at the cost of lower 
returns.    
3.3.4.8 Common factors excluding MAI 
Table 21 presents the important factors (excluding MAI) across all strategies. During 
growth periods fund managers invest more in equity factors such as MOM, SMB and 
HML. Hence, momentum sub-strategies, investing in small firms compared to large or 
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investing in value versus growth stocks are efficient in delivering high excess returns to 
investors. During recession periods, the three most important factors are COAG, COEN, 
and COIM. Fund managers change their asset allocations and are trying to invest in 
commodity factors (food/agriculture, energy, and industrial metals) that relate to more 
defensive or counter-cyclical industries. This is in agreement with Cashin, McDermott, 
Scott (2002) who found that economic cycles are not the fundamental drivers of the 
evolution of commodity prices and Gleich, Achzet, Mayer, and Rathgeber (2013) who 
found that commodity prices depend on other fundamental factors such as economic 
scarcity and supply risk. However, the Others strategy is able to deliver significant 
excess returns to investors as it has significant exposures to the GEMI factor meaning 
that is investing in global markets. The same is true for the Sector strategy that invests 
in certain (counter-cyclical) industries, providing significant alpha.  
During the up regime, similar to growth periods, the most common exposures are to 
MOM, SMB and HML. Fund managers invest in equity factors and implement 
momentum sub-strategies investing more heavily in smaller firms and value stocks. 
Like the growth periods, directional and semi-directional strategies mainly have these 
exposures. During down regimes, fund managers invest primarily in equity and 
commodity factors. Although SMB is still a main exposure for hedge fund strategies, 
nevertheless this exposure is lower compared to the up regime. Similarly to the 
recession period, in the down regime fund managers take exposures to the factors 
COAG and COIM, as they are related to more defensive counter-cyclical industries. 
This aligns with the results of the studies of Cashin, McDermott and Scott (2002) and 




Table 21. Most Common Factors Excluding MAI 
This table shows the most frequent exposures for all strategies across business cycles and during different market 
conditions. The X symbol represents the existence of a statistically significant exposure. During down regimes there 




















































































MOM X X X X   X X     X X 
SMB X X X X X X     X     
HML  X  X X X   X   
Recession 
Period                       
COAG   X X X       X   X   
COEN X      X X   X 
COIM X           X X     
 Up Regime                       
MOM X X X X   X   X X X   
SMB X X X X X X     X     
HML  X  X X X   X X  
Down 
Regime                       
SMB   X   X         X     
COIM         X X     X     
COEN X  
  




Table 22 examines the portfolio allocation exposures (in terms of intensity) of the asset 
classes for all hedge fund strategies. According to the analysis the most common asset 
classes across all hedge fund strategies within business cycles/different regimes are: 
first, the Equity class (MAI, SMB, MOM, HML and GEMI), then the commodity class 
(COIM, COAG, COEN and COPM), then Credit (DEF and TERM) and finally the 
Option (DVIX) class. On average, during recession and down regimes hedge fund 
managers lower their exposures to the equity class factors by 17% and 22% 
respectively. It is the opposite for commodities: during recession and down regimes, on 
average, hedge fund managers increase their exposures to the commodity asset classes 
by 50% and 57% respectively. Concerning the credit factors (which are less common 
than the two previous classes), during recessions hedge fund managers change their 
average exposures and go from negative to positive (please see the sub-section on 
opposite/reverse exposures). The opposite is true for the option class factor: here, during 
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stressful market conditions, hedge fund managers on average change their exposures 
from positive to negative to protect themselves against risk.    
Table 22. Portfolio Allocations 
This table shows the average allocations to the most common asset classes for all hedge fund strategies within 














Equity 0.112 0.093 -17% 0.109 0.085 -22% 
Commodity 0.056 0.084 50.% 0.063 0.099 57% 
Credit -0.637 0.130 120% -0.024 - 
 
Option 0.021 -0.061 -390% 0.014 -0.029 -307% 
 
3.3.4.9 Opposite/Reverse exposures 
So far we have seen that hedge fund strategies, conditional on market conditions, reduce 
both the number of their exposures to different asset classes and their portfolio 
allocations. However, I have found that there are some exposures for a few hedge fund 
strategies that are systematically negative (positive) during stressful market conditions 
and positive (negative) during good times. For example, during growth and recession 
periods fund managers (e.g. Sector, Long Short, Others) take positions with negative 
exposures toward DEF (default premium) and HML (High minus Low), respectively. In 
this study, I computed that the DEF spread is lower during growth periods (average 
equal to 0.88) than during recessions (average equal to 1.60) due to market uncertainty. 
Hence, fund managers during growth periods take negative exposure against DEF for 
higher returns. The HML spread is higher during growth periods (average equal to 0.51) 
compared to recessions (average equal to -0.39), as value stocks are in better (worse) 
position than growth stocks during growth periods (recessions). Thus, fund managers 
during recessions take negative exposures against HML (e.g. buying fewer asset-rich 
stocks). Overall, there is evidence that fund managers take negative positions to some 
factors conditional on changing market conditions.   
There are also fund managers who reverse their exposure from negative to positive and 
vice versa in the same asset class, depending on market conditions. For example, Long 
Short and Market Neutral strategies have positive HML exposure during “good” times 
and negative HML exposure during “bad” times. By doing this they provide high excess 
returns when there is upward market movement and protect themselves from risk during 
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“bad” times. Ultimately, fund managers, beyond taking negative positions in some asset 
classes as mentioned in the precious paragraph, move further by taking negative or 
positive positions on the same asset class conditional on changing market conditions.         
3.3.4.10 Exposure by group 
I now examine the most common exposures for the three groups of strategies: 
directional, semi-directional and non-directional26. For directional the most common 
exposures (excluding MAI) during “good” times are SMB and MOM as fund managers 
exploit the momentum and the size effect. During stressful market conditions fund 
managers are trying to minimize their risk. Hence, for recession periods the exposures 
are COAG and then HML (with negative exposures) while for the down regime these 
are SMB and COAG. Semi-directional strategies have less common exposures between 
them as they have less systematic risk than directional strategies. The most important 
for growth periods (in terms of intensity) are DEF (negative exposures) and SMB. For 
recession periods the most common are COIM and TERM. For the up regime they are 
the HML and SMB (in terms of intensity) whereas for the down regime it is the COIM 
factor. Regarding the non-directional strategies these by nature have very low 
systematic risk and are less sensitive to business cycles and market conditions. For 
growth periods the most common is the MOM factor whereas for the up regime there is 
an additional factor, the HML. For recession periods and down regimes, except for the 
MAI, there is no common factor as each strategy may exploit different factors.    
Table 23 shows that directional strategies have less dispersed (more common) factors 
concerning their asset class exposures within different business cycles and market 
conditions (on average, 2.2 asset class exposures per group). Next are the semi-
directional strategies (on average 1.8 asset class exposures per group) and then the non-
directional strategies (1.3), i.e. the last group has the least common exposures within its 
hedge fund strategies. This dispersion increases gradually when moving from 
directional to non-directional strategies.  
 
 
                                                 
26 Recall that I consider directional strategies to be Short Bias, Long Only, Sector and Long Short, semi-
directional strategies to be Event Driven, Multi Strategy, Others and Global Macro and non-directional 
strategies to be Relative Value, Market Neutral and CTAs. There is a grading from extreme directional 
strategies such as Short Bias to extreme non-directional strategies such as CTAs.  
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Table 23. Exposures per Group (excluding MAI) 
 This table shows the number of exposures and the most common factor within different business cycles and market 
conditions across three groups: directional, semi-directional and non-directional strategies (depending on their 
correlation with the MAI market index). 
          Growth Recession Up Down 
 Panel A Directional Strategies 
Average number of 
factors within group 
2.4 2.2 2.2 1.8 
Total number of factors 10 5 10 6 
Most common factors SMB, MOM COAG, HML SMB, MOM SMB,GOAG 
 Panel B Semi Directional Strategies 
Average number of 
factors within group 
1.9 1.5 1.9 1.4 
Total number of factors 8 8 10 7 
Most common factors DEF, SMB 
COIM, 
TERM 
HML, SMB COIM 
 Panel C Non-Directional Strategies 
Average number of 
factors within group 
1.3 1.3 1.4 1 
Total number of 
factors 
7 4 7 8 
Most common factors MOM - MOM, HML - 
 
Table 24 examines the portfolio allocation exposures (the intensity) for each group27. In 
general, all strategies change their exposures during stressful market conditions. 
Concerning the equity factors in growth/recession periods the change is driven mostly 
by the directional strategies. For the up/down regimes it is driven mostly by semi/non 
directional strategies. Regarding the commodity factors in growth/recession regimes, 
the change is driven mainly from directional strategies whereas for up/down regimes the 
change is driven mainly by directional and non-directional strategies.  
  
                                                 
27 I remind the reader that there is a gradual market classification, hence it is difficult to impose strict 
limits on each group. 
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Table 24. Portfolio Allocation 
This table shows the average changes of the most common asset classes for each group of strategies within business 
cycles and different market conditions. Non-directional strategies do not have any significant commodity asset 
classes during growth periods. 
Asset Class Growth Recession 
% 
Difference 






(Base = Up) 
Directional strategies 
Equity 0.095 0.064 -33% 0.100 0.129 29% 
Commodity 0.053 0.116 119% 0.061 0.115 89% 
Semi-directional strategies 
Equity 0.148 0.191 29% 0.140 0.079 -44% 
Commodity 0.066 0.063 -5% 0.047 0.104 121% 
Non-directional strategies 
Equity 0.091 0.064 -30% 0.072 0.013 -82% 
Commodity - 0.082 - 0.137 0.079 -42% 
 
3.3.4.11 Discussion 
The results confirm the initial assumption that hedge funds have exposures to different 
factors and are time-varying, conditional on different cycles and regimes. Moreover, the 
results do not confirm the assumption that hedge funds are superior investment vehicles, 
i.e. they do not deliver excess returns to investors in all business cycles and market 
conditions. In general, the findings agree with other authors (e.g. Bali, Brown and 
Caglayan, 2011, Jawadi and Khanniche, 2012 and Giannikis and Vrontos, 2011) that 
hedge fund strategies are dynamic in terms of exposures and returns. More specifically, 
the model used agrees with the literature that returns and factor exposures change over 
time, as there are major switches of hedge fund returns (as modelled by Jawadi, 
Khannich, 2012) occurring in stressful market conditions. In addition, there is partial 
agreement with Bollen and Whaley (2009) since I found that only one of their two 
samples, containing spikes of exposures’ switching to appear during stressful market 
conditions. However, it is important to mention that they focus (contrary to this study) 
on the internal change of funds’ exposures examining funds during the period 1994 to 
2005, allowing for a single shift in the parameters (asset weightings) of the funds. I have 
shown that different strategies (especially between directional and non-directional) have 
different exposures. In addition, there are some common risk factors such as the market, 
credit, the term spread and commodities that are shared between many hedge fund 
strategies (as mentioned by Billio, Getmansky and Pelizzon, 2012) and there are some 
other factors such as default spread and VIX that are economically important (Avramov 
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et.al. 2013). The findings agree with Meligkotsidou and Vrontos (2014) that the market 
index and the spread of small cap minus large cap were the most significant factors in 
hedge fund returns. Furthermore, there are changes in portfolio allocations that are more 
intense than changes in exposures to asset classes, as Patton and Ramadorai (2013) 
found. There is partial agreement with Ibbotson, Chen and Zhu (2011) as only a few 
strategies add significant value to investors during bear market conditions because fund 
managers are concerned about risk. Nonetheless, they examined alpha and exposures 
only during the 2008 financial crisis. There is also agreement with Brown (2012) that 
traditional systematic factors such as equities or credit impose significant exposures on 
hedge funds although the author took into consideration performance before fees. Last 
but not least, as Agarwal and Naik (2004) found, there are many hedge fund strategies 
exhibiting significant exposures to Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model and 
Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor. 
3.3.4.12 Robustness 
The proposed piece-wise parsimonious multifactor model is a flexible twin model; the 
first component contains pre-specified structural breaks used (multiple business cycles) 
incorporating the stepwise regression technique and the second component is without 
pre-specified breaks (but using a regime switching statistical process that specifies them 
also) incorporating the stepwise regression technique. The model used sufficiently 
captures hedge fund behaviour and it is robust. This is because the statistical 
significance of the factor loadings on the Wilshire 5000TRI, conditional on the different 
regimes, is almost the same as that obtained in the simple market model with only the 
Wilshire 5000 TRI risk factor. This indicates that the analysis performed above is robust 
to the inclusion of other factors that may affect hedge index returns. Moreover, the 
average adjusted 𝑅2 for all strategies (excluding CTA) within all periods/regimes is 
0.61 for the proposed multi-factor model. The average highest is 0.84 for the Long Only 
strategy and the lowest is 0.29 for the Market Neutral strategy; it is 0.15 for CTA. This 
is compared to 0.48 for the simple market model.  
I tested the proposed model by using Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model and all the 
regressors in the model had the same sign and most were statistically significant. This 
process took place for all periods/regimes under consideration. Moreover, the proposed 
model adjusted 𝑅2  was higher than Carhart’s model which was 0.53. An essential 
robustness test is that I performed the analysis again by excluding the first 48 months 
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(1/1990-12/1993) and implementing the proposed model again. Within all 
cycles/regimes, all the regressors had the same sign and mostly statistically significant, 
making my findings more robust. Another robustness test I implemented was to model 
only the first 48 months (1/1990-12/1993). The results were qualitatively similar. I 
confirmed that during “good” times hedge fund strategies invest mainly in equity asset 
classes (MAI, MOM, SMB, and HML). An additional robustness check was to examine 
the model for the post-1994 period (1/1994-3/2014) using lookback straddles on bonds, 
currencies, commodities, short term interest rates and stock indices. As well as the 
lookback straddles, I found that COAG, COEN, and COIM were significant for this 
hedge fund strategy. I also proceed to another statistical test of my model for all hedge 
fund strategies using the HAC/Newey-West estimator for any unknown residual 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity and the results are still valid28.  
3.4 Conclusion 
In this study I have modelled 11 different hedge fund strategies using predefined 
structural breaks, based on multiple business cycles during 1990-2014 (the longest 
period in any hedge fund paper to date), using a comprehensive merged database. 
Beyond this, I used a Markov Switching model to identify in the proposed model the 
structural breaks conditional on the different states of the market index incorporating the 
stepwise regression technique so that the proposed model adjusts to different economic 
and market conditions, providing more accurate and useful results.  
There are some important conclusions that contribute significantly to the hedge fund 
literature, beyond those that agreed with the extant literature discussed above. First, 
stressful market conditions have a negative impact on hedge fund performance in terms 
of alphas as the majority of hedge fund strategies do not provide significant excess 
return to investors; at such times it is difficult to find opportunities. In addition, fund 
managers are concerned more about risk so as to protect themselves from losing money. 
Hedge fund strategies have much less exposure during stressful market conditions in 
terms of different assets classes and portfolio allocations (e.g. equity classes) as fund 
managers are concerned more about risks even at the cost of low returns. There are 
                                                 
28 The results concerning (1) Carhart’s model, (2) those concerning the pre-1994 period that was omitted, 
(3) those that include the first four years e.g. 1/1990-12/1993 (I implemented my model for “good” only 
times as in recessions and down regimes there were only 8 and 4 monthly observations, respectively), and 
(4) those of the CTA strategy concerning the post-1994 period, e.g. 1/1994-3/2014, using lookback 
straddles (Fung and Hsieh, 2001), and (5) the HAC/Newey-West estimator test in the robustness part of 
section 3.3 are in the appendix. 
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some strategies such as Long Short that even reverse their exposures to some factors, to 
protect themselves from risk. However, there are some strategies such as Market 
Neutral that are little affected by these conditions in terms of exposures, although it is 
not a trivial process to keep a market neutral portfolio balanced for all market 
conditions. Second, directional strategies have, on average, more common exposures 
between themselves, within all business cycles / different market conditions, compared 
to less directional strategies as by nature they have more systematic risk than non-
directional strategies. Third, factors related to commodities such as COAG, COEN and 
COIM are the most common exposures during stressful market conditions (in addition 
to the MAI factor) as they are regarded counter-cyclical industries or essential 
goods/services. On the contrary, some factors such as MAI, MOM, SMB and HML are 
the most common factors for the “good” time periods because fund managers benefit 
from the upward market movement, paying attention more to high returns compared to 
the systematic risk. Fourth, market volatility appears to affect hedge fund performance 
(in terms of alpha and exposures) more than business cycles volatility as down regimes 
are difficult to predict or to instantly realize once they happen. 
The results are important because they enable us to better understand hedge funds’ 
behaviour and I reveal aspects that have not been examined before. Although hedge 
funds are complex investment vehicles and difficult to model, there are nevertheless 
some consistent patterns in their behavior at a strategy level. These patterns are related 
to fund managers’ responses in terms of the excess returns delivered to investors and 
their exposures to factors within multiple business cycles and different market 
conditions. The long period of the used database (to my knowledge, the longest of any 
extant paper) enables us to examine hedge fund behavior in more a comprehensive way, 
not isolating a relatively short period of time containing just one financial crisis. In the 
proposed model, instead of using one general commodity factor I used specific ones for 
more precise results including for the first time (to my knowledge) the commodity 
factor COAG (agricultural/food industry). This is one of the prime exposure factors 
during recession and down regimes for many strategies.    
Investors can benefit from the findings as, at strategy level, they are able to know what 
to expect from different strategies taking into consideration stressful market conditions, 
having a clear distinction between business cycles and bull/bear market conditions. This 
is crucial as these two different states do not necessarily coincide and they have 
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different implications for hedge funds. The results should help investors and fund of 
fund managers in their strategic asset allocation process (e.g. selecting specific 
strategies during “bad” times that do not suffer a lot) although investors should predict 
by themselves with high accuracy these market conditions. Another use of the findings 
could be by fund administrators to use more flexible performance fee policies that can 
capture in a better way hedge fund managers’ performance (e.g. higher watermarks 
during “good” times). Last but not least, financial governance authorities could benefit 
by better understanding hedge funds’ risks and returns, in case there is a need for closer 
monitoring or a more restrictive legal framework in the future. 
I have focused on hedge funds that invest primarily in the North America region due to 
the use of U.S. business cycles. Whether similar results hold for the European and Asia-
Pacific regions would be a valuable out of sample test, but the definition of business 
cycles in these regions may be problematic. A further limitation is that I do not use in 
the main analysis lookback straddles that are appropriate for CTAs, due to data 
unavailability in the early 1990s. There is a need to examine hedge fund behaviour 
investing in other regions (e.g. Emerging Market strategies) within my approach. Last 
but not least, due to data unavailability (e.g. time-series of long and short position 





4 Chapter: Performance at fundamental and mixed level 
This Chapter (paper) examines the second research question that deals with what the 
impact is of fundamental factors on hedge fund strategy performance within (multiple) 
business cycles and different market conditions. Similar to the previous chapter, this is 
an empirical study therefore its structure has its own introduction, methodology, 
empirical analysis, and conclusion sections (a version of this paper is to be submitted to 
a journal). 
I explain hedge fund performance as a part of a holistic approach taking into 
consideration fund specific characteristics, fund strategies, and both business cycles and 
different market conditions using a long U.S. dataset from 1990 to 2014. Using the 
proposed piece-wise parsimonous model I have found, first, that irrespective of the 
underlying fundamental factors, hedge funds on average deliver significant excess 
returns to investors only during “good” times. During “bad” times they try to minimize 
their systematic risk. Secondly, during “good” times, small funds, young funds and 
funds with redemption restrictions deliver higher alpha with respect to their peers; 
however, during “bad” times small funds suffer more than large funds, young funds 
continue to outperform old ones, and funds that do not impose restrictions (and survive) 
outperform funds with lockups. Third, at the mixed level there are strategies with 
specific characteristics that deliver significant negative alpha to investors, conditional 
on stressful market conditions.   
4.1 Introduction 
In the hedge fund literature there are many studies that investigate the relationship 
between fund returns and fund specific characteristics such as size, age, lockup, and fees 
(e.g. Harri and Brorsen, 2004; Frumkin and Vandegrift, 2009; Bae and Yi, 2012). There 
have been also studies that investigate the relationship between fund returns and specific 
strategies or investment styles (e.g. Bollen and Whaley, 2009; O’Doherty, Savin, and 
Tiwari, 2015; Racicot and Theoret, 2016). Despite the fact that these studies use 
different databases and time periods, they can provide a useful guide to investors. 
Although these studies are important, until now there has been no investigation under a 
holistic approach of the relationship between funds’ performance and fund strategies 
and characteristics, within both different business cycles and market conditions. Given 
the complexity of hedge funds, knowing all the above interactions within a holistic 
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approach is a major issue for investors to deal with. Consequently, this study which uses 
an accurate parsimonious model discussed later, closes an important gap and helps 
investors in their asset and portfolio allocation process. In this study I use both multiple 
business cycles and market conditions as these two do not coincide necessarily. I have 
classified and ranked four different states of economic activity beginning from the most 
desirable state to the least desirable state. I focus on North American due to the use of 
three full U.S. business cycles and the importance of this market, counting for $1.9 
trillion of assets under management corresponding to almost 72% of the worldwide total 
of hedge funds (Preqin Global Hedge Fund Report, 2014). 
The novelty of this study lies to the use of a holistic approach examining the 
relationship between fund performance, fund strategies and fund characteristics 
exploiting both multiple business cycles and different market conditions (there is a clear 
distinction between them), and using the longest dataset ever used in a study. The 
proposed econometric model is flexible enough to capture hedge fund behaviour within 
these regimes/periods helping investors in their asset and portfolio allocations. The 
results are robust and the most important findings are, first, that hedge funds, on 
average, deliver significant alpha to investors only during “good” times irrespective of 
their characteristics whereas during “bad” times they try to minimize their systematic 
risk. Secondly, during “good” times small, young and funds with redemption 
restrictions outperform their peers; nevertheless, during “bad” times small funds suffer 
more than large funds, young funds continue to outperform old ones, and funds that 
impose restrictions (and survive) outperform funds with lockups. Third, strategies with 
specific characteristics can even deliver significant negative alpha, conditional on 
stressful market conditions.       
Several papers (e.g. Schneeweis, Kazemi, and Martin, 2002; Hedges, 2003; Harri and 
Brorsen, 2004; Ammann and Moerth, 2005; Meredith, 2007; Joenavaara, Kosowski, and 
Tolonen, 2012) showed that there is a negative relationship between fund performance 
and size. Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2004) found that there is a negative correlation 
and diseconomies of scale. Commercial studies (e.g. Pertrac Corp, 2012) also showed 
that there is a negative relationship between size and performance. However, there are 
some others studies (e.g. Gregoriou and Rouah, 2002) that found no evidence of a 
relationship, whereas yet other papers (e.g. Amenc and Martellini, 2003; Koh, Koh, and 
Teo, 2003) found a positive relationship and economies of scale. Getmansky (2004) 
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found that there is a positive and concave correlation and suggested that there is an 
optimal asset size. Although there are contradictory results due to different time periods, 
databases and methodologies, most studies conclude that there is a negative relationship 
between hedge fund size and performance. The age factor usually has to do with when 
the fund was launched, or the date the hedge fund entered vendor database(s). There are 
many studies (e.g. Howell, 2001; Amenc and Maertellini, 2003; Meredith, 2007; 
Frumkin and Vandegrift, 2009) that found young funds outperform old funds and 
commercial studies (e.g. Pertrac Corp, 2012) have also confirmed this. An exception is 
from Schneeweis, Kazemi and Martin (2002) who found strong evidence that there is a 
negative relationship between age and performance. However, Schneeweis et.al. (2002), 
contrary to other studies, took into consideration funds with the same starting month.  
As for the management fee, many studies (e.g. Ackerman, McEnally, and Ravenscraft, 
1999; Amemc and Martellini, 2003; Bae and Yi, 2012; Joenvaara, Kosowski, and 
Tolonen, 2012) have found that there is a positive relationship between performance 
fees and hedge funds’ performance. An exception is Schneeweis et al. (2002) and Koh 
et al. (2003) who found no significant relationship although the latter considered Asian 
hedge funds. This is intuitive for an investor to expect that higher performance fee 
corresponds to managers with higher skills (you get what you pay for). Regarding other 
fundamental factors, studies (such as Aragon, 2007; Joenvaara et al., 2012) showed that 
funds that impose lockup periods outperform funds that do not impose redemption 
restrictions as they are able to exploit liquidity premia for higher returns. Later studies 
(e.g. Hong, 2014) showed that although funds may have lower returns after decreasing 
share restrictions, nevertheless, investors reward fund managers by increasing flows. 
There are also many studies focusing on hedge fund strategies showing that funds’ 
exposures change over time and different strategies demonstrate different exposures in a 
non-linear framework (e.g. Bollen and Whaley, 2009; Billio, Getmansky and Pelizzon, 
2012; Melighotsidou and Vrontos, 2014; O’Doherty, Savin, and Tiwari, 2015).  
All the above studies present different perspectives of hedge fund performance and 
almost all agree that there is an association between specific fund characteristics 
(fundamental factors) and fund performance, and that funds’ exposures change over 
time. These studies are important for understanding hedge fund behaviour; nevertheless, 
investors are still confused by hedge fund complexity as these associations are 
investigated on fundamental-only or strategy-only levels, without also examining their 
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conditional changes over time. There is no holistic approach between performance, and 
the three elements of fundamental factors, strategies and market conditions. This study 
closes an important gap, as this is the first investigation of hedge funds in a 
comprehensive, holistic approach that examines the relationship of performance with 
the previous three elements. I examine funds’ performance at the fundamental (fund 
characteristics) and mixed level (strategy and fund characteristics, together). As these 
relations are dynamic, I use multiple business cycles and different market conditions 
(thus not isolating one only recession or financial event) making a clear distinction 
between them as they do not coincide necessarily, having a different impact on funds’ 
performance. In addition, I rank favorable economic states from the most desirable state 
to the least desirable within the above approach (see section 4.3.2.6). Beyond that I 
examine hedge funds that invest primarily in one only region, which is the North 
American29 for more robust and concrete results, within the flexible adjusted model, I 
am the first to use specific commodity factors (e.g. agriculture/food, energy, industrial 
and precious metals) instead of one only general factor that is over simplistic.  
There are some important findings that contribute to the academic literature beyond 
those that agree with the literature, in terms of the negative relation between size and 
performance (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2004; Ammann, and Moerth, 2005; Meredith, 
2007; Joenvaara, Kosowski, and Tolonen, 2012), the negative relation between age and 
performance (Amenc and Martelini, 2003; Meredith, 2007; Frumkin, and Vandegrif, 
2009; Pertrac Corporation, 2012), and funds that impose redemption restrictions 
outperforming those that do not (Aragon, 2007; Joenvaara, Kosowski, and Tolonen, 
2012), as well as the changing exposures over time of funds in a non-linear framework 
(Bollen and Whaley, 2009; Billio, Getmansky and Pelizzon, 2012; Melighotsidou and 
Vrontos, 2014; O’Doherty, Savin, and Tiwari, 2015): First, irrespective of the 
underlying fundamental factors, all funds, on average, during “good” times deliver 
excess returns to investors, contrary to “bad” times where there are no significant excess 
returns. In terms of the market exposures, irrespective of the fundamental factors, 
during stressful conditions funds, on average, decrease their market exposures. 
Secondly, at the fundamental level, during “good” times, small funds, young funds, and 
funds with redemption restrictions deliver higher alpha with respect to their peers. For 
                                                 
29 As I have mentioned North America is the most economically important region and I cover three full 
U.S. business cycles. I examine what the direct impact is of the underlying economic conditions on hedge 
funds’ performance. Funds that invest in equity emerging markets or fixed income emerging markets that 
do not have direct exposure to the North America region should be treated separately in another paper.   
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“bad” times, small funds seem to suffer more than large, young funds continue to 
outperform old funds, and funds that do not impose restrictions (and survive) 
outperform funds with lockups. It seems that fund managers feeling the pressure of not 
having the “safety” of redemption restrictions are more innovative and do better than 
their peers. Third, at the mixed level, there are strategies with specific characteristics, 
conditional on stressful market conditions that deliver significant negative alpha to 
investors. The findings are robust even after having excluding the pre 1994 period from 
my analysis to the robustness checks (many papers exclude pre-1994 data because the 
majority of the databases for commercial use came into existence from the early/mid 
1990s with a few exceptions such as the Eurekahedge and Barclayhedge databases that 
include also pre 1994 dead funds) or using the pre-1994 only time period. 
This study contributes to the hedge fund literature being the first to examine fund 
performance in a holistic approach of funds’ fundamental characteristics, funds’ 
strategies, and both multiple business cycles and different market conditions. I have 
revealed useful findings on hedge fund behaviour, helping investors in their investment 
decision processes as they now know how these different aspects are related and what to 
expect from hedge funds. I used multiple business cycles and market conditions (not 
isolating only one recession or financial stressful event) and I make a clear distinction 
between them as they have different implications for hedge funds. An extension of this 
is the analysis of ranking favorable economic states from the most desirable state to the 
least desirable. By using a systematic database merging and cleaning process, the 
proposed piece-wise parsimonious econometric model with pre-defined and undefined 
structural breaks is flexible enough to capture changes in asset and portfolio allocations 
of hedge funds over time. Lastly, I use several specific commodity factors (e.g. 
agriculture/food, energy, industrial and precious metals) for more accuracy as different 
commodities do not behave in the same way in the market, as suggested by Bhardwaj 
and Dunsby (2014).        
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 4.2 is the methodology 
detailing the theoretical framework and the data I use in the analysis. Section 4.3 is the 
empirical analysis with key statistics, the regime switching model, and fund 
performance at fundamental and mixed level with some robustness tests. Section 4.4 is 
the conclusion providing a summary of the findings and some opportunities for further 




This section presents the theoretical framework along with the data. 
4.2.1 Theoretical framework 
I use the custom proposed model with pre-defined and non-defines structural breaks. 
The pre-defined structural breaks depend on the growth and recession periods of 
multiple business cycles. For the non-defined structural breaks there is a use of a 
statistical stochastic process using the Markov regime-switching model (Hamilton, 
1989, 1990). This agile model is flexible enough to capture changes in asset and 
portfolio allocations due to the use of the stepwise regression technique in each 
regime/period. For more details about the above please see Chapter Three – 
methodology section. This approach takes place at the fundamental and the mixed level.   
In order to examine hedge funds at fundamental level I form portfolios (groups) for all 
hedge funds according to size, age, and lockup redemption restriction. Furthermore, in 
order to examine hedge funds at mixed level I form sub-portfolios (sub-groups) for each 
of the 11 hedge fund strategies (see next section).  
4.2.2 Data 
I use the same databases as I used in the Chapter Three covering the period from 
January 1990 to March 2014 and the same factors form the Datastream and Fama and 
French’s online data library (Ibottson Associates). For more information about the data, 
the database merging and cleaning processes, the hedge fund strategies, and the factors 
please the empirical paper one – data section. However, in this empirical chapter I use 
an extra dataset that deals with hedge fund fundamental factors (hedge fund specific 
characteristics). 
As fundamental factors I use three hedge fund characteristics: the size, the age and the 
lock-up period. The objective is to examine the differences between small versus large 
funds, young versus old funds, and lockup-yes versus lockup-no funds regarding their 
performance (alpha and exposures) within multiple business cycles and different market 
conditions. I implemented an analysis concerning all hedge fund strategies excluding 
CTAs, which I examine separately in my empirical section. Beginning from the size 
fundamental factor, I calculated the median asset under management (AUM) of all 
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hedge funds to be $34.4 million. For each individual hedge fund I computed the average 
AUM since its inception. This is because the AUM are not steady and usually grow 
over time. Thus I formed two portfolios of funds, those that were below $34.4m 
classifying them as small and those above $34.4m classifying them as large. Concerning 
the age fundamental factor, I computed the median age in months since the inception of 
each fund to be 62 months. Hence, I formed two portfolios of funds, those with age less 
than 62 months classifying them as young and those that were more than 62 months 
classifying them as old funds. Regarding the lockup fundamental factor I formed two 
portfolios with lockup-yes restrictions and lockup-no restrictions30.   
I formed sub-portfolios for each of the eleven strategies. Hence I formed six portfolios 
for each of the 11 strategies (in total 66 portfolios): the size portfolios (small and large 
funds based on their median), the age portfolios (young and old funds based on their 
median age since the inception period), and lockup portfolios (lockup-yes and lockup-
no)31. Table 25 provides the overall portfolio analysis structure.  
  
                                                 
30 This dual categorization has been used by other authors as well. I found that about half of the funds do 
not have an explicit lockup period. There are other implicit restrictions such as the redemption frequency 
or the redemption notice period that can be considered as “soft” restrictions, however too many records 
were missing to enable further analysis. I considered young/old and large/small categorization similar to 
other authors mentioned in the introduction section. The industry has grown over time however this does 
not mean that small funds will be in the early years only, as the number of hedge funds has been increased 
significantly over the past years.   
31 Those funds that had missing information such as missing size (794) or lockup information (672) were 
excluded from the sample.  
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Table 25. Portfolio Analysis Structure 
This table presents the overall structure of the portfolio analysis. At the fundamental level analysis, I formed six 
portfolios whereas at the mixed level analysis I formed 66 portfolios. (All data containing fundamental factor 
information were mapped to each appropriate fund return and AUM time series data).    
       
4.3 Empirical analysis  
This section presents the basic statistics at strategy and fundamental level and market 
classification into broader categories of the hedge fund strategies (from directional to 
non-directional), and giving details of the regime switches that arrived at. Finally it 
reports the results from multi-factor models at fundamental and mixed levels. 
4.3.1 Basic statistics 
The basic statistics of the raw returns for each of the 11 hedge fund strategies are 
presented in the Chapter Three’s data section. The reader is reminded that, on average, 
directional strategies have more volatile returns than non-directional strategies.  
All Hedge Funds (at fundamental 
level) 
Hedge Funds (at mixed level) 
Portfolio 1 Size Small Funds (SS) Strategy 1   
Portfolio 2 Size Large Funds (SL)  Portfolio 1 Size Small Funds (SS) 
Portfolio 3 Age Young Funds 
(AY) 
 Portfolio 2 Size Large Funds (SL) 
Portfolio 4 Age Old Funds (AO)  Portfolio 3 Age Young Funds (AY) 
Portfolio 5 Lockup-Yes Funds 
(LY) 
 Portfolio 4 Age Old Funds (AO) 
Portfolio 6 Lockup-No Funds 
(LN) 
 Portfolio 5 Lockup-Yes Funds 
(LY) 
   Portfolio 6 Lockup-No Funds (LN) 
  …………...   
   ……………. ……………………….. 
  Strategy 11   
   Portfolio 1 Size Small Funds (SS) 
   Portfolio 2 Size Large Funds (SL) 
   Portfolio 3 Age Young Funds (AY) 
   Portfolio 4 Age Old Funds (AO) 
   Portfolio 5 Lockup-Yes Funds 
(LY) 
   Portfolio 6 Lockup-No Funds (LN) 
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Table 26 presents some statistics for all hedge funds based on the fundamental factors. 
Each fundamental group is a representative-average time series of their relevant 
(equally weighted) hedge funds. In absolute returns large funds, old funds, and funds 
with lockups outperform their peers. 
Table 26. Raw Returns by Main Portfolios 
This table provides the basic statistics of monthly raw returns for each of the 6 portfolios. 
Fundamental Group Mean Standard Deviation 
Size Small 0.92% 2.069 
Size Large 1.02% 2.022 
Lockup-Yes 1.07% 2.269 
Lockup-No 0.91% 1.884 
Age Young 0.77% 2.336 
Age Old 0.99% 2.040 
 
 
I classified the strategies into directional, semi-directional, and non-directional 
strategies according to their correlation with the market index Wilshire 5000TRI, 
including dividends. The reader can see the correlation of each strategy and its 
corresponding classification in the Chapter Three’s empirical analysis section.   
I implement the analysis taking into consideration different business cycles and market 
conditions. I remind the reader that within the January 1990 to March 2014 period there 
are three official business cycles. Hence the period under examination is divided into 
growth periods (01/1990-07/1990, 04/1991-03/2001, 12/2001-12/2007 and 07/2009-
03/2014) and to recession periods (08/1990-03/1991, 04/2001-11/2001, and 01/2008-
06/2009). Regarding the different market conditions, the Markov Switching process 
determines (up and down regimes) based on the mean and volatility of the Wilshire 
5000TRI. In order to compare the two different stages with business cycles I selected 
two regimes. Hence the period under examination is divided into up regimes 01/1990-
06/1990, 11/1990-10/2000, 10/2002-05/2008 and 03/2009-03/2014) and to down 
regimes (07/1990-10/1990, 11/2000-09/2002 and 06/2008-02/2009). It is mentioned 
that the average monthly MAI (excess risk free) return for down regimes is -3.69% 
whereas for recessions it is -1.03%. Hence, in the twin model, the classification of the 
market conditions (from favourable to less favourable overlapping states) is: Up 
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regimes, Growth periods, Recession periods, Down regimes (Best, Good, Bad, Worst) 
(see section 4.3.2.6 for more details). 
The assumptions needed for the parameter techniques used are discussed in chapter 3, 
section 3.2.2.   
4.3.2 Fundamental level 
This section takes into consideration all hedge funds and measures hedge fund 
behaviour based on their characteristics32. 
4.3.2.1 Growth periods 
Table 27 shows the results for the growth period under examination. When grouped 
according to each of the nine fundamental factors all hedge funds deliver strongly 
significant alphas33. The highest is 1.322 and the lowest is 0.823, delivered from funds 
that impose redemption restrictions and funds that do not impose restrictions 
accordingly. Regarding the exposures, as expected, there is no wide distribution of 
different exposures as I take into consideration all strategies. In other words, there is no 
large difference in terms of exposures of different asset allocations compared to my 
analysis at strategy level in the empirical chapter one. The most common exposure is 
MAI, SMB and then MOM and DEF in terms of intensity (portfolio allocations). In 
total there are 37 exposures to the various asset classes. Overall, within the growth 
period, hedge funds have relatively high asset allocation exposures for higher returns, 
irrespective of their fundamental characteristics.  
 
                                                 
32 I have also examined hedge funds including the CTA strategy. The results are similar except that, on 
average, large funds appear to outperform small funds.  
33 Concerning the alphas and exposures, the significant term means significantly different from zero. 
Alpha is the monthly excess return delivered to investors, expressed as a percentage.  
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Table 27. Multi-Factor Model During Growth Periods  
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model for growth periods, at fundamental level. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. The Risk 
free (RF) return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF returns. * 
denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. For space reasons, I present only the t-statistics in parentheses. (In this and the subsequent tables empty cells mean that there is 
no significant exposure to these factors).     
Dep. Variable Size Small Size Large Age Young Age Old Lockup-Yes Lockup-No 
C (excess return) 1.2188** 0.9055** 1.7091** 1.0016** 1.3220** 0.8228** 
 (4.8329) (4.3329) (3.7400) (5.0070) (5.1951) (4.4444) 
Market Index - MAI 0.3756** 0.3828** 0.3930** 0.3937** 0.4297** 0.3554** 
 (23.5797) (27.6861) (14.9596) (29.8729) (25.6305) (29.0154) 
Small minus Big - SMB 0.1266** 0.1536**  0.1523** 0.1727** 0.1284** 
 (6.6024) (9.0928)  (9.4607) (8.4346) (8.5813) 
Momentum - MOM 0.0625** 0.0480** 0.1029** 0.0504** 0.0466** 0.0603** 
 (4.1856) (3.8675) (4.6570) (4.2688) (3.0987) (5.4834) 
Commodity Energy - COEN 0.0262** 0.0206** 0.0288* 0.0217** 0.0224** 0.0213** 
 (3.2979) (3.1339) (2.2989) (3.4244) (2.7754) (3.6623) 
Default Spread - DEF -0.9408** -0.4914* -1.4060** -0.6521** -0.9207** -0.5153* 
 (-3.3934) (-2.1456) (-3.0333) (-2.9709) (-3.2969) (-2.5397) 
Commodity Previous Metals - COPM 0.0460**   0.0323** 0.0348*  
  (3.2904)   (2.9166) (2.4692)  
High minus Low - HML  0.0941** -0.0812* 0.0841** 0.0815** 0.0642** 
   (5.0484) (-2.4780) (4.7450) (3.6155) (3.8860) 
Adj. R-squared: 0.7423 0.7902 0.6388 0.8207 0.7734 0.8069 
F-statistic: 123.9101 161.7340 60.4222 168.3790 125.8359 179.2989 
Prob (F-stat): 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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4.3.2.2 Recession periods 
Table 28 shows the results during recession periods. On average, hedge funds do not 
provide significant alphas to investors, irrespective of their characteristics. Concerning 
the exposures there are fewer compared to the growth period in terms of asset allocation 
and portfolio allocation. The most common exposures are MAI and COAG. The highest 
exposure is, on average, in large funds and the lowest, on average, in funds that impose 
redemption restrictions on investors. In total, there are 20 exposures to asset classes 
compared to 37 during growth periods. Overall fund managers during recessions try to 














Table 28. Multi-Factor Model During Recessions 
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model during recession periods, at fundamental level. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. The 
Risk free (RF) return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF 
returns. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. For space reasons, I present only the t-statistics in parentheses.   
Dep. Variable Size Small Size Large Age Young Age Old Lockup-Yes Lockup-No 
C (excess return) 0.2516 0.4043 0.3066 0.3417 0.2463 0.3849 
  (1.2998) (1.5336) (1.9611) (1.4835) (0.9528) (1.9492) 
Market Index - MAI 0.2277** 0.3802** 0.2944** 0.3684** 0.2774** 0.3469** 
  (5.4665) (8.9358) (11.2112) (9.9131) (4.9877) (10.8859) 
Commodity Energy - COEN 0.0483**  0.0435*    
  (3.5140)  (2.7571)    
Change in VIX - DVIX -0.0269*    -0.0344*  
  (-2.4561)    (-2.3586)  
Commodity Agriculture - COAG 0.0598* 0.0855* 0.0526* 0.0913** 0.0841* 0.0811** 
  (2.0598) (2.3088) (2.5001) (2.8207) (2.2968) (2.9255) 
High minus Low - HML  -0.1897* -0.2533** -0.1420*  -0.1312* 
   (-2.5438) (-6.3516) (-2.1803)  (-2.3484) 
       
Adj. R-squared: 0.8365 0.7811 0.9161 0.8182 0.7892 0.8426 
F-statistic: 43.2033 40.2533 69.2761 50.5051 42.1903 59.9072 




4.3.2.3 Up regimes 
Table 29 presents results showing that during up regimes all hedge funds deliver 
strongly significant alphas or excess returns to investors. The highest alpha is 0.507, 
delivered from funds that impose redemption restrictions and the lowest is 0.301, 
delivered from young funds. The most important exposures are MAI and MOM. The 
highest exposure is 0.422 and the lowest 0.367 delivered from lockup-yes and lockup-
no, respectively. Similarly to the growth period there is, as expected, no wide 
distribution of exposures in hedge funds in terms of asset allocations. In total, there are 
32 asset class exposures across all strategies. In general fund managers during “good” 














Table 29. Multi-Factor Model During a Rising Market 
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model for the up regime, at fundamental level. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. The Risk 
free (RF) return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF returns. * 
denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. For space reasons, I present only the t-statistics in parentheses.   
Dep. Variable Size Small Size Large Age Young Age Old Lockup-Yes Lockup-No 
C (excess return) 0.3133** 0.4757** 0.3010** 0.4283** 0.5073** 0.3719** 
  (4.2796) (8.2110) (2.6501) (7.8143) (7.3898) (7.2230) 
Market Index - MAI 0.4101** 0.3898** 0.4032** 0.3992** 0.4222** 0.3669** 
  (17.3091) (26.0117) (14.5904) (28.1500) (23.7737) (27.5416) 
Commodity Energy - COEN 0.0325** 0.0269** 0.0340** 0.0277** 0.0304** 0.0260** 
  (3.8644) (3.9292) (2.6814) (4.1946) (3.6815) (4.2849) 
Small minus Big - SMB 0.1329** 0.1507**  0.1487** 0.1645** 0.1271** 
  (5.9324) (8.0935)  (8.4239) (7.4432) (7.6842) 
Momentum - MOM 0.0696** 0.0515** 0.1116** 0.0521** 0.0664** 0.0528** 
  (4.6395) (4.1310) (5.3557) (4.4165) (4.4994) (4.7672) 
Commodity Precious Metals - COPM 0.0435**   0.0320** 0.0351*  
  (3.0807)   (2.8800) (2.5196)  
High minus Low - HML 0.0692** 0.1001**  0.0950** 0.0952** 0.0798** 
  (2.6241) (4.5908)  (4.6056) (3.6841) (4.1187) 
Change in VIX - DVIX 0.0102*      
  (2.0334)      
       
Adj. R-squared: 0.7050 0.7737 0.6060 0.8041 0.7486 0.7911 
F-statistic: 87.7017 174.7268 84.0608 174.7865 127.0627 193.3936 




4.3.2.4 Down regimes 
Table 30 presents the results during down regimes. Hedge funds, irrespective of their 
fundamental characteristics, do not provide significant alphas to investors. Most hedge 
fund strategies do not provide significant alphas to investors. Any significant alphas 
delivered from particular strategies are shadowed by the other strategies, as in the 
current sample they are taken into consideration all eleven hedge fund strategies. 
Regarding the exposures, there are fewer compared to the growth period in terms of 
asset allocation and portfolio allocation. MAI, SMB and then COIM are the most 
common exposures. Small funds and no lockup funds deliver market exposures equal to 
0.237 and 0.165, which are the lowest and highest, respectively. The total number of 
exposures during the down regimes is 26 across all hedge fund strategies. Similar to 













Table 30. Multi-Factor Model During a Falling Market 
This table shows the exposures of my multi-factor model for when the Wilshire 5000 is falling, at fundamental level. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. The Risk free (RF) 
return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF returns. * denotes 
significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. For space reasons, I present only the t-statistics in parentheses.   
Dep. Variable Size Small Size Large Age Young Age Old Lockup-Yes Lockup-No 
C (excess return) 0.2105 0.0729 0.3592 0.0821 0.0367 0.0971 
  (1.1433) (0.2761) (1.9243) (0.3613) (0.1417) (0.4995) 
Market Index - MAI 0.2366** 0.1487* 0.2227** 0.1747** 0.1961** 0.1649** 
  (6.0250) (2.4669) (7.1105) (3.3687) (3.3132) (3.7177) 
Exchange Rate - EXCH -0.1927*      
  (-2.5528)      
High minus Low - HML -0.0699*  -0.1760**    
  (-2.2676)  (-6.1706)    
Commodity Energy - COEN 0.0434**      
  (3.7543)      
Change in VIX - DVIX -0.0211* -0.0315*  -0.0278* -0.0344** -0.0229* 
  (-2.4214) (-2.5173)  (-2.5791) (-2.8010) (-2.4832) 
Small minus Big - SMB 0.1027* 0.1926** 0.1424** 0.1591** 0.2055** 0.1404** 
  (2.3779) (3.0794) (3.2257) (2.9560) (3.3468) (3.0524) 
Commodity Industrial Metals - COIM  0.0974** 0.1132** 0.1003** 0.0858* 0.0874** 
   (2.8113) (4.4656) (3.3623) (2.5214) (3.4277) 
       
Adj. R-squared: 0.8729 0.7594 0.8981 0.8112 0.8082 0.8239 
F-statistic: 41.0543 28.6188 69.3116 38.6023 37.8663 41.9512 




4.3.2.5 Analysis by funds characteristics 
In this sub-section I present an overview and a brief analysis of the most important 
findings for each of the six fundamental groups based on Tables 27-30. Then I proceed 
to detailed market exposure and alpha analysis. 
Concerning the size (small versus large funds), during “good” market conditions the 
most important exposures are the market, small minus big and momentum. Both groups 
try to exploit the upward market movement providing significant alpha to investors. 
They have also a negative DEF exposure as the DEF premium is negative during 
“good” times. On average, small funds appear to have larger exposures to these factors, 
and deliver higher alpha than large funds. During stressful market conditions, both 
groups decrease their exposures and they do not deliver significant alpha to investors. 
The market exposure is still the most important for both groups although there are other 
important exposures such as the energy and agriculture commodities that fund managers 
switch to during stressful times. Large funds seem to be more successful than small 
funds in minimizing their risk as they have a small number of exposures. Overall small 
funds are more successful that large funds and we explain this as the most talented fund 
managers building experience in large funds, who then self-select to start their own 
firms. Small funds have better niche opportunities than large funds and as fund 
managers have a limited set of “good” ideas. When the fund increases in size they have 
to incorporate other less profitable ideas. Moreover in small funds there is higher 
pressure due to lower assets under management (thus management fees). In addition we 
conjecture that the bigger the fund, the further away the fund managers are from 
security-level analysis.   
Regarding the age (young versus old funds), during “good” times both groups exploit 
upward market movement by increasing their exposures. Young funds appear to be 
more successful in this. The most important exposures are the market, momentum, and 
the small minus big factor. During “bad” times, neither group provides significant alpha 
to investors; instead fund managers try to minimize their risk. The most important 
exposures are the market, and the energy and agriculture commodities. In addition both 
groups have negative high minus low exposure during “bad” times, however young 
funds appear to have more exposure to this factor. It seems that young funds are more 
successful in this. We would like to mention that young funds by definition have a 
timing advantage over old funds. This is because young funds tend to be formed at 
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times that are advantageous for specific strategies. An example could be funds that 
specialize in securitized credit strategy after a recession in response to opportunities in 
this area. In addition, young funds appear to be more returns driven because they have 
not created their fortune yet. 
Concerning lockups (yes versus no-redemption restrictions funds), both groups during 
“good” times deliver significant alpha to investors although funds that impose lockup 
restrictions are more successful because they can exploit liquidity premia. The most 
important factors for both groups are the market, small minus big, momentum, and the 
default spread (negative). Overall, funds that impose redemption restrictions are riskier, 
having more exposures in terms of asset allocations than funds that do not impose 
restrictions. During “bad” times both groups reduce their exposures, although funds 
with no lockups appear to have slightly fewer exposures. Overall it seems that funds 
that impose lockup restrictions are more successful as they can have more exposures 
than their peers (because of their protection) and exploit more liquidity premia. 
However during stressful conditions funds with no restrictions (that survive) are more 
successful than funds with restrictions. See section “alpha analysis” for more details. 
4.3.2.6 MAI analysis 
Overall, there are no large differences in exposures between funds that belong to 
different groups, according to the underlying fundamental factors. This has to do with 
the fact that differences in strategies and styles matter more in explaining hedge fund 
behaviour. In general, all funds during stressful market conditions try to minimize their 
exposures in terms of asset and portfolio allocations. Moreover, they do not provide 
significant alphas to investors (even for funds with lockup periods that in theory can 
exploit the liquidity premia) meaning that, in terms of alphas and exposures, 
fundamental characteristics are less important in the strategic asset allocation process 
than strategies or different styles of hedge funds. Table 31 provides the different MAI 
exposures for all hedge funds taking into consideration only the fundamental factors. As 
expected, on average, all groups decrease their exposures during stressful market 
conditions. There is a large decrease in exposures across all groups during the down 
regimes, however, during the recessions large, old and lockup-no funds do not change 
their exposures a lot meaning that recessions are less fierce than down regimes for 
hedge funds.   
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I move one step further toward the market state analysis where I examine the MAI 
behaviour of the underlying groups within different states. I classified and ranked four 
different states of the economic activity beginning from the most desirable state to the 
least desirable state. Based on the Markov Switching Model the worst or most severe 
state is the down regime, because it captures market downturns accompanied with great 
volatility. The next (less severe) state is the recession period, as it contains mostly 
negative market returns due to general low economic activity. The next (better) state is 
the growth period which contains mostly positive market returns. Finally, best state is 
the up regime which contains very high market returns. Regarding the up regime, it 
contains the whole time period under investigation minus the down (very severe) 
regimes. Similarly, the growth period contains the whole time period under 
investigation minus the recession (severe) periods. 
Table 31 shows that, in general, groups have the highest market exposures during the 
best state and in almost all cases these exposures gradually diminish when approaching 
the worse state. At a group level, small funds have higher exposures into the extreme 
good and bad financial conditions compared to large funds. Young funds have higher 
exposures in the extremely good and bad conditions compared to the old funds. 
Regarding the lockup groups, funds with lockup periods provide higher exposures 
during “good” times whereas in the bad and worst states this group provides higher and 
lower exposures, respectively, compared to the lockup-no funds. However, the 
differences in exposures in each pair group are not significant different from zero when 
we consider all states together - four observations (states) per each group. 
Table 31. MAI Analysis per Fundamental Group 
This table shows market exposures of my multi-factor model for all the groups (portfolios). ** denotes significance at 














(Base  Up) 
Size Small 0.376** 0.228** -39.40% 0.410** 0.237** -42.31% 
Size Large 0.383** 0.380** -0.68% 0.390** 0.149** -61.85% 
Age Young 0.393** 0.294** -25.09% 0.403** 0.223** -44.77% 
Age Old 0.394** 0.368** -6.43% 0.399** 0.175** -56.24% 
Lockup-Yes 0.430** 0.277** -35.44% 0.422** 0.196** -53.35% 




4.3.2.7 Alpha analysis 
I have mentioned that hedge funds, on average, do not provide significant alpha to 
investors during stressful market conditions as fund managers are more concerned about 
risks in the cost of alpha. However, hedge funds provide strongly significant alpha to 
investors during the growth and up regimes, and increase their market exposure so as to 
benefit from the upward market movement. Table 32 reports the average performances 
of the different groups within “good” and “bad” times. Small funds outperform large 
funds during “good” times; however, during “bad” times small funds seem to be more 
vulnerable. Young funds outperform old funds during all conditions, especially during 
“good” times. As expected, lockup-yes outperforms lockup-no hedge funds during the 
“good” times. Nevertheless, during “bad” times lockup-no slightly outperforms lockup-
yes. It seems that lockup-yes funds cannot successfully exploit the liquidity premia (e.g. 
by investing in real estate) during “bad” times, contrary to the lockup-no funds that try 
to do something more efficient (e.g. investing in counter-cyclical industries).  
In the “states” alpha analysis I present the non-linearity in groups’ performances. In 
Table 32, in general, contrary to market exposures, that there is non-linearity across all 
different states regarding the excess returns in each of the different groups. Especially in 
the best state hedge funds, irrespective of the groups that they belong to, do not provide 
the highest excess returns to investors, meaning that hedge funds are rather exploiting 
the upward market conditions just by increasing their exposures to the market factor. 
Large funds compared to small funds perform very well during the extremely good 
conditions such as the up regimes (0.476) but suffer a lot during the extremely bad 
conditions such as the worst state (0.073) perhaps due to sensitivity to cash 
redemptions. The opposite happens with small funds with 0.313 and 0.211 in the 
extremely good and extremely bad states, accordingly. It appears that in the extremely 
negative conditions large funds do not have the flexibility to adapt and in consequences 
these have a worse impact on their performance. In extremely good conditions, large 
funds just enjoy the benefits of economies of scale. Concerning the age factor, old funds 
perform better than young funds in extremely good market conditions (0.428) but they 
suffer more during extreme negative market conditions (0.082). It appears that 
extremely negative market conditions have more negative impact on old funds, 
especially for those funds that have a proven good track record and remain in the market 
for a relatively long time period. Lockup-yes funds outperform lockup-no funds during 
the “good” time (0.507 and 1.322 for the best and good states) as these funds are 
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exploiting liquidity premia. However, during the “bad” time, even though lockup-yes 
funds do not suffer from money redemptions, they underperform compared to the 
lockup-no funds, even though the differences are not large. It seems that fund managers 
try to find new investment opportunities (e.g. better resource sector allocation) or hedge 
their portfolios in a better way toward market risk. Nevertheless, the differences in 
alphas in each pair group are not significantly different from zero when all states are 
considered together - four observations (states) for each group. 
One last comment concerning the relationship of small versus large and young versus 
old that is different for growths and up regimes: in the extremely good conditions (up 
regimes) large funds and old funds just enjoy the benefits of the economies of scale and 
their long establishment (reputation) within the existing opportunities, respectively. 
However, this does not work in just good conditions (growth) where there might be 
some fluctuations in market returns and investing opportunities are somewhat scarcer. 
The opposite happens to the extremely negative conditions (down regimes) where large 
funds and old funds suffer a lot because of the reduced flexibility and their negative 
impact on the proven track record of their existence in the market. However, during 
“bad” times (recessions) large and old funds seem not to suffer as much as in the 
exremely “bad” times, as the issues of flexibility and the negative impact on the 
previous track record are not so intense.    
Table 32. Alpha Analysis by Fundamental Group and “State”  
This table shows excess returns for all groups between different “states” and the average excess returns for groups 
between “good” and “bad” market conditions (“Good ” market conditions is the average between up regimes and 
growth periods whereas “Bad” market conditions is the average between down regimes and recessions). ** denotes 





















Size Small 0.313** 1.219** 0.766 0.252 0.211 0.232 
Size Large 0.476** 0.906** 0.691 0.404 0.073 0.239 
Age Young 0.301** 1.709** 1.005 0.307 0.359 0.333 
Age Old 0.428** 1.002** 0.715 0.342 0.082 0.212 
Lockup-Yes 0.507** 1.322** 0.915 0.246 0.037 0.142 
Lockup-No 0.372** 0.823** 0.598 0.385 0.097 0.241 
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4.3.3 Mixed level 
In this section I proceed to the mixed level analysis i.e. taking into consideration hedge 
fund strategies and fundamental factors together within different business cycles and 
market conditions. Since strategies are more important in explaining hedge fund returns 
than fundamental factors my analysis is based on the 66 portfolios mentioned before 
(six groups times 11 strategies – see data section). I begin with the more directional 
strategies and then I move gradually to the non-directional strategies. 
Table 33 presents the results at a mixed level for all strategies focusing on the excess 
returns delivered to investors. The findings are mostly strategy dependent as each 
strategy is unique having different relationship with fund characteristics and specific 
performance behaviour under different market conditions.   
4.3.3.1 Analysis by strategy    
The Short Bias strategy does not provide significant alpha during stressful market 
conditions. During “good” times, large funds outperform small funds, whereas old 
funds outperform young ones. Surprisingly, lockup-no funds outperform the lockup-yes 
funds meaning that fund managers do not rely on liquidity premia for high performance. 
The Long Only strategy, in general, does not provide excess returns during stressful 
market conditions. During “good” times, large funds outperform small funds as they are 
able to exploit economies of scale concerning the transaction/investing process (e.g. 
lower trade spreads). Young funds appear to outperform old funds whereas lockup-yes 
funds outperform lockup-no funds as they do not suffer from redemptions or 
liquidations and they are able to exploit the liquidity premia for high returns. An 
interesting point is that lockup-no funds provide strongly significant negative alpha 
during recessions. This means that lockup-no funds are struggling during recessions 
because of redemptions by investors forcing losses to be crystallized. For the Sector 
strategy, during “bad times”, only old and large funds provide significant alpha as they 
can benefit from their experience and their exploitation of the counter-cyclical sectors. 
During “good” times large and young funds outperform their peers as it seems that they 
can benefit from upward market movement. Lockup-yes funds outperform lockup-no 
funds as they are able to exploit the liquidity risk and do not suffer from investor 
redemptions. For the Long Short strategy, during “bad” times, only young funds provide 
significant alpha because of the timing advantage (see section 4.3.2.5). During “good” 
times, young funds appear to outperform old funds (although mainly for growth 
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periods). The same is with small funds in relation to large funds being able to exploit 
the upward market movement efficiently. As expected, lockup-yes funds outperform 
lockup-no funds as they exploit liquidity premia for higher returns.  
The Event Driven strategy does not deliver significant alpha during stressful market 
conditions, except for funds imposing lockup restrictions. During “good” times large 
and old funds outperform their peers. It seems that large funds are more efficient in 
terms of the economies of scales and old funds are in a better position to use their 
experience. As expected, lockup-yes funds outperform lockup-no funds due to the 
exploitation of the liquidity premia and protection. For the Multi Strategy, during “bad” 
times, small fund outperform large funds due to their higher flexibility in their mixture 
use of other strategies. An interesting point is that young funds suffer more than old 
funds and during down regimes they provide even significant negative alpha to 
investors. This suggests a lack of the necessary experience of implementing this type of 
“mixture” strategy. Funds with lockup restrictions outperform funds without lockups 
because they do not rely on the liquidity premia as fund managers are more innovative 
from their peers having more alternatives (e.g. invest in different markets). During 
“good” times large and lockup-yes funds outperform their peers due to the economies of 
scale and the exploitation of the liquidity premia, accordingly. In general, old funds 
outperform young funds due to their experience and establishment in the market. The 
Others strategy delivers significant alpha in almost all cases. This is because it uses 
different styles/tools (e.g. private investment in public equity, close-ended) or even 
allocations (e.g. start-ups) not widely used by other fund strategies. During “bad” times 
there are cases such as small, old and funds without redemption restrictions that provide 
high returns to investors. Similar applies during “good” times as these kind of funds 
have the flexibility and innovation to benefit more from the upward market movement. 
For the Global Macro strategy, during “bad” times, funds with lockups and old funds 
outperform their peers as fund managers do not rely on lockup protections having 
experience, accordingly. Regarding the age the mixed results do not give a clear picture. 
During “good” times lockups-no and old funds outperform their peers. Regarding the 
size factor the results are mixed and this suggests that the investor cannot rely on the 
size of her investment decision. The Relative Value strategy, during “bad” times, does 
not provide significant alpha except for the young funds having the timing advantage. 
During “good” times small, young and funds with redemption restrictions outperform 
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their peers. This is because small funds have the “right” capacity (as arbitrage 
opportunities are in a shortfall), young funds have the time advantage, and lockup 
restrictions provide a protection against redemptions or opportunities for liquidity 
premia exploitation. The Market Neutral strategy, during “bad” times, does not provide 
significant alpha exempt for the small and old funds due to the “right” capacity and the 
experience within the old funds. During “good” times large and old funds are able to 
exploit better the upward market movement than their peers. Funds with redemption 
restrictions outperform their peers due to the protection against investors and due to the 
liquidity premia. For the CTA strategy, during “bad” times, large, young and funds with 
lockups outperform their peers because of the economies of scale, the timing advantage 
and the protection-liquidity premia, accordingly. The same applies for the lockup-yes 
funds during “good” times. However, small and old funds outperform their peers due to 
their flexibility-“right” capacity and experience, respectively.   
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Table 33. Mixed Level Analysis 
This table shows the exposures of my multi-factor model for all conditions of the Wilshire 5000, at a mixed level. Panel A shows Short Bias and Long Only, Panel B shows Sector and Long Short, Panel C shows Event Driven and Multi Strategy, Panel D shows Others and Macro, 
Panel E shows Relative Value and Market Neutral, and Panel F shows the CTA. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. SS: Size Small, SL: Size Large, AY: Age Young, AO: Age Old, LY: Lockup Yes, LN: Lockup No. The Risk free return (RF) is the one-
month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF returns. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. For space reasons, I do not present 
the t-statistics.   
Panel A                       1a. Short Bias – Growth 1b. Short Bias - Recessions 1c. Short Bias – Up Regimes 1d. Short Bias – Down Regimes 
Dep. 
Var: 
SB_SS SB_SL SB_AY SB_AO SB_LY SB_LN Dep. 
Var: 
SB_SS SB_SL SB_AY SB_AO SB_LY SB_LN Dep. 
Var: 
SB_SS SB_SL SB_AY SB_AO SB_LY SB_LN Dep. 
Var: 
SB_SS SB_SL SB_AY SB_AO SB_LY SB_LN 
C 0.545** 1.659** 0.243 0.569** 0.043 0.661** C -0.624 0.445 0.389 -0.570 -0.116 -0.726 C 0.476* 1.788** 0.311 0.479** 0.152 0.547** C 0.2836 0.333 -0.739 0.392 0.627 0.317 
MAI -0.874** -0.764** -0.672** -0.874** -0.916** -0.870** MAI -0.984** -0.881** -0.820** -1.010** -0.867** -1.069** MAI -0.955** -0.754** -0.615** -0.957** -0.989** -0.955** MAI -0.818** -0.758** -0.964** -0.826** -0.451** -0.892** 
SMB -0.276**   -0.264** -0.189** -0.270** COEN 0.140**   0.131** 0.150** 0.114** SMB -0.290**   -0.275** -0.209** -0.281** COEN 0.122**   0.114** 0.124** 0.101** 
MOM -0.163** -0.275**  -0.200**  -0.197**         MOM -0.127** -0.253**  -0.150**  -0.137** RLE  -0.109*   -0.170*  
COIM 0.119**  -0.156* 0.127** 0.166** 0.093**         COIM 0.114**  -0.153** 0.120** 0.170** 0.086*         
GEMI -0.178** -0.199*  -0.194**  -0.226**               GEMI -0.134* -0.211*  -0.150*  -0.178**         
TERM  -0.585**                   TERM  -0.692**             
2a. Long Only - Growth 2b. Long Only - Recessions 2c. Long Only – Up Regimes 2d. Long Only – Down Regimes 
Dep. 
Var: 
LO_SS LO_SL LO_AY LO_AO LO_LY LO_LN Dep. 
Var: 
LO_SS LO_SL LO_AY LO_AO LO_LY LO_LN Dep. 
Var: 
LO_SS LO_SL LO_AY LO_AO LO_LY LO_LN Dep. 
Var: 
LO_SS LO_SL LO_AY LO_AO LO_LY LO_LN 
C 0.073 0.451** 1.408* 0.293** 0.555** 0.167 C 0.286 -0.517 -0.060 -0.426 1.734 -3.524** C 0.110 0.413** 0.224 0.285** 0.533** 0.166 C 0.054 -0.331 -1.121 -0.379 0.362 -0.515 
MAI 0.826** 0.592** 0.576** 0.680** 0.440** 0.783** MAI 0.785** 0.541** 0.663** 0.601**  0.723** MAI 0.842** 0.586** 0.343** 0.677** 0.405** 0.800** MAI 0.663** 0.529** 1.508** 0.535** 0.341** 0.607** 
SMB 0.123** 0.290** 0.174* 0.257** 0.253** 0.250** HML -0.248**      SMB 0.103** 0.304** 0.279** 0.263** 0.259** 0.262** SMB 0.320** 0.387** 0.553** 0.409** 0.390** 0.396** 
MOM 0.074**  -0.129** 0.044*  0.073** SMB 0.271** 0.414** 0.691** 0.413** 0.296* 0.432** HML  0.295**  0.240** 0.255** 0.215** COIM 0.139**    0.237**  
HML  0.270** -0.151* 0.215** 0.219** 0.187** COIM 0.092*  0.127*    COEN  0.044**  0.037**  0.037** HML   -0.279*    
COEN  0.032**  0.025*  0.029* COAG  0.127*  0.112*  0.173** MOM  0.055** -0.078** 0.055** 0.057* 0.053* GEMI   -0.793**    
DEF   -1.361*    DVIX     -0.079**  GEMI   0.132*  0.106**  COAG   0.171* 0.114*  0.144* 
GEMI     0.099**  COEN     0.155**          COPM   0.164*    
              MOM     -0.147**                
              DEF     -1.109*                
              TERM      1.467**               
Panel B                            1a. Sector - Growth 1b. Sector - Recessions 1c. Sector - Up Regimes 1d. Sector -Down Regimes 
Dep. 
Var: 
SE_SS SE_SL SE_AY SE_AO SE_LY SE_LN Dep. 
Var: 
SE_SS SE_SL SE_AY SE_AO SE_LY SE_LN Dep. 
Var: 
SE_SS SE_SL SE_AY SE_AO SE_LY SE_LN Dep. 
Var: 
SE_SS SE_SL SE_AY SE_AO SE_LY SE_LN 
C 1.440** 1.595** 4.175** 1.484** 1.775** 1.149* C 0.516 0.596 0.005 0.665* 0.461 0.421 C 0.425** 0.543** 0.371 0.509** 0.628** 0.323** C 0.063 1.980** 0.197 0.349 0.147 0.409 
MAI 0.611** 0.618** 0.803** 0.577** 0.591** 0.604** MAI 0.703** 0.532** 0.410** 0.519** 0.673** 0.442** MAI 0.651** 0.600** 0.850** 0.578** 0.585** 0.593** MAI 0.241* 0.604** 0.446** 0.408** 0.436** 0.438** 
COPM 0.149**   0.079**  0.074** HML -0.499** -0.353** -0.559** -0.334** -0.428** -0.361** COPM 0.174**   0.080**  0.087** HML -0.372** -0.347** -0.555**   -0.327** 
MOM 0.113** 0.101** 0.326** 0.083** 0.072* 0.131** COPM 0.182*      MOM 0.100** 0.108** 0.318** 0.083** 0.083** 0.136** COIM 0.162**  0.227**   0.100** 
SMB 0.112** 0.174**  0.153** 0.154** 0.161** COAG  0.140** 0.114** 0.130**  0.086* COIM -0.070*      RLE 0.129*      
DEF -1.296* -1.264** -3.915** -1.160** -1.389* -0.985* COEN   0.131**   0.047** SMB 0.103* 0.158**  0.142** 0.143** 0.140** MOM  0.188**    0.102** 
COEN 0.039* 0.052**  0.043** 0.054** 0.041** MOM   -0.116**    COEN  0.061**  0.045** 0.058** 0.045** SMB  0.231**    0.143* 
COIM -0.061*                      TERM  -0.677*     
HML   -0.356**                    COAG  0.095*     
                      DVIX    -0.0446* -0.057*  
                     EXCH      -0.201* 
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Table 33. Mixed Level Analysis (continued) 
2a. Long Short - Growth 2b. Long Short - Recessions 2c. Long Short – Up Regimes 2d. Long Short – Down Regimes 
Dep. 
Var: 
LS_SS LS_SL LS_AY LS_AO LS_LY LS_LN Dep. 
Var: 
LS_SS LS_SL LS_AY LS_AO LS_LY LS_LN Dep. 
Var: 
LS_SS LS_SL LS_AY LS_AO LS_LY LS_LN Dep. 
Var: 
LS_SS LS_SL LS_AY LS_AO LS_LY LS_LN 
C 1.629** 1.422** 2.586** 1.426** 1.610** 1.360** C 0.110 0.397 2.280* 0.251 0.100 0.388 C 0.554** 0.779** 0.573* 0.647** 0.670** 0.650** C 0.033 0.045 0.354 -0.070 -0.092 -0.080 
MAI 0.540** 0.506** 0.405** 0.537** 0.560** 0.493** MAI 0.429** 0.496**  0.430** 0.476** 0.480** MAI 0.576** 0.520** 0.506** 0.593** 0.599** 0.516** MAI 0.451** 0.275** 0.191** 0.322** 0.320** 0.297** 
SMB 0.196** 0.206** 0.090* 0.206** 0.231** 0.165** COAG 0.083*   0.087* 0.092*  SMB 0.175** 0.202**  0.209** 0.218** 0.178** SMB 0.210** 0.208** 0.146* 0.197** 0.240** 0.174** 
MOM 0.099** 0.078* 0.105** 0.087** 0.080** 0.099** HML -0.144* -0.218* -0.245** -0.163* -0.211** -0.187* MOM 0.096** 0.080** 0.115** 0.085** 0.093** 0.090** COAG 0.072*      
COEN 0.038** 0.029** 0.055** 0.032** 0.033** 0.034** GEMI   0.342**    COEN 0.048** 0.037** 0.077** 0.042** 0.045** 0.035** RLE -0.056*      
DEF -1.211** -0.760** -2.385** -0.880** -1.014** -0.887** TERM   -0.899*    TERM -0.172* -0.203** -0.273* -0.187** -0.205** -0.179** DVIX  -0.030* -0.031* -0.023* -0.034* -0.021* 
COPM 0.042* 0.030*  0.035* 0.042*  SMB    0.158*   DVIX 0.014*  0.031* 0.011* 0.012*  HML   -0.121**    
TERM -0.147* -0.190**  -0.165** -0.187** -0.136*        COPM 0.038*   0.040** 0.041*  COIM   0.109**    
HML  0.094**  0.075** 0.096**         HML  0.095**  0.098** 0.116** 0.054*        
              COIM    -0.027*          
Panel C                    1a. Event Driven - Growth 1b. Event Driven - Recessions 1c. Event Driven – Up Regime 1d. Event Driven – Down Regime 
Dep. 
Var: 
ED_SS ED_SL ED_AY ED_AO ED_LY ED_LN Dep. 
Var: 
ED_SS ED_SL ED_AY ED_AO ED_LY ED_LN Dep. 
Var: 
ED_SS ED_SL ED_AY ED_AO ED_LY ED_LN Dep. 
Var: 
ED_SS ED_SL ED_AY ED_AO ED_LY ED_LN 
C 0.472** 0.514** 0.272* 0.493** 0.616** 0.433** C -0.001 0.090 -0.099 0.100 0.184 0.044 C 0.426** 0.529** 0.156 0.507** 0.611** 0.427** C 0.303 0.109 0.185 0.184 1.950** 0.158 
MAI 0.195** 0.315** 0.209** 0.307** 0.235** 0.300** GEMI 0.162**      MAI 0.173** 0.270** 0.172** 0.254** 0.189** 0.277** COIM 0.188** 0.149** 0.108* 0.163** 0.136* 0.127* 
SMB 0.185** 0.160** 0.112** 0.165** 0.185** 0.148** COEN 0.088**  0.099**  0.084**  HML 0.203** 0.182** 0.133** 0.191** 0.182** 0.185** DVIX -0.032*    -0.046**  
HML 0.181** 0.176** 0.108** 0.183** 0.163** 0.170** MAI  0.323**  0.301**  0.411** SMB 0.174** 0.163** 0.118** 0.171** 0.184** 0.154** MAI  0.228** 0.123* 0.211**  0.234** 
GEMI 0.074*  0.111*  0.073**  COIM  0.117*  0.125** 0.122*  GEMI 0.085** 0.047* 0.171** 0.059** 0.096** 0.048* DEF     -1.371**  
COPM    0.027*   DVIX   -0.040**  -0.051**  COEN  0.019*  0.019* 0.028**         
              MOM   0.069**           
2a. Multi Strategy - Growth 2b. Multi Strategy - Recessions 2c. Multi Strategy – Up Regime 2d. Multi Strategy – Down Regime 
Dep. 
Var: 
MS_SS MS_SL MS_AY MS_AO MS_LY MS_LN Dep. 
Var: 
MS_SS MS_SL MS_AY MS_AO MS_LY MS_LN Dep. 
Var: 
MS_SS MS_SL MS_AY MS_AO MS_LY MS_LN Dep. 
Var: 
MS_SS MS_SL MS_AY MS_AO MS_LY MS_LN 
C 0.498** 0.665** 0.200** 1.394** 2.173** 0.601** C 0.610* 0.509 -0.4297 0.449 0.459 0.689* C 0.618** 0.661** 0.926** 0.662** 0.785** 0.601** C 0.674** 0.536 -1.316* 0.602* 0.402 0.710* 
MAI 0.228** 0.201** 0.133** 0.223**  0.179** GEMI 0.119**     0.142** MAI 0.170** 0.226**  0.231** 0.252** 0.187** GEMI 0.210**   0.093*  0.159** 
MOM 0.108**   0.042*   COEN 0.079**    0.153**  MOM 0.113**   0.051** 0.102*  HML -0.188**     -0.117* 
GEMI 0.110**    0.238**  HML -0.294** -0.233*     GEMI 0.088*  0.120**    COEN 0.061**      
DVIX 0.018*      RLE 0.061*      COPM 0.057*  0.029* 0.046** 0.081*  DVIX  -0.049**  -0.035** -0.046**  
SMB  0.135**  0.092**  0.076** MAI  0.266**     HML  0.181**  0.087**  0.113** COIM  0.160** 0.232** 0.122** 0.135** 0.128** 
HML  0.151**  0.060*  0.086** COAG  0.121*    0.101* SMB  0.156**  0.095**  0.088** DEF   0.919*    
COIM  0.039*    0.027* DVIX   -0.030* -0.066** -0.064** -0.034* DEF   -0.618**           
RLE   0.041*    COIM   0.083* 0.119**   DVIX   -0.013*           
COEN   0.026**    EXCH     0.434*  COEN      0.024**        
COPM   0.030* 0.043*          COAG      0.027*        
DEF    -0.832* -2.085*                       





Table 33. Mixed Level Analysis (continued) 
Panel D                               1a. Others - Growth 1b. Others - Recessions 1c. Others – Up Regimes 1d. Others – Down Regimes 
Dep. 
Var: 
OT_SS OT_SL OT_AY OT_AO OT_LY OT_LN Dep. 
Var: 
OT_SS OT_SL OT_AY OT_AO OT_LY OT_LN Dep. 
Var: 
OT_SS OT_SL OT_AY OT_AO OT_LY OT_LN Dep. 
Var: 
OT_SS OT_SL OT_AY OT_AO OT_LY OT_LN 
C 1.524** 1.456** 2.017** 1.441** 0.863** 1.569** C 4.142** 1.265** 0.807** 2.462** 0.521** 2.794** C 0.673** 1.288** 0.649** 1.101** 0.853** 1.189** C 0.655 0.585** 1.965** 0.429 0.447** 0.789** 
MAI 0.214** 0.199** 0.326** 0.147**  0.162** GEMI 0.181**   0.142** 0.106** 0.159** MAI 0.177** 0.188** 0.388** 0.123**  0.156** MAI 0.262** 0.117** 0.169** 0.137**  0.216** 
GEMI 0.095**   0.067** 0.079** 0.068** TERM -1.627**   -0.851*  -1.007** GEMI 0.104**   0.075** 0.103** 0.075** EXCH -0.558**   -0.308**  -0.311** 
MOM 0.054** 0.036*  0.057**  0.040* DVIX -0.032*      MOM 0.049**   0.034* 0.034*  HML  -0.069** -0.229**    
DEF -0.979** -0.825** -1.390* -0.897**  -1.034** MAI  0.070** 0.274**    COPM 0.040*      SMB  0.107**     
COPM 0.052**      HML  -0.143** -0.155**    DEF  -0.663**  -0.469*  -0.557* COEN   0.042*    
RLE -0.050* -0.042*  -0.032* 0.037* -0.046* MOM  -0.056**     SMB  -0.063**   0.079**  RLE   0.063*  0.051**  
COIM  -0.030*     DEF  -0.550**     RLE  -0.036* -0.068*   -0.040* TERM   -0.317*    
EXCH   -0.255**    SMB      0.149* DVIX   0.028*    COAG     0.044*  
DVIX   0.025*           EXCH   -0.200*           









GM_LY GM_LN Dep. 
Var: 
GM_SS GM_SL GM_AY GM_AO GM_LY GM_LN Dep. 
Var: 
GM_SS GM_SL GM_AY GM_AO GM_LY GM_LN Dep. 
Var: 
GM_SS GM_SL GM_AY GM_AO GM_LY GM_LN 
C 0.770* 0.421** -0.016 0.299* -0.128 0.355** C 1.204* 0.559* 0.168 -1.139 0.859 0.752** C 0.124 0.342** -0.009 0.288* -0.032 0.304* C -0.854 0.595** 0.653 0.624** 0.547 0.652** 
MAI 0.566** 0.191**  0.290** 0.657** 0.234** COAG 0.206**   0.151** 0.156*  MAI 0.525** 0.204**  0.319** 0.559** 0.246** MOM -0.105*    -0.162*  
DVIX 0.070**   0.024** 0.053** 0.019* COEN  0.073** 0.092* 0.072**  0.053** COPM 0.181** 0.068** 0.080* 0.113** 0.228** 0.069** HML -0.160*   -0.151**   
COPM 0.144** 0.062** 0.101** 0.090** 0.174** 0.058* DVIX  -0.024* -0.070**    HML -0.185*      MAI 0.168**  0.454**  0.514**  
HML -0.183**      EXCH  0.255* 0.821**    DVIX 0.070**   0.018* 0.046** 0.018* DEF 1.035*      
COEN 0.066**      COIM    -0.090*   COEN 0.075**   0.043**  0.034* EXCH  -0.313**  -0.259**   
TERM -0.363*      TERM    0.937*   MOM  0.049* 0.098**   0.053* RLE   -0.173**  -0.257**  
MOM  0.052*  0.052*  0.087** COPM      0.102** GEMI   0.294** -0.083*   COEN     -0.082* 0.033* 
GEMI   0.284**           EXCH      0.142* COPM      0.103** 
Panel E                           1a. Relative Value – Growth 1b. Relative Value - Recessions 1c. Relative Value – Up Regimes 1d. Relative Value – Down Regimes 
Dep. 
Var: 
RV_SS RV_SL RV_AY RV_AO RV_LY RV_LN Dep. 
Var: 
RV_SS RV_SL RV_AY RV_AO RV_LY RV_LN Dep. 
Var: 
RV_SS RV_SL RV_AY RV_AO RV_LY RV_LN Dep. 
Var: 
RV_SS RV_SL RV_AY RV_AO RV_LY RV_LN 
C 0.289** -0.138 0.617** 0.239** 0.333** -0.1262 C 0.462 0.224 0.620** 0.342 0.483 0.305 C -0.165 -0.114 0.139 -0.134 0.370** -0.225 C 0.098 0.1650 1.417** 0.064 -0.132 0.154 
MAI 0.173** 0.134**  0.152** 0.173** 0.137** MAI 0.308**  0.174** 0.302** 0.316** 0.271** MAI 0.193** 0.135**  0.153** 0.173** 0.113** MAI 0.134*      
SMB 0.064** 0.064** 0.034* 0.073** 0.081** 0.070** RLE  0.141**     SMB 0.096** 0.055**  0.067** 0.085**  SMB 0.200* 0.180*  0.195* 0.235** 0.178** 
TERM 0.091* 0.120**  0.131** 0.153**  COIM  0.116**     DEF 0.685** 0.429* 0.424** 0.467**  0.517** COIM 0.107* 0.123** 0.107** 0.143** 0.137** 0.116** 
HML  0.083**  0.070** 0.069** 0.067** HML  -0.362** -0.116**    MOM 0.034*      DVIX  -0.034** -0.020** -0.035** -0.030* -0.033** 
DEF  0.462*    0.609** COEN   0.042**    HML 0.058** 0.083**  0.074** 0.064*  TERM   -0.303*    
GEMI   0.081**           COIM -0.021*             
              TERM  0.128**  0.122** 0.168** 0.098*        
              GEMI   0.098**           
              RLE      0.035**        
              COEN      0.012*        
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Table 33. Mixed Level Analysis (continued) 
                               2a. Market Neutral - Growth 2b. Market Neutral - Recessions 2c. Market Neutral – Up Regimes 2d. Market Neutral – Down Regimes 
Dep. 
Var: 
MN_SS MN_SL MN_AY MN_AO MN_LY MN_LN Dep. 
Var: 
MN_SS MN_SL MN_AY MN_AO MN_LY MN_LN Dep. 
Var: 
MN_SS MN_SL MN_AY MN_AO MN_LY MN_LN Dep. 
Var: 
MN_SS MN_SL MN_AY MN_AO MN_LY MN_LN 
C 0.151* 0.191** -0.036 0.368** 1.397** 0.155** C 0.074 0.161 0.027 -0.454 0.177 0.098 C 0.152* 0.174** 0.005 0.335** 0.610** 0.132** C 1.022** 0.1010 -0.190 0.688** -0.117 0.142 
MOM 0.109** 0.055** 0.082** 0.078**  0.085** COAG 0.093*   0.066** 0.105** 0.051* MOM 0.110** 0.053** 0.058** 0.077** 0.068** 0.070** GEMI 0.106**      
MAI 0.089** 0.057** 0.139** 0.054** 0.057** 0.067** MOM 0.065* 0.035*  0.082** 0.80**  RLE 0.062**   0.026*  0.026* MOM 0.139** 0.059**  0.092**  0.080** 
HML  0.039*     HML   -0.168*  -0.196**  COEN 0.025**   0.013*  0.013* HML -0.157**  -0.167** -0.077**  -0.056* 
RLE   -0.044* 0.024*   GEMI   0.081*    MAI  0.067** 0.095** 0.049** 0.056* 0.050** TERM -0.321*   -0.219*   
TERM    -0.084*   DEF    0.409*   HML  0.043*     COAG    0.052** 0.082* 0.035* 
DEF     -1.117**  COPM     -0.086*  TERM    -0.082* -0.150*  RLE     -0.078**  
                     EXCH      -0.128* 
Panel F                          1a. CTA - Growths 1b. CTA - Recessions 1c. CTA – Up Regimes 1d. CTA – Down Regimes 
Dep. 
Var: 
CT_SS CT_SL CT_AY CT_AO CT_LY CT_LN Dep. 
Var: 
CT_SS CT_SL CT_AY CT_AO CT_LY CT_LN Dep. 
Var: 
CT_SS CT_SL CT_AY CT_AO CT_LY CT_LN Dep. 
Var: 
CT_SS CT_SL CT_AY CT_AO CT_LY CT_LN 
C 0.895** 0.739** 0.284 0.820** 0.984** 0.788** C 0.848 0.915 1.371** 0.840* 0.852 0.816 C 0.821** 0.720** 0.215 0.836** 0.962** 0.809** C 0.964 2.682** 1.481 0.821 1.438** 0.656 
EXCH -0.383* -0.293* -0.501** -0.409**  -0.425** COEN 0.130** 0.091*  0.106**  0.105** COPM 0.176**  0.087* 0.140**  0.141** COEN 0.104**   0.068*   
COPM 0.124*      MAI -0.183**   -0.149*  -0.151* COIM  0.120**     MAI -0.186*   -0.157*  -0.208** 
MOM  0.144** 0.202** 0.116*  0.128* COAG   0.243**  0.176**  MOM  0.138** 0.095*    MOM  0.134**     
COIM  0.092*     COIM   -0.121*    COEN   0.084**    TERM  -0.820*     
       COPM   -0.123*    HML   0.252*    COIM     0.197**  




4.3.3.2 Analysis by strategy group 
4.3.3.2.1 MAI analysis 
In this section I provide an alpha analysis taking into consideration the strategy groups 
and the fundamental factors so as the reader to get a broader perspective. As I have 
already mentioned, there are three broad groups of strategies: Directional, semi 
directional and non-directional. Table 34 Panel A presents the results for all the groups 
that are directional strategies. Regarding the growth-recession periods, all groups lower 
their exposures during recession periods. This means that all funds regardless of their 
characteristics try to protect against negative market movements. Regarding the 
up/down regimes, most groups decrease their exposures during down regimes. 
However, young funds and lockup-yes funds are not successful in this. Young funds 
have the timing advantage (hence there is no need to adjust considerably their portfolio) 
and lockup-yes are protected from the restrictions (thus there is also no need to adjust 
considerably their portfolio). Panel B shows the results for all the groups that are semi-
directional strategies. Regarding the growth-recession periods the majority of groups do 
not lower their exposures during the recession period. This means that funds regardless 
of their characteristics do not rely on changing their exposures toward the market factor. 
However, when combining up/down regimes, all the groups change their exposures 
against the market factor as the down regimes are fiercer than recessions. One exception 
is the lockup-yes funds that do not suffer from redemptions. This seems to work for this 
group as its excess returns are one of the highest among the groups. Panel C present the 
results for all the groups that are non-directional strategies. Regarding the growth-
recession periods there is no great change in exposures among groups. This is probably 
because non-directional strategies, in general, are not correlated with market 
movements. Concerning the up/down regimes, some groups decrease their exposures 
substantially. It appears that during down regimes (low market returns with high 
volatility) hedge funds are trying not only to minimize their exposures but even to have 




Table 34. MAI Analysis by Strategy Group 
This table shows the average exposures to the MAI market index for all groups that are directional, semi-directional 
and non-directional strategies during growth and recession periods as well as the up and down regimes. Since the 
growth periods and up regimes are the longest I use them as the base to measure the percentage change of the 




Growth Recession Difference % Difference 
(Base Growth) 
Up Down Difference % Difference 
(Base Up) 
Panel A. Directional Strategies 
Size 
Small 
0.276 0.234 0.042 -15.28% 0.279 0.134 0.145 -51.88% 
Size 
Large 
0.238 0.172 0.066 -27.69% 0.238 0.162 0.076 -31.84% 
Age 
Young 
0.278 0.084 0.194 -69.73% 0.271 0.295 -0.024 8.87% 
Age Old 0.230 0.135 0.095 -41.27% 0.223 0.110 0.113 -50.74% 
Lockup-
Yes 
0.169 0.094 0.075 -44.58% 0.150 0.162 -0.012 7.83% 
Lockup-
No 
0.252 0.144 0.108 -42.90% 0.239 0.112 0.126 -52.87% 
Panel B. Semi-Directional Strategies 
Size 
Small 
0.301 - - - 0.261 0.215 0.046 -17.72% 
Size 
Large 
0.226 0.220 0.007 -2.94% 0.222 0.173 0.049 -22.14% 
Age 
Young 
0.223 0.274 -0.052 23.15% 0.280 0.248 0.031 -11.18% 
Age Old 0.241 0.301 -0.059 24.75% 0.232 0.174 0.058 -24.81% 
Lockup-
Yes 
0.446 - - - 0.333 0.514 -0.181 54.29% 
Lockup-
No 
0.219 0.411 -0.192 88.04% 0.216 0.225 -0.009 3.97% 
Panel C. Non-Directional Strategies 
Size 
Small 
0.131 0.063 0.068 -52.06% 0.193 -0.026 0.219 -113.42% 
Size 
Large 
0.096 - - - 0.101 - - - 
Age 
Young 
0.139 0.174 -0.035 24.91% 0.095 - - - 
Age Old 0.103 0.077 0.026 -25.69% 0.101 -0.157 0.258 -255.06%s 
Lockup-
Yes 
0.115 0.316 -0.202 175.52% 0.114 - - - 
Lockup-
No 
0.102 0.060 0.042 -41.50% 0.082 -0.208 0.290 -354.12% 
 
4.3.3.2.2 Alpha analysis by strategy group 
In this section I provide an alpha analysis taking into consideration the strategy groups 
and the fundamental factors. As I have already mentioned before there are three broad 
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groups of strategies: Directional, semi directional, and non-directional34. Table 35 
shows the results. Large directional funds outperform small directional funds in both 
“good” and “bad” conditions as they are able to benefit from the upward market 
movement and avoid the downward market movement, accordingly. The same applies 
to young directional funds versus old directional funds due to the timing advantage. 
Lockup-yes directional strategies outperform lockup-no directional strategies in all 
market conditions due to the liquidity premia exploitation and the redemption 
protection. The semi-directional large funds outperform small funds during “good” 
market conditions (due to better exploitation of the upward market movement) whereas 
during “bad” market conditions small semi-directional strategies outperform large funds 
due to their flexibility. Old semi-directional strategies outperform young directional 
funds in all market conditions due to their experience and market establishment. 
Moreover, lockup-yes semi-directional strategies outperform lockup-no in good market 
conditions (due to the liquidity premia) whereas the opposite is true during “bad” 
market conditions. It seems that funds with no redemption restrictions (that survive) 
during “bad” times are more innovative and efficient than their peers as fund managers 
feel high pressure. Small non-directional funds outperform large funds during “good” 
times as small funds use some market exposure to benefit from the upward market 
movement and this explain also that during “bad” times small fund underperform 
compared to large funds. Old non-directional funds outperform young funds because of 
their experience and the market establishment, whereas young funds outperform during 
“bad” times due to the timing advantage (they enter the market when it is for their 
benefit). Lockup-yes non-directional funds outperform lockup-no funds in all market 
conditions as fund managers have the “protection” of the redemption restrictions. 
  
                                                 
34 There is a gradual classification from extreme directional strategies (e.g. Short Bias strategy) to the 
extreme non-directional strategies (e.g. CTAs). 
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Table 35. Alpha Analysis for Group Strategies 
This table shows the alphas for all groups belonging to the directional, semi-directional and non-directional strategies 
during growth and recession periods as well as the up and down regimes (during “good times” alphas for most mixed 
cases are statistically significant from zero).  
 Directional  Semi-Directional Non-Directional 








0.656 0.090 0.638 0.842 0.357 0.578 
Size 
Large 
1.081 0.368 0.735 0.531 0.262 0.708 
Age 
Young 
1.236 0.163 0.524 0.242 0.204 0.788 
Age Old 0.711 0.027 0.773 0.464 0.411 0.383 
Lockup-
Yes 
0.746 0.403 0.718 0.671 0.776 0.450 
Lockup-
No 
0.628 -0.414 0.685 0.823 0.255 0.362 
 
4.3.3.2.3 Mixed level rankings: Top two and last two performers 
It is expected that top (bottom) performers are related with how well (or not) the 
strategy can benefit from the upward market movement during “good” times and how 
well it can deal with the “bad” conditions. For example for top performers we expect 
that some directional strategies may have an asset and portfolio allocation that 
maximize the returns during upward market movement even with high exposures. 
During “bad” times top performers should be less directional strategies that are not 
affected to a large extent by these “bad” times. In addition to this it is expect that 
characteristics such as flexibility (e.g. small size funds or funds with short selling), 
experience (e.g. old funds), and deep knowledge/innovation (e.g. specializing in specific 
industries or exploiting allocations that are not widely used by other strategies) are 
essential for “good” fund performance.       
The above assumptions (forecasts) are confirmed by Table 36 which presents the results 
of the best two and worst two strategy funds with specific fundamental characteristics 
during “good” and “bad” times. During “good” conditions, Sector young funds and 
Long Short young funds are the top in terms of excess return delivered to investors with 
4.175% and 2.856%, respectively on monthly basis. This is explained in a way that both 
strategies are directional strategies and young that in general provide superior returns 
than old funds. Sector funds specialize in specific sectors having a deeper knowledge of 
specific cyclical industries/sectors (increasing also their systematic risk). Long short 
181 
 
strategy is conceptually easy to understand but difficult to implement strategy hence 
fund managers with superior stock picking capabilities can benefit from this. Moreover 
as Long Short strategy is superior to the Long Only as it utilizes the short selling. On 
the other hand, during “good” times, the bottom performers are the Market Neutral 
young, and the Relative Value no-lockup funds (although the last two results are not 
significantly different from zero). This can be explained as these are non-directional 
strategies that cannot benefit from the upward market movement. For the “bad” 
conditions the Others strategy and especially small funds deliver high excess returns to 
investors as this strategy is investing mainly in start-ups with “good” promised yields. 
On the other hand Long Only funds without redemption restrictions and Multi Strategy 
young funds deliver significant negative alphas to investors. It seems that the last two 
funds perform very poorly, with investors losing money. We can explain this poor 
performance as Long Only funds with no restrictions having no alternative but to stay 
long while they are not protected from redemptions. Multi strategy young funds may 
lack the necessary experience of implementing this type of complex strategy which it is 
a combination of other strategies. 
Table 36. Bottom/Top Performers 
This table shows the returns of the top two and bottom two performers during “good” and ”bad” conditions. * denotes 
significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. 
“Good Conditions” “Bad” Conditions 
Sector – Young Funds 4.175** Others - Small Funds 4.142** 
Long Short -Young Funds 2.586** Others - Old Funds 2.462** 
Market Neutral – Young Funds -0.036 Long Only – Lockup-No Funds -3.524** 
Relative Value – Lockup-No Funds -0.225 Multi-Strategy – Young Funds -1.316* 
 
4.3.3.3 Discussion 
Concerning the relationship between size and performance, the results agree with other 
authors (such as Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2004; Ammann, and Moerth, 2005; 
Meredith, 2007; Joenvaara, Kosowski, and Tolonen, 2012) that there is a negative 
correlation, on average. These results are in alignment with commercial studies (e.g. 
Pertrac Corporation, 2012). Getmansky (2004) found that there is a positive and 
concave correlation and suggested that there is an optimal size of AUM. A few studies 
are exceptions that found no relationship, such as Gregoriou and Rouah (2002) or a 
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negative relationship such as Koh, Koh, and Teo (2003)35 but the differences are mainly 
due to the use of different samples and methods. In this study I show that this 
relationship is not static, in other words it changes according to different market 
conditions. Although this negative relationship holds for “good” times, during “bad” 
times it is questionable. Small funds seem to suffer more than large as they are not able 
to absorb the turbulence during “bad” times. These findings allow investors to be more 
knowledgeable than before about this relationship.  
Concerning the relationship between age and performance, there is again agreement 
with the literature (such as Amenc and Martelini, 2003; Meredith, 2007; Frumkin, and 
Vandegrif, 2009; Pertrac Corporation, 2012) that there is a negative relationship, on 
average. One exception is the study from Schneeweis, Kazemi and Martin (2002)36 that 
showed a positive relationship. This study proceeds further and examines this 
relationship for “good” and “bad” market conditions. I found that this holds for “good” 
and “bad” times. This finding allow investors to be more confident than before when 
considering this relationship in their investment decision process. 
Regarding the relationship of the lockup restrictions to performance there is an 
agreement with other authors (such as Aragon, 2007; Joenvaara, Kosowski, and 
Tolonen, 2012) that there is positive relationship. However in this study I show that this 
relationship is not static as this negative relationship holds only during “good” times. 
During “bad” times, no lockups funds (that survive) outperform funds with lockups. I 
rationalize this as fund managers becoming more innovative with respect to their peers, 
under the pressure of not having the “safety” of redemption restrictions. These findings 
facilitate investors in their decision process, as having redemption restrictions does not 
necessarily mean high expected returns, particularly during stressful market conditions.  
Beyond the above there was an investigation into hedge funds at the mixed level 
(strategies and fund specific characteristics concurrently). Directional strategies with 
specific characteristics (such as young and small funds) can provide high returns to 
investors. On the contrary, non directional strategies especially those with no 
redemption restrictions and young suffer during “good” times. I also found that 
                                                 
35 Greogoriou and Rouah used the AUM at the inception date of each fund and not the average that is 
most commonly used by the other authors. Koh, Koh, and Teo in their study considered Asian hedge 
funds. 
36 Schneeweis, et al. (2003), contrary to the other studies, took into consideration funds with the same 
starting point (same inception date). 
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directional strategies (e.g. strategies similar to traditional investments taking long only 
positions) with no redemption restrictions present negative alpha to investors whereas 
some less directional strategies (perhaps due to lack of experience) e.g. young funds 
also present negative alpha. My findings are important because investors know what to 
expect from hedge funds at the mixed level and sometimes it is possible to pay high fees 
for negative alpha during stressful market conditions. 
4.3.3.4 Robustness 
This piece-wise parsimonious model is sufficient and robust because the statistical 
significance of the factor loadings on the Wilshire 5000TRI, conditional on the different 
regimes, is almost the same as that derived in the simple market model with only the 
Wilshire 5000 TRI risk factor and adds significant explanatory power. This suggests 
that the analysis performed above is robust to the inclusion of other factors (see section 
4.3.2) that may affect hedge index returns. Irrespective of fund fundamental factors, 
during stressful market conditions there is no significant alpha to hedge funds, on 
average. This is in alignment with the analysis at the mixed level during “good” times, 
where almost all funds deliver significant excess returns to investors and during “bad” 
times where the majority of funds do not deliver significant excess returns. In addition 
to the above tests, I repeated another robustness check by excluding the first 48 months 
(1/1990-12/1993) and implemented my model again at the fundamental level. All the 
regressors had the same sign and were mostly statistically significant making my 
findings more robust. Moreover, I confirmed the relative performance between funds 
with different characteristics, and irrespective of the fundamental factors I confirmed 
that hedge funds deliver significant alpha only during “good” times, contrary to “bad” 
times where fund managers are concerned with minimizing their risks. Another 
robustness check was when I implemented the model for the first 48 months (1/1990-
12/1993) where there are comparable qualitative results. A final robustness check was 
by using the HAC/Newey-West estimator for any unknown residual autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity where the results remain valid37.  
4.4 Conclusion 
In this paper I have modelled hedge funds taking into consideration the fundamental 
factors that can affect hedge funds’ performance during different market and financial 
                                                 




conditions. I pursue the analysis further at the mixed level. In order to do that I used an 
extra dataset with fund characteristics that was associated with the underlying hedge 
funds. Thus, I extended my basic model that exploits predefined structural breaks, based 
on multiple business cycles during 1990-2014, using a comprehensive merged database 
and a Markov Switching model to identify in the proposed model the structural breaks 
conditional on the different states of the market index. I used the stepwise regression 
technique, thus allowing the model to adjust to these different conditions, providing 
more accurate and useful results. In order to study the impact of the fundamental factors 
on hedge fund performance I formed portfolios based on fund characteristics: the age, 
size, and whether lockup period exist. Then I moved further by examining the impact of 
these fundamental factors at strategy level, so as to facilitate investors in their investing 
decision process with more accurate and detailed results. 
This study has some important findings that contribute significantly to the literature, 
beyond those that agreed with the extant literature discussed above. First, on average, 
hedge funds during “good” times deliver significant excess returns to investors, 
irrespective of the underlying fundamental factors. On average none of these factors 
was able to significantly assist in delivering excess returns to investors. Secondly, at the 
fundamental level, during “good” times, small funds, young funds, and funds with 
redemption restrictions deliver higher alpha with respect to their peers. For “bad” times, 
small funds seem to suffer more than large, young funds continue to outperform old 
funds, and funds that do not impose restrictions (and survive) outperform funds with 
lockups. We can explain this as fund managers feeling the pressure of not having the 
“safety” of redemption restrictions, thus being more innovative and doing better than 
their peers. Third, at the mixed level, there are strategies with specific characteristics, 
conditional on stressful market conditions that deliver significant negative alpha to 
investors. Two examples are the Long Only funds with no redemption restrictions, and 
the Multi Strategy young funds. On the contrary, there are some strategies with specific 
characteristics that provide extraordinary excess returns to investors during stressful 
market conditions: Two examples are Others strategy small and old funds. Accordingly 
there are specific strategies that perform extremely well or badly in “good” or “”bad” 
conditions and investors should be conscious of this. Even after I exclude the pre 1994 
period from the analysis or using pre-1994 only data the findings are robust. 
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The results are important as they extend previous knowledge about the relations 
between fund performance and fund specific characteristics, by examining it in a 
holistic approach between different business cycles and financial conditions. Thus, I 
provide a deeper understanding of hedge funds’ behaviour and I reveal dimensions that 
have not been examined previously. Beyond this extension, I proceed further by 
examining fund behaviour at a mixed level, meaning I investigate fund performance 
taking into consideration different strategies and different fundamental factors together. 
Despite the fact that hedge funds are complex investment vehicles and difficult to 
model, there are some consistent patterns which are related to managers’ behaviour in 
terms of the excess returns and their exposures to factors within both multiple business 
cycles and different market conditions. The longest covered period (compared to any 
extant paper) of this dataset enables me to investigate hedge fund behaviour in a more 
comprehensive way (not choosing a short period of time with just one financial crisis or 
event). Moreover, instead of using one general commodity factor I used specific ones 
for more precise results as commodities do not behave in the same way in the market.  
The findings can benefit investors enabling them to have a better sense of what to 
expect from funds with different characteristics, taking into consideration business 
cycles and different market conditions. The results should help investors and fund of 
fund managers in their strategic asset allocation process. However, in this study it is 
assumed that investors are capable enough in forecasting different market conditions (at 
least with relatively high probability). I reveal for the first time that some fund strategies 
with specific fundamental characteristics within specific market conditions can even 
deliver negative alpha to investors. Another use of the findings could be by fund 
administrators to use more flexible performance fee policies that can capture in a better 
way hedge fund managers’ performance.  
I have investigated hedge funds that focus mainly in the North America region because I 
use U.S. business cycles. An interesting investigation would be focusing on the 
European and Asia-Pacific regions, however, the definition of the business cycles in 
these regions would be questionable. One more limitation is that I do not use lookback 
straddles that are appropriate for CTAs, due to data unavailability in the early 1990s. 
Hence, a CTA-only mixed level examination using lookback straddles would also be of 
interest, even if shorter period of time is used. Last but not least, there is a need to 
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5 Chapter: Persistence and mixed trading strategies 
This chapter (paper) examines the impact of multiple business cycles and different 
market conditions on hedge fund strategies in terms of persistence and how investors 
can utilize this. Similar to the previous chapters it has its own structure with 
introduction, methodology, empirical analysis and conclusion sections (a version of this 
paper is to be submitted to a journal).     
I examine US hedge funds’ performance persistence and mixed-trading strategies across 
both different economic and market conditions for 1990-2014. I use parametric and 
non-parametric models and I examine hedge fund persistence in various aspects. During 
“good” times there is smoothness in hedge fund (risk-adjusted) returns whereas during 
“bad” times this smoothness disappears. With respect to the market benchmark, with a 
few exceptions, there is no performance persistence. Concerning the persistence within 
each strategy group, for “good” times I find persistence up to one year whereas for 
“bad” times it lasts up to six months. There is strong evidence that the persistence is 
driven mainly by the top performers, and recessions are harsher than down regimes for 
hedge fund persistence. Finally, I construct mixed trading strategies and I introduce the 
zero investment portfolio “momentrarian” strategy that can bring conditional high 
excess returns to investors. 
5.1 Introduction 
Investors very often rely on hedge fund past performance expecting that it is stable over 
time and that some fund managers outperform their peers. There is strong evidence that 
there is at least short term persistence (e.g. Agarwal and Naik, 2000a; Harri, and 
Brosen, 2004; Eling, 2009; Joenvaara, Kosowiski, and Tolonen, 2012; Hentati-Kaffel 
and Peretti, 2015). However there are studies (e.g. Jagannathan, Malakhov, and 
Novikov, 2010; Ammann, Huber, and Schumid, 2013) that challenge the above studies 
showing that there is long term persistence (over a year). Nevertheless, further research 
is needed to verify the results of these recent studies. There is evidence (Bares, Gibson, 
and Gyger, 2003; Eling, 2009) that some non-directional strategies (e.g. Merger 
Arbitrage, Convertible Arbitrage strategies) present more persistence than directional 
strategies (e.g. Long Only and Short Bias strategies). Details concerning the nature of 
the fund persistence continue to emerge, such persistence varying between different 
hedge fund strategies and between different fund characteristics such as size (Joenvaara, 
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Kosowski and Tolonen, 2012), age (Meredith, 2007), fees (Amenc and Martellini, 
2003) and flow restrictions (Bae and Yi, 2012). Other studies (e.g. Bollen and Pool, 
2006; Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2011; Itzhak, Franzoni, Landlier and Moussawi, 
2013) showed that illiquidity has a significant effect and the smoothing of returns is 
widespread as some fund managers invest in illiquid assets or manage their returns. In 
hedge fund studies, there are differences due to industry heterogeneity and the use of 
different databases, time periods and methodologies. However, there are some 
consistent trends and patterns that reveal useful dimensions about hedge fund 
behaviour.   
Although the above studies are important in explaining hedge funds performance in 
terms of persistence, there is a need to examine hedge fund performance persistence in a 
more comprehensive way by making a distinction between the different types of 
performance and not only focusing in one only type of persistence (e.g. persistence 
within each strategy). Furthermore, there is a need to examine the impact of different 
market conditions in hedge fund performance persistence focusing on specific region(s) 
for more robust results. This paper uses the term multiple business cycles and different 
market conditions (these are not limited to only one recession/growth period or financial 
event) and focuses on North America funds38 as this is the most important region for 
hedge funds in economic terms. Therefore, this study fills a gap in the literature. It 
makes a distinction between multiple business cycles and different market conditions as 
they do not coincide necessarily, having different implications (as presented later in the 
empirical analysis) in hedge fund behaviour. Furthermore I investigate hedge funds at 
the strategy level and it examines different types of persistence using several parametric 
and non-parametric tests. Another gap in the literature is the lack of the examination of 
different trading strategies based on persistence and spreads of top/bottom performers 
that investors or fund of fund managers can exploit so as to gain higher returns. This 
paper deals with various mixed trading strategies (investment styles) that can help fund 
managers achieving higher returns. I also introduce the term “momentrarian strategy” 
that is a combination of a momentum and contrarian strategy under specific conditions, 
as discussed later in section 5.2.1.  
There are some important findings that contribute to the academic literature beyond 
those that agree with other authors above in terms of short term persistence (e.g. Harri 
                                                 
38 These are funds that invest primarily in the North America region.  
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and Brorsen, 2004; Eling, 2009; Joenvaara, Kosowski, and Tolonen, 2012; Hentati-
Kaffel, and Peretti, 2015) or that some strategies appear to be more consistent than 
others (e.g. Eling, 2009; Brown and Goetzmann, 2003; Hari and Brorsen, 2004): First, 
using a regression based parametric approach, non-directional and semi-directional 
strategies have on average smoother returns compared to directional strategies, however 
during stressful market conditions there is a negative impact on the smoothness for all 
hedge fund strategies. When considering risk-adjusted returns the smoothness weakens 
even more in all cases. Second, using CPR tests and Chi-square tests, I found that there 
is little or no persistence of hedge funds against the market benchmark. Only a few 
strategies such as Long Short, Multi-strategy, and Long Short seem to present some 
performance persistence against the market during “good” market conditions. Third, 
when examining persistence within strategies, I found that there is persistence up to one 
year, however, during stressful market conditions there is quarterly persistence (with a 
few exceptions that provide semi-annual persistence). Fourth, the persistence, on 
average, is attributed mainly to top performers and less to bottom performing funds. 
Often, there are reversals in bottom performers as fund managers are pressurized to 
deliver higher returns; otherwise they will go out of business. Furthermore, during 
stressful market conditions, the persistence is reduced dramatically for hedge fund 
strategies. Fifth, I created a framework of using various zero investment trading 
strategies that can utilize differences in return spreads between top and bottom 
performing funds among different strategies. I found that a momentum trading strategy 
is, on average, the most efficient within “good” market conditions whereas the 
momentrarian strategy is, on average, the most efficient during stressful market 
conditions.          
This study makes important contributions to the literature and to investors as well. I 
have revealed aspects that have not been examined before. More specifically, for the 
first time, I make a clear distinction between different aspects of performance 
persistence and I examine each of these aspects, at strategy level, within multiple 
business cycles and different market conditions, as these two different states do not 
coincide necessarily, having different implications for hedge funds. For example it 
seems that recessions periods are, on average, fiercer in terms of hedge fund 
performance persistence compared with down regimes. Investors know what to expect 
from different strategies in terms of performance persistence. Past performance is no 
guide to the future; however, most investors in their capital allocation process rely on 
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past performance. One more contribution is that, for the first time, I develop a 
framework of using zero investment trading strategies that utilize the differences in 
return spreads between top and bottom performing hedge funds. These mixed or 
synthetic trading strategies can be a guide to investors allowing them for potential 
higher returns, outperforming market returns. Last but not least, I executed a systematic 
database merging and cleaning process that can be considered as a guide for future 
studies.  
Investors can benefit from the findings as they are able to know what to expect from 
different strategies in terms of performance persistence. Although past performance is 
no guide to the future, most investors in their capital allocation process, rely on funds’ 
past records. This implies that investors expect performance to be stable over time and 
that some fund managers provide better performance compared to their peers. This 
study provides a comprehensive investigation of hedge fund performance persistence 
allowing investors to implement mixed trading strategies utilizing return spreads 
between top and bottom performers of different hedge fund strategies. Financial 
government authorities can benefit by better understanding hedge funds in terms of their 
persistence and risks, in case there is any need for closer monitoring (e.g. “unusual” 
hedge fund persistence) or a change in the legal framework.     
The remainder of this paper is as follows: First I present the methodology used 
describing the theoretical framework and the data. Second, I proceed to the empirical 
analysis by presenting some key statistics, the regime switching model, the performance 
persistence analysis at strategy level, and the mixed trading strategies. Then I have some 
robustness tests. Lastly, I present the conclusions providing a summary of the findings 
and some opportunities for further research. 
5.2 Methodology 
This section presents the theoretical framework along with the data. 
5.2.1 Theoretical framework 
As in the Chapters Three and Four, the proposed model uses predefined and undefined 
structural breaks conditional on different states of the market. As predefined structural 
breaks I use the U.S. business cycles and as undefined structural breaks I use the 
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statistical Markov switching process conditional on the different states of the market 
index. For more information please see Chapter Three’s methodology section. Within 
this framework I examine hedge fund performance persistence in terms of returns and 
risk-adjusted returns to investors. I present the methods used in order to detect 
performance persistence. Afterwards, I present several trading strategies that includes a 
momentrarian trading strategy which is a combination of momentum and contrarian 
strategies, so the investor or fund of funds manager can have higher returns in her 
portfolio.  
In order to examine hedge funds at a strategy level I form portfolios of hedge funds 
according to their strategy (total 11 strategy portfolios – see the data section of the 
empirical chapter one). In this study I examine hedge fund performance persistence in 
terms of smoothness (how constant are their raw and risk-adjusted returns), against the 
market benchmark and within strategy groups (hedge funds) over quarterly, semi-
annual, and annual intervals. These are the most common time horizons examined in the 
literature. I do not use time horizons of more than a year due to limited observations 
during stressful market conditions39.  
5.2.1.1 Performance persistence - Methods 
As Agarwal and Naik (2000a) said, in general there are two statistical approaches when 
examining performance persistence: two-period and multi-period approaches. In the 
first approach two consecutive time units are examined (e.g. months) whereas in the 
second approach more than two consecutive periods are examined. This is known as a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. In this study I use the traditional two-period framework. 
This is because I examine persistence within multiple business cycles and market 
conditions and there are not enough available observations for the stressful market 
conditions to consider a multi-period framework.   
Within the two-period framework as a nonparametric approach the contingency-table 
methods are based on the construction of tables of winners and losers. Winners are 
funds whose performance is higher than the median of all funds within the same group 
or benchmark, whereas losers are funds whose performance is lower than the median. 
Funds that are winners (WW) or losers (LL) in both time units are persistent. Funds that 
are winners in the first period and losers in the second are denoted WL or LW. In this 
                                                 
39 The numbers of observations for recessions and down regimes are 34 and 36, respectively. Hence, at 
the yearly time horizon I would have only three observations.  
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framework I have conducted as a primary test the cross-product ratio (CPR) and as a 
secondary test the Chi-square statistic so as to detect the performance persistence. This 
is because the CPR is stricter than the Chi-square test and is able to capture the positive 
or negative manner of the persistence.   
The cross-product ratio (CPR) test is the ratio of funds that display persistence to the 
funds that do not (Agarwal and Naik, 2000b). 
𝐶𝑃𝑅 = (𝑊𝑊 ∗ 𝐿𝐿)/(𝑊𝐿 ∗ 𝐿𝑊)                      (15) 
The null hypothesis in this setting means that there is persistence where the CPR is 
equal to one. Under this, it is expected that the each of the four categories (WL, LL, 
WL, and LW) will have 25% of the funds under consideration. The statistical 
significance of the CPR can be tested using the standard error of the natural logarithm 
of CPR that is given by 












                                                      (16) 
The resulting Z-statistic is the ratio of the natural logarithm of the CPR to the standard 
error of the natural logarithm.  
In the Chi-square test (see Park and Staum, 1998) the observed frequency distribution of 













                     (17) 
Where 𝐷1 =
(𝑊𝑊 + 𝑊𝐿) ∗ (𝑊𝑊 + 𝐿𝑊)
𝑁⁄   
𝐷2 =
(𝑊𝑊 + 𝑊𝐿) ∗ (𝑊𝐿 + 𝐿𝐿)
𝑁
⁄    
𝐷3 =
(𝐿𝑊 + 𝐿𝐿) ∗ (𝑊𝑊 + 𝐿𝑊)
𝑁
⁄    and  
𝐷4 =
(𝐿𝑊 + 𝐿𝐿) ∗ (𝑊𝐿 + 𝐿𝐿)
𝑁
⁄  ; | N is the number of funds.  
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Following the chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom, a critical value 𝑋2 
(chi-square) greater than 3.84 (6.64) indicates significance at the 5% (1%) confidence 
level.  
Within the two-period framework as a parametric approach I use the regression-based 
parametric model (Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, 1999) where I regress funds’ returns 
(and risk adjusted returns) during the current period against the returns (or risk adjusted 
returns) during the previous period. As risk adjusted measures I use the Sharpe ratio and 
the Information ratio. For each month, I computed the Sharpe ratio which is the 
portfolio return minus the risk free return divided by the standard deviation of the 
portfolio return.  𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = ( 𝑅𝑝– 𝑅𝑓) / 𝜎𝜌, (Sharpe, 1994). Similarly, for each 
month, I computed the Information ratio which is the portfolio return minus the 
benchmark (Wilshire 5000TRI, including dividends) return divided by the standard 
deviation of the excess market returns. 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = (𝑅𝑃 − 𝑅𝐵)/𝜎(𝑅𝑃 −
𝑅𝐵), (Goodwin, 1998). A positive significant slope coefficient indicates performance 
persistence. This means that a hedge fund (or group) that did well in a specific period 
tends to do well in the subsequent period. In other words, there are no high fluctuations 
in the returns. The statistical significance of the slope can be tested using the t-statistic. 
As I mentioned, I use the regression-based parametric model so as to examine the 
smoothness of returns for each hedge fund strategy.  
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏(𝑅𝑡−1) +  𝜀𝑖      where 𝑅 are fund’s returns                           (18) 
Within the multi-period framework a Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit-test 
(Agarwal and Naik, 2000a) is applied, where a series of wins and losses are constructed 
for each fund and I compare the observed frequency distribution with the theoretical 
frequency distribution of more than two consecutive wins and losses. For example, 
under the null hypothesis of no persistence the expected probabilities of observing 
WWW or LLL and WWWW or LLLL is one-eighth and one-sixteenth, respectively.  
By using the two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test I check whether the observed 
distribution is statistically different from the theoretical distribution.  
Last but not least I use the portfolio construction approach by forming initial winners P1 
and losers P10 and tracking their performances for the next period denoted by P1* and 
P10*. I examine the relationship of P1 versus P1*, and the relationship of P10 versus 
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P10*. Then I examine the relationship between P1* with the average within the same 
strategy and the relationship of P10* with the average in the same strategy as well. I use 
parametric and non-parametric correlation tests such as the Pearson and the Spearman 
correlation tests for more robust results. The Spearman correlation test is the Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient on the ranks of the data.  
5.2.1.2 Aspects of performance persistence 
Contrary to earlier studies (e.g. Harri, and Brosen, 2004; Eling, 2009; Hentati-Kaffel, 
and Peretti, 2015) that focus only on whether fund winners (losers) continue to be fund 
winners (losers), I measure three different aspects of performance persistence. The first 
aspect is the smoothness (uniform consistency or fluctuation from one period to the 
next) of the returns and risk adjusted returns for hedge funds groups at strategy level. As 
absolute performance is the most important element in the hedge fund industry when 
examining persistence, I focus more on raw returns. However, I also include risk-
adjusted returns in my analysis, computing the Sharpe ratio and Information ratio cross-
sectionally using funds at the strategy and fundamental level for each time period, as 
some strategies are more risky whereas others attempt to offer more stable returns. I use 
the regression based parametric model described previously.  
The second aspect is measuring the out(under)performance of hedge funds returns 
against a specific benchmark which is the market index. In other words I try to 
determine whether hedge funds consistently provide higher (or lower) returns against 
the market index (Wilshire 5000TRI, including dividends). This is examined at a 
strategy level and using the CPR and Chi-square tests described in the previous section.  
The third aspect is the examination of persistence at a fund level. I take into 
consideration funds that belong to the same strategy. The objective is to examine 
whether fund winners (losers) continue to be fund winners (losers) in the next period. In 
order to fulfil the objectives I form ranked portfolios of funds that are rebalanced every 
subsequent period. I follow a decile classification similar to other authors (e.g. Carhart, 
1997; Capocci, 2007). Each period (quarterly, semi-yearly, yearly) all funds within a 
specific group (e.g. strategy) are ranked in ten equally weighted portfolios (D1 
[highest]…D10 [lowest]) based on their previous period results. The portfolios are held 
until the next period and then rebalanced again. Funds that disappear are included in 
their equally weighted average until their death, then the portfolio weights are adjusted 
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appropriately40. After this, I examine the spread between the first ranked and the last 
ranked portfolios and I implement the regression based parametric model so as to 
examine the smoothness of the underlying spread41. I then examine the relationship 
between initially top (bottom) ranked portfolios against the subsequent performance in 
the next time period of the same portfolios. Finally I compare the returns of the 
subsequent performances (top or bottom initially ranked portfolios) with the average of 
all funds within the same strategy, according to the tests mentioned in the previous 
section.  
5.2.1.3 “Momentrarian” trading style 
It is known from the academic literature that the momentum (e.g. Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993) and contrarian (e.g. De Bondt and Thaler, 1990) trading strategies 
produce significant excess returns to investors. In this study, I introduce the term 
momentrarian which denotes an investment style (or trading strategy) that utilizes the 
momentum (MOMEN-) and the contrarian (-TRARIAN) trading strategies to maximize 
returns. For the first time, I present a trading style that is a combination of these two 
trading styles that can bring conditional higher returns than just exploiting one of these 
strategies. Table 37 presents a framework with the possible actions when using 
momentum and contrarian trading strategies. These possible actions may refer to 
securities, financial indices or hedge funds, as in this case. I use periods of quarterly, 
semi-yearly, and yearly similar to my performance persistence examination. Hence, an 
investor when using trading strategies at the hedge fund level has the following four 
cases: The first case (A) is the momentum trading concerning top performers; the 
second case (B) is the (reverse) momentum trading concerning the bottom performers. 
The third case (C) is the contrarian strategy concerning the top performers; the fourth 
case (D) is the (reverse) contrarian strategy with the bottom performers. It is known 
from the literature that the momentum strategy can be a zero investment portfolio that is 
long past winners and short past losers. Similarly, the contrarian strategy can be a zero 
investment portfolio short in (early) past winners and long in (early) past losers. 
                                                 
40 Due to the fact that my data length concerning the various horizons under consideration (e.g. quarterly, 
semi-annual, annual) does not always match, and I want to exploit as many observations as I can, I 
exclude data-months where the missing values are more than 50% of the total. For example, in the yearly 
analysis within recessions, the third year consists of ten months/observations that are available. On the 
contrary, in the yearly analysis within growth periods, I excluded the last five months/observations 
because the missing data (seven months/observations) were greater than the 50% required (12 
months/observations). 
41 A positive and significant slope means that the spread is smooth, in other words the distance between 
top and bottom performers is not random (not having high fluctuations). 
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According to the literature (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) the momentum effect lasts 
for a few months (e.g. up to a year). Hence beyond this time period I expect the 
contrarian effect to dominate. 
As can be seen from Table 37, the above trading strategies can work horizontally (e.g. 
implementing in parallel two separate zero investment portfolios – one momentum and 
the other contrarian) denoted as a horizontal momentrarian trading strategy. The other 
case is a vertical momentrarian strategy (using a combination of a momentum and 
contrarian strategy). For the vertical momentrarian trading strategy the implementation 
seems more difficult as in order to have zero investment portfolios the period should be 
the same for the momentum and the contrarian trading, although in different time 
intervals (please see the next example).  
Table 37. Basic Trading Strategies 
This table provides the basic trading strategies which are momentum (horizontal), contrarian (horizontal),  

























Hedge funds, A : High 
Recent Returns  
Action: Buy then Sell 
Hedge funds, B : Low Recent 
returns 
























Hedge funds, C : High 
Earlier Returns 
Action: Short-Sell then Buy 
Hedge funds, D : Low Earlier 
Returns 
Action: Buy then Sell 
 
A simple example of a vertical momentrarian (involving high returns exploitation) 
strategy is: At time t, select and buy a hedge fund (A) whose returns at t-1 (e.g. last 
year) are high (compared to other funds). Also, select and short-sell another hedge fund 
(C) whose returns at t-2 (e.g. two years before) were higher (compared to other funds)42. 
At time t+1 (e.g. one year, ahead) sell hedge fund (A) and buy hedge fund (C). Then, at 
time t+1, I rebalance the portfolio, repeating the above initial process, and so on.   
                                                 
42 In practice, when the fund manager wants to apply the momentrarian strategy (involving high returns 
exploitation) and has to select between e.g. two similar funds (C) whose returns are higher at t-2 (years 
before) compared to other funds, she can choose the fund where the performance trends are poorer at t-1, 
as it is a sign that the contrarian effect starts to takes place and at t+1 the fund’s returns will be relatively 
low. This applies accordingly in the next example of the momentrarian strategy (involving low returns 
exploitation) when considering two similar (D) funds. In this case the fund manager should choose the 
fund whose performance trends are better at t-1, as it is a sign that the contrarian effect start to takes place 
and at t+1 fund’s returns will be relatively high. Last but not least, my framework covers many variations 
of the above strategies with different time periods of forming/holding portfolios that an investor can 
choose. However for simplicity reasons we focus on specific equal forming/holding horizons of portfolios 
for momentum strategies (being in accordance with my fund persistence analysis) and one year forming 
with holding periods of one, two and three years for the contrarian and momentrarian strategies .     
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A similar example could be used in the other vertical momentrarian (involving low 
return exploitation). At time t, select and short-sell a hedge fund (B) whose returns at t-1 
(e.g. last year) are low (compared to other funds). Also, select and buy another hedge 
fund (D) whose returns at t-2 (e.g. 2 years before) are low (compared to other funds). At 
time t+1 (e.g. one year, ahead) buy hedge fund (B) and sell hedge fund (D). Afterwards, 
at time t+1, I rebalance the portfolio, repeating the above initial process, and so on. 
In section 5.3.3 I take into consideration the above framework, revealing the 
momentrarian trading styles that can bring substantially higher returns to investors. I 
implement this strategy along with the momentum and the contrarian trading strategies. 
Moreover, I implement these trading strategies at different business cycles or market 
conditions for even higher investor returns. Later, in order to test the study for sufficient 
and robustness, I take into consideration fund redemption fees (lockups), and I perform 
a sub-period analysis with a holdback period.  
5.2.2 Data 
As in the Chapters Three and Four, in the analysis I combine and use three hedge fund 
databases (one with live/dead funds, one with live funds and one with dead funds) from 
two database vendors. These are BarclayHedge and EurekaHedge covering the period 
from January 1990 to March 2014. For more details about the database merging and 
cleaning processes, and the reported strategies please see Chapter Three. In this chapter 
I use hedge funds’ raw returns investigating funds’ performance persistence and how 
investors can explicit these differences between hedge fund strategies. The reader is 
reminded that I have selected funds that invest primarily in the North America region 
due to the use of U.S. business cycles. 
In order to assure data quality and integrity I excluded the returns of the first 12 months 
so as to deal with the instant history bias. Regarding the outliers I applied the 
“winsorized” technique and deal the zeros or null values according to specific rules. For 
more details about all these process please see Chapter Three’s, data section. The 
mapping between the database strategies is the same as that adopted in Chapter Three. 
It is important to make the point that non-parametric techniques are useful in the 
presence of a few datapoints. This data requirement is particularly relevant when 
analyzing hedge fund returns where usually only monthly returns are available, for 
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example, if 120 monthly returns are examined, which are then reduced even further to 
12 yearly and 6 biyearly datapoints. The use of the non-parametric teckniques is also 
important where returns do not follow a normal distribution (Eling, 2009). The use of 
correlation-based techniques may be problematic in the presence of serial correlation 
and the absence of normality of fund returns. This is also a problem with regression-
based tests, however, there are modified statistics available for autocorralated data (e.g. 
the Newey-West statistic) that I have used in the appendix. Beyond this, the dataset 
used in this study is long enough (to my knowledge the longest ever used in a scholarly 
study) hence the above issues are mitigated. Additional discussion about the 
assumptions needed for the parameter-based techniques used can be found in chapter 3, 
section 3.3.1. 
5.3 Empirical analysis  
In this section I proceed from basic statistics about hedge fund strategies and market 
classification to broader categories of the hedge fund strategies, and give details of the 
regime switches that I used. 
5.3.1 Basic statistics and regimes 
The basic statistics for the raw returns for each of the 11 hedge fund strategies are 
presented in the Chapter Three’s basic statistics section. I followed the same approach 
as there by classifying the hedge fund strategies into directional, semi-directional, and 
non-directional strategies. This is based on the correlation of each strategy with the 
market index as is represented by the Wilshire 5000TRI, including dividends. The 
correlation of each strategy and its classification are presented in Chapter Three’s – 
basic statistics section.  
I remind the reader that in the analysis I took into consideration different U.S. business 
cycles and market conditions. There are three official U.S. business cycles from January 
1990 to March 2014. The growth periods are 01/1990-07/1990, 04/1991-03/2001, 
12/2001-12/2007 and 07/2009-03/2014 and the recession periods are 08/1990-03/1991, 
04/2001-11/2001 and 01/2008-06/2009. Similarly to the Chapter Three, I used the 
Markov Switching process so as to determine the regimes that based on the mean and 
volatility of the Wilshire 5000TRI. The two regimes are: up regimes 01/1990-06/1990, 
11/1990-10/2000, 10/2002-05/2008 and 03/2009-03/2014 and down regimes 07/1990-
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10/1990, 11/2000-09/2002 and 06/2008-02/2009. The average monthly MAI (excess 
risk free) return for down regimes is -3.69% whereas for recessions it is -1.03%. 
5.3.2  Performance persistence 
In this section I examine hedge funds’ performance persistence at strategy level within 
multiple business cycles and different market conditions. I first examine the smoothness 
of the returns, then the persistence with respect to the market index, and finally the 
persistence within each strategy. I examine the smoothness at quarterly, semi-annual, 
and annual horizons by computing the average return within each time period.  
5.3.2.1 Smoothness of returns 
5.3.2.1.1 Growth/Recession periods 
Table 38 Panel A presents the results for the growth period under examination using the 
regression based parametric method. Concerning the raw returns, the majority of the 
hedge funds strategies present smoothness in their returns. On average non-directional 
(except for the CTA strategy) and semi-directional strategies have more consistent 
returns than the directional strategies (except for the Short Bias strategy). Regarding the 
Sharpe ratio, the situation is almost the same as for raw returns. However, some 
strategies such as Other, Global Macro and CTA suffer more compared to the others. 
On average, non-directional (except CTA) and semi-directional strategies (except 
Global Macro) have more consistent returns than directional strategies (except Short 
Bias). Regarding the information ratio, almost all hedge fund strategies have poor 
results in term of smoothness. One exception is the Long Short strategy that presents 
consistency at semi-annual and annual horizons.  
Table 38 Panel B presents the results during recession periods. No hedge fund strategies 
present consistency in their raw returns with a few exceptions such as Long Only and 
Market Neutral that present significant consistency at annual horizons. Regarding the 
Sharpe ratio and the Information ratio all hedge funds have little consistency. There are 
a few exceptions such as CTA and Long Bias that provide some consistency at semi-




Table 38. Hedge Fund Smoothness at Strategy Level – Growth/Recession 
Periods 
This table shows the results of the regression-based parametric model (equation 18) for raw returns (RR), the Sharpe 
ratio (SR), and the Information ratio (IR), during growth periods (Panel A) and recessions (Panel B). A positive and 
significant slope coefficient indicates performance persistence. This suggests that a hedge fund (or group) that did 
well in a specific period tend to do well in the subsequent period and vice-versa. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 
and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01 using a two-tailed t-statistic test. For space reasons, I present only coefficients 
followed by the t-statistics in parentheses. 








Panel A: growth period 
Short Bias -0.114 0.060 -0.082 0.168 0.198 0.634** 0.109 0.198 0.720** 
 (-1.077) (0.393) (-0.351) (1.575) (1.360) (3.609) (1.004) (1.355) (4.567) 
Long Only 0.241* 0.474** 0.553* 0.222* 0.444** 0.619** 0.054 (2.273) (2.110) 
 (2.268) (3.422) (2.765) (2.026) (3.117) (3.341) (0.488) 0.366* 0.384 
Sector 0.279** 0.543** 0.453* 0.323** 0.519** 0.529* 0.097 0.366* 0.384 
 (2.665) (4.165) (2.248) (3.124) (3.843) (2.701) (0.913) (2.576) (0.129) 
Long Short  0.322** 0.532** 0.597**  0.299** 0.462**  0.509*  0.265*  0.296  0.570* 
  (3.112)  (4.028)  (3.235)  (2.862)  (3.283)  (2.476)  (2.484)  (1.986)  (2.744) 
Event Driven  0.578** 0.661** 0.805**  0.604** 0.649** 0.748**  0.102  0.178  0.289 
  (6.467)  (5.646)  (5.983)  (6.897)  (5.414)  (4.764)  (0.932)  (1.147)  (1.258) 
Multi-Strategy  0.712** 0.763** 0.760**  0.518** 0.612** 0.582** -0.250* -0.214** -0.005 
  (9.315)  (7.622)  (5.310)  (5.496)  (4.945)  (4.091) (-2.364) (-4.790) (-0.059) 
Other  0.786** 0.850** 0.843** -0.001 0.596** 0.606** -0.120  0.147  0.380 
 (11.892) (10.490)  (7.138) (-0.007)  (8.723)  (9.019) (-0.948)  (0.764)  (1.330) 
Global Macro  0.411** 0.571** 0.524**  0.340** 0.457**  0.366  0.111  0.298  0.191 
  (4.146)  (4.499)  (2.990)  (3.093)  (3.121)  (1.619)  (0.963)  (1.897)  (0.804) 
Relative Value  0.718** 0.796** 0.871**  0.675** 0.735** 0.840**  0.015  0.227  0.311 
  (9.425)  (8.301)  (7.732)  (8.310)  (6.755)  (6.314)  (0.132)  (1.478)  (1.288) 
Market 
Neutral 
 0.744** 0.771** 0.758**  0.472** 0.419** 0.620**  0.029  0.317*  0.472 
 (10.181)  (7.827)  (5.257)  (4.885)  (2.885)  (3.368)  (0.264)  (2.107)  (2.079) 
CTA  0.185 0.448** 0.708**  0.030  0.080  0.382 -0.007  0.085  0.445 
  (1.766)  (3.342)  (4.530)  (0.286)  (0.547)  (1.851) (-0.063)  (0.557)  (1.869) 
Panel B: recession period 
Short Bias  0.073 -0.533  0.357  0.285  0.433 -0.001  0.329  0.393* -0.002 
  (0.251) (-1.129)  (0.258)  (0.927)  (1.196) (-0.075)  (1.058)  (3.456) (-0.164) 
Long Only  0.080 -0.748  3.451*  0.057 -0.065 -0.748  0.007 -0.184 -0.030 
  (0.255) (-1.705)  (4.788)  (0.168) (-0.119) (-1.128)  (0.084) (-1.568) (-0.070) 
Sector  0.176 -0.437 -0.125  0.196 -0.194 -0.216 -0.038 -0.421  0.846 
  (0.511) (-0.775) (-0.227)  (0.597) (-0.335) (-1.267) (-0.122) (-0.950)  (1.126) 
Long Short  0.141 -0.712 -0.090  0.062 -0.825 -0.224  0.106 -0.489  1.853 
  (0.413) (-1.346) (-0.136)  (0.193) (-1.599) (-0.490)  (0.302) (-0.985)  (1.622) 
Event Driven  0.206 -0.822  0.116  0.260 -0.686 -0.326  0.077 -0.362  0.041 
  (0.541) (-1.478)  (0.096)  (0.746) (-1.106) (-0.514)  (0.236) (-0.824)  (0.038) 
Multi-Strategy  0.138 -0.4551 -0.006  0.181 -0.576  0.243 -0.283 -0.717  0.527 
  (0.381) (-0.709) (-0.065)  (0.492) (-0.779)  (0.352) (-1.014) (-1.500)  (0.414) 
Other  0.276 -0.039  0.282 -0.254  0.332  0.899  0.120  0.032  0.671 
  (0.831) (-0.075)  (1.043) (-0.716)  (0.448)  (0.976)  (0.314)  (0.059)  (1.746) 
Global Macro  0.129  0.844  0.824  0.124  0.589  1.075  0.167  0.974  1.529 
  (0.381)  (2.216)  (5.812)  (0.318)  (0.713)  (1.125)  (0.449)  (1.238)  (7.158) 
Relative Value  0.028 -0.666  0.215  0.024 -0.570  1.253 -0.053 -0.352  0.929 
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Table 38. Hedge Fund Smoothness at Strategy Level – Growth/Recession 
Periods (continued) 
  (0.085) (-1.190)  (0.546)  (0.090) (-1.144)  (9.045) (-0.151) (-0.658)  (0.836) 
Market 
Neutral 
 0.183 -0.177  0.704* -0.149 -0.569  1.716 -0.025 -0.663  0.360 
  (0.977) (-0.726)  (3.499) (-0.554) (-1.163)  (0.382) (-0.083) (-1.422)  (0.222) 
CTA  0.004  0.747  0.909  0.011  0.940*  1.036  0.027 -0.433  0.156 
 -0.018  (2.523)  (2.917)  (0.044)  (4.531)  (2.532)  (0.082) (-0.814)  (0.134) 
 
 
5.3.2.1.2 Up/Down regimes 
Table 39 Panel A shows that during up regimes almost all hedge fund strategies (except 
Short Bias and CTAs) display consistency in their returns for all horizons. Moreover, on 
average, non-directional and semi-directional strategies have higher returns consistency 
for the underlying time horizons compared to the directional strategies. Regarding the 
Sharpe ratio, CTA, Others and Global Macro strategies show the least persistence. 
Concerning the Information ratio, similar to the growth periods, hardly any hedge fund 
strategies display persistence.  
Table 39 Panel B presents the results during down regimes. Almost no hedge fund 
strategies show raw returns consistency. One exception is the Market Neutral Strategy 
that is consistent in all time horizons, and CTA that is, but only on a quarterly basis. As 
far as the Sharpe ratio is concerned almost no hedge fund strategies provide smooth 
returns. There are some exceptions such as the Short Bias and CTA strategy that 
provides return consistency on quarterly basis and the Market Neutral that provide on 
yearly basis. Information ratio results during down regimes are poor in terms of 
smoothness. However, there are a few strategies such as Sector, Long Short, Event 
Driven that present consistency at a semi-annual period whereas other strategies such as 




Table 39.  Hedge Fund Smoothness at Strategy Level – Up Regimes 
This table shows the results of the regression-based parametric model (equation 18) for raw returns (RR), the Sharpe 
ratio (SR), and the Information ratio (IR), during up (Panel A) and down (Panel B) regimes. A positive and 
significant slope coefficient indicates performance persistence. This suggests that a hedge fund (or group) that did 
well in a specific period tend to do well in the subsequent period and vice-versa. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 
and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01 using a two-tailed t-statistic test. For space reasons, I present only coefficients 
followed by the t-statistics in parentheses.    








Panel A: up regime 
Short Bias  0.112 -0.135 -0.244  0.163  0.042  0.185  0.199  0.071  0.260 
  (1.067) (-0.894) (-1.095)  (1.507)  (0.267)  (1.009)  (1.852)  (0.452)  (1.501) 
Long Only  0.371** 0.409**  0.539*  0.257* 0.504** 0.648**  0.020  0.223  0.093 
  (3.639)  (2.863)  (2.710)  (2.388)  (3.705)  (3.498)  (0.227)  (1.743)  (0.475) 
Sector  0.425** 0.511** 0.615**  0.343** 0.538** 0.689** -0.035  0.126  0.196 
  (4.282)  (3.818)  (3.849)  (3.325)  (4.054)  (4.335) (-0.330)  (0.831)  (0.786) 
Long Short  0.407** 0.516** 0.611**  0.278* 0.506** 0.562**  0.017  0.253  0.298 
  (4.059)  (3.872)  (3.577)  (2.635)  (3.740)  (2.908)  (0.155)  (1.697)  (1.214) 
Event Driven  0.604** 0.589** 0.636**  0.577** 0.641** 0.658** -0.066  0.152  0.307 
  (6.897)  (4.673)  (3.656)  (6.438)  (5.333)  (3.764) (-0.602)  (0.988)  (1.331) 
Multi-Strategy  0.721** 0.708** 0.726**  0.662** 0.691** 0.662**  0.085  0.138**  0.004 
  (9.505)  (6.420)  (4.959)  (7.975)  (5.993)  (3.984)  (0.774)  (3.683)  (0.066) 
Other  0.717** 0.865** 0.862**  0.002 0.615** 0.627** -0.143 -0.119  0.631 
  (9.492) (11.162)  (7.959)  (0.033)  (9.739)  (9.295) (-1.117) (-0.598)  (1.785) 
Global Macro  0.397** 0.478** 0.560**  0.340** 0.465**  0.360  0.118  0.292  0.144 
  (3.950)  (3.520)  (3.007)  (3.050)  (3.146)  (1.541)  (1.008)  (1.826)  (0.579) 
Relative Value  0.729** 0.691** 0.759**  0.724** 0.751** 0.793** -0.099  0.134  0.327 
  (9.661)  (6.068)  (5.676)  (9.481)  (7.077)  (5.621) (-0.907)  (0.867)  (1.253) 
Market 
Neutral 
 0.616** 0.713** 0.840**  0.408** 0.431** 0.645**  0.142  0.252  0.330 
  (7.127)  (6.598)  (6.537)  (4.055)  (3.031)  (3.477)  (1.307)  (1.667)  (1.571) 
CTA  0.128 0.563** 0.594** -0.001  0.141 -0.046  0.124  0.085  0.003 
  (1.204)  (4.634)  (3.304) (-0.002)  (0.975) (-0.205)  (1.170)  (0.552)  (0.012) 
Panel B: down regime 
Short Bias  0.364  0.419  0.600  0.487**  0.007  0.127  0.512**  0.056  0.160 
  (1.582)  (1.170)  (0.634)  (3.348)  (0.059)  (0.491)  (3.193)  (0.380)  (0.441) 
Long Only  0.208  0.277  0.225  0.156  0.348  0.924  0.439  0.379  1.076 
  (0.773)  (0.487)  (0.103)  (0.504)  (0.784)  (0.377)  (1.252)  (0.611)  (9.627) 
Sector  0.008  0.757  1.401 -0.080  0.352  0.940  0.630  1.119*  1.384 
  (0.027)  (1.260)  (0.757) (-0.307)  (0.922)  (0.887)  (1.858)  (3.961)  (1.119) 
Long Short  0.174  0.681  0.148  0.187  0.440  0.221  0.518  1.294**  1.512 
  (0.600)  (1.064)  (0.034)  (0.672)  (0.982)  (0.104)  (1.597)  (5.616)  (3.716) 
Event Driven  0.301  1.293 -3.749  0.404  0.579 -5.262  0.023  0.925**  0.930 
  (1.005)  (1.373) (-0.722)  (1.455)  (0.958) (-8.776)  (0.070)  (4.757)  (9.132) 
Multi-Strategy  0.004  1.011 -0.291  0.124  0.133  0.125  0.202  0.176  0.316 
  (0.012)  (1.458) (-0.183)  (1.046)  (1.143)  (0.430)  (1.577)  (1.074)  (0.922) 
Other -0.180  0.301  0.133  0.127  0.186 -0.819  0.626  0.339  1.035 
 (-0.605)  (0.586) ( 0.193)  (0.379)  (0.321) (-0.870)  (1.870)  (0.649)  (7.618) 
Global Macro -0.094  0.383  0.479  0.169  0.415  1.613  1.184*  0.540  1.642 
 (-0.513)  (1.946)  (9.891)  (0.443)  (0.741)  (5.200)  (2.382)  (1.077)  (2.190) 
Relative Value -0.024 -0.126 -1.770  0.296 -0.088 -0.678  0.272  1.109**  1.429 
 (-0.081) (-0.221) (-3.297)  (1.418) (-0.364) (-4.336)  (0.822)  (7.079) (11.340) 
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To sum up, during “good” market conditions almost all hedge fund strategies present 
returns consistency on quarterly, semi-annual and annual horizons. This situation 
weakens when I take into consideration risk-adjusted returns, although they are still 
mostly significant. When I take into consideration stressful market conditions hardly 
any hedge fund strategies present returns smoothness. Furthermore recession periods 
have a greater negative impact on hedge fund strategies’ smoothness compared to down 
regimes. This is because down regimes (that are characterized by low market returns 
with high volatility) affect a lot of funds’ performance in terms of poor but relatively 
consistent returns. On average, non-directional and semi-directional strategies present 
higher consistency in their returns. From the above it seems that during “good” times 
fund managers display return consistency (or massage their returns more efficiently) 
compared to stressful market conditions as it is more difficult to have smooth returns. 
The findings are close to the literature such as Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) and 
Eling (2009) who observed serial correlation for hedge fund strategies and especially for 
those that invest in illiquid assets43.  
5.3.2.2 Persistence against the market benchmark 
This section examines hedge funds’ raw returns persistence against the market 
benchmark (Wilshire 5000TRI, including dividends). In other words it examines 
whether hedge funds are able to outperform (or underperform) the market consistently. I 
use three time horizons: annual, semi-annual, and quarterly. In order to consider 
persistence the CPR test and the Chi-square test are used. The CPR should be 
                                                 
43 I have tested for autocorrelation for one, two, four, six, and twelve months and some strategies such as 
Relative Value, and Market Neutral present autocorrelation even at the 12-month horizon. The results are 
not presented here for space reasons but are available in the appendix.   
Market 
Neutral 
 0.535*  0.508* 0.515**  0.190  0.077  0.406*  0.260  0.583  0.825 
  (2.660)  (4.179)  (9.120)  (0.885)  (0.470)  (4.883)  (1.042)  (1.354)  (0.776) 
CTA  0.521*  0.267  0.359  0.393*  0.193  0.175  0.579*  0.660  0.648 
  (3.097)  (1.497)  (0.962)  (2.387)  (1.085)  (0.376)  (2.495)  (2.074)  (0.686) 
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significantly greater than one if it is to conclude that there is performance persistence44. 
Depending on the ratio WW/LL I discuss out- or under-performance versus the market.  
5.3.2.2.1 Growth/Recession periods 
Table 40 Panel A using the CPR test shows that only a few strategies such as Long 
Short (annual), Multi-strategy (semi-annually), and Long Short (quarterly) are able to 
present performance persistence against the market (although underperforming). The 
Chi-square test examines the difference in the observed versus the expected 
frequencies45. Using this test, Short Bias (annual, semi-annual, quarterly), Market 
Neutral (annual, semi-annual, quarterly), and Relative Value (annual) present 
persistence versus the market index. Although there are some strategies that perform 
better than the markets, nevertheless using two different tests these results are not 
significant. In other words both tests show that none of the strategies present persistence 
with respect to the market (in a positive or negative manner)46. 
During recession periods, due to the fact that there are relatively few observations, I use 
descriptive statistics as presented in Table 40 Panel B concerning the performance 
persistence of the strategies against the market benchmark. Similar to the growth period, 
I use three time horizons: annual, semi-annual, and quarterly. Concerning the annual 
period all strategies present two or three wins against zero or one loss in terms of 
frequencies. However, during the semi-annual period non-persistence is more common 
among all hedge fund strategies compared to persistence. The same applies for the 
quarterly horizon for all hedge fund strategies. An exception is the Long Only strategy 
that shows six cases of persistence (WW and LL) against four of non-persistence (WL 
and LW). Hence, during recessions hedge funds display almost no persistence against 
the market benchmark. 
  
                                                 
44 After I have computed the CPR, I examine whether it is greater than one. If it is less than one, this 
means instantly that there is no persistence; hence I do not proceed further to hypothesis tests. The CPR 
test is stricter than the Chi-square test.  
45 A drawback of the Chi-square test in this case is that unlike the CPR test, it cannot capture the 
proportion of winners and losers. Hence, I consider the CPR test more powerful. However, I believe that 
it is better to use more than one test, for more robust results. 
46 An exception is the Multi Strategy that presents weakly significant persistence for the annual and semi-
annual time horizon using both tests. 
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Table 40. Persistence against Benchmark - Growth/Recessions 
This table shows the results for the persistence during growth (Panel A) and recessions (Panel B). Regarding the 
growth periods, Panel A shows the results of CPR and the chi-square statistics. A significant CPR statistic indicates 
persistence whereas a WW/LL greater (less) than one indicates outperformance (underperformance) against the 
market index (Wilshire 5000TRI, including dividends). A chi-square less than 0.05 indicates significant persistence 
against the market index. For CPR, * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01 using a 
two-tailed statistic test. At an annual horizon I use the t-statistic (due to the low number of observations) whereas at 
the semi-annual and quarterly horizon I use the z-statistic. Regarding the recessions, Panel B shows only descriptive 
statistics due to the low number of available observations.   
Panel A: growth periods 
 annual,   (t-stat)  semi  -  annual, (z-stat) quarterly, (z-stat)  
Strategy CPR WW/LL 𝑥2  CPR WW/LL 𝑥2  CPR WW/LL 𝑥2  
Short Bias 2.33 0.07 22.00** 2.86 0.21 23.33** 1.01 0.31 14.15** 
Long Only 5.00 1.80 4.80 2.39 1.89 5.43 1.66 1.29 2.29 
Sector 3.50 1.17 2.00 2.14 1.27 2.00 2.03 1.17 3.05 
Long Short 9.33* 0.88 5.20 3.04 0.59 5.81 2.47* 0.86 4.65 
Event 
Driven 
3.00 0.44 4.40 0.68 - 0.48 1.15 1.00 0.13 
Multi-
Strategy 
8.33 0.50 7.60 4.86* 0.71 7.33 1.66 0.78 2.29 
Other 1.50 0.83 0.40 2.14 0.79 2.00 1.14 0.83 0.51 
Global 
Macro 
2.50 0.30 6.80 1.33 0.35 6.19 1.35 0.70 2.11 
Relative 
Value 
0.69 - 10.80* 1.17 0.26 10.19* 0.82 - 6.06 
Market 
Neutral 
3.75 0.07 26.80** 1.86 0.12 31.33** 0.94 - 25.54** 
CTA 1.50 0.83 0.40 0.64 - 1.62 0.96 - 7.75 
Panel B: recession periods 
 annual   semi- annual   quarterly   
Strategy W L WW LL WL LW WW LL WL LW 
Short Bias 2 1 2 0 2 1 4 1 3 2 
Long Only 2 1 1 0 2 2 4 2 2 2 
Sector 3 0 2 0 2 1 5 0 3 2 
Long Short 2 1 2 0 2 1 4 1 3 2 
Event 
Driven 
2 1 0 0 3 2 4 1 3 2 
Multi-
Strategy 
2 1 0 0 3 2 4 1 3 2 
Other 3 0 2 0 2 1 4 1 3 2 
Global 
Macro 
2 1 2 0 2 1 4 1 3 2 
Relative 
Value 
2 1 2 1 1 1 4 1 3 2 
Market 
Neutral 
2 1 2 0 2 1 4 1 3 2 
CTA 2 1 2 0 2 1 4 1 3 2 
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5.3.2.2.2 Up/Down regimes 
Table 41 Panel A shows hedge fund returns persistence against the market benchmark 
during up regimes. Using the CPR test, none of the strategies show persistence against 
the benchmark, over all time horizons. As I have already mentioned, the Chi-square test 
examines the difference of the observed versus the expected frequencies. Some 
strategies such as Short Bias, Global Macro, or Market Neutral show significant 
persistence over these time horizons but only using the 𝑋2 test. However, it is mentioned 
that there is no confirmation from the two tests of performance persistence. Hence it can 
be concluded that no strategies present persistence against the market benchmark.  
For the down regimes, we have relatively few observations, so similar to recessions we 
use descriptive statistics. Table 41 Panel B shows that all strategies, annually, present 
three wins against zero losses in terms of frequencies. Similar results apply for the 
semi–annual period. During the quarterly time horizon, all hedge fund strategies also 
present persistence in term of wins against losses. During recessions hedge funds do 
present some persistence against the market benchmark but we are unable to state 




Table 41. Persistence against Benchmark – Up/Down Regimes 
This table shows the results for the persistence during up (Panel A) and down (Panel B) regimes. Regarding the up 
regimes, Panel A shows the results of CPR and the chi-square statistics. A significant CPR statistic indicates 
persistence whereas a WW/LL greater (less) than one indicates outperformance (underperformance) against the 
market index (Wilshire 5000TRI, including dividends). A chi-square less than 0.05 indicates significant persistence 
against the market index. For CPR, * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01 using a 
two-tailed statistic test. At annual horizon I used the t-statistic (due to low number of observations) whereas at the 
semi-annual and quarterly horizon I used the z-statistic. Regarding the down regimes, Panel B shows only descriptive 
figures due to the low number of available observations.    
 
 
To sum up, during “good” time conditions for some strategies (e.g. Long Short and 
Multi -Strategy) there is weak evidence that there is persistence with respect to the 
market within the underlying time horizons. For all the other strategies it is clear that 
there is no persistence. However, during stressful market conditions, there is some 
Panel A: up regime 
 annual (t-stat)  semi  - annual (t-stat) quarterly (z-stat)  
Strategy CPR WW/LL 𝑥2  CPR WW/LL 𝑥2  CPR WW/LL 𝑥2  
Short 
Bias 
0.75 - 12.71** 0.19 - 18.67** 0.78 - 20.48** 
Long 
Only 
0.44 - 0.80 1.47 0.92 0.48 0.56 - 1.81 
Sector 
3.50 0.86 2.00 1.78 1.00 0.86 0.99 - 0.38 
Long 
Short 
0.84 - 1.60 1.58 0.32 9.62* 1.00 - 4.10 
Event 
Driven 
2.00 0.50 2.40 1.67 0.60 2.57 0.50 - 5.14 
Multi-
Strategy 
3.67 0.27 9.60* 2.08 0.37 9.24* 1.40 0.64 3.14 
Other 
0.44 - 0.80 0.69 - 3.14 1.20 0.83 0.57 
Global 
Macro 
0.40 - 7.76* 1.17 0.19 15.33** 0.67 - 10.57* 
Relative 
Value 
1.69 0.33 4.40 0.45 - 6.19 0.68 - 13.71** 
Market 
Neutral 
0.69 - 10.80* 0.26 - 23.14** 0.45 - 20.10** 
CTA 
0.16 - 3.60 0.82 - 3.90 0.71 - 9.67* 
Panel B: down regime 
 annual   semi- annual   quarterly   
Strategy W L WW LL WL LW WW LL WL LW 
Short Bias 3 0 5 0 0 0 7 0 2 2 
Long Only 3 0 4 0 1 0 8 0 1 2 
Sector 3 0 5 0 0 0 8 1 1 1 
Long Short 3 0 5 0 0 0 7 0 2 2 
Event Driven 3 0 5 0 0 0 7 0 2 2 
Multi-Strategy 3 0 5 0 0 0 7 0 2 2 
Other 3 0 5 0 0 0 7 0 2 2 
Global Macro 3 0 5 0 0 0 6 1 2 2 
Relative 
Value 
3 0 5 0 0 0 7 0 2 2 
Market 
Neutral 
3 0 5 0 0 0 6 1 2 2 
CTA 3 0 5 0 0 0 6 1 2 2 
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evidence that strategies present some persistence against the market benchmark. 
Unfortunately there are relatively few available observations so it is not possible 
calculate statistical significance. Recessions affect hedge fund persistence against the 
market benchmark more fiercely than down regimes as funds continue to outperform the 
market during down regimes. The reader is reminded that I am referring to raw returns, 
only. To my knowledge, I am the first to examine hedge funds returns against the 
market index.  
5.3.2.3 Persistence within each strategy 
In this section I proceed further and examine hedge fund performance persistence within 
each of the 11 strategies. The objective is to examine whether fund winners (losers) 
continue to be fund winners (losers) in the next time period (in terms of raw returns). 
Hence I form ranked portfolios of funds that I rebalance every subsequent period 
(quarterly, semi-annually, and annually). I then take the spread between the first ranked 
and the last ranked portfolios and implement the regression based parametric model so 
as to examine the smoothness of the underlying spread. I present the results of whether 
top performers continue to be top performers and bottom performers continue to be 
bottom performers. 
5.3.2.3.1 Growth periods 
For quarterly times, Table 42 Panel A compares the performance of the top performers 
(P1*) or losers (P10*) with that of the average of all hedge funds. It is important to 
clarify the distinction between P1 versus P1* and P10 versus P10*. P1 are the ex-ante 
best performer portfolios and more specifically funds that I formed based on best past 
performance (e.g. quarterly, semi-annual, annual). P1* are ex-post portfolios and more 
specifically the previous P1 after one time period (e.g. quarterly, semi-annual, annual). 
Similar rules apply to P10.  
The monthly spread between top performers P1* and the average of all funds is positive 
for more than half hedge fund strategies and significant47 as well. Short Bias, Sector, 
Global Macro, Market Neutral, and CTAs strategies have positive but insignificant 
spreads. The highest is from Relative Value (0.88%, monthly) and the lowest from 
Long Short (0.49%, monthly). Concerning the bottom performers P10* for all hedge 
fund strategies the spread is negative and in most cases significant. Short Bias and CTA 
                                                 
47 Significantly different from zero. I used a two-tailed t-test at 0.05 and 0.01 levels. 
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strategies have positive spread but are insignificant. The highest (in terms of absolute 
value - negative) and most significant spread is from the Other strategy (-0.51%, 
monthly) and the lowest (in terms of absolute value - negative) is from Event Driven (-
0.16%, monthly). I compare the ex-ante best performers portfolios (P1) with that of ex-
post (P1*); For the Other and Relative strategies there is positive and significant 
correlation (using the Spearman and Pearson statistics). This means that the persistence 
for these two strategies (their spreads are the highest) is driven by the top performers. In 
other words, the top performers are performing extremely well. I also compare the ex-
ante bottom performers’ portfolios (P10) with that of ex-post (P10); there is significant 
negative correlation for Global Macro and Relative Value strategies. This means that, 
despite the reversals, the bottom performers continue to be poor performers, especially 
for the Relative Value strategy. 
Panel B examines whether top performers continue to be top performers and bottom 
performers continue to be bottom performers on a semiannual basis. In other words I 
examine P1* and P10*. The majority of the hedge fund strategies demonstrate 
significant persistence for top performers. The exception is the Short Bias, Long Only, 
Global Macro, and the CTA strategies. The highest significant spread of the top 
performers P1* and the average of all funds within the specific strategy is Others 
(1.01%, monthly) and the lowest is for the Market Neutral strategy (0.37%, monthly). 
Regarding the bottom performers (P10*), there are many strategies that have significant 
spreads compared to the average within the specific strategy. The highest (in absolute 
values - negative) spread is from the Other strategy (-0.96%, monthly) and the lowest 
(in absolute values - negative) is from the Market Neutral strategy (-0.36%, monthly). 
When compare the P1 with the P1* portfolios the Other and the Relative Value have 
positive and significant correlations meaning that, especially for the Other strategy, top 
performers continue to perform extremely well. Comparing the P10 and P10* in most 
cases there are negative correlations although in the Relative Value strategy it is 
significantly different from zero. This means that there are reversals within poorly 
performing funds. 
Table 42 Panel C examines persistence on an annual basis. Concerning the top 
performers (P1* hedge funds), their spreads in relation to the average funds within the 
same strategy are positive for almost all hedge funds strategies. The only exception is 
from Market Neutral and the CTA strategies although this (negative) difference is not 
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significantly different from zero. For the rest, the highest significant spread is from 
Short Bias (1.01%, monthly) and the lowest from the Long Only strategy (0.44%, 
monthly). Regarding the worst performing funds, their spreads in relation to the average 
funds within the same strategy is negative, although only for the Relative Value strategy 
is it significantly different from zero (-0.43%, monthly). When comparing the P1 with 
the P1* portfolios the Long only strategy has significant negative correlations, meaning 
that although P1* perform well above the average, there is reversal when compared with 
the P1. Similarly, comparing the P10 and P10* there are no significant correlations 






Table 42. Persistence within Strategies – Winners/Losers – Growth Periods 
This table shows average (avg) monthly returns of spreads (spd) between top P1 versus P1*, P10 versus P10* performers, spreads between P* versus the average, and P10* versus the average. These are 
for all hedge fund strategies on a quarterly (Panel A), semi-annual (Panel B), and annual (Panel C) basis during growth periods. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P <0.01 
(two-tailed tests). P1 and P10 are ex-ante best performer and worst performer portfolios, respectively. P1* and P10* are ex-post portfolios of P1 and P10, respectively. Spearman (‘Spear’) and Pearson 
(‘Pear’) represent the relevant correlation coefficients so as to examine whether top (bottom) performers continue to be top (bottom) performers.   
Panel A: Quarterly 
Quarterly 
Short Bias Return Spear Pear Long Only Return Spear Pear Sector Return Spear Pear Long Short Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 3.71% -0.014 -0.125 Spr. P1-P1* 3.32% 0.090 -0.070 Spr. P1-P1* 5.22% 0.036 -0.162 Spr. P1-P1* 4.03% 0.125 -0.113 
Spr. P10-P10* -4.09% -0.145 -0.206 Spr. P10-P10* -2.99% -0.067 -0.099 Spr. P10-P10* -4.59% 0.123 0.041 Spr. P10-P10* -3.90% 0.024 -0.133 
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.52%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.65%**   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.28%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.49%*   
Spr. P10*-Avg 0.14%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.40%*   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.39%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.28%**   
Event Driven Return Spear Pear Multi Strategy Return Spear Pear Other Return Spear Pear Global Macro Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 2.63% 0.185 -0.034 Spr. P1-P1* 2.80% 0.126 0.144 Spr. P1-P1* 2.91% 0.353** 0.237 Spr. P1-P1* 3.90% -0.069 -0.128 
Spr. P10-P10* -2.52% 0.001 0.004 Spr. P10-P10* -2.60% 0.063 -0.172 Spr. P10-P10* -2.94% -0.04 -0.139 Spr. P10-P10* -3.57% -0.187 -0.315* 
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.62%**   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.66%*   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.85%**   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.16%   
Spr. P10*-Avg -0.16%**   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.28%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.51%*   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.07%   
Relative 
Value 
Return Spear Pear Market Neutral Return Spear Pear CTAs Return Spear Pear      
Spr. P1-P1* 1.90% 0.307** 0.309** Spr. P1-P1* 2.30% 0.153 -0.084 Spr. P1-P1* 5.72% -0.011 -0.073      
Spr. P10-P10* -2.16% -0.161 -0.292** Spr. P10-P10* -2.18% -0.007 -0.04 Spr. P10-P10* -5.51% -0.164 -0.201      
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.88%**   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.15%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.32%        
Spr. P10*-Avg -0.29%*   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.20%   Spr. P10*-Avg 0.26%       
Panel B: Semi-Annual 
Semi- 
Annual 
Short Bias Return Spear Pear Long Only Return Spear Pear Sector Return Spear Pear Long Short Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 2.75% 0.170 0.321 Spr. P1-P1* 2.87% 0.157 0.070 Spr. P1-P1* 4.19% -0.038 -0.047 Spr. P1-P1* 3.21% -0.093 -0.18 
Spr. P10-P10* -2.94% -0.010 -0.196 Spr. P10-P10* -2.50% -0.089 -0.071 Spr. P10-P10* -3.64% 0.098 0.243 Spr. P10-P10* -3.04% -0.006 0.058 
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.84%   Spr. P1*- Avg 0.38%   Spr. P1*- Avg 0.28%   Spr. P1*- Avg 0.48%*   
Spr. P10*- Avg -0.19%   Spr. P10*- Avg -0.47%*   Spr. P10*- Avg -0.69%   Spr. P10*- Avg -0.40%*   
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Table 42. Persistence within Strategies – Winners/Losers – Growth Periods (continued) 
Event Driven Return Spear Pear Multi Strategy Return Spear Pear Other Return Spear Pear Global Macro Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 2.13% 0.028 -0.280 Spr. P1-P1* 1.93% 0.121 0.093 Spr. P1-P1* 2.24% 0.221 0.403* Spr. P1-P1* 2.61% 0.162 0.148 
Spr. P10-P10* -1.65% -0.165 -0.152 Spr. P10-P10* -2.22% 0.191 0.173 Spr. P10-P10* -1.82% 0.071 0.136 Spr. P10-P10* -3.04% 0.029 -0.238 
Spr. P1*- Avg 0.62%**   Spr. P1*- Avg 0.9%**   Spr. P1*- Avg 1.01%**   Spr. P1*- Avg 0.47%   
Spr. P10*- Avg -0.55%**   Spr. P10*- Avg -0.17%   Spr. P10*- Avg -0.96%**   Spr. P10*- Avg 0.14%   
Relative Value Return Spear Pear Market Neutral Return Spear Pear CTAs Return Spear Pear      
Spr. P1-P1* 1.62% 0.395** 0.371* Spr. P1-P1* 1.62% 0.298 0.062 Spr. P1-P1* 4.47% -0.140 -0.202      
Spr. P10-P10* -1.74% -0.048 -0.342* Spr. P10-P10* -1.47% 0.014 -0.069 Spr. P10-P10* -4.09% 0.163 0.042      
Spr. P1*- Avg 0.76%**   Spr. P1*- Avg 0.37%*   Spr. P1*- Avg 0.30%        
Spr. -0.33%   Spr. P10*- Avg -0.36%*   Spr. P10*- Avg 0.28%        
  Panel C: Annual 
Annual 
Short Bias Return Spear Pear Long Only Return Spear Pear Sector Return Spear Pear Long Short Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 2.42% 0.086 0.002 Spr. P1-P1* 2.27% -0.519* -0.575** Spr. P1-P1* 3.15% -0.217 -0.271 Spr. P1-P1* 2.67% -0.426 -0.276 
Spr. P10-P10* -3.04% -0.060 0.055 Spr. P10-P10* -2.21% 0.005 -0.219 Spr. P10-P10* -3.06% 0.060 -0.369 Spr. P10-P10* -2.67% 0.052 -0.312 
Spr. P1*-Avg 1.01%*   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.44%*   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.59%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.29%   
Spr. P10*- Avg 0.41%   Spr. P10*- Avg -0.47%   Spr. P10*- Avg -0.35%   Spr. P10*- Avg -0.17%   
Event Driven Return Spear Pear Multi Strategy Return Spear Pear Other Return Spear Pear Global Macro Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 1.90% 0.048 0.044 Spr. P1-P1* 1.98% -0.074 0.072 Spr. P1-P1* 2.33% 0.050 0.016 Spr. P1-P1* 2.77% -0.318 -0.244 
Spr. P10-P10* -1.72% 0.200 -0.128 Spr. P10-P10* -2.00% -0.164 -0.234 Spr. P10-P10* -1.70% 0.222 0.220 Spr. P10-P10* -2.40% 0.318 -0.277 
Spr. P1*- Avg 0.46**   Spr. P1*- Avg 0.29%   Spr. P1*- Avg 0.58%   Spr. P1*- Avg 0.08%   
Spr. P10*- Avg -0.19   Spr. P10*- Avg 0.12%   Spr. P10*- Avg -0.68%   Spr. P10*- Avg -0.04%   
Relative Value Return Spear Pear Market Neutral Return Spear Pear CTAs Return Spear Pear      
Spr. P1-P1* 1.57% 0.279 0.285 Spr. P1-P1* 1.95% 0.104 -0.247 Spr. P1-P1* 3.78% 0.221 -0.011      
Spr. P10-P10* -1.39% -0.021 -0.395 Spr. P10-P10* -1.75% 0.064 0.065 Spr. P10-P10* -3.71% 0.108 -0.037      
Spr. P1*- Avg 0.63%**   Spr. P1*- Avg -0.26%   Spr. P1*- Avg -0.42%        
Spr. P10*- Avg -0.43%**   Spr. P10*- Avg 0.21%   Spr. P10*- Avg -0.41%        
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5.3.2.3.2 Recession periods 
Table 43 Panel A presents the results on quarterly basis. Concerning top performing 
hedge funds the spreads between the top performers P1* and the average are for the 
majority of hedge fund strategies positive, although not significant. The only exception 
is for the Relative Value strategy that is weakly significant (0.98%, monthly). Similar 
results are for spreads between bottom performers P10* and the average which is 
negative in all strategies, although not significant. The only exception is for the CTA 
strategy with significantly positive spread (2.36%, monthly). When compare the P1 
with the P1* portfolios only the Relative Value Strategy demonstrates high significant 
positive correlation between them. This means that top performers continue to perform 
extremely well. Similar results are seen when compare P10 and P10* where there are no 
significant correlations within bottom performers.  
Panel B presents the results on a semi-annual basis. Regarding the top performers (P1*), 
their spreads in relation to the average within the specific strategy are for the majority of 
hedge fund strategies positive, although not significant. The only exception is the CTA 
strategy with a significantly negative spread equal to -3.60%, monthly. Similar results 
are seen for spreads between bottom performers P10* and the average which are 
negative in all strategies although not significant. The only exception is for the CTA 
strategy with a significantly positive spread (3.04%, monthly). This means that for P1 
and P10 of the CTA strategy there is not only a lack of performance persistence but 
there are significant reversals when comparing these portfolios with the average fund 
within the same strategy. When comparing the P1 with the P1* portfolios there is no 
significant correlation between them, although in most cases it is positive. Similar 
results are seen when compare P10 and P10*, where there are no significant correlations 
within bottom performers. The only exception is from Market Neutral where there is a 
significant negative correlation, meaning that bottom performers P10* tend to reverse 
their performance, but still they underperform compared to the average within this 
strategy. 
Panel C the results on an annual basis. The spread between P1* and the average of 
funds within the specific strategy varies between positive and negative. The largest 
positive is from the Long Only strategy (1.83%, monthly) and the largest negative is 
from the Sector and Other strategy (-2.56%, monthly). P1 and P1* spreads for all 
strategies are relatively high. The largest is from the Short Bias strategy (10.70%, 
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monthly) and the smallest is from the Multi Strategy (2.56%, monthly). P10 and P10* 
spreads for all strategies are negative. The largest (in terms of absolute value) is from 
CTA (-7.31%, monthly) and the smallest is from the Multi Strategy (-0.29%, monthly). 
It seems that during recessions, there is no yearly performance persistence among hedge 














Table 43. Persistence within Strategies – Winners/Losers - Recessions 
This table shows average (avg) monthly returns of spreads (spd) between top P1 versus P1*, P10 versus P10* performers, spreads between P* versus the average, and P10* versus the average. These are 
for all hedge fund strategies, on a quarterly (Panel A), semi-annual (Panel B), and annual (Panel C) basis, during recessions. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P <0.01 
(two-tailed tests).  P1 and P10 are ex-ante best performer and worst performer portfolios, respectively. P1* and P10* are ex-post portfolios of P1 and P10, respectively. Spearman (Spear) and Pearson 
(Pear) represent the relevant correlation coefficients so as to examine whether top (bottom) performers continue to be top (bottom) performers.  Panel C shows descriptive only statistics (due to the low 
number of observations). 
Panel A: Quarterly 
Short Bias Return Spearm
an 
Pearson Long Only Return Spearm
an 
Pearson Sector Return Spearm
an 
Pearson Long Short Return Spearm
an 
Pearson 
Spr. P1-P1* 4.32% -0.214 -0.006 Spr. P1-P1* 9.38% 0.433 0.335 Spr. P1-P1* 8.87% -0.200 0.004 Spr. P1-P1* 7.06% 0.225 0.229 
Spr. P10-P10* -6.13% 0.143 0.057 Spr. P10-P10* -6.41% -0.083 0.133 Spr. P10-P10* -8.41% 0.173 0.101 Spr. P10-P10* -7.51% 0.027 0.094 
Spr. P1*-Avg 1.77%   Spr. P1*-Avg -0.89%   Spr. P1*-Avg -0.42%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.03%   
Spr. P10*-Avg -0.70%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.39%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.44%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.26%   
Event Driven Return Spear Pear Multi Strategy Return Spear Pear Other Return Spear Pear Global Macro Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 5.42% 0.382 0.519 Spr. P1-P1* 3.93% 0.321 0.153 Spr. P1-P1* 6.41% 0.250 0.190 Spread P1-P1* 7.56% -0.200 -0.299 
Spr. P10-P10* -3.72%   Spr. P10-P10* -4.03% -0.006 -0.040 Spr. P10-P10* -6.50% -0.567 -0.383 Spr. P10-P10* -5.53% -0.550 0.286 
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.33%   Spr. P1*-Avg 1.21%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.40%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.20%   
Spr. P10*-Avg -1.53%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.78%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.29%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.19%   
Relative Value Return Spear Pear Market Neutral Return Spear Pear CTAs Return Spear Pear      
Spr. P1-P1* 3.94% 0.818** 0.653* Spr. P1-P1* 3.96% 0.418 0.332 Spr. P1-P1* 8.98% -0.082 0.245      
Spr. P10-P10* -4.48% -0.105 -0.309 Spr. P10-P10* -3.06% 0.227 0.035 Spr. P10-P10* -10.50% -0.009 0.070      
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.98%   Spr. P1*-Avg -0.47%   Spr. P1*-Avg -0.51%        
Spr. P10*-Avg -0.22%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.48%   Spr. P10*-Avg 2.36%*        
Panel B: Semi-Annual 
Short Bias Return Spear Pear Long Only Return Spear Pear Sector Return Spear Pear Long Short Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 5.29% 0.500 0.254 Spr. P1-P1* 4.72% -0.200 0.082 Spr. P1-P1* 8.80% 0.500 0.652 Spr. P1-P1* 5.01% 0.300 0.733 
Spr. P10-P10* -7.86% -0.900* -0.943 Spr. P10-P10* -8.00% -0.800 -0.924 Spr. P10-P10* -7.87% -0.100 -0.519 Spr. P10-P10* -7.83% -0.100 -0.700 
Spr. P1*-Avg -1.81%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.20%   Spr. P1*-Avg -0.72%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.28%   
Spr. P10*-Avg -0.06%   Spr. P10*-Avg 2.76   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.12%   Spr. P10*-Avg 1.28%   
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Table 43. Persistence within Strategies – Winners/Losers – Recessions (continued) 
Event Driven Return Spear Pear Multi Strategy Return Spear Pear Other Return Spear Pear Global Macro Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 6.51% 0.700 0.740 Spr. P1-P1* 3.57% 0.500 0.288 Spr. P1-P1* 4.52% -0.200 0.354 Spr. P1-P1* 6.50% 0.400 0.471 
Spr. P10-P10* -5.29% -0.500 -0.745 Spr. P10-P10* -5.44% -0.500 -0.832 Spr. P10-P10* -6.50% -0.400 -0.822 Spr. P10-P10* -6.25% -0.200 -0.565 
Spr. P1*-Avg -1.44%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.30%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.64%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.48%   
Spr. P10*-Avg 1.00%   Spr. P10*-Avg 0.72%   Spr. P10*-Avg 0.98%   Spr. P10*-Avg 1.29%   

































Sprd P1-P1* 3.74% 0.300 0.225 Spr. P1-P1* 2.46% 0.101 0.334 Spr. P1-P1* 10.19% 0.200 0.379   
Spr. P10-P10* -3.87% -0.500 -0.471 Spr. P10-P10* -2.60% -0.900* -0.887* Spr. P10-P10* -11.26% 0.700 0.764   
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.06%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.45%   Spr. P1*-Avg -3.60%*     
Spr. P10*-Avg -0.91%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.38%   Spr. P10*-Avg 3.04%*     
Panel C: Annual 
Short Bias Return Long Only Return Sector Return Long Short Return 
Spread P1-P1* 10.70% Spread P1-P1* 3.52% Spread P1-P1* 5.67% Spread P1-P1* 4.40% 
Spread P10-P10* -6.68% Spread P10-P10* -2.60% Spread P10-P10* -4.77% Spread P10-P10* -3.93% 
Spread P1*- Avg -1.04% Spread P1*- Avg 1.83% Spread P1*- Avg -0.07% Spread P1*- Avg 0.41% 
Spread P10*- Avg 1.45% Spread P10*- Avg -1.54% Spread P10*- Avg -2.56% Spread P10*- Avg -1.44% 
Event Driven Return Multi Strategy Return Other Return Global Macro Return 
Spread P1-P1* 4.12% Spread P1-P1* 2.56% Spread P1-P1* 3.92% Spread P1-P1* 4.18% 
Spread P10-P10* -2.55% Spread P10-P10* -0.29% Spread P10-P10* -1.42% Spread P10-P10* -3.05% 
Spread P1*- Avg -0.02% Spread P1*- Avg 0.92% Spread P1*- Avg 0.76% Spread P1*- Avg 1.18% 
Spread P10*- Avg 
 
-1.41% Spread P10*- Avg -2.33% Spread P10*- Avg -2.56% Spread P10*- Avg -0.94% 
Relative Value Return Market Neutral Return CTAs Return   
Spread P1-P1* 2.97% Spread P1-P1* 4.37% Spread P1-P1* 6.97%    
Spread P10-P10* -1.39% Spread P10-P10* -2.77% Spread P10-P10* -7.31%    
Spread P1*- Avg 1.16% Spread P1*- Avg -1.65% Spread P1*- Avg -2.27%    
Spread P10*- Avg -4.66% Spread P10*- Avg 0.01% Spread P10*- Avg 
 
1.44%    
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5.3.2.3.3 Up regimes   
For quarterly times Table 44 Panel A investigates whether top performers continue to be 
top performers and bottom performers continue to be bottom performers. Regarding the 
top performers (P1*), their spreads in relation to the average within the same strategy is 
for the majority of cases significantly positive. There are some exceptions such as 
Global Macro, CTAs, and Market Neutral where the spreads are not significantly 
different from zero. Similar results are seen for spreads between the bottom P10* 
performers and the average, which are negative in all strategies, although not 
significant. This means that the bottom performers do not differ significantly from the 
average hedge fund within the same strategy. When comparing the P1 with the P1* 
portfolios, for almost half of the strategies there is significantly positive correlation. For 
some strategies such as the Multi Strategy and the Relative Value this correlation is 
strongly significant. Similar results are seen when comparing P10 and P10*. Many 
strategies have significantly negative correlations such as the Long Short, Other and 
CTA strategies, meaning that there is a reversal in bottom performers even though they 
perform poorly compared to the average fund in the same strategy.  
Panel B presents the results on a semi-annual basis. Concerning top performers (P1*), 
their spreads with the average are for the majority of hedge fund strategies significantly 
positive. Regarding the spreads between bottom performers P10* and the average, this 
is negative in almost all strategies but is not significant. The only exception is for the 
Relative Value and the CTA strategies which are negative and positive, respectively. In 
the first case this means that bottom performers’ funds consistently underperform the 
average within the Relative Value strategy, whereas in the second case bottom 
performers outperform the average, meaning there is a reversal. When comparing the P1 
and P1* portfolios, the correlations between them are not significant except for the 
Other and Relative Value strategies which are significantly positive. This implies that 
top performer funds continue to perform extremely well. When comparing P10 and 
P10* only the Long Short, Global Macro, and Relative Value strategies demonstrate 
significantly negative correlation, meaning that there is a reversal in bottom performers 
even though they perform poorly compared to the average fund in the same strategy, as 
is case with the Relative Value strategy. 
I report the results regarding persistence on an annual basis in Panel C. Concerning the 
top performers P1*, and their spreads with the average, for specific strategies such as 
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the Long Only, Event Driven, Multi Strategy and Relative Value the spread is positive 
and significantly different from zero. Regarding the spreads between the bottom 
performers P10* and the average, only the Relative Value strategy presents a negative 
spread that is a significantly different from zero. This means that the worst performing 
funds consistently underperform the average within the strategy. When comparing the 
P1 with the P1* portfolios only the Relative Value strategy presents significant results 
(positive correlation). When comparing P10 and P10* only the Sector Strategy presents 












Table 44. Persistence within Strategies – Winners/Losers – Up Regimes 
This table shows average (avg) monthly returns of spreads (spd) between top P1 versus P1* P10 versus P10* performers, spreads between P* versus the average, and P10* versus the average. These are 
for all hedge fund strategies, on quarterly (Panel A), semi-annual (Panel B) and annual basis (Panel C) during up regimes. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P <0.01 (two-
tailed tests). P1 and P10 are ex-ante best performer and worst performer portfolios, respectively. P1* and P10* are ex-post portfolios of P1 and P10, respectively. Spearman (Spear) and Pearson (Pear) 
represent the relevant correlation coefficients so as to examine whether top (bottom) performers continue to be top (bottom) performers.  
Panel A: Quarterly 
Quarterly 
Short Bias Return Spear Pear Long Only Return Spear Pear Sector Return Spear Pear Long Short Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 3.14% 0.040 0.125 Spr. P1-P1* 3.27% 0.175 0.267* Spr. P1-P1* 4.70% 0.348 0.201 Spr. P1-P1* 3.88% 0.165 0.254* 
Spr. P10-P10* -3.34% -0.009 -0.007 Spr. P10-P10* -3.15% -0.230* -0.188 Spr. P10-P10* -4.76% -0.180 -0.103 Spr. P10-P10* -4.01% -0.211 -0.349** 
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.77%*   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.75%*   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.64%*   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.68%**   
Spr. P10*-Avg -0.15%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.21%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.16%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.16%   
Event Driven Return Spear Pear Multi Strategy Return Spear Pear Other Return Spear Pear Global Macro Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 2.73% 0.143 0.374** Spr. P1-P1* 2.76% 0.353** 0.373** Spr. P1-P1* 3.18% 0.143 0.068 Spr. P1-P1* 4.76% 0.141 0.165 
Spr. P10-P10* -2.56% -0.052 -0.105 Spr. P10-P10* -3.13% 0.083 0.118 Spr. P10-P10* -3.57% -0.155 -0.329** Spr. P10-P10* -4.65% -0.181 -0.298** 
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.7%**   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.71%**   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.87%*   Spr. P1*-Avg -0.31%   
Spr. P10*-Avg -0.28%   Spr. P10*-Avg 0.24%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.09%   Spr. P10*-Avg 0.83%*   
Relative 
Value 
Return Spear Pear Market Neutral Return Spear Pear CTAs Return Spear Pear      
Spr. P1-P1* 1.96% 0.460** 0.550** Spr. P1-P1* 2.37% 0.213 0.082 Spread P1-P1* 5.66% -0.112 -0.100      
Spr. P10-P10* -2.06% -0.052 -0.012 Spr. P10-P10* -2.21% 0.041 -0.045 Sprd P10-P10* -5.15% -0.318** -0.234*      
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.97%*
* 
  Spr. P1*-Avg 0.09%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.28%        
Spr. P10*-Avg -0.31%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.11%   Spr. P10*-Avg 0.12%        
Panel B: Semi-Annual 
Semi- 
Annual 
Short Bias Return Spear Pear Long Only Return Spear Pear Sector Return Spear Pear Long Short Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 2.74% 0.197 0.038 Spr. P1-P1* 2.92% 0.023 0.102 Spr. P1-P1* 3.56% 0.088 0.098 Spr. P1-P1* 3.04% 0.079 0.145 
Spr. P10-P10* -2.87% 0.085 0.165 Spr. P10-P10* -2.71% -0.284 -0.368* Spr. P10-P10* -3.68% -0.112 0.053 Spr. P10-P10* -3.02% -0.223 -0.347* 
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.43%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.36%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.82%**   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.54%   
Spr. P10*-Avg 0.14%   Spr. P10*-Avg 0.03%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.27%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.19%   
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Table 44. Persistence within Strategies – Winners/Losers – Up Regimes (continued) 
Event Driven Return Spear Pear Multi Strategy Return Spear Pear Other Return Spear Pear Global Macro Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 2.24% -0.144 0.123 Spr. P1-P1* 2.18% 0.069 -0.139 Spr. P1-P1* 3.09% 0.428** 0.347* Spr. P1-P1* 3.24% -0.205 -0.139 
Spr. P10-P10* -2.28% 0.008 -0.269 Spr. P10-P10* -2.14% 0.224 0.102 Spr. P10-P10* -2.68% 0.115 0.094 Spr. P10-P10* 1.16% -0.322 -0.425* 
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.51*   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.52%*   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.54%*   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.21%   
Spr. P10*-Avg -0.08   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.03%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.28%   Spr. P10*-Avg 0.32%   
Relative 
Value 
Return Spear Pear Market Neutral Return Spear Pear CTAs Return Spear Pear      
Spr. P1-P1* 1.84% 0.467** 0.505** Spr. P1-P1* 1.97% 0.230 0.096 Spr. P1-P1* 4.66% 0.124 0.187      
Spr. P10-P10* -1.59% 0.036 -0.308* Spr. P10-P10* -1.81% 0.236 0.132 Spr. P10-P10* -4.20% -0.094 -0.103      
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.67%**   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.04%   Spr. P1*-Avg 2.14%**        
Spr. P10*-Avg -0.38%**   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.08%   Spr. P10*-Avg 2.53%**        
Panel  C: Annual 
Annual 
Short Bias Return Spear Pear Long Only Return Spear Pear Sector Return Spear Pear Long Short Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 2.46% -0.064 -0.207 Spr. P1-P1* 2.32% -0.120 -0.003 Spr. P1-P1* 3.53% -0.099 0.061 Spr. P1-P1* 2.81% -0.019 0.048 
Spr. P10-P10* -3.32% -0.130 -0.173 Spr. P10-P10* -1.97% -0.376 -0.410 Spr. P10-P10* -3.28% -0.370 -0.474* Spr. P10-P10* -2.71% -0.156 -0.228 
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.43%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.54%*   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.57%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.36%   
Spr. P10*-Avg 0.54%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.33%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.07%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.16%   
Event Driven Return Spear Pear Multi 
Strategy 
Return Spear Pear Other Return Spear Pear Global Macro Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 1.98% -0.052 0.041 prd P1-P1* 1.93% -0.114 0.036 Spr. P1-P1* 2.96% 0.286 0.173 Spr. P1-P1* 3.11% 0.135 0.140 
Spr. P10-P10* -1.81%  -0.374 Spr. P10-P10* -2.30% 0.196 0.118 Spr. P10-P10* -2.19% 0.154 0.149 Spr. P10-P10* -2.50% -0.094 -0.240 
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.38%**   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.46%*   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.26%   Spr. P1*-Avg -0.07%   






































     
Spr. P1-P1* 1.78% 0.640** 0.674** Spr. P1-P1* 1.58% -0.048 -0.040 Spr. P1-P1* 3.56% 0.065 0.024      
Spr. P10-P10* -1.41% -0.145 -0.216 Spr. P10-P10* -2.44% 0.011 0.013 Spr. P10-P10* -3.49% -0.013 -0.023      
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.64%**   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.03%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.19%        




5.3.2.3.4  Down regimes 
Table 45 Panel A presents the quarterly results. Regarding the top performers P1* and 
their spreads with the average, most hedge fund strategies present positive spreads, 
although they are not significant. The Relative Value strategy presents a significant 
spread equal to 0.76% monthly (and the Event Driven has a weakly significant positive 
spread). Regarding the spreads between the bottom performers P10* and the average, 
almost all hedge fund strategies present negative spreads, although they are not 
significant. When comparing the P1 with the P1* portfolios only the Long Only and 
Event Driven strategies present significantly positive correlations. When comparing P10 
and P10* there are mixed results of positive and negative correlations, although they are 
not significantly different from zero.  
Panel B presents the semi-annual results. Concerning the top performers P1*, and their 
spreads with the average, the majority of hedge fund strategies present positive spreads, 
although this is not significant (some strategies such as Sector, Long Short, and Relative 
Value provide results weakly significantly different from zero). Regarding the spreads 
between the bottom performers P10* and the average, almost all hedge fund strategies 
present negative spreads, although these are not significant (but some strategies such as 
Sector, Long Short, and Market Neutral present results weakly significantly different 
from zero). When comparing the P1 with the P1* portfolios in all cases except for the 
CTA strategy, there is positive correlation. For some strategies such as the Sector, Long 
Short and Long Only these are significantly different from zero. When comparing P10 
and P10* there are mixed results of positive and negative correlations, although they are 
not significantly different from zero. However, the Other and the Market Neutral 
strategies present results significantly different from zero.  
Panel C shows that the spread between P1* and the average of funds within the specific 
strategy varies from positive to negative. The largest positive is for the Global Macro 
strategy (2.59%. monthly) and the largest negative is for the Global Macro strategy (-
3.64%, monthly). P1 and P1* spreads for all strategies are relatively high. The largest is 
from the Long Only strategy (5.01%, monthly) and the smallest is from CTA (1.82%, 
monthly). P10 and P10* spreads for all strategies are negative. The most negative is 




Table 45. Persistence within Strategies – Winners/Losers – Down Regimes 
This table shows average (avg) monthly returns of spreads (spd) between top P1 versus P1*, P10 versus P10* performers, spreads between P* versus the average, and P10* versus the average. These are 
for all hedge fund strategies, on quarterly (Panel A), semi-annual (Panel B) and annual basis (Panel C), during down regimes. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P <0.01 
(two-tailed tests). P1 and P10 are ex-ante best performer and worst performer portfolios, respectively. P1* and P10* are ex-post portfolios of P1 and P10, respectively. Spearman and Pearson represent 
the relevant correlation coefficients so as to examine whether top (bottom) performers continue to be top (bottom) performers. 
Panel A: Annual 
Annual 
Short Bias Return Spear Pear Long Only Return Spear Pear Sector Return Spear Pear Long Short Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 8.34% -0.048 -0.049 Spr. P1-P1* 5.57% 0.636* 0.403 Spr. P1-P1* 6.37% -0.509 -0.502 Spr. P1-P1* 5.90% 0.309 0.125 
Spr. P10-P10* -5.63% 0.001 -0.258 Spr. P10-P10* -6.20% -0.188 -0.081 Spr. P10-P10* -6.67% -0.145 -0.204 Spr. P10-P10* -6.11% 0.036 0.001 
Spr. P1*-Avg -1.12%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.65%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.60%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.36%   
Spr. P10*-Avg -0.43%   Spr. P10*-Avg -1.00%   Spr. P10*-Avg -2.94%   Spr. P10*-Avg -1.74%   
Event Driven Return Spear Pear Multi Strategy Return Spear Pear Other Return Spear Pear Global Macro Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 3.31% 0.618* 0.718* Spr. P1-P1* 0.50% 0.467 0.305 Spr. P1-P1* 4.78% 0.055 -0.271 Spr. P1-P1* 5.52% -0.167 -0.109 
Spr. P10-P10* -4.18% 0.300 0.157 Spr. P10-P10* -3.48% -0.309 -0.192 Spr. P10-P10* -5.80% -0.442 -0.345 Spr. P10-P10* -6.98% 0.050 0.124 
Spr. P1*-Ag 1.34%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.78%   Spr. P1*-Avg -0.30%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.88%   
Spr. P10*-Avg -0.87%   Spr. P10*-Avg -1.58%   Spr. P10*-Ag -0.20%   Spr. P10*-Avg 0.33%   
Relative 
Value 
Return Spear Pear Market Neutral Return Spear Pear CTAs Return Spear Pear      
Spr. P1-P1* 3.17% 0.491 0.324 Spr. P1-P1* 3.01% 0.445 0.223 Spr. P1-P1* 8.97% 0.309 0.347      
Spr. P10-P10* -4.47% -0.227 -0.246 Spr. P10-P10* -3.81% 0.300 0.399 Spr. P10-P10* -6.45% -0.564 -0.423      
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.76%*   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.54%   Spr. P1*-Avg -1.23%        
Spr. P10*-Avg -1.01%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.05%   Spr. P10*-Avg 0.05%        




Short Bias Return Spear Pear Long Only Return Spear Pear Sector Return Spear Pear Long Short Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 6.02% 0.200 0.033 Spr. P1-P1* 3.18% 0.900* 0.825 Spr. P1-P1* 4.10% 0.998** 0.964** Spr. P1-P1* 0.14% 0.900* 0.902* 
Spr. P10-P10* -3.47% 0.600 -0.002 Spr. P10-P10* -3.46% 0.400 -0.251 Spr. P10-P10* -5.42% -0.100 -0.024 Spr. P10-P10* -3.91% 0.200 0.184 
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.42%   Spr. P1*-Avg -0.01%   Spr. P1*-Avg 1.80%   Spr. P1*-Avg 1.07%   
Spr. P10*-Avg -1.14%   Spr. P10*-Avg -2.52%*   Spr. P10*-Avg -3.98%   Spr. P10*-Avg -3.01%   
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Table 45. Persistence within Strategies – Winners/Losers – Down Regimes (continued) 
Event Driven Return Spear Pear Multi 
Strategy 
Return Spear Pear Other Return Spear Pear Global Macro Return Spear Pear 
Spr. P1-P1* 3.26% 0.600 0.412 pr. P1-P1* 3.25% 0.700 0.713 Spr. P1-P1* 2.90% 0.600 0.435 Spr. P1-P1* 4.44% 0.300 0.669 
Spr. P10-P10* -2.38% 0.400 0.214 Spr. P10-P10* -3.64% -0.700 -0.029 Spr. P10-P10* -2.27% 0.900* 0.755 Spr. P10-P10* -3.92% -0.100 -0.070 
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.61%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.70%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.55%   Spr. P1*-Avg 1.69%   
Spr. P10*-Avg -2.02%   Spr. P10*-Avg -1.50%*   Spr. P10*-Avg -2.44%   Spr. P10*-Avg -1.84%   
Relative 
Value 
Return Spear Pear Market Neutral Return Spear Pear CTAs Return Spear Pear      
Spr. P1-P1* 3.56% 0.300 0.479 Spr. P1-P1* 2.37% 0.800 0.445 Spr. P1-P1* 8.11% -0.100 -0.315      
Spr. P10-P10* -3.06% -0.100 -0.327 Spr. P10-P10* -2.94% 0.700 0.879* Spr. P10-P10* -7.82% -0.100 -0.195      
Spr. P1*-Avg 0.80%   Spr. P1*-Avg 0.68%   Spr. P1*-Avg -1.29%        
Spr. P10*-Avg -2.14   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.88%   Spr. P10*-Avg -0.31%        
Panel C: Annual 
Annual 
Short Bias Return Long Only Return Sector Return Long Short Return 
Spread P1-P1* 2.83% Spread P1-P1* 5.01% Spread P1-P1* 4.02% Spread P1-P1* 3.84% 
Spread P10-P10* -3.00% Spread P10-P10* -1.62% Spread P10-P10* -3.53% Spread P10-P10* -2.97% 
Spread P1*-Average 1.08% Spread P1*-Average -0.28% Spread P1*-Average 1.46% Spread P1*-Average 0.85% 
Spread P10*-Average -1.68% Spread P10*-Average -1.82% Spread P10*-Average -2.94% Spread P10*-Average -1.91% 
Event Driven Return Multi Strategy Return Other Return Global Macro Return 
Spread P1-P1* 2.48% Spread P1-P1* 3.36% Spread P1-P1* 3.49% Spread P1-P1* 4.55% 
Spread P10-P10* -1.89% Spread P10-P10* -2.87% Spread P10-P10* -2.45% Spread P10-P10* -0.28% 
Spread P1*-Average -2.75 Spread P1*-Average 0.32% Spread P1*-Average -0.29% Spread P1*-Average 2.59% 
Spread P10*-Average -2.61 Spread P10*-Average -1.70% Spread P10*-Average -1.10% Spread P10*-Average -3.64% 
Relative Value Return Market Neutral Return CTAs Return    
Spread P1-P1* 2.50% Spread P1-P1* 2.21% Spread P1-P1* 1.82%    
Spread P10-P10* -1.49% Spread P10-P10* -2.24% Spread P10-P10* -4.34%    
Spread P1*-Average 0.50% Spread P1*-Average 0.12% Spread P1*-Average 1.69%    
Spread P10*-Average -1.80% Spread P10*-Average -0.49% Spread P10*-Average -0.04%    
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To sum up, I examined whether top performers continue to be top performers and 
bottom performers continue to be bottom performers (in technical terms I examined P1* 
and P10*). During “good” market conditions many strategies such as the Event Driven, 
Relative Value and Multi Strategy funds display persistence up to one year. Some other 
strategies such as the Sector and Other show persistence up to half a year. Some other 
strategies such as Short Bias and Long Only present persistence on a quarterly basis. In 
most cases the persistence was driven by the top performers that continue to perform 
extremely well. Also, in most cases there were reversals in bottom performers. This 
implies that there is fierce competition among bottom performers to be at least average 
in terms of performance, otherwise the fund will go out of business. It is known that 
there are high attrition rates in the hedge fund industry; hence funds that are 
underperforming in one time period push their managers to do their best to reverse their 
performance. During stressful market conditions the persistence reduces dramatically 
for all hedge fund strategies. Some strategies such as Event Driven and Relative Value 
present quarterly persistence and some such as CTA show semi-annual persistence48.   
The results confirm earlier studies (e.g. Agarwal and Naik, 2000a; Eling, 2009; 
Joenvaara, Kosowski, and Tolonen, 2012; Hentati-Kaffel, and Peretti, 2015) that there 
is short term persistence. However, in this study I proceed further, by confirming the 
initial assumption that that persistence depends also on the different business cycles and 
the different market conditions. More specifically there is a negative impact concerning 
the spreads between top P1 and bottom P10 performers and their performance 
persistence. Also I show evidence that some non-directional strategies (e.g. Relative 
Value) present more persistence than directional strategies (e.g. Short Bias or Long 
Only).  Nevertheless the difference in persistence is mainly related to the type of 
strategy each fund follows. There are some studies such as Kosowski, Naik and Teo 
(2007), Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov (2010), and Amman, Huber and Schmid 
(2013) that indicate persistence beyond one year. This study examines persistence up to 
one year due to the limitation of data availability, especially during stressful market 
                                                 
48 I also examined the spreads between top P1 and bottom P10 performing funds across all hedge fund 
strategies for “good” and “bad” market conditions. During “good” times I found persistence in spreads up 
to an annual basis. During “bad” times I found persistence in spreads on a quarterly basis whereas for the 
semi-annual period many strategies such as the Short Bias, Other, Global Macro and Relative Value do 
not provide persistence in their spreads. For the annual period I found no persistence in spreads among 
hedge fund strategies. It seems that during stressful market conditions there is fiercer completion among 
fund managers, thus making it more difficult for sustainable outperformance against its peers. In all 
market conditions, on average, directional strategies present higher spreads between top P1 and bottom 
P10 fund performers, compared to semi or non-directional strategies. I do not provide detailed results here 
for space reasons but these are shown in the appendix. 
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conditions. This study reveals that the persistence is driven mainly by the top 
performers, a finding that agrees with Jagannathan, Makakhov and Norvikov (2010), as 
they noticed reversals in bottom performers in most cases. Other authors (e.g. Capocci, 
2007) suggest that bad performance is more likely to persist than good performance. 
This is intuitive as, in general, it is easier to identify fund characteristics that result in 
poor performance (e.g. high expense ratios, high turnover ratios, high trading costs) 
compared to identifying the secrets of successful stock picking. However, if there were 
consistency in poor performance these bottom performers would soon be out of 
business unless they reversed their performance.  
5.3.3 Mixed trading strategies 
In this section I discuss trading strategies based on the persistence analysis at section 
5.3.2 at the hedge fund level that an investor can exploit for potential higher returns. 
They are considered growth periods and recessions. This is because down regimes that 
are characterized by down market movements with high volatility are more difficult to 
predict or to realize instantly once they happen. Moreover, contrary to recessions that 
last for a few months, down regimes primarily consist of shocks; thus any trading 
strategy implementation is difficult during down regimes. After a brief discussion of the 
underlying trading strategies, in the next two sub-sections (5.3.3.1 and 5.3.3.2) I 
demonstrate to the reader the theoretical optimal implementation of different trading 
strategies, so that the reader can rationalize these strategies. It is expected that strategies 
with higher persistence compared to other strategies and strategies with high spreads 
between top and bottom performers can be used by investors for high returns. Indeed I 
show later that some strategies that appear to be more common in our examples (e.g. 
Other, Sector, Short Bias, Relative Value) in general present these characteristics. This 
is explained with the suggestion that these strategies may demand excessively high 
skills from fund managers such as investing on start-ups or private investment in public 
equity (Others), deep knowledge of specific sectors (Sector), better contrarian 
investment styles (Short Bias), or finding arbitrage opportunities (Relative Value). 
Subsequently, I proceed to the overall evaluation of these eight trading strategies by 
presenting their average performance within the different market conditions. Finally, 
there are some robustness tests.    
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5.3.3.1 Trading strategies 
I begin the analysis when dealing with growth periods on quarterly, semi-annual, and 
annual basis. Then I proceed to recession periods. I take into consideration three basic 
trading strategies (based on the whole data length): (i) momentum strategy, 
(ii) contrarian strategy, and (iii) momentrarian strategy (see section 5.2.1 for an 
explanation of the latter). I inform the reader that investors select a portfolio based on 
the expected performance represented by the P1* and P10* which are the ex post values 
of P1 and P10, respectively. In other words, P1 and P1* refer to the same portfolio (e.g. 
top fund performers of a particular strategy) but within different time periods. Hence, an 
investor that wants to follow a specific trading style (e.g. momentum quarterly) selects 
the portfolio based on the P1* (quarterly expected performance). Similar rules apply in 
the case of P10 and P10*. 
The zero investment momentum trading strategy consists of two sub strategies: the first 
is when the investor selects one hedge fund strategy (the one with the highest spread 
between P1* and P10*) but within the same period (quarterly, semi-annual, annual). 
The second sub-strategy is when the investor uses different hedge fund strategies (so 
that the cross sectional spread between P1* and P10* is the highest) but again within the 
same period. The rationale behind the momentum strategy is that fund managers 
(similary to stocks) will continue to perform well (badly) during relatively short periods 
(e.g. due to investors’ short term overreaction to new information).  
The contrarian (zero investment) strategy also consists of two sub strategies: the first is 
when the investor selects one hedge fund strategy (the one with the highest spread 
between P1* and P10*) for a longer period (e.g. two or three years). The second is when 
the investor selects different hedge fund strategies for a longer period (e.g. two or three 
years) as well. I use longer holding periods than the previous momentum trading 
strategy so as to capture the contrarian effect. The contrarian strategy is rationalized in a 
similar way to stocks where well (bad) performers will reverse their performance in the 
long run (e.g. due to investors’ long term underreaction to new information, fund 
managers reversding their bad performance to stay in business, or fund managers are 
“tried up” off new ideas or there are other better-performing fund managers). 
The momentrarian (zero investment) strategy is defined as an investment style (or 
trading strategy) that is a combination of a momentum (MOMEN-) and contrarian (-
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TRARIAN) strategy by taking the appropriate long and short positions on different 
funds (securities or financial indices). The momentrarian strategy consists of two sub 
strategies: the first is the momentrarian involving high return exploitation focusing on 
the top performing funds’ spreads; the second sub strategy is the momentrarian 
involving low return exploitation focusing on the worst performing funds’ spreads. Both 
sub strategies are on an annual basis involving P1* and P10* that are held for one, two 
or three years (please see the trading examples in section 5.2.1). I do not take into 
consideration quarterly or semi-annual periods because the contrarian effect does not 
work in these “short” periods. 
It is expected that strategies requiring very high manager skill (e.g. specializing in 
specific sectors, with portfolio allocations not used by other strategies and arbitrage) 
with high persistence and spreads between top and bottom performers could be the most 
appropriate selections for implanting mixed trading strategies. 
5.3.3.1.1 During growth periods 
Table 46 presents the monthly returns (%) for top and bottom hedge fund performers, 
for all hedge fund strategies during growth periods. This table is derived from table 42 
presented in section 5.3.2.3.1 (persistence within strategies – winner/loser returns of 
P1* and P10*). Since there is short term performance persistence in hedge fund returns, 
investors can utilize these spreads by forming appropriate trading strategies so as to 
increase their returns. The analysis when forming and constructing trading strategies is 
based on the performance of winners and losers.   
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Table 46. Spreads – Winners/Losers – Growth Periods 
This table shows results of spreads (spd) between P1* versus P10* (or ex-post spreads of P1 vs P10) of all hedge fund strategies, at quarterly, semi-annual, annual, two years, and three years. These are 























P1* 0.62 0.92 1.00 0.43 -0.33 P1* 1.93 1.64 1.71 1.33 1.76 P1* 1.57 1.55 1.88 1.30 0.51 
P10* 0.24 -0.10 0.40 1.07 -1.12 P10* 0.89 0.79 0.79 1.46 1.07 P10* 0.90 0.58 0.94 1.34 0.97 
Spd P1*-
P10* 
0.38 1.03 0.60 -0.64 0.79 Spd P1*-
P10* 
1.05 0.85 0.92 -0.13 0.69 Spd P1*-
P10* 

























P1* 1.66 1.62 1.40 1.38 1.44 P1* 1.71 1.69 1.52 1.27 1.11 P1* 1.78 2.00 1.40 1.32 0.91 
P10* 0.88 0.75 0.94 1.18 0.80 P10* 0.93 0.53 0.87 1.13 1.17 P10* 0.84 0.92 1.23 1.25 0.76 
Spd P1*-
P10* 
0.78 0.88 0.46 0.20 0.63 Spd P1*-
P10* 
0.79 1.17 0.65 0.14 -0.06 Spd P1*-
P10* 























P1* 1.90 2.04 1.56 0.91 0.47 P1* 0.91 1.19 0.72 0.53 0.28 P1* 1.78 1.65 1.51 1.15 0.93 
P10* 0.53 0.07 0.31 1.03 0.37 P10* 0.69 0.86 0.60 0.64 0.68 P10* 0.61 0.57 0.46 0.90 0.63 
Spd P1*-
P10* 
1.37 1.97 1.25 -0.12 0.10 Spd P1*-
P10* 
0.22 0.34 0.12 -0.11 -0.40 Spd P1*-
P10* 















       
P1* 0.70 0.94 0.31 0.81 0.58 P1* 1.46 1.51 -1.54 -1.26 -0.44        
P10* 0.36 0.21 0.77 0.61 0.82 P10* 1.41 1.50 -1.52 -0.93 -1.15        
Spd P1*-
P10* 
0.35 0.73 -0.46 0.19 -0.24 Spd P1*-
P10* 




5.3.3.1.1.1 Momentum and contrarian trading 
Table 47 Panel A shows the momentum trading style when the investor uses only one 
strategy per time period (quarterly, semi-annually, and annually).  Based on this, the 
investor should choose to invest in the strategy with the highest expected difference 
between top and bottom performers and more specific the Others strategy. Therefore, 
the investor should take long and short positions in the top and bottom performers 
accordingly to exploit the differences in spreads. For example, the investor for each 
time period, should take a long position on the best performers (P1) and a short position 
on the worst performers (P10). The next time period she should adjust and rebalance the 
portfolio accordingly. Thus, for the quarterly period the excess market return is 0.30% 
on a monthly basis whereas for the semi-annual and annual periods it is 0.90% and 
0.18% respectively. Panel B shows the momentum trading style when the investor uses 
different hedge fund strategies. The investor should choose the hedge fund strategies 
with the highest cross strategy spread between P1 and P10. For the quarterly period, the 
investor by taking long and short positions in Long Only and Short Bias of top and 
bottom performers respectively can have an excess market return equal to 0.63% on a 
monthly basis. For the semi-annual period the investor by utilizing the Other and Short 
Bias strategies can have an expected excess market return equal to 1.06% on a monthly 
basis. For the yearly period by using the Sector and CTA strategies can have an 
expected excess market return equal to 2.33% on a monthly basis. 
Table 47 Panel C shows the contrarian trading style when the investor uses only one 
strategy per time period (two and three years). The investor should use the contrarian 
strategies for two or more years between the top and bottom performers within the 
hedge fund strategy with the highest spreads between them. In the two year contrarian 
trading the Short Bias strategy is the most appropriate hedge fund strategy that the 
investor should exploit. However, we observe that although this is the best contrarian 
strategy, the investor receives lower returns than the market returns. Similar results are 
seen for the three year contrarian trading using the Sector strategy. However, the results 
here are not significant. Panel D shows the contrarian trading style where the investor 
utilizes more than one hedge fund strategy per time period. In this case the investor 
should utilize these strategies with the highest cross strategy spread. Therefore, for the 
two year contrarian trade, the investor by taking a long position in the bottom 
performing Long Only strategy taking a short position in the top performing CTA 
strategy can have an expected excess market return equal to 1.71% per month. For the 
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Table 47. Momentum and Contrarian Trading Strategies – Same/Mixed Hedge Fund Strategies – Growth Periods 
This table presents the optimum momentum trading strategy during growth periods, when using one only strategy (Panel A) and different hedge fund strategies (Panel B) per time period. It also presents 
the optimum contrarian trading strategy during growth periods, when using one only strategy (Panel C) and different hedge fund strategies (Panel D) per time period. Return: Trading Raw Return, 
Exc.Mkt Rtn: is the Return minus the market return (Wil5000TRI including dividends). * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01 using a two-tailed t-statistic test. “…” 
denotes the same activity after each horizon (t+2, t+3, and so on). The returns are expected average monthly returns (%) from P1 and P10 portfolios. 
Panel A      Panel B      
Momentum  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn Momentum  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn 
Quarterly t 
Buy P1 of OT Short-sell P10 of 
OT 1.37** 0.30 
Quarterly t Buy P1 of LO Short-sell P10 
of SB 1.70** 0.63 
 
t+1 
sell P1 of OT then 
rebalance 
Buy P10 of OT 
then rebalance 
   t+1 Sell P1 of LO 
then rebalance 
Buy P10 of SB 
then rebalance 
  
 … … …    … … …   
Momentum  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn Momentum  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn 
Semi-annual t Buy P1 of OT 
Short-sell P10 of 
OT 1.97** 0.90* 
Semi-annual t Buy P1 of OT Short sell P10 
of SB 2.14** 1.06* 
 
t+1 
Sell P1 of OT then 
rebalance 
Buy P10 of OT 
then rebalance 
   t+1 Sell P1 of OT 
then rebalance 
Buy P10 of SB 
then rebalance 
  
 … … …    … … …   
Momentum  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn Momentum  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn 
Annual t Buy P1 of OT 
Short-sell P10 of 
OT 1.25** 0.18 
Annual 
t 
Buy P1 of SE Short sell P10 
of CT 3.40** 2.33** 
 
t+1 
Sell P1 of OT then 
rebalance 
Buy P10 of OT 
then rebalance 
   
t+1 
Sell P1 of SE 
then rebalance 
Buy P10 of CT 
then rebalance 
  
 … … …    … … ….   
Panel C      Panel D      
Contrarian  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn Contrarian  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn 
2 Years t Buy P10 of SB| 
Short sell P1 of 
SB| 0.64 -0.38 2 Years t Buy P10 of LO| 
Short sell P1 of 
CT| 2.72** 1.71** 
 
t+1 
Sell P10 of SB| then 
rebalance 
Buy P1 of SB| 
then rebalance 
   
t+1 
Sell P10 of LO| 
then rebalance 
Buy P1 of CT| 
then rebalance 
  
 … … …    … … ….   
Contrarian    Return Exc. Mkt Rtn Contrarian  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn 
3 Years t Buy P10 of SE|| 
Short sell P1 of 
SE|| 0.46 -0.55 3 Years t Buy P10 of ED|| 
Short sell P1 of 
CT|| 1.60** 0.60 
 
t+1 
Sell P10 of SE|| then 
rebalance 
Buy P1 of SE|| 
then rebalance 
   
t+1 
Sell P10 of ED|| 
then rebalance 
Buy P1 of CT|| 
then rebalance 
  
 … … …    … … ….   
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5.3.3.1.1.2 High and Low Return Momentrarian trading 
Table 48 Panel A presents the momentrarian trading style, involving high return 
exploitation, where the investor uses only one strategy per time period (first or second 
order). For the first order case, the investor exploits the spread between the top 
performer at t (long position based on previous one year portfolio performance) and top 
performer at t-1 (short position based on prior two years portfolio performance). The 
highest spread is from the Others strategy, nevertheless the investor is unable to 
outperform the market index as it provides a negative excess market return equal to -
0.42% on a monthly basis. For the second order case the investor exploits the spread 
between the top performer at t (long position based on previous one year portfolio 
performance) and top performer as well at t-2 (short position based on prior three years, 
portfolio performance). For the Others strategy the expected excess market return is 
0.30%, monthly. Nevertheless, the results here are not significant. Panel B presents the 
momentrarian trading style involving high return exploitation, where the investor uses 
different strategies per time period. In the first order case the investor should take a long 
position in Sector top performers (one year before) and a short position in CTA top 
performers (two years before); the excess market return delivered is 2.07% on monthly 
basis. For the second order the excess market return is 1.25% on monthly basis. 
Table 48 Panel C shows the momentrarian trading style involving low return 
exploitation, where the investor uses only one strategy per time period (first and second 
order). In the first order case the investor exploits the spreads between bottom 
performers at one year before (long position) and bottom performers two years before 
(short position). The highest spread is from the Others strategy, nevertheless the 
investor is unable to outperform the market index as the excess market returns equal -
0.35% on monthly basis. For the second order there are excess market returns equal to -
0.69% on monthly basis. The results here are not significant. Panel C shows the 
momentrarian trading style involving low return exploitation, when the investor uses 
different strategies. In the first order case the investor receives excess market return 
equal to 1.79% on a monthly basis whereas in the second order case the excess market 




Table 48. High Return Momentrarian Trading Strategy – Same/Mixed Strategies – Growth Periods 
This table presents the optimum momentrarian trading strategy (involving high return exploitation) during growth periods, when using one only strategy (Panel A) and different strategies (Panel B) 
per time period. It also presents optimum momentrarian trading strategy (involving low return exploitation) during growth periods, when using one only strategy (Panel C) and different strategies 
(Panel D) per time period. Return: Trading Raw Return, Exc. Mkt Rtn: is the Return minus the market return (Wil5000TRI including dividends). “|” denotes the portfolio which selected based on high 
(P1) performance two years prior t (= 0) and “||”denotes the portfolio which selected on high (P1) performance three years prior t. “…” denotes the same activity after each yearly horizon (t+2, t+3, 
and so on). The returns are expected average monthly returns (%) from P1 portfolios. ** denotes significance at P < 0.01 using a two-tailed t-statistic test. 
Panel A      Panel B      
Momentrarian  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn Momentrarian  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn 
first order t Buy P1 of OT 
Short sell P1 of 
OT| 0.65 -0.42 first order t Buy P1 of SE 
Short sell P1 of 
CT| 3.14** 2.07** 
 
t+1 
Sell P1 of OT then 
rebalance 
Buy P1 of OT| 
then rebalance 
   
t+1 
Sell P1 of SE 
then rebalance 
Buy P1 of CT| 
then rebalance 
  
 … … …    … … …   
Momentrarian  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn Momentrarian  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn 
second order t Buy P1 of SE 
Short sell P1 of 
SE|| 1.37 0.30 second order t Buy P1 of SE 
Short sell P1 of 
CT|| 2.32** 1.25 
 
t+1 
Sell P1 of SE then 
rebalance 
Buy P1 of SE|| 
then rebalance 
   
t+1 
Sell P1 of SE 
then rebalance 
Buy P1 of CT|| 
then rebalance 
  
 … … …    … … …   
Panel C      Panel D      
Momentrarian  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn Momentrarian  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn 
first order t Buy P10 of OT| 
Short sell P10 of 
OT 0.72 -0.35 first order t 
Buy P10 of 
SE| 
Short sell P10 
of CT 2.86** 1.79** 
 
t+1 
Sell P10 of OT| then 
rebalance 
Buy P10 of OT 
then rebalance 
   
t+2 
Sell P10 of 
SE| then 
rebalance 
Buy P10 of CT 
then rebalance 
  
 … … …    … … …   
Momentrarian  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn Momentrarian  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn 
second order t Buy P10 of CT|| Short sell P10 CT 0.38 -0.69 second order t 
Buy P10 of 
ED|| 
Short sell P10 
of CT 2.69** 1.61** 
 
t+1 
Sell P10 of CT|| 
then rebalance 
Buy P10 of CT 
then rebalance 
   
t+2 
Sell P10 of 
ED|| then 
rebalance 
Buy P10 of CT 
then rebalance 
  




Using the above examples, I calculate the average return for each of the eight different 
trading styles. Overall, during “good” financial conditions, the average monthly return 
for zero investment quarterly, semi-annual, and annual momentum strategies using one 
only hedge fund strategy is equal to 0.71% (significantly different from zero at P<0.01 – 
two tail test, [t-statistic 3.404]), 0.92% (significant different from zero at P<0.01 – two 
tail test, [t-statistic 4.610]), and 0.52% (significant different from zero at P<0.05 – two 
tail test, [t-statistic 2.451]), respectively. For the 2-year and 3-year contrarian strategies 
is 0.05% (not significant different from zero) and -0.20% (not significant different from 
zero), respectively. For the first and second order momentrarian (involving high return 
exploitation) is 0.21% (not significant different from zero) and 0.38% (not significant 
different from zero), respectively. For the first and second order momentrarian 
(involving low return exploitation) is 0.35% (significant different from zero at P<0.05 – 
two tail test, [t-statistic 2.112]) and -0.07% (not significant different from zero), 
respectively.  
5.3.3.1.2 During recession periods 
I continue the analysis during recession periods. I again take into consideration three 
basic trading strategies: (i) momentum strategy, (ii) contrarian strategy, and (iii) 
momentrarian strategy. Due to the low number of observations during recessions, I do 
not consider the three year contrarian and the momentrarian second order trading 
strategy. 
Table 49 presents the monthly returns (%) for top and bottom hedge fund performers, 
for all hedge fund strategies during recessions. This table is derived from table 43 
presented in section 5.3.2.3.2 (persistence within strategies –winners/losers returns, of 
P1* and P10*). Since there is short term performance persistence in hedge fund returns 
(at least for a quarter), investors can benefit and have higher returns even during 







Table 49. Spreads – Winners/Losers – Recessions 
This table shows results of spreads (spd) between top P1* versus P10* (or ex-post spreads of P1 vs P10) of all hedge fund strategies, at quarterly, semi-annual, annual, and two years. These are for all 
hedge fund strategies during recession periods.  












P1* 2.15 1.76 -1.60 7.77 P1* -1.51 -1.45 0.38 -3.84 P1* 0.08 -0.88 -1.29 -1.38 
P10* -0.31 2.08 0.90 2.72 P10* -1.01 1.12 -2.99 -1.74 P10* 0.06 -0.28 -3.78 -0.79 
Spr P1*-P10* 2.47 -0.32 -2.50 5.05 Spr P1*-P10* -0.49 -2.56 3.37 -2.10 Spr P1*-P10* 0.02 -0.60 2.49 -0.59 














P1* 0.42 0.22 -0.43 -1.48 P1* 0.36 -1.43 -0.94 -4.14 P1* 1.38 0.49 0.36 -0.27 
P10* 0.12 1.22 -2.28 -1.20 P10* -1.50 1.01 -2.33 -0.40 P10* -0.61 0.91 -2.89 0.60 
Spr P1*-P10* 0.29 -1.00 1.85 -0.28 Spr P1*-P10* 1.86 -2.45 1.39 -3.74 Spr P1*-P10* 1.99 -0.42 3.25 -0.87 














P1* 0.85 0.68 0.83 0.53 P1* 0.86 1.35 1.89 0.83 P1* 1.55 0.31 0.84 -4.58 
P10* 0.17 1.02 -2.48 -0.95 P10* 0.47 2.16 -0.23 0.47 P10* -0.34 -0.65 -4.10 -0.26 
Spr P1*-P10* 0.68 -0.34 3.32 1.48 Spr P1*-P10* 0.39 -0.82 2.12 0.36 Spr P1*-P10* 1.89 0.96 4.94 -4.32 








     
P1* -0.27 0.62 -1.63 -1.04 P1* -0.18 -2.67 -1.25 0.50      
P10* -0.27 -0.22 0.03 -0.96 P10* 2.69 3.98 2.45 2.65      




5.3.3.1.2.1 Momentum and contrarian trading 
Table 50 Panel A presents the momentum trading style when the investor uses only one 
strategy. Based on this, the investor should choose to invest in this strategy with thee 
higher expected difference between top and bottom performers. Therefore, for the 
quarterly, semi-annual and annual period the investor should take long and short 
positions in the top and bottom performers accordingly to exploit the differences in 
spreads. For the quarterly period the excess market return is 3.28% on a monthly basis 
whereas for the semi-annual and annual periods it is 2.67% and 5.72%, respectively. 
Panel B presents the momentum trading style when the investor uses different hedge 
fund strategies. The investor should choose the hedge fund strategies with the highest 
cross strategy spread between P1 and P10. For the quarterly period, the investor by 
taking long and short positions in Short Bias and Event Driven for the top and bottom 
performers respectively can have an excess market return equal to 0.38% on a monthly 
basis. For the semi-annual period the investor by utilizing the Short Bias and Others 
strategies can have an expected excess market return equal to -0.26% on monthly basis. 
For the yearly period by using the Global Macro and Relative Value strategies investors 
have an expected excess market return equal to 6.77% on monthly basis. 
Table 50 Panel C shows the two year contrarian trading style when the investor uses one 
only strategy per time period. The Relative strategy is theoretically the most appropriate 
hedge fund strategy that the investor should exploit. We observe that the investor 
receives excess market returns equal to 5.10%, monthly. Panel D shows the contrarian 
trading style where the investor utilizes more than one hedge fund strategy. In this case 
the investor should utilize these strategies with the higher cross strategy spread. Thus 
the investor, by taking a long position in the worst performing Short Bias strategy and 
taking a short position in the top performing Relative Value strategy, can have an 
expected excess market return equal to 8.08% per month49. 
 
 
                                                 
49 I have to mention that this is one of the few cases with an extraordinary return if annualized, but this is 
only available for a small number of months in the data and is not statistically significant. 
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Table 50. Momentum and Contrarian Trading Strategies – Same/Mixed Hedge Fund Strategies – Recessions 
This table presents the optimum momentum trading strategy during recessions, when using one only strategy (Panel A) and different hedge fund strategies (Panel B) per time period. It also presents the 
optimum contrarian trading strategy during recessions, when using one only strategy (Panel C) and different hedge fund strategies (Panel D) per time period. Due to the limited data availability we 
computed the contrarian only for two years (we cannot also calculate the statistical significance for this horizon). Return: Trading Raw Return, Exc.Mkt Rtn: is the Return minus the market return 
(Wil5000TRI including dividends). * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01 using a two-tailed t-statistic test. “…” denotes the same activity after each horizon (t+2, 
t+3, and so on). The returns are expected average monthly returns (%) from P1 and P10 portfolios. 
Panel A      Panel B      
Momentum  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn Momentum  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn 
Quarterly t 
Buy P1 of SB Short-sell P10 of 
SB 2.46 3.28 
Quarterly t Buy P1 of SB Short-sell P10 
of ED 3.66 0.38 
 
t+1 
sell P1 of SB then 
rebalance 
Buy P10 of SB 
then rebalance 
   t+1 Sell P1 of SB 
then rebalance 
Buy P10 of ED 
then rebalance 
  
 … … …    … … …   
Momentum  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn Momentum  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn 
Semi-annual t Buy P1 of RV 
Short-sell P10 of 
RV 0.96 2.67 
Semi-annual t Buy P1 of SB Short sell P10 
of RV 2.41 -0.26 
 
t+1 
Sell P1 of RV then 
rebalance 
Buy P10 of RV 
then rebalance 
   t+1 Sell P1 of SB 
then rebalance 
Buy P10 of RV 
then rebalance 
  
 … … …    … … …   
Momentum  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn Momentum  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn 
Annual t Buy P1 of RV 
Short-sell P10 of 
RV 4.94 5.72 
Annual 
t 
Buy P1 of GM Short sell P10 
of RV 5.99s 6.77 
 
t+1 
Sell P1 of RV then 
rebalance 
Buy P10 of RV 
then rebalance 
   
t+1 
Sell P1 of GM 
then rebalance 
Buy P10 of RV 
then rebalance 
  
 … … …    … … ….   
Panel C      Panel D      
Contrarian  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn Contrarian  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn 
2 Years t Buy P10 of RV| 
Short sell P1 of 
RV| 4.32 5.10 2 Years t Buy P10 of SB| 
Short sell P1 of 
RV| 7.30 8.08 
 
t+1 
Sell P10 of RV| then 
rebalance 
Buy P1 of RV| 
then rebalance 
   
t+1 
Sell P10 of SB| 
then rebalance 
Buy P1 of RV| 
then rebalance 
  
 … … …    … … ….   
Contrarian    Return Exc. Mkt Rtn Contrarian  Actions  Return Exc. Mkt Rtn 
3 Years  -  - - 3 Years  -  - - 
            




5.3.3.1.2.2 High and Low Return Momentrarian trading 
Table 51 Panel A presents the momentrarian trading style, involving high return 
exploitation, when the investor uses only one strategy. The investor exploits the spreads 
between the top performer one year before (long position) and top performer two years 
before (short position). The higher spread is from the Relative strategy providing the 
investor with 6.20% excess market returns, on monthly basis. Panel B presents the 
momentrarian trading style involving high return exploitation, where the investor uses 
different strategies. The investor should take a long position in Global Macro top 
performers and short positions in Relative Value top performers. The excess market 
return that the investor receives is 7.25% on monthly basis. 
Table 51 Panel C shows the momentrarian trading style, involving low return 
exploitation, where the investor uses one only strategy. The investor exploits the 
spreads between bottom performers (long position) and bottom performers (short 
position). The higher spread is from the Relative Value strategy and the investor is 
expected to receive excess market return equal to 4.62% on monthly basis. Panel D 
shows the momentrarian trading style, involving low return exploitation, where the 
investor uses different strategies. In this case the investor should take long position in 
Short Bias bottom performers and short positions in Relative Value bottom performers. 




Table 51. High Return and Low Return- Momentrarian Trading Strategies 
– Same/Mixed Hedge Fund Strategies - Recessions 
This table presents the optimum momentrarian trading strategy (involving high return exploitation) during recessions, 
when using one only strategy (Panel A) and different strategies (Panel B) per time period. It also presents the 
optimum momentrarian trading strategy (involving low return exploitation) during recessions, when using one only 
strategy (Panel C) and different strategies (Panel D) per time period. Return: Trading Raw Return, Excess Mkt 
Return: is the Return minus the market return (Wil5000TRI including dividends). “|” denotes the portfolio which 
selected based on high (P1) performance two years prior t (= 0). “…” denotes the same activity after each yearly 
horizon (t+2, t+3, and so on). The returns are expected average monthly returns (%) from P1 portfolios. 
Unfortunately, I cannot calculate the statistical significance for the momentrarian trading strategy due to the low 
number of available observations. 
Panel A      
Momentrarian  Actions  Return Excess Mkt Return 
  t Buy P1 of RV Short sell P1 of 
RV| 
5.43 6.20 
  t+1 Sell P1 of RV 
then rebalance 
Buy P1 of RV| 
then rebalance 
  
 … … …   
Panel B      
Momentrarian  Actions  Return Excess Mt Return 
  t Buy P1 of GM Short sell P1 of 
RV| 
6.48 7.25 
  t+1 Sell P1 of GM 
then rebalance 





… … …   
 
Panel C      
Momentrarian  Actions  Return Excess Mkt Return 
  t Buy P10 of RV| Short sell P10 of 
RV 
3.84 4.62 
  t+1 Sell P10 of RV| 
then rebalance 
Buy P10 of RV 
then rebalance 
  
  … … …   
Panel D      
Momentrarian  Actions  Return Excess Mt Return 
  t Buy P10 of SB| Short sell P10 of 
RV 
6.82 7.60 
  t+1 Sell P10 of SB| 
then rebalance 
Buy P10 of RV 
then rebalance 
  
  … … …   
 
Based on the above examples, I computed the average return for each of the eight 
different trading styles. Overall, during stressful market conditions, the monthly return 
for the zero investment momentum strategies on quarterly, semi-annual, and annual 
basis (using one only hedge fund strategy) is equal to 0.50% (not significantly different 
from zero), -1.25% (not significantly different from zero), and 1.35% (too few 
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observations to test for significance), respectively. For the 2-year contrarian strategy the 
return is 0.66% (very low number of observation to test for significance). For the 1st 
order momentrarian (high return exploitation) is 0.39% (too few observations to test for 
significance) and for the 1st order momentrarian (low return exploitation) is 1.59% (too 
few observations to test for significance). 
To sum up, it is important to mention that the main purpose of section 5.3.3 is to 
demonstrate trading strategies and more specifically the momentrarian style within a 
specific framework. The underlying basic trading styles help investors to form their own 
custom trading style that can exploit the differences between top and bottom performing 
funds within hedge fund strategies. Although currently there are limitations concerning 
the short selling of hedge funds, there may be future changes in the legal framework or 
a regulation change where fund of fund managers can use short selling. I demonstrated 
examples of the optimum eight different trading strategies that an investor can 
theoretically use so as to maximize her returns. As hedge fund behaviour changes 
during stressful market conditions, I implemented these trading strategies during growth 
and recession periods, only. This is because down regimes are difficult to predict or to 
realize instantly once they happen. Furthermore, contrary to recessions that last for a 
few months, down regimes mainly consist of shocks; thus trading strategy 
implementation is difficult during down regimes. By using the underlying trading styles 
on specific hedge fund strategies which present in general higher persistence compared 
to other strategies, and that have high spreads between top and bottom performers as 
they require very high skill levels from fund managers, (e.g. Other, Sector, Relative 
Value) the investor can get substantial excess market returns. In general zero investment 
trading strategies such as momentum are more efficient during “good” time conditions, 
although they cannot beat the market benchmark. On the other hand, momentrarian 
trading strategies are more efficient during “bad” times, and they can beat the market 
benchmark although, due to the low number of observations, it is not possible to 
calculate the statistical significance.  
5.3.3.2 Robustness Checks 
In order to check for robustness for the average and optimal performance of the eight 
trading strategies, I first take into consideration the redemption fees that managers may 
impose on investors, and second I replicate the analysis for two different sub-periods 
241 
 
with a holdback period to examine whether the underlying strategies can make out-of-
sample profits for investors.   
5.3.3.2.1 Redemption fees 
In order to compute the redemption cost by implementing the above trading strategies I 
proceed as follows. In the dataset 40.90% of the funds contain lockup restrictions and 
the equally weighted average redemption fee is 3.40%50. The maximum redemptions 
that are needed for implementation are four within a year for the quarterly momentum 
trading strategy and the minimum is one within three years for the 3-year contrarian 
strategy. Hence I compute the net return by subtracting from each trading strategy’s 
return the average monthly redemption cost of the proportional funds that belong to the 
category of lockup-yes funds. I define this as: 
 𝐴𝑣𝑅𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 = 𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝐹𝑒𝑒 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑃𝑒𝑟/12                   (19) 
Where 𝐴𝑣𝑅𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ is the average monthly redemption cost, 𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 is the 
proportion of funds in the sample that impose lockups, 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝐹𝑒𝑒 is the average 
redemption fee for funds that impose lockups, and 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑃𝑒𝑟 is the redemptions per year 
for a given trading strategy. I divide by 12 (number of months per year) so as to 
standardize it.  
During “good” market conditions the average monthly costs for the quarterly, semi-
annual and annual momentum strategy become 0.46%, 0.23%, and 0.12%, respectively. 
For the 2-year and 3-year contrarian strategy the average monthly costs are 0.06%, and 
0.04%, respectively. For the 1st and 2nd order momentrarian (involving high or low 
return exploitation) the average monthly costs become 0.06% and 0.04%, respectively. 
During “bad” market conditions the average monthly cost for quarterly, semi-annual, 
annual and momentrartian strategies are the same as the “good” conditions. For growth 
periods, all trading strategies except for the contrarian and the 2nd order momentrian 
(low return) continue to provide positive returns to investors. For recessions all trading 
strategies continue to provide positive returns to investors except for the semi-annual 
momentum strategy. Concerning the theoretical optimal eight different trading 
strategies the positive returns are still higher than the market benchmark in most cases 
                                                 
50 The underlying average redemption fee corresponds to those funds with explicit restrictions mentioning 
a specific cost.  
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during growth periods (exceptions are the contrarian strategy, the quarterly momentum 
using one strategy, and the momentrarian low return using one strategy) whereas in 
recessions they are all positive.  
5.3.3.2.2 Out-of-sample test  
All the strategies tested previously were based on the full sample period. When using a 
holdback period in order to test whether the underlying trading strategies make profits 
out-of-sample, my results generally holds. The initial historical data on which these 
trading strategies are tested (in-sample data) consist of half of my data length and the 
other half are reserved (out-of-sample) data (for “good” and “bad” times separately). 
During “good” market conditions the returns for all trading strategies have the same 
sign. Exceptions are the 3-year contrarian and the second order momentrarian (low 
return exploitation) strategies. I performed the out-of-sample test during “bad” times 
and the semi-annual momentum strategy has the same signs contrary to the quarterly 
momentum strategy that presents reversals from negative returns for the first half period 
to positive returns for the second half period. Due to limited data availability I did not 
examine validity beyond one year. Concerning the theoretical optimal implementation 
of the eight different trading strategies hardly any of the sub-cases had differences in 
their signs in growth periods and the same strategies in most cases were still the best 
ones for the sub-periods tested. During recessions the quarterly momentum trading 
strategy presented the same sign, contrary to the semi-annual momentum which exhibits 
changes from negative returns for the first half period to positive returns for the second 
half. Most results concerning these (half data) returns are significantly differently from 
zero51.   
5.4 Conclusion 
In this paper I deal with two issues: hedge fund performance persistence and different 
hedge fund trading strategies. This is the first study that examines different aspects of 
performance persistence under different market conditions. Using several parametric 
and non-parametric tests I examine hedge fund persistence in terms of the smoothness 
of returns, the persistence against the market benchmark and the persistence within each 
group strategy. I extend my analysis to trading strategies; this is the first study that 
                                                 




examines momentum and contrarian strategies when dealing with hedge fund spreads. 
Moreover, I am the first to introduce a mixed strategies that we term the ‘momentrarian’ 
strategy that allows investors to gain greater investment returns.  
I have some important conclusions that contribute significantly to the hedge fund 
literature, beyond those that agree with the extant literature discussed above. 
Concerning hedge fund performance persistence, it is found that during “good” 
conditions there is smoothness in returns for almost all hedge fund strategies (an 
exception is the CTA and the Short Bias strategy) even for one year. This smoothness 
weakens but is still significant when considering risk adjusted returns. Moreover, on 
average, non-directional and semi-directional strategies present more smoothness in 
their returns compared to directional strategies. During “bad” conditions no hedge fund 
strategies present smoothness in their returns. As far as persistence with respect to the 
market benchmark is concerned I find no persistence in the examined strategies, with a 
few exceptions such as the Multi-Strategy (semi-annually), the Long Short (annual) and 
Long Short (quarterly) which present some performance persistence against the market. 
There is no reliable evidence during stressful market conditions due to having relatively 
few observations in the data. Concerning the persistence within each strategy I find 
persistence for hedge funds during “good” times up to one year whereas during stressful 
market conditions there is a negative impact on fund persistence within every strategy. 
There is strong evidence that persistence is driven mainly by the top performers as I 
found reversals in bottom performers in most cases, and recessions are fiercer than 
down regimes in terms of fund persistence.  
The conclusions regarding the mixed trading strategies are that an investor can 
outperform the market by having zero investment portfolio strategies that exploit the 
differences between top and bottom performing funds within hedge fund strategies. 
During “good” conditions momentum trading strategies are on average the most 
successful strategies, followed by momentrarian trading strategies. However, during 
“bad” times the momentrarian strategies are the most successful followed by the 
momentum strategies. In all market conditions the contrarian trading strategy comes 
third after the other two trading strategies. The above average results concern trading 
strategies that take into consideration the spreads of only one strategy. When the 
investor takes into consideration different hedge fund strategies, their average returns 
are even higher.   
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The results are important as they enable us to better understand hedge funds’ behaviour 
and reveal aspects that have not been examined before. This is the first study in the 
literature that examines hedge fund performance persistence under different investment 
conditions. More specifically, I make a clear distinction between different kinds of 
persistence such as in terms of smoothness of (risk-adjusted) returns, persistence against 
the market benchmark, and persistence within each specific strategy. All these different 
kinds of persistence are examined using the longest dataset ever used, from 1990 to 
2014. I examine persistence under different market conditions, and not isolating just one 
relatively short period of time containing only one financial crisis or event. Moreover, 
for first time, I examined mixed or synthetic trading strategies such as the momentrarian 
strategies, allowing investors to utilize persistence in more efficient ways.    
Investors can benefit from the findings as they now know what to expect from different 
strategies in terms of performance persistence. Although past performance is no guide 
to the future, most investors rely on funds’ past records in their capital allocation 
process. This suggests that investors expect performance to be stable over time and that 
some fund managers provide better performance compared to their peers. This study 
provides a comprehensive investigation of hedge fund performance persistence, 
allowing investors to implement mixed trading strategies that utilize spreads between 
top and bottom performers of different hedge fund strategies although currently this is 
not an easy task for investors or fund of fund managers due to legal and practical 
restrictionas on short selling. In addition, investors do not know with certainty the future 
state of the market when implementing these trading strategies (including the 
momentrarian strategies, too). Fund administrators can apply more flexible and 
appropriate fee polices by taking into consideration performance persistence. Financial 
regulators can benefit in case there is any need for closer monitoring (e.g. monitoring of 
hedge funds that exhibit “unusual” persistence) or change in the legal framework (as 
there is apparently some market inefficiency in the hedge fund industry). 
One limitation is that the focus is on hedge funds that invest in the North America 
region, due to the use of three U.S. business cycles. There is a need to examine 
performance persistence using my approach for funds that invest in other regions as 
well. Another limitation is the limited validation of the yearly persistence during 
stressful market conditions due to the small number of observations. However, it seems 
that during these conditions persistence is at most quarterly. Concerning the application 
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of the proposed mixed or the synthetic trading strategies, I considered lockup 
redemption costs; however there might be other costs (e.g. bid-ask spreads, short-selling 
costs) that may affect investors’ profits and are not captured. Due to limitations of data 
availability, especially during stressful market conditions, I also did not considered 

















6 Chapter: Hedge fund index engineering 
This chapter (paper) examines the fourth research question that has to do why there are 
such large differences between hedge fund indices from different vendors, even when 
they are supposed to represent the same strategy. In the literature review, I found that 
there is no universal hedge fund classification scheme and authors do not consider index 
construction issues (instead many authors use them just as “consumers”). As with the 
previous chapters this is an empirical study hence its structure has its own introduction, 
methodology, empirical analysis, and conclusion sections (a version of this paper is 
under review at Applied Economics journal).   
I examine hedge fund index construction methodologies, by describing and analyzing 
the general principles and construction methods for a successful hedge fund index. I 
present case studies from two well-known database vendors and evaluate them using 
numerical examples on the same dataset. Despite the fact that they follow a similar due 
diligence process, there are great differences in the index engineering practices arising 
from different quantitative techniques, even for indices in the same hedge fund 
category. However, those quantitative techniques provide similar results. The 
differences are rather due to the use of different hedge fund universes and different 
inclusion criteria. This paper is the first to use actual numerical case studies to illustrate 
and compare how hedge fund index engineering works. Having read it the reader will 
have a good understanding of how hedge fund indices are formed and current issues in 
the area. 
6.1 Introduction 
This study sheds light on hedge fund index construction methodologies and in particular 
on the classification processes. This study is the first to compare different 
methodologies using the same dataset and demonstrate using real data how hedge fund 
indices can end up with very different constituents. The research objective is to close 
the gap in the literature concerning hedge fund index construction methodologies, 
particularly when dealing with classification issues. To this end I examine two existing 
hedge fund index engineering methodologies and compare them using a common 
database with practical examples, thereby providing a better understanding of how all 
hedge fund indices are constructed.  Through this investigation I answer the research 
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question of why there are such large differences between hedge fund indices from 
different vendors, even when they are supposed to represent the same strategy. 
In general, the hedge fund index engineering methodology consists of three broad 
elements: the hedge fund selection process, the classification process, and the index 
construction process itself. During the selection process every database vendor imposes 
not only its own inclusion criteria but within the same vendor there are different 
inclusion criteria for different indices. The classification process involves allocating 
hedge funds to the same group (sub-index) based on their sharing similar characteristics. 
The characteristics derive from the fund’s behaviour in relation to a reference element 
(e.g. an equity index) or characteristics of the fund itself that derive from its own return 
behaviour, assets, and so on. The index construction itself is a more standard process 
concerned with calculating NAV (Net Asset Value) or GAV (Gross Asset Value); 
usually the indices are engineered in a “tree” structure, meaning that there is one main 
index which consists of other indices, each of them from one or more sub-indices. 
Many authors such as Harri and Brorsen (2004), Ammann and Moerth (2005), Bali, 
Brown and Caglayan (2011), and Getmansky (2012) simply used the classification 
scheme provided by the database vendors. Other authors such as Agarwal and Naik 
(2000), Jawadi and Khanniche (2012) and Meligkotsidou and Vrontos (2014) used 
hedge fund indices provided by the database vendors, thus working on a strategy index 
level and obviating the need to consider whether those indices really were 
representative. Most studies on hedge funds use more than one database, due to the fact 
that inclusion on every database is a voluntary decision made by the fund principals. 
Authors who used more than one database such as Ackerman, McEnnally, and 
Ravenscraft (1999), Capocci and Hubner (2004), Joenvaara, Kosowski, and Tolonen 
(2012), and Patton and Ramadorai (2013) usually implemented a mapping between the 
strategies provided by the database vendors, whereas others such as Agarwal, Daniel 
and Naik (2004) and Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007) made a broader classification of 
the database strategies provided by the database vendors. This classification consisted 
of mapping strategies into five groups; directional, relative value, security selection, and 
multi-process funds. Yet others such as Bares, Gibson, and Gyger (2003) used 
classification systems based on the investment process, the asset class, and the 
geographical period provided by the vendor. Last but not least Das (2003) used a non-
hierarchical clustering algorithm on the asset class (as disclosed by fund managers), 
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size, fees, leverage, and liquidity. However, this classification scheme does not focus on 
funds’ strategy or style. 
Overall it seems that the majority of authors have used the predefined classification 
schemes from the database vendors. Subsequently, some authors grouped hedge funds 
into broader styles or categories. However, none of those who did use the predefined 
classification schemes focused on the vendors’ classification process itself. There is 
little or no examination in the extant literature of the issues arising from the various 
vendors’ different hedge fund classification processes, and more specifically the 
examination of the quantitative techniques used by these vendors. Hence, in the 
literature there is a significant gap regarding hedge fund index construction methods. In 
order to fill this gap, I focus on two studies (Hedge Fund Research Inc, 2012 and Patel, 
Roffman, and Meziani, 2003) from two well-known database vendors, Hedge Fund 
Research Inc. and Standard and Poor’s. These studies describe the processes and 
algorithms of their respective index construction methodology and form the basis of my 
study. They begin by presenting their vendor’s selection criteria, the classification 
method and then the index construction process. Nevertheless, neither study provides 
any practical examples of their techniques, nor do they address that fact that other 
database vendors adopt different quantitative techniques that must end up giving 
different results. These issues are covered by this study. I focus on hedge fund 
classification processes using the same dataset because the index construction phase 
(calculating NAV, GAV etc.) is similar between the two vendors.   
By comparing HFR’s and S&P’s methods using numerical examples from the same 
database I came to two new findings. First, both vendors use rigorous quantitative 
techniques, combined with qualitative processes through due diligence so as to ensure 
that they produce high quality representative indices. Nevertheless, these database 
vendors use different quantitative techniques, particularly when dealing with the 
classification process. Second, I show that these different quantitative techniques end up 
classifying hedge funds in a fairly similar way. The differences between indices’ 
reported returns are instead mainly due to the different datasets used and the different 
inclusion criteria adopted by the two database vendors.  
This paper contributes to the literature by filling a gap, as being the first to examine and 
explain the main principles and quantitative techniques used to build hedge fund indices 
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through the use of real vendor cases. Investors are now able to better understand the 
nature of the hedge fund indices on offer rather than treating them as a “black box”. 
Database vendors are helped to construct better indices, by understanding the methods 
of their rivals and combining new methods in their index construction methodology, by 
collaborating with other vendors or even specializing in certain indices. Researchers can 
have deeper knowledge of the hedge fund indices that use in their research. Also, some 
of their results can be affected had the hedge funds been allocated to different strategies. 
Last but not least, financial governance authorities could through collaboration with 
database vendors create a common hedge fund pool to help investors, as the differences 
in indices are mainly due to the different hedge fund universes used by the database 
vendors.  
Following this introduction, I proceed to the HFR case and in the third section to the 
S&P case. Afterwards, I proceed to numerical calculations – demonstration of the two 
classification methods. I then compare and evaluate the two cases on a quantitative and 
qualitative basis. I conclude by examining some outstanding important issues 
concerning index construction methods in the hedge fund industry.  
6.2 Hedge fund index construction: HFR case 
In this section I present a detailed analysis of the hedge fund indexing methodology that 
is followed by Hedge Fund Research Inc. (2012). Later I present an analytical case from 
S&P’s Hedge Fund Indexing methodology (Patel, Roffman, and Meziani 2003), 
following the index engineering methodology step by step. As a result, the reader will 
see the differences in practical terms through these comparisons. 
Hedge Fund Research, Inc. (HFR) contains more than 6800 funds and funds of funds 
worldwide. It constructs two main types of indices: the HFRX and HFRI indices (HFR, 
2012). However in February 2013 the firm also introduced the HFRU indices. The 
HFRI Monthly indices are a range of benchmarks constructed so that they are able to 
represent the hedge fund industry or universe by equally weighted components of funds 
that are being reported by their managers to the HFR database. The HFRI index 
category ranges from the HFRI Fund Weighted Composite index that consists of 2200 
funds to particular sub-strategy classified indices. It is non-investable. The HFRX 
indices have various index-weighting methods (depending on each index), have 
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different characteristics from HFRI and HFRU indices, and are investable. The newest 
HFRU (Euros) index category that is denominated in euros is equally-weighted, and is 
not investable. The HFRU composite index consists of over 600 funds. Other 
differences are that the index is calculated on a daily basis and finalized within five 
days, it has lower minimum asset size and minimum track record for inclusion. For all 
the above indices there is usually no cost for reporting by fund managers.      
Table 52 highlights the main differences between these three categories of HFR indices. 
As can be seen, HFRX indices are more restricted than HFRI indices in terms of the 
criteria of fund inclusion and have fewer funds, a result that is logical due to the fact 
that this category consists of investable indices. However, the HFRU index has the least 
strict criteria of fund inclusion compared with HFRX and HFRI index categories. 
Another difference is that the HFRX category has many weighting techniques according 
to specific HFRX indices, whereas HFRI and HFRU are only equally-weighted. 




Table 52. Characteristics and Differences between HFRI, HFRX and HFRU 
indices 
Category HFRI Monthly Indices HFRX Indices HFRU Indices 
Inception 
Varies by index (Earliest 
1990) 












Monthly Daily or Monthly 
Daily since 2011, 
Monthly since 2008 




Trailing four months of 
performance are subject 
to revision  
Performance finalized at 
month-end 
Trailing 5 days of 
performance are 
subject to revision 
Index rebalanced Monthly Quarterly Quartely 
Criteria for fund 
inclusion 
Listing in HFR Database; 
Reports monthly net of 
all fees monthly 
performance and assets 
in USD 
Further to meeting HFRI 
criteria, fund must be open 
to new transparent 
investment and meet track 
record and minimum asset 
size requirements as listed 
below 
Fund is UCITS 
compliant; Reports 
performance net of all 
fees at least bi-weekly 
Minimum Asset 
Size and/or Track 
Record for fund 
inclusion 
$50 Million 
minimum or > 12-
Month Track Record 
$50 Million and 24-Month 
Track Record (typical) 
$10 Million EUR 




USD; some hedged to 
GBP, JPY, CHF & EUR 
USD; some hedged to GBP, 
JPY, CHF & EUR 
EUR 
Investable Index No 
HFR Asset Management, 
LLC constructs investable 





Available to HFR 
Database subscribers 
Available to HFR Database 
subscribers 





Over 2200 in HFRI Fund 
Weighted Composite; 
over 600 in HFRI Fund of 
Funds Composite 
Over 250 in total 
constituent universe, with 
over 60 of these in the 
HFRX Global Hedge Fund 
Index 
Over 600 funds in the 




Published on HFR website and through various market data services 
      Source: Hedge Fund Research Inc. (2013) 
 
The HFRX, HFRI and HFRU indices follow almost the same quantitative and 
qualitative processes of hedge fund selection. However, the HFRX and HFRU indices 
use more up-to-date quantitative techniques regarding the weighting process (not only 
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equal or asset weighted but also representative optimization using special algorithms). 
Furthermore they employ the advanced HFRX methodology (UCITS compliant) that is 
analyzed later in this section. 
The HFRI category consists of four primary strategies. These are Equity Hedge, Event-
Driven, Macro, and Relative Value. Each main strategy consists of many sub-strategies. 
In addition to the main strategies there is one more index called Emerging Markets. This 
consists of many sub-indices that are constructed according to a regional investment 
focus. Figure 7, depicts the structure graphically. 
  Figure 7. Hedge Fund Research Index Structure 
HFRI Hedge Fund 
Composite Index
















               Source: Modified table from Hedge Fund Research Inc. (2012) 
 
The HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index is composed of four main strategy indices that 
consist of other sub-indices representing various sub-strategies (with new names from 
October 1st 2011). The four main strategies are: Equity Hedge, Event Driven, Macro 
CTA, and Relative Value Arbitrage. There are no differences to HFRI categories. The 
new HFRU index category of HFRU Hedge Fund Composite Index consists of the same 
four main strategies. Every strategy consists of other sub-strategies that are represented 
by sub-indices in the same way as for HFRI and HFRX indices.    
The HFRX methodology (that is similar to HFRU) includes highly quantitative 
classification, cluster analysis, correlation analysis, cutting-edge optimization, and 
Monte Carlo simulations. This approach uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis 
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in order to first, define whether the hedge fund is being managed with transparency and 
second, check whether the manager complies with the requirements of the due diligence 
process that is followed by Hedge Fund Research Inc. Using appropriate aggregated and 
weighted techniques this HFRX methodology produces the highest statistical 
probability that the return series would be adequately representative of the hedge fund 
industry. The general processes that are followed are: 
(i) Cluster Analysis: HFR screens approximately 7000 funds in its database. 
Funds with at least $50M assets under management are included. Also, they 
must have at least two years’ track record, consent to trade on a transparent 
basis and be open for new investment. 
(ii) Correlation Analysis: used for grouping funds by appropriate strategies and 
to eliminate outliers. 
(iii) Monte Carlo Simulation: also used for grouping funds by the most relevant 
strategies and to eliminate outliers. 
(iv) Due Diligence Analysis: Selected funds from the initial screening must be 
transparent and pass the rigorous qualitative screening. 
(v) Strategy Weighting: funds are weighted appropriately to maximize 
correlation with their group.  
Each of these steps is covered in more detail below. 
The first step is the construction through initial database screening of pure clusters that 
are represented by specific strategies. Each cluster is for funds using a certain strategy 
and will be the base for the creation of hedge fund sub-indices. So, there is an initial 
screening of the HFR database of open funds that (at least claim to) belong to a 
particular strategy class and comply with the criteria mentioned in the first section.  
HFR choose one representative hedge fund in each strategy for each manager. It is 
common for successful and well-known managers to manage two or more separate 
hedge funds that belong to the same strategy. Therefore, if there is such a situation and 
the most representative hedge fund cannot determined then: (a) the fund having the 
longest track record will be regarded as representative (b) if the funds have the same 
time track record then the one with the larger assets under management is used. 
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The representative Hedge Fund Strategy Universe (also called the Strategy Universe-
HFS) is obtained from the Global Hedge Fund Universe (HFU) that is contained in the 
HFR database. The funds that constitute the pure HFS are then filtered and passed only 
if they satisfy specific criteria such as having a minimum value of assets under 
management, net of fees reporting, a minimum reporting frequency, fund transparency, 
being open to new investments etc. If even one of these criteria is not met then the 
relevant formula used is equal to zero and the hedge fund does not pass on to the next 
stage. This process is robust, objective and all criteria must be met by each fund for 
inclusion. Besides this, in the due diligence process (transparency screening) HFR 
examine other qualitative factors through fund manager interviews, examination of 
financial statements and organizational structure and other important elements. This 
qualitative process is complementary to the quantitative process in the database 
screening. 
At the initial database screening the self-reported strategies and sub-strategies are used. 
However, there are biases in self-reported data that must be eliminated. Therefore, in 
order to verify style purity, cluster analysis is implemented at the sub-strategy level. If a 
fund is an outlier then it is excluded or reclassified. Below is a detailed description of 
the cluster analysis.  
Cluster analysis is implemented at a sub-strategy level using 24 consecutive monthly 
returns at the end of a prior quarter. HFR use in their methodology the Euclidian 
distance in the space of monthly returns as the distance or distinction measure of hedge 
funds. I present numerical examples in the section 6.4 of how this is implemented.  
They also use Ward’s (1963) linkage rule. This rule minimizes the variance within 
clusters and maximizes it between the clusters at every move of the process.  
Using Euclidian distances or Ward’s (1963) linkage rule is a type of cluster analysis 
instead of ANOVA that I present in the next section.  
It was mentioned above that funds that belong to outliers may be excluded or 
reclassified. For that reason HFR uses the trim parameter within the cluster analysis 
that eliminates some funds, for example the six percent that are least close to the rest of 
the group. The remaining funds constitute the strategy pure cluster, in other words, the 
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pure strategy index as the remaining funds after the initial classification (through 
distance rules and Ward’s linkage rule) minus the outliers.  
The next process is to perform an additional screening called representation analysis. 
This denotes how dissimilar the returns of each fund are to the respective strategy’s 
returns (sub-strategy or region). The analysis is based on monthly returns for the last 
twenty four months in order that HFR can ensure that all funds have a complete 
available dataset. Those funds that have successfully passed cluster analysis and 
representation analysis are called the final strategy pure cluster. In each cluster all 
funds have equal weight.  
Hedge Fund Research applies multiple representation analysis in order to calculate and 
rank (in ascending order) the Divergence Score (DS) for each fund. The Divergence 
Score measures the dissimilarity of a fund in relation to the cluster. Section 6.4 presents 
how this technique is implemented. Each fund is ranked by its return DS score 
according to the specific measures mentioned below. 
The smaller the DS of a fund, the smaller its difference compared to the underlying 
cluster, hence the higher its ranking. The general formula for the Divergence Score is: 
𝐷𝑆𝑖 = 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖                  (20) 
Where 𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑖 = (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟/𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 − 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖/𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦) + (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟/𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 −
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖/𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦) + (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟/𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖/𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛)                                        (21)            




                                                                          (22) 
(𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝐵) is the average monthly difference in returns between the fund and the 
benchmark for twenty four month period. The 𝜎(𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝐵) is the standard deviation of 
the difference in returns. The benchmarks that are used are: 
Strategy = Hedge fund strategy benchmark specific to fund’s strategy (i.e. Event 
Driven). Sub-strategy = Hedge fund sub-strategy benchmark specific to fund’s strategy 
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(e.g. Merger Arbitrage). Region = Regional equity benchmark particular to fund’s 
investment focus (i.e. Europe). 
BetaScorei in equation 20 is defined as 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 = |𝛽𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟/𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 − 𝛽𝑖/𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦| + |𝛽𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟/𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 − 𝛽𝑖/𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦| +
|𝛽𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟/𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝛽𝑖/𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛|                                                                                                   (23) 
 The beta of fund i versus benchmark B is expressed as: 
|1 − 𝛽𝑖/𝐵| = |1 − 𝜌𝑖/𝐵 ∗
𝜎𝑖
𝜎𝐵
|                                                                                        (24) 
𝜎𝑖 and 𝜎𝐵 are the standard deviation of fund i and the benchmark B respectively. 𝜌𝑖/𝐵 is 




                                                                                                              (25) 
Where 𝑅𝑖 denotes the returns of the fund and B the returns of the benchmark. 





                                                                                                (26) 
Where 𝜎𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 is the standard deviation of returns of the cluster during the evaluation 
period. 
A high beta (correlation) and high volatility scores indicate that a fund is more 
directional / tactical in its classification. So, higher ranking funds are categorized as a 
market directional class whereas lower ranking funds are classified as being in the 
absolute return class. The middle group between them is not taken into consideration.  
The representation analysis is the second process in the two-tier screening process and 
assures the pure cluster group. Accuracy is assured by means of the divergence scores. 
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The total number of funds that constitutes a pure strategy cluster may exceed 500. 
Because of the rapidly-changing nature of the hedge fund industry it is virtually 
impossible to maintain such a large number of funds, all providing daily transparent 
reporting. For that reason HFR use Monte Carlo simulations in order to construct an 
index with fewer funds without significantly losing representativeness. The number of 
funds is different from strategy to strategy and may depend upon the number of funds in 
each cluster, the desired accuracy level, strategy diversity and volatility. This 
optimization model randomly selects different sized fund samples from a certain 
strategy cluster and then compares the correlation between each fund sample with the 
whole cluster. The optimization process not only determines the number of constituents 
that maximize the representation of the cluster but also their optimal weights. Monte 
Carlo simulation is therefore employed to examine the number of funds needed to 
constitute a strategy index that is representative of the strategy cluster. The next step is 
to find the optimal weights to maximize the representation of the cluster using the 
Generalized Reduced Gradient quasi-Newtonian Optimization Method. The optimum 
number of funds depends on the weights (that should lie between certain limits) and the 
Divergence Score for each fund, as described above. 
The underlying HFR indices compute NAV (Net Asset Value) using the actual 
performance of the managed account by a single hedge manager (hedge fund) that 
reports to the HFR database. The NAV is computed from the following formula: 
Net Asset Value (per share) = 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠−𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠−𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
              (27) 
The basic HFR NAV index is 1000 and represents the value of the first day of trading. 
HFR’s NAV index change is calculated from the percentage change from t to t+1, and 
this change depends on the weighted change of all fund-specific NAVs.  
For the HFRX and HFRU indices there is an index rebalancing process implemented 
every quarter, whereas for HFRI indices it is every month (these are just HFR’s 
policies). For example, regarding HFRX indices, HFR uses the fund data available at 
the beginning of each period and computes the new optimal allocation weights at the 
beginning of the next period. Simultaneously, adjustments to the pool of funds such as 
additions, removals or reclassifications are taking place.  
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I now describe briefly how the global HFRX index, the single strategy index, and the 
weighted strategy index are structured. The index is organized as a tree structure. The 
HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index is constituted from other single strategy indices such 
as the Equity Hedge Fund Index, the Event Driven Hedge Fund Index, the Macro Hedge 
Fund Index and the Relative Value Arbitrage Hedge Fund Index. These represent the 
four basic categories according to HFR. The weights of each strategy are given by its 
assets under management in the fund universe as contained in the HFR database. I then 
move one level lower, to the HFRX Single (broader) Strategy Indices. Each index is 
represented by one of the above four categories. Each single (broader) strategy index is 
composed by the eligible sub-strategy indices that underlie that strategy. Hence, every 
index is a combination of one or more sub-indices with specific weights, either equal or 
percentage as described in the optimization process above.  
6.3 Hedge fund index construction: S&P case 
The S&P Hedge Fund Index is composed of three hedge fund styles. Those are 
Arbitrage, Event-Driven, and Directional/Tactical. Each style is composed of three 
strategies. For the first style these are Equity Market Neutral, Fixed Income Arbitrage, 
and Convertible Arbitrage. For the second style they are Merger Arbitrage, Distressed, 
and Special Situations. For the third style they are Equity Long/Short, Managed futures, 





















 Figure 8. S&P Index Structure 















  Source: Modified table from S&P (2012) 
 
The index construction equally weights the styles and strategies, and uses a rigorous 
quantitative and qualitative approach so as to select the appropriate funds. The whole 
index engineering process considers three complementary procedures.  
The first procedure has to do with the number of funds that is required in order to build 
a representative and investable index. S&P apply stratified sampling (presented later) 
and bootstrap simulation techniques and have concluded that a fund sample consisting 
of approximately thirty or forty funds corresponds sufficiently to the risk/return 
characteristics of a wider portfolio of funds. The second procedure settles on a specific 
universe (pool) of appropriate candidates in order to be included in the index. This 
process begins by examining the strategy consistency of each fund through screening 
the fund sample for self-reporting bias and inconsistencies. The screening process may 
take into consideration style classification that uses two common quantitative 
approaches: Fundamental Style Analysis and Return-based Analysis. The process is 
essential so as to produce a pool that is cohesively characterized in terms of styles and 
strategies. Then this pool is additionally screened according to length of track record, 
investment capacity and assets under management in order to confirm that it is 
investable. The third procedure is the due diligence process. Standard & Poor’s uses the 
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due diligence process to qualitatively analyse the candidates for the index hedge funds. 
This process verifies the management and investment policy, operational capabilities 
and management experience. Consequently, having gone through this process the 
remaining funds are investable and have passed the due diligence evaluation. The fourth 
procedure is to apply an equal weight of styles and strategies, providing investors with 
broad diversification across major hedge funds strategies. The index provider ensures 
that there is a completely clear and public annual announcement regarding potential 
construction methodology changes and index rebalances to equal weights.  
It is often stated that the indexing requirements of representativeness and investability 
conflict. Representativeness includes a large number of non-accessible funds that are 
not investable. Conversely, investability requires fewer hedge funds due to the fact that 
for each hedge fund there are more restrictions such as due diligence, continuous 
monitoring and additional administration. According to S&P a portfolio of 30 or 40 
randomly selected funds has a stable distribution of risk and return characteristics. 
However, the range of these characteristics is wide. If there are two portfolios of funds 
(each containing twenty randomly selected funds) there may be a large difference in risk 
and return characteristics due to different risk exposures. To eliminate the effect of wide 
distribution of returns and risks in a hedge fund portfolio, S&P used the stratified 
sampling technique52 in order to build hedge fund portfolios with balanced risk 
exposures to tighten the return-risk characteristics. 
The first step in the stratifying sample application is to identify the risk dimensions. 
S&P uses two approaches: first it examines the systematic market exposures of a 
particular investment doctrine and second, it statistically examines the returns history of 
particular investments. Under the first approach, one could allocate investments to style 
classifications. This is simple but may be inconsistent because hedge funds’ style 
classifications are made by fund managers. As a result, there might be some biases or 
inconsistencies.  Concerning the second statistical approach, it is stricter but it suffers 
from the typical problems when dealing with historical returns analysis (fluctuations 
and not being precise in predicting future returns) as well as translating the analysis into 
a transparent investment process. 
                                                 
52 It is crucial that the strata used in stratified sampling must not overlap. A stratified random sample is 
better than a simple random sample because it provides greater precision and guarantees better coverage 
of the population, providing that the strata or groups are carefully chosen and have greater similarity 
according to their underlying characteristics. However, stratified random sampling has difficulty in 
identifying strata and it is more complex to organize and analyse the results (Crossman, 2012). 
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Hence these two approaches constitute pools of single-strategy funds. As mentioned 
before they categorize hedge funds into three general styles. Those are Arbitrage, Event-
Driven, and Directional/Tactical. Every style is composed of three strategies. 
Consequently, there are in total nine strategies that describe almost completely the 
investment styles and asset classes. However, there are some strategies, for instance 
Long-only (in equities or fixed-income securities) that can be represented by other 
indices, not necessarily hedge fund indices. Furthermore, there are some strategies such 
as Short-only that are niche strategies that are implemented within other strategies; 
hence there is no need for an extra hedge fund index. These strategy-groups are not 
necessarily designed to be used as different sub-indices. They rather exist in order to 
enable S&P to construct (through individual hedge funds selection from the samples) 
the S&P HFI index.  
The second step in stratified sampling is to investigate the cohesiveness of each of the 
nine samples. Due to the fact that there is no consistency in style reporting, funds from 
different strategy groups are mixed so that the cross-section of return dispersion is high 
within these strategies. Also, because there is a wide spectrum of returns there is a need 
for a relatively large sample of funds in order to have an appropriate level of sampling 
precision. To enhance strategy cohesiveness there are four quantitative screens:      
(i) For each fund of S&P’s database they compare two correlation distributions53 
regarding returns. The first is correlation distributions with funds in the same 
industry and the second is correlation distributions with funds in all other 
strategies. Then using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test, they test whether the two 
distributions are different. 
(ii) The next quantitative screen, after having tested that the two distributions are 
different, is to examine whether the median of the correlation distribution of 
funds within the same strategy is greater than the median of the correlation 
distribution of funds in all other strategies. 
(iii) The next quantitative screen is to compare the degree of (return) correlation of 
each individual fund within the same group with other hedge fund indices of 
similar strategy they want to examine. 
                                                 
53 “Correlation distribution”: if I have a group of hedge funds then I have a number of pair correlations, 
i.e. the correlation of each hedge fund’s returns with the returns of each of the other hedge funds. Each 
hedge fund has its own distribution of pair correlations, with a mean, standard deviation etc. 
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(iv) The last quantitative screen is to compare the standard deviation of each fund to 
its peer group.  
In section 6.4 I implement the above techniques with numerical examples. In order to 
cross-validate the statistical consistency of the nine strategy groups (quantitative screen 
(ii) above) S&P use ANOVA (analysis of variance). Its principle is to examine whether 
the standardized distance within groups is less than the standardised distance between 
groups. Section 6.4 provides an application of the ANOVA using numerical examples. 
Since this follows standard textbook ANOVA analysis I do not present the formulae 
here. 
ANOVA (S&P) and correlation analysis/distance (HFR) produce similar results, i.e. 
they cluster funds in a similar way. 
To summarize, the construction of the index is begun by calculating the aggregate score 
of a hedge fund followed by the four quantitative screenings above. The first two 
calculate whether the correlations of fund returns with other funds in the industry are 
different from correlations with funds in other strategies. The third statistic measures 
the correlation of the fund return with the proper hedge fund sub-index. The fourth 
statistic compares the risk of a fund to the risk of other equivalent funds as they can be 
observed by the historical volatility.   
Some further elements should be taken into consideration. The Macro strategy is 
extremely diverse as it invests in equities, bonds, currencies and commodities. Hence, 
in the quantitative screening there is a great concentration on the fund’s volatility and 
the lack of correlation with the other eight strategies. On the other hand, within the 
Event-driven style, the Special Situation strategy is very similar to Merger Arbitrage 
and Distressed strategies over a short period of time. For that reason there is separation 
of funds within the Special Situation strategy that have low correlation with either 
Distressed or Merger Arbitrage strategies over two equal sub-periods.  
The above processes are designed to be accurate and robust, providing reliable results 
concerning the appropriate grouping of hedge funds. 
To find out the number of funds that are needed in order to represent a strategy for the 
general index construction, a simulation is needed. For each strategy S&P run 600 
263 
 
simulations, that is, 100 each for samples ranging from one to six funds. They use the 
simulated bootstrap model for which there is repeated random resampling from the 
original sample, using each bootstrapped sample to compute a statistic. The resulting 
empirical distribution of that statistic (in this case return dispersion as the number of 
funds increases within a certain group-strategy) is then examined and interpreted as an 
approximation to the true sampling distribution. S&P found that three to five funds per 
strategy (each of the three broader styles consists of three strategies) is a sufficient 
number to express the return distribution between funds.  
The appropriate number of funds chosen per strategy is based on a quantitative 
evaluation of the simulation results as well as the number of specialities (sub-strategies) 
within each strategy. S&P found that portfolios of 30 to 40 funds based on quantitative 
techniques sufficiently narrowed the range of risk/return characteristics, but that more 
funds did not narrow it significantly further. Also, stratified sampling facilitates further 
narrowing of the spectrum of standard deviations, returns, and correlations with well-
established asset classes. 
So far I have described the quantitative screening of hedge funds as well as the 
quantitative method used in order to have the appropriate number (a target) of funds 
that will constitute the S&P HFI (first and second procedures). The initial candidate 
pool consists of funds that have the highest quantitative scores within each strategy. 
The third process is Due Diligence. The basics of S&P’s Due Diligence Process are 
described below. It consists of three main components and includes interviews with 
fund managers regarding each fund’s pure style, trading strategy and practices, 
infrastructure and operations. There is a special S&P Committee that participates in 
the formal review of hedge funds. 
(i) An initial screening of selected funds takes place with sufficiently long track 
records to provide a preliminary indication of their performance, taking into 
consideration the assets under management of these funds in order to verify 
their appeal to investors and the sustainability of their strategy. 
(ii) A preliminary examination of the track record, strategy, operating setup, and 
personnel is performed. This is designed to identify the quality of management, 
risk and operational management, strategy implementation and capacity limits. 
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(iii) The Due Diligence Process is a continuous process that is able to detect any 
changes to how the fund is being operated and managed. 
There are interviews of and questionnaires for fund managers and other key staff with 
periodic visits. The content that is investigated is: general questions regarding the 
funds, management team backgrounds, investment strategy detailed questions, risk 
profiles and polices, portfolio construction, systems and infrastructures, service 
providers, performance analysis, and intensity of strategy cohesiveness. It should be 
clear that S&P follow a very transparent and rigorous methodology in their due 
diligence process. 
At the beginning of this case I referred to the fact that the S&P HFI equally weights 
styles and the strategies. Contrary to the capitalization-weighted indexes, equally-
weighted indexes avoid favouring large funds or strategies that attract noticeable capital 
flows. Generally, fund-weighted or equally-weighted indices, unlike asset-weighted 
indices, present a broader view concerning the hedge fund universe. Any biases in 
favour of larger funds are eliminated because there are no changes in weights. This is 
particularly important for strategies that contain a relatively small number of funds. 
After considering via the quantitative and qualitative process the appropriate funds as 
well their (equal) weights, the final process is the calculation of the index value. It is 
calculated through the common NAVs (Net Asset Values) formula of the underlying 
hedge funds. 
Net Asset Value (per share) = 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠−𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠−𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
             (28) 
Gross Asset Value (per share) = 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙.𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑔𝑡.𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠)
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
              (29) 
Thus, the composite index is computed as: 





                 (30) 





                 (31) 
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Where F=Number of funds in the index, Number of shares of fundi = number of shares 
allocated to the fund at the last rebalancing to initiate index participation at the 
appropriate weight, NAVi = net asset value of the fund (equally weighted according to 
S&P), GAVi = gross asset value of the fund and Divisor = initial translation factor to 
start index at 1000. The S&P HFI tracks a hypothetical portfolio of its components with 
no capital inflows or outflows, which holds the divisor constant.  
As the Diligence Process is an on-going procedure, some funds may be added or 
removed to/from the S&P HFI if they do (or do not) meet certain criteria. These 
changes are actioned by the S&P Committee. A fund can be excluded from the index if 
it violates qualitative due diligence standards, does not conform to the reporting 
process, there is a significant strategy shift, there are legal and regulatory issues, major 
management changes, or concerns for excessive growth or redemptions. Additions can 
take place not only to replace other hedge funds. If there is a fund that complies with all 
the previously mentioned criteria and rules and it will generate a more representative 
group for a given strategy then it may be added in alignment with the committee 
perspective.  
To summarize, it is clear that there are mechanisms that guarantee the alignment of 
superior and continuously-improved hedge fund indices. The necessary adjustments 
take place via the on-going due diligence process.         
For an index to make sense there must be a base. So Standard & Poor’s constructed an 
index as of 30 September 2002 that is called the S&P HFI Pro Forma Index. This index 
is equally-weighted and is rebalanced annually. It uses monthly performance data for 
the time period January 1998 to September 2002. The S&P HFI index uses this Pro 
Forma Index as a reference. It is similar to that used by HFR.   
It is crucial to preserve a high level of integrity and transparency in portfolio return 
computations. Thus, there is independent verification of portfolio holdings. For each 
hedge fund within the index there is a representative managed account to monitor the 
fund’s performance information. Sometimes that information may vary from that of the 
hedge fund in order to ensure strategy purity. This happens because the fund manager 
may make an implicit shift from the strategy she had initially declared and 
implemented. Furthermore, a third-party administrator makes all the calculations so 
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that the account is running in parallel with the main calculator, verifying valuation 
results on a daily basis. On the other hand there is another third-party partner that 
maintains the managed accounts. The external third parties ensure that there is no 
conflict of interest (e.g. index calculations and verifications) and the final results are 
objective. 
Another important feature of the S&P hedge fund indices is timely reporting. S&P 
publishes on a daily basis values in the S&P HFI and executes regular performance and 
correlation reviews between hedge funds and their associated strategies. Net asset 
values are delivered via third-parties/partners to S&P that monitor their changes for any 
anomalies and calculate the daily index values. Due to pricing reviews there may be a 
time-lag of two days prior to the publication of the daily index values. After each 
month end, there is a final confirmation or finalization process and the monthly index 
values are published that cannot be changed.  
6.4 HFR and S&P classification - Demonstration  
This section illustrates the calculations used in implementing the HFR and S&P index 
engineering approaches. As in Chapter Three, I used data from two database vendors: 
Eurekahedge and BarclayHedge containing live and dead funds providing a long 
coverage (01/1990 to 03/2014). I followed a strict database cleaning and merging 
approach.54 I mapped strategies between the different databases and I ended up with: 
CTA, Event Driven, Global Macro, Long Only, Long Short, Market Neutral, Multi 
Strategy, Relative Value, Sector, Short Bias and Others (includes funds that do not 
belong to any of the previous strategies). The Emerging Markets strategy is not included 
in my sample. Each portfolio of a specific strategy is represented by its average time 
series returns. In this section I classify these strategies in broad categories (groups).  
Using numerical examples I demonstrate in practical terms the way that indices are 
constructed. As noted in the main body of this paper, index construction concerning the 
NAV or GAV calculation is the same. Nevertheless, the clustering and classification 
process is different between database vendors. I simulate the two different index 
engineering methodologies on the same dataset and then I compare the results to 
examine whether there are differences between them. I demonstrate that those 
                                                 
54 The algorithms and processes I followed for database cleaning and merging are in the appendix. 
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quantitative techniques provide similar results in the index construction process. 
Differences in the indices between the vendors is mainly because they have different 
hedge fund universes (different databases) and different inclusion criteria in their due 
diligence process. The quantitative parts of their processes, although different, 
nevertheless provide similar results. In my examples the steps that I followed are: 
For HFR: 
1. I used part of the HFR methodology in the index engineering process that calculates 
the distances between those hedge fund strategies. 
2. Then I implemented the Divergence Score for these hedge fund strategies. 
For S&P: 
1. I used part of the S&P methodology, measuring the correlations with strategies in the 
same category (group) and then measuring the correlations with strategies in other 
categories. 
2. Next, I compared the (return) correlation of each individual strategy with the index in 
the same group. 
3. I also compared the standard deviation of a strategy to its peer group. 
4. I used ANOVA to examine whether the standardized distance within groups is less 
than the standardized distance between groups. 




Table 53. The Eleven Strategies of the Used Dataset 
CTA CT Market Neutral MN 
Event Driven ED Multi Strategy MS 
Global Macro GM Relative Value RV 
Long Only LO Sector SE 
Long Short LS Short Bias SB 
Others OT   
 
6.4.1 Distances between strategies (HFR) 
As mentioned above, I use a part of the HFR methodology and compare the distances 
between the eleven fund strategies. In table 54, LO, SE and LS are relatively close 
compared to GM, ED, and SE and even more so for SB, CT, and GM. More 
specifically, the average distance between LO, SE and LS is 23.850 units; for GM, ED 
and SE it is 40.413; and for SB, CT and GM it is 90.510 units. Hence, the SE strategy 
should be allocated with LO and LS and not with GM and ED. Similarly, GM is better 
allocated with ED and SE rather than SB and CT. Another potential group is ED, RV 




Table 54. Distances Between Strategies 
 
CT ED GM LO LS MN MS RV SE SB OT 
CT 0.000 
          
ED 66.331 0.000 
         
GM 62.341 36.067 0.000 
        
LO 85.650 34.622 53.126 0.000 
       
LS 73.417 26.850 39.608 23.404 0.000 
      
MN 58.205 32.370 34.030 58.099 43.992 0.000 
     
MS 58.298 20.954 35.383 43.075 30.461 29.395 0.000 
    
RV 62.189 18.242 33.928 43.696 33.267 25.085 20.564 0.000 
   
SE 81.106 37.083 48.088 28.353 19.804 54.335 38.168 43.399 0.000 
  
SB 102.137 111.854 107.050 140.945 129.134 90.934 108.589 103.473 137.920 0.000 
 







Figure 9 shows the distances between fund strategies graphically. I expect that fund 
strategies that have small distances would be allocated to the same category. The SB 
strategy follows an opposite direction toward the market index with negative exposures. 
Hence, I would expect SB to have a large distance compared to the other strategies. 
Figure 9 confirms this. 
Figure 9. Distances Between Strategies 
 
 
The above process is implemented by HFR for every fund (in pairs) with 24 months’ 
returns so as to discover the distances between them. Some funds have a small distance 
between them, hence they should form a group or an index.  
6.4.2 Correlations (S&P) 
Following the S&P methodology, I measure the correlations of strategies in the same 
group (category) and then measure the correlations of strategies in other groups. 
Table 55 presents all correlations between strategies. Some correlations between 
strategies are high, indicating a similar group; Other correlations between strategies are 
low, indicating strategies that belong to different groups. For example (I use the same 
strategies with the previous demonstration regarding distances) LO, SE, LS have an 
average correlation among them equal to 0.917; the strategies GM, ED, SE have 0.563 
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and the strategies SB, CT, GM have -0.030. Similar to the distance example, the SE 
strategy should be allocated with LO and LS and not with GM and ED. Similarly, GM 
is better allocated with ED, SE rather than SB, CT. Another potential group is ED, RV, 










Table 55. Correlations Between Strategies 
 
CT ED GM LO LS MN MS RV SE SB OT 
CT 1.000 
          
ED -0.005 1.000 
         
GM 0.174 0.400 1.000 
        
LO -0.076 0.875 0.444 1.000 
       
LS 0.011 0.816 0.536 0.930 1.000 
      
MN 0.197 0.219 0.285 0.193 0.308 1.000 
     
MS 0.247 0.765 0.391 0.709 0.748 0.336 1.000 
    
RV -0.001 0.831 0.329 0.798 0.736 0.099 0.723 1.000 
   
SE -0.018 0.776 0.514 0.879 0.943 0.280 0.765 0.715 1.000 
  
SB 0.112 -0.626 -0.366 -0.806 -0.811 -0.057 -0.545 -0.606 -0.790 1.000 
 






Figure 10 shows the correlations graphically. Hedge fund strategies that are highly 
positively correlated to belong to the same group. Strategies that are either uncorrelated 
or negatively correlated (e.g. CT and ED) I expect not to belong to the same group. 




From the analysis, so far both processes (Euclidian Distance and correlation techniques) 
produce similar results.  
Continuing the example of S&P correlation analysis, using Table 55 I calculate the 
correlation distribution for strategies that belong to the same group. Thus, the 
correlation distribution (its standard deviation)55 for LO, SE, LS is 0.032; for GM, ED, 
SE it is 0.196; and for SB, CT, GM it is 0.296.  Based on the correlation distribution, it 
is preferable that SE should belong to the same group as LO, LS compared to the 
candidate group GM, ED. Similarly, GM should preferably belong to the ED, SE group 
compared to the CT, SB group. Similarly within the group of ED, RV, MS the 
distribution correlation is equal to 0.056, which is relatively low. 
                                                 
55 I compute the standard deviation of the pair correlations (correlation of each fund or strategy with each 
of the other funds or strategies) within the group. 
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The correlation distribution between all strategies (both within and between groups) is: 
standard deviation 0.511 with mean 0.410, median 0.479, and mean to standard 
deviation ratio 0.803. The correlation distribution for the groups (e.g. LO, SE, LS or 
ER, RV, MS) as I expected, is narrower than all strategies together, having larger mean-
to-standard deviation ratio.    
Based on table 71, I proceed further by computing the correlation of each strategy with 
its group. LO has correlation with its group (SE, LS) of 0.914; SE with its group (LO, 
LS) of 0.923; LS with its group (LO, SE) of 0.966. ED’s correlation with its group (RV, 
MS) is 0.852; RV’s with its group (ED, MS) is 0.829; MS’s with its group (ED, RV) is 
0.781. We can observe, as expected, strategies are highly correlated with the group that 
they belong to. The same process is followed by S&P at the fund level for all individual 
funds with the indices that they belong to, for verification purposes.       
6.4.3 Standard deviation 
The next step is to compare the standard deviations of strategies that belong to the same 
group.  
LO, SE, LS have an average standard deviation equal to 3.120 and the distribution of 
their standard deviation56 is equal to 0.405; GM, ED, SE have an average standard 
deviation equal to 2.372 and the distribution of their standard deviation is equal to 
0.773, i.e. higher than the previous group; SB, CT, GM have an average standard 
deviation equal to 3.543 and the distribution of their standard deviation is equal to 
0.594, which is also higher than the first group. It is observed that strategies belonging 
to the same group (LO, SE, LS) have a narrower standard deviation distribution 
compared to the other two groups in my example (GM, ED, SE and SB, CT, GM).    
The next step in the quantitative screening process is to compare the standard deviation 
of a strategy to its peer group: LO has standard deviation of 3.437 compared to 2.919 
for its peer group (SE, LS). SE has standard deviation equal to 3.259 compared to 2.997 
for its peer group (LO, LS). LS has standard deviation of 2.663 compared to 3.245 for 
                                                 
56 “Distribution of their standard deviation”: If I have a group of funds within a strategy then each 
member of this group has its own standard deviation of returns. Hence, I have many standard deviations 
in this group (one value for each fund). Thus, I can plot the overall distribution (of all fund-specific 
standard deviation values) represented by a mean, standard deviation etc. for this group. The lower the 
standard deviation of the overall distribution for the group (of funds or strategies) the better it is, because 
this group is more homogenous. 
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its peer group (LO, SE). Similarly, ED has standard deviation equal to 1.840 compared 
to 1.373 for its peer group (RV, MS).  RV has standard deviation equal to 1.238 
compared to 1.669 for its peer group (ED, MS).  MS has standard deviation equal to 
1.713 compared to 1.475 for its peer group (ED, RV). It is observed not surprisingly, 
that the standard deviation is similar between each strategy and its related group. 
6.4.4 Analysis of variance (S&P) 
In order to validate the statistical consistency of the strategy groups, S&P uses 
ANOVA. The basic idea is to examine whether the standardized distance within groups 
is less than the standardized distance between groups. In other words, this approach 
investigates whether the mean vectors are the same and, if not, which mean components 
differ significantly. 
The analysis of variance is based upon a decomposition of the observations: 
Xli    X̅   X̅l - X̅   Xli - X̅l 
Observation 
(SSobs) 
= overall sample mean 
(SSmean) 






This decomposition into sums of squares allocates variability in the combined samples 
into mean, treatment, and residual (error) components. 




Table 56. Analysis of Variance 
 
CT ED GM LO LS MN MS RV SE SB OT 
CT 0.000 
          ED 8.907 0.000 
         GM 9.124 0.001 0.000 
        LO 4.971 0.570 0.626 0.000 
       LS 3.677 1.138 1.217 0.097 0.000 
      MN 62.813 24.413 24.058 32.442 36.096 0.000 
     MS 2.162 2.293 2.403 0.577 0.200 41.670 0.000 
    RV 19.200 1.953 1.853 4.632 6.073 12.558 8.477 0.000 
   SE 0.161 6.675 6.863 3.345 2.300 56.621 1.144 15.848 0.000 
  SB 186.275 113.716 112.948 130.384 137.610 32.750 148.303 85.867 175.494 0.000 









The average pairs ANOVA of the group LO, SE, LS is 1.913. Between non-groups such 
as GM, ED, SE and SB, CT, GM it is much higher, equal to 4.514 and 102.783 
respectively. In figure 11 there is a visual representation of the ANOVAs which is 
derived from Table 56. For example, the SB and SE strategies have one of the highest 
ANOVAs between them compared to other pair ANOVAs. On the other hand MN and 
ED have one of the lowest ANOVAs between them compared to other pair ANOVAs. 
Figure 11. ANOVA Chart 
 
Table 57 and 58 show two example within-group ANOVA calculations. First I compute 
the ANOVA within group LO, SE, LS (table 57). The F-value is less than the critical 
value Fcrit hence the null hypothesis that the variables are the same is not rejected. There 





Table 57. ANOVA Within Group (LO, SE, LS) 
Groups Sum Average Variance 
LO 290.77 0.999 11.813 
LS 298.3 1.025 7.093 
SE 334.89 1.151 10.620 
Source of Variation SS MS F F crit 
Between Groups 3.828 1.914 0.194 3.006 
Within Groups 8562.512 9.842 
   
Table 58 shows the results from the computation of the ANOVA between three 
candidate groups: (LO, SE, LS), (OT, GM, RV) and SB (it has the highest distances and 
opposite correlations with almost all the other strategies). The F-value is larger than the 
Fcrit which means that the alternative hypothesis is accepted: the variances are not the 
same between these three groups. 
Table 58. ANOVA Between Groups (LO, SE, LS), (OT, GM, RV) and SB 
Groups Sum Average Variance 
SB 15.3 0.053 27.004 
Group LO, SE, LS (Average) 307.987 1.058 9.178 
Group OT, GM, RV (Average) 275.98 0.948 1.401 
Source of Variation SS MS F F crit 
Between Groups 177.141 88.570 7.070 3.006 
Within Groups 10898.988 12.528 
   
I have demonstrated with the use of ANOVA that the standardized distance within the 
group (LO, SE, LS) is low (3.83), whereas the standardized distance between groups 
(LO, SE, LS), (OT, GM, RV) and SB, is considerably larger at 177.14. 
I now move on to the concept of the Divergence Score as adopted by HFR. 
6.4.5 Divergence score (HFR) 
The divergence score (DS) measures the dissimilarity of a fund in relation to the group 
(cluster). It is used by HFR in their representation analysis as a second quantitative 
screening. The smaller the score, the better it is (less different compared to the cluster). 
The score for each hedge fund was defined as: 
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Divergence Score (DS) = Information Ratio Score (IR) + Beta Score (BS) + Volatility Score (VS)
            
(Note equation numbers refer to the equations already introduced in the main text.) In 
the example I compute the DS of LS against the group (SE, LO); then I compute the DS 
of the RV against the same group (SE, LO). 
In the simple example I compute the information ratio of the strategy LS and the 
strategy RV in relation to the same candidate group. 
6.4.5.1 Information Ratio: 
As it was mentioned before, the Information Ratio is given by:    
  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖/𝐵 =
𝑅𝑖−𝑅𝐵
𝜎(𝑅𝑖−𝑅𝐵)
                       
(𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝐵) is the average monthly difference in returns between the fund and the 
benchmark, usually for at least 24-month period. 
𝜎(𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝐵) is the standard deviation of the difference in returns. 
LS case: 
Absolute average monthly difference in returns between LS and the group: 0.681 
Standard Deviation of the difference of returns of LS and the group: 0.962 
Hence, Information Ratio for LS is: 
0.681
0.962
= 0.708  
RV case: 
Absolute average monthly difference in returns between RV and the group: 1.912 
Standard Deviation of the difference of returns of RV and the group: 2.404 






The above process is implemented by S&P for different levels of benchmarks i.e. 
strategy, sub-strategy and region. 
6.4.5.2 Beta Score: 
The Beta Score was defined as:  |1- 𝛽𝑖/𝐵| = |1 − 𝜌𝑖/𝐵 ∗
𝜎𝑖
𝜎𝐵
 |             
𝜎𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎𝐵 are the standard deviation of fund i and the benchmark B, respectively. 𝜌𝑖/𝐵 




                        
LS case: 
Standard Deviation of Benchmark (group):  3.245 
Standard Deviation of LS: 2.663 




Correlation of LS with the Benchmark (group): 0.966 
So, the Beta Score for LS is |1- 0.966 × 0.821| = 0.207 
RV case: 
Standard Deviation of Benchmark (group): 3.245 
Standard Deviation of RV: 1.238 




Correlation of RV with the Benchmark (group): 0.782 
So, the Beta Score for RV is |1- 0.782 × 0.381| = 0.702 
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6.4.5.3 Volatility Score: 
The Volatility Score was defined as:    𝑉𝑆𝑖 =
|𝜎𝑖−𝜎𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟|
𝜎𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟
                   
Where 𝜎𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 is the standard deviation of the cluster (SE, LO group in this case)   and 
𝜎𝑖 is the standard deviation of the strategy (LS or RV). 
 |𝜎𝑖 − 𝜎𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟| for LS is |2.663 − 3.245| = 0.582 
 |𝜎𝑖 − 𝜎𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟| for RV is |1.238 − 3.245| = 2.007 








Finally, I compute the Divergence Score for LS and RV: 
DS = IR + BS + VS   
Divergence 
Score for LS = 0.708 + 0.207 + 0.179  = 1.094 
                  
Divergence 
Score for RV = 0.795 + 0.702  + 0.619 = 2.115 
 
The LS strategy has a Divergence Score of 1.094, which is barely less than half that of 
RV (2.115). As previously mentioned, the Divergence Score denotes how much the 
fund is different from the benchmark (SE, LO in this case). So LS is closer to the cluster 
(group) than RV. I also tested LS against all the other strategies with regard to the 
benchmark (SE, LO group), and found that the differences in DS scores were similarly 
high. Thus, it can be observed that LS should be better allocated to the group (SE, LO), 
compared to the other strategies. 
Last but not least I tested LO vs RV against the group (LS, SE) which gave Divergence 
Scores of 0.980 and 2.061 respectively; also SE vs RV against the group (LS, LO) 
which gave 0.803 and 2.063 respectively. Hence, it can be concluded that only LO 
should be allocated to the group LS, SE, compared to the other strategies.  
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To summarize, in this section I have presented parts of the HFR and S&P 
methodologies so as to give practical examples on how indices are constructed using 
their contrasting methods and particularly classification. I have demonstrated using 
numerical examples that the calculation of distances along with divergence scores 
(HFR) provides similar results to calculating correlations, standard deviation analysis 
and ANOVA (S&P). Strategies such as (LO, SE, LS) or (ED, RV, MS) are clustered in 
a similar way despite the different methods. This evidence suggests that differences of 
the indices between the vendors is mainly because they have different hedge fund 
universes and different inclusion criteria in their due diligence process.  
6.5 Comparison between HFR and S&P cases 
Both vendors use rigorous quantitative techniques, combined with qualitative processes 
through due diligence in order to ensure that they produce high quality representative 
indices. Nevertheless, they use some different technical quantitative methods. HFR 
uses cluster analysis using Ward’s (1963) linkage rule (that is very similar to the 
ANOVA methodology) and correlation - representation analysis through the 
Divergence Score. On the other hand, S&P uses a stratified sampling technique 
considering systematic market exposures and statistically examines the returns history 
of the funds. Then, in order to bring out the cohesiveness and the differences among 
hedge funds it uses the ANOVA methodology. Both firms use simulations to find the 
appropriate number of funds within the index and perform due diligence analysis. HFR 
follows somewhat more rigorous quantitative rules concerning the initial screening 
process. This is because they use specific formulae and eliminate any subjectivity that a 
stratified method may realize. Concerning the second screening and hedge funds 
allocation to specific indices (strategy groups), both vendors use robust and clear 
techniques with several sub-processes to ensure that the construction methodology is 
appropriate. Ultimately, both database vendors use quantitative techniques that produce 
very similar results, in other words, they cluster funds in a similar way.   
Furthermore, both vendors use rigorous qualitative due diligence processes with 
interviews, visits etc. The qualitative due diligence process is a very important element 




I pointed out that both index vendors use simulation techniques to construct a relatively 
small number of funds that are representative in a hedge fund index. However, there is 
one great difference concerning the weights that each fund has in the index. For S&P it 
is equally weighted whereas HFR use a more advanced method using an optimization 
process. In favour of asset-weighted indices, investors tend to allocate their money to 
larger companies and rebalance their portfolios’ constructions according to the 
performance results of individual assets. Conversely, asset-weighted indices may 
sometimes be distorted due to large funds’ performance. However, in the traditional 
markets there is a tendency towards capitalization weights that correspond better to 
investors’ preferences (they invest their money in larger companies).    
Regarding the index structure and index calculations, both vendors use a ‘tree’ 
framework. The general principles of the NAV calculations are the same and both use a 
base index equal to 100 or 1000, hence enabling them to compute index changes in a 
meaningful way. Concerning the computation of the Net Asset Value (NAV) the 
formula is similar with the same principles and compounding rules.    
Nevertheless, it must be stated that between these two index construction 
methodologies there is almost a decade of age difference between them (2003 for S&P 
and 2012 for HFR). However, the purpose is not to favour one or the other. It is rather 
to demonstrate and present to the reader detailed index engineering construction 
processes in a practical way.                                 
Index transparency is derived from three important characteristics: representativeness, 
investability and minimization of bias. There are several major private database vendors 
alongside HFR and S&P. Table 59 depicts their characteristics according to Mesirow 
Financial Services (2011). The weights are mostly Equal or Asset-Weighted. There are 
great differences between the minimum fund asset requirements, ranging from $10 
million to $100 million. Moreover, the Dow Jones Credit Suisse Blue Chip takes into 
consideration the largest six funds in its calculation. Also, there are differences 
concerning funds that constitute the indices as well as regarding whether their funds are 
open or closed. It is noticeable that hedge funds indices that are investable have many 
fewer hedge funds due to their stricter constraints. Ultimately, I believe that each 
category index should be designed and constructed according to the needs and purposes 
of its users. 
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6.6 Issues in hedge fund index construction 
Several academic studies deal with the measurement and interpretation problems of 
hedge fund indices. Brittain (2001) and Schneeweis, Kazemi and Martin (2002) 
documented measurement and perception problems regarding existing hedge fund 
indices and funds subject to different market conditions respectively. Brooks and Kat 
(2002) showed that hedge funds are not such attractive investments if skewness and 
kurtosis are taken into consideration (for funds and indices). Fung and Hsieh (2002d) 
examined the survivorship and selection bias that are inherited from databases to 
benchmarks that are hedge fund indices.  
However, Amenc and Martellini (2003) were the first who examined in a systematic 
way the differences between hedge fund indices and their lack of success in accurate 
measuring. The results of their performance comparison between hedge fund index 
providers were striking. For example, in specific time intervals, concerning the long-
short equity strategy (1998-2000), Zurich Capital Market reported +20.48% return 
whereas EACM reported -1.56%. For the Short-Selling strategy (1998-2000), EACM 
reported -3.09% whereas Yan Hedge reported -24.3%. For the Global Macro strategy 
(1997-2000), HF Net reported +12.00% whereas Van Hedge reported -5.80%. So there 
are large differences and sometimes the signs are different. They also examined the 
correlations between these indices (average and lowest correlation). It is common sense 
that similar indices should be highly correlated with each other. But Amenc and 
Martellini found that some indices were not highly correlated. For example some 
strategies like Equity Market Neutral, Fixed Income Arbitrage and Global Macro had 
average correlations (the same strategy over time) of 0.428, 0.541 and 0.559 
respectively. The Long/Short Strategy had average correlation of 0.458 with the lowest 
correlation being -0.190. 
As I have shown in the previous two sections, hedge fund indices are built from 
different data sets, in keeping with different selection criteria and style allocation, and 
use different construction methodologies. Consequently, investors would be unwise to 
rely on only one index. For that reason they should follow different approaches that 
eliminate these disadvantages. These are (i) the pure indexes (also named ‘index of 
indices’) proposed by Amenc and Martellini (2003) and adopted by various institutions 
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such as EDHEC and (ii) fund of funds indices that according to Fung and Hsieh (2002d) 
better estimate and deliver hedge fund industry performance. I discuss these below. 
Regarding the unrepresentative nature of hedge fund indices, because hedge fund 
reporting is voluntary Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2011) showed that less than one 
percent of hedge funds report to all known databases as presented in figure 12. 
Figure 12. The Hedge Fund Universe 
 
        Source: Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2011) 
 
Amenc and Martellini (2003) proposed pure indices or index of indices as an alternative 
indexing approach. Instead of using one index for a given strategy, they proposed that 
investors should use pure indices that are combinations of relevant competitive indices. 
One simple method could be the construction of equally-weighted portfolios of all 
competing indices. However, Amenc and Martellini explored a statistical approach 
using Kalman filter techniques for the estimation of an observable factor from 
competing index return observations. Moreover, as the pure indices can be considered to 
be a portfolio of existing indices they proposed using the portfolio approach. In 
particular they suggested using Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to derive the 
‘best possible one-dimensional summary’ of a group of competing indices and 
exploiting minimum variance analysis to extract the ‘least biased portfolio’ from a 
group of competitive indices. 
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Amenc and Martellini (2003) derived two theorems concerning the appropriateness of 
indexing indices. Firstly, an index of indices is consistently more representative than 
any competing index it is based upon. Secondly, an index of indices is consistently less 
biased than the average of the set of indices it is extracted from. Therefore the aim of 
the ‘index of indices’ methodology is to engineer a benchmark with better stability and 
representativeness than individual market indices. This approach gives to the ‘index of 
indices’ characteristics similar to portfolio properties, allowing investors to allocate 
their resources to alternative asset classes.    
Goltz, Vaissie and Martellini (2007) examined the performance of a two-stage 
methodology dependent on factor analysis techniques to produce factor replicating 
portfolios that may be accounted as investable and representative indices for many 
different hedge fund strategies. They found that a chosen portfolio of funds sufficiently 
represents the returns characteristics of a large set of funds in the universe, excluding 
the case of Equity Market Neutral strategies.   
I cover below a short case from the EDHEC Risk and Management Research Centre 
regarding the methodology of building pure indices, or indices of indices (Goltz et al., 
2007). It is known that there is non-representativeness and bias that hedge fund indices 
inherit from the database vendors. The immediate effect of this is the large difference in 
results between many hedge fund indices for the same strategy. 
EDHEC use factor analysis to derive the best possible ‘one-dimensional summary’ of a 
group of competing indices in order to design ‘pure style’ indices. Their main objective 
is to find the portfolio weights that make the combination of the competitive indices 
embody the highest possible fraction of the information contained in the data from the 
various competing indexes. In other words, they use Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) of the competing indices to create a pure style index. The first component 
typically captures a high proportion of cross-sectional variation, since indices of 
competing styles tend to be at least partially positively correlated. PCA’s target is to 
justify the behavior of observed variables exploiting a smaller set of unobserved implied 
variables. The first principal component can be presumed as the ‘best one dimensional 
summary’ of a set of competing indices, as it accounts for the largest fraction of the 








                                                                                                                 (33) 
Where 𝜆𝑖 is the eigenvalue linked to the ith principal component.  
A simple normalization can be implemented to get an index that can be considered as a 
portfolio of competing indices. In order to construct the alternative indices, EDHEC 
first eliminated strategies for which there are fewer than four indices. They concluded 
that for statistical reasons it is better to have at least four competing indices. Then, they 
eliminated strategies with very narrow concentration (e.g. the health care sector). The 
second step is to select the indices that are going to be included in the alternative 
indices. The competing indices must be public and have transparent style classifications. 
Furthermore, the candidate indices must rely on a broad database, and post their 
performances in a timely manner. Also, the competing indices must have a sufficient 
length of historical data (at least from 1994). Table 60 depicts seven index providers 
(with their weights) along with thirteen style classification EDHEC indices. As is 
shown, each alternative index represents a specific strategy and consists of some indices 
from other database vendors with a specific weight tailored to that EDHEC alternative 












Table 60. EDHEC Indices and their Constituent Weights as of 2013Q2 
EDHEC 
Alternative 
Indexes CSFB Hennessee HFR 
HF 
Net Barclay CISDM Greenwitch 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 16.5% 16.5% 16.5% 16.9% 16.9% 16.7% - 
CTA Global 33.2% - - 33.5% 33.3% - - 
Distressed 
Securities 14.4% 14.3% 14.6% 14.4% 14.6% 14.3% 13.4% 
Emerging 
Markets 16.8% 16.6% 17.0% 16.2% 16.9% - 16.5% 
Equity Market 
Neutral 12.9% 12.9% 15.1% 15.0% 14.8% 14.2% 15.1% 
Event Driven 16.7% 16.6% 16.9% 16.9% 16.8% 16.1% - 
Fixed Income 
Arbitrage 16.7% 14.0% - 17.5% 17.6% 17.0% 17.2% 
Funds of Funds - - 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% - - 
Global Macro 14.3% 12.7% 15.2% 15.0% 15.1% 14.2% 13.5% 
Long / Short 
Equity 20.0% - 20.0% 20.1% 19.9% 20.0% - 
Merger Arbitrage 16.3% 15.5% 17.9% 15.5% 16.9% 17.9% - 
Relative Value - 24.3% 25.5% 25.6% - - 24.6% 
Short Selling 16.7% 16.7% 16.3% 17.0% 16.8% - 16.5% 
    Constructed table. Data source: EDHEC 2013 
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The EDHEC indices are rebalanced every three months and the EDHEC Index Advisory 
Board decides on the inclusion or exclusion of every individual hedge fund index. The 
criteria that are taken into consideration are: the accessible history, the clarity of the 
construction methodology, its representativeness, the completeness, the stability of the 
composition, and the consistency with which the data/index is published.  
Another alternative approach regarding measuring and benchmarking hedge fund 
universe, that is distinct from competitive indices or an index of indices, is the Fund of 
Hedge Funds (FoFs). FoFs have an extra management layer and have greater 
diversification that can benefit investors. On the other hand they have two layers of 
management fees. Fung and Hsieh (2002d) proposed the simple idea of FoFs as 
benchmarks that constitute a most direct way to evaluate hedge fund performance. It 
captures the investment experience of hedge fund investors themselves. Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) examined several biases such as selection biases, survivorship biases and instant 
history biases. These biases can be eliminated when using FoFs. Regarding the selection 
biases, even if a hedge fund ceases reporting to databases, a FoF may include this hedge 
fund in its portfolio. Moreover, a FoF may contain a hedge fund that has never reported 
to any database. Concerning survivorship bias, even if a hedge fund stops operations or 
goes into bankruptcy, this fund remains in the historical return of the FoF. As far as 
history biases are concerned, these are reduced due to the fact that the past returns of a 
fund that has just joined a FoF are not included. Consequently, FoFs give a sufficiently 
qualitative representation of the hedge fund universe for investors.  
To conclude, several studies have dealt with the problems of measuring and interpreting 
of indices (e.g. Brittain, 2001, Schneeweis, Kazemi and Martin, 2002), the 
attractiveness of investing in hedge fund indices (e.g. Brooks and Kat, 2002) or 
survivorship and selection biases in these indices (Fung and Hsieh, 2002d). Amenc and 
Martellini (2003) highlighted the major numerical differences in hedge fund indices 
from different vendors even though they are supposed to be measuring the same 
strategy. Various approaches have been proposed to improve the situation. First, Fung 
and Hsieh (2002d) proposed the use of Fund of Funds (FoFs) indices that can eliminate 
selection, survivorship, and instant history biases. These constitute a direct way to 
evaluate hedge fund performance because FoFs can capture the investment experience 
of hedge fund investors themselves. Second is the alternative indexing approach 
proposed by Amenc and Martellini (2003) (EDHEC institute) with the use of pure or 
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index of indices that are more representative and less biased compared to any competing 
index. The third solution is from Goltz, Vaissie and Martellini (2007) who used factor 
replicating portfolios that counted as investable and representative indices for many 
different hedge fund strategies. All these solutions give the indices characteristics 
similar to those of portfolios, allowing investors to allocate their resources to alternative 
asset classes. However none of these studies were directly concerned with 
understanding hedge fund index construction methodologies, nor do they answer why 
there are large differences between hedge fund indices from different vendors, even 
when they are supposed to represent the same strategy. Also, they make no attempt to 
propose best practice when classifying hedge funds based on characteristics such as 
their own returns behaviour or assets. 
6.7 Conclusion 
This study is the first to present and analyze in an integrated and practical way hedge 
fund index engineering processes and comparisons. I have reviewed the hedge fund 
index engineering process and particularly classification in detail. I have demonstrated 
the methods followed by two database vendors as examples that use rigorous 
quantitative techniques, and also qualitative processes through the due diligence 
process, in order to ensure that they produce high quality representative indices. The 
section 6.4 presents numerical examples emulating their quantitative processes using 
real data.  
The findings are that, even though database vendors use different methods or 
quantitative approaches, they are able to cluster hedge funds in a somewhat similar way. 
This implies that the differences between the index vendors are primarily due to 
different datasets and different selection criteria. However, further research is needed in 
that direction, as I present below. It is almost inevitable that indices in the same 
category have great differences. This is because the vendors use different datasets, have 
different selection criteria and use different quantitative techniques. This was 
demonstrated by Amenc and Martellini (2003). 
Investors may well be confused about which benchmark measurement is the appropriate 
one to choose. This is an important choice in order to evaluate either their investments 
or hedge funds managers’ performance. Two solutions are the construction of an index 
of indices (EDHEC institute) or fund of funds indices. Another solution might be the 
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concept of 'customized indices'. An example is the customized benchmark service 
provided by the ERI Scientific Beta - EDHEC Institute (2013).  
Further research is needed towards the reproduction of this study using multiple datasets 
and focusing at the fund level. By implementing various classification techniques on 
hedge funds, a researcher could have more robust results on the efficiency and the 
similarities of the quantitative methods used by the underlying vendors. This extension 
could include the use of further quantitative techniques beyond those used by the 
database vendors. It was a surprise to me is that so little statistical work has been done 
to determine the best methods for different end users. Another expansion would be the 
evaluation and identification of the ‘best’ possible construction methods or practices 
(industry standards - protocols) that are appropriate to the hedge fund index 
composition process. This could include either evaluating specific quantitative 
techniques within the construction process according to predefined criteria, or 
evaluating currently-available indices against other benchmarks such as an index of 
indices or fund of funds index. 
Last but not least, database vendors and researchers should take into consideration two 
issues: first, there are hedge funds with a great difference in length of history, making 
the classification process questionable; therefore, vendors should use hedge funds with 
at least 24 months of data for classification purposes. Second, many hedge funds 
operate in different times and market conditions. Hedge funds’ performances change 
due to different market conditions; hence there should be a standardizing process (e.g. 
based on hedge fund excess returns or correlation against a market benchmark) in order 
to capture this issue. As a result, database vendors and researchers will be able to 
construct more efficient and representative indices helping investors understand the 







7 Chapter: Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This doctoral thesis examines hedge fund return attribution for different hedge fund 
strategies under changing market conditions. This thesis is important because it covers 
gaps in the literature that created confusion to investors and researchers. There was no a 
clear picture of hedge funds’ behaviour under changing market conditions, in a holistic 
approach. Previous studies had important inefficiencies in terms of over-simplistic 
models for all hedge fund strategies and/or different market conditions, using several 
macro factors that did not necessarily present the state of the market or the economy, 
focusing only on the internal structure of hedge funds returns, or using some factors 
(e.g. general commodity factors) that did not represent accuracy their sub components. 
Beyond the confusion that the investors faced in their decision investment process, there 
was also a lack of understanding of the behaviour of hedge funds’ returns in other 
aspects such as at the fundamental or mixed level within different market conditions. 
Regarding the performance persistence, there was no clear distinction between different 
aspects of persistence. Neither was there a distinction between “good” or “bad” times. 
Examining persistence only within each strategy group of without taking into 
consideration other aspects did not provide deep knowledge and did not help investors 
much. Furthermore, until now investors have had no guidance on how they can exploit 
differences in persistence of hedge funds so as to gain conditional higher returns. In 
terms of the hedge fund index construction and classification issues, although investors 
were using several indices as benchmarks in their portfolios (simply as “consumers”), 
nevertheless, they knew almost nothing how they were practically constructed. There 
was a gap in the literature of why there were differences in hedge fund indices from 
vendors even if they supposed that they represented the same strategy. The benchmark 
selection in general is not a trivial process and may change the portfolio and asset 
allocation decision process of the investor.   
I remind the reader the research questions that are examined in this study:  
1. How and what is the impact of the (multiple) business cycles and different market 
conditions on hedge fund strategies in terms of performance (alphas and exposures)? 
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 2. How and what is the impact of the (multiple) business cycles and different market 
conditions on hedge funds at the fundamental  and mixed level in terms of performance 
(alphas and exposures)?  
3. What is the impact of multiple business cycles and different market conditions on 
hedge fund performance persistence at strategy level and how investors can exploit 
persistence?  
4. Why there are such large differences between hedge fund indices from different 
vendors, even when they are supposed to represent the same strategy?  
Based on the previous questions, the research objectives are, first, to understand and 
explain the return generating process under changing market conditions at a strategy 
level, second, understand and explain the return generating process under changing 
market conditions at a fundamental and mixed level, third, to examine hedge fund 
performance persistence and its exploitation by investors, and fourth, to examine the 
differences between hedge fund indices and more specific the classification problem of 
the hedge funds.        
7.2 Findings 
The main empirical findings are chapter specific and are summarized within the 
respective empirical chapters. In this section I provide a synthesis of these findings so as 
to answer the research questions in a homogeneous way. In other words, I discuss the 
findings in an integrated way so as to capture the “big” picture of this doctoral thesis. 
As I have already mentioned, this doctoral thesis examines hedge fund return attribution 
for different hedge fund strategies under changing market conditions. All four research 
questions are related and the results within each research question can be explained with 
regards to the other questions as well. Moreover, section 7.3 mentions the contributions 
of this thesis. 
7.2.1 Performance at strategy level 
7.2.1.1 Main results 
In the third chapter that deals with hedge fund performance attribution at the strategy 
level, I found that almost no hedge fund strategies provide significant alphas to 
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investors during stressful market conditions. It seems that at such times fund managers 
try to minimize their risks. Indeed, when I examine funds’ exposures during “bad” 
times, hedge funds reduce both the number of their exposures to different asset classes 
and their portfolio allocations while some strategies even reverse their exposures. The 
opposite happens during “good” times as fund managers focus more on returns trying to 
exploit upward market movements even at the cost of increasing their systematic risk. 
As expected, directional strategies share more common exposures under all conditions 
compared to non-directional strategies due to their nature. During stressful market 
conditions fund managers switch from equity asset classes to commodity asset classes 
as the later asset classes seem to be more inelastic and economic activity is not the main 
driver of their prices. I have also found that down regimes are harsher than recessions as 
they consist mainly from down market movement with high volatility, being difficult to 
predict by fund managers.  
7.2.1.2 Connecting performance findings with the literature 
The findings of this study agree with other authors (e.g. Bali, Brown and Caglayan, 
2011, Jawadi and Khanniche, 2012 and Giannikis and Vrontos, 2011) that hedge fund 
strategies are dynamic in terms of exposures and returns. First, the proposed model 
agrees with the literature that returns and factor exposures change over time, as I found 
major switches of hedge fund returns occurred during stressful market conditions (as 
modelled by Jawadi, Khannich, 2012). Moreover, there is partial agreement with Bollen 
and Whaley (2009) since I found only one of their two samples, containing spikes of 
exposures’ switching appears during under stressful market conditions, although they 
examined funds during the period 1994 to 2005, allowing for a single shift in the 
parameters of the funds. Second, different strategies have different exposures due to 
their nature. Third, there are some common risk factors such as the market, credit, the 
term spread and commodities that are shared between many hedge fund strategies 
(Billio, Getmansky and Pelizzon, 2012) and there are some other factors such as default 
spread and VIX that are economically important (Avramov, Baras, and Kosowski, 
2013). My findings agree with Meligkotsidou and Vrontos (2014) that the market index 
and the spread of small cap minus large cap were the most significant factors in hedge 
fund returns.  
Fourth, there are changes in portfolio allocations that are more intense than changes in 
exposures to asset classes, as Patton and Ramadorai (2013) found. There is partial 
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agreement with Ibbotson, Chen and Zhu (2011) as only a few strategies add significant 
value to investors during bear market conditions because fund managers are concerned 
more about risk. Nonetheless, they examined alpha and exposures only during the 2008 
financial crisis. There is also agreement with Brown (2012) that traditional systematic 
factors such as equities or credit impose significant exposures on hedge funds although 
the author took into consideration performance before fees. Last but not least, as 
Agarwal and Naik (2004) found, I find that many hedge fund strategies exhibited 
significant exposures to Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model and Carhart’s 
(1997) momentum factor. As mentioned before, my findings regarding (i) the absence 
of alpha (ii) the switching toward commodities during stressful market conditions, (iii) 
common sharing exposures for directional strategies, (iv) the high negative impact of 
the down regimes on hedge funds (see the findings section for more details) influence 
the further understanding or application knowledge in the area of hedge fund. Under this 
holistic approach there is a clear understanding of the relationship between hedge fund 
strategies and changing market conditions. This additional knowledge can be the basis 
of an extended examination of hedge funds for forecasting purposes.     
7.2.2 Performance at fundamental-mixed level  
7.2.2.1 Main results 
In the fourth chapter that examines fund performance at a fundamental and mixed level 
I found that irrespective of the fundamental factors, hedge funds, on average, deliver 
significant excess returns to investors, contrary to bad times when they try to minimize 
their systematic risk delivering no significant alpha. These results are in alignment with 
the third chapter concerning the return/risk performance of hedge funds in changing 
market conditions. The interesting thing is that none of the fundamental factors (hedge 
fund characteristics) is able to assist in providing excess returns for hedge funds. On the 
contrary, some hedge fund strategies are able to deliver excess returns even during 
stressful market conditions. Also, on average, all funds irrespective of their 
characteristics try to minimize their systematic risk during stressful market conditions. I 
found that small funds suffer more than large as the latter funds seem to have more 
resources and being able to absorb shocks. Young funds outperform old ones for all 
conditions as young fund managers seems to have higher pressure than old ones to 
deliver higher performance. An interesting finding is that funds that do not impose 
restrictions (and survive) outperform funds with lockups. I rationalize this as fund 
managers feeling the pressure of not having the “safety” of redemption restrictions are 
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more innovative and do better than their peers. I also found that some strategies with 
specific characteristics even deliver significant negative alpha to investors conditional 
on stressful market conditions. Indeed, as I found in the third chapter that almost no 
hedge fund strategies provide significant alpha during stressful market conditions, it is 
rational that fund strategies with specific characteristics (such as no lockups Long Only 
and young Multi Strategy – see chapter 3) may struggle even more. This is because in 
the first case there are no redemption restrictions so as to protect fund managers who 
have mainly long positions; in the second case as Multi Strategy needs special skills 
(e.g. exploiting other strategies or investing in other markets) there may be no 
managerial experience in doing this. 
7.2.2.2 Connecting the above findings with the literature 
The results concerning the relationship between size and performance agree with other 
authors such as Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2004; Ammann, and Moerth, 2005; 
Meredith, 2007; Joenvaara, Kosowski, and Tolonen, 2012 that there is a negative 
correlation, on average. These results are in alignment with commercial studies (e.g. 
Pertrac Corporation, 2012), as well.  Getmansky (2012) found that there is a positive 
and concave correlation and suggested that there is an optimal size of assets under 
management. A few studies are exceptions that found no relationship, such as 
Gregoriou and Rouah (2002) or a negative relationship such as Koh, Koh, and Teo 
(2003), but the differences are mainly due to the use of different samples and methods. 
According to my findings, although this negative relationship holds for “good” times, 
during “bad” times this is questionable as small funds seem to suffer more than large. 
Concerning the relationship between age and performance this study again agree with 
the literature (such as Amenc and Martelini, 2003; Meredith, 2007; Frumkin, and 
Vandegrif, 2009; Pertrac Corporation, 2012) that there is a negative relationship, on 
average. One exception is the study from Schneeweis, Kazemi and Martin (2002) that 
showed a positive relation taking into consideration funds with the same starting point. 
In this study I found that this holds for “good” and “bad” times.  
Regarding the relationship of the lockup restrictions and performance this study agrees 
with other authors (such as Aragon, 2007; Joenvaara, Kosowski, and Tolonen, 2012) 
that there is a positive relationship, although, only during “good” times. During “bad” 
times, funds without lockup restrictions (that survive) outperform funds with lockups. I 
explain this as fund managers becoming more innovative with respect to their peers, 
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under the pressure of not having the “safety” of redemption restrictions. This study 
extends the previous knowledge in terms of hedge fund performance and fund 
characteristics, providing a deeper understanding of this relationship as I find that it is 
not necessarily linear when changing market conditions are taken into consideration. 
Moreover, scholars should not take for granted that hedge funds always provide 
superior returns to investors. This is because I found that there are some cases (e.g. 
Long Only funds with no redemption restrictions and the Multi Strategy young funds) 
that that provide significant negative excess returns to investors, conditional on stressful 
market conditions.    
7.2.3 Persistence and mixed trading strategies 
7.2.3.1 Main results 
The fifth chapter’s findings are connected with those in the third one, as in general, 
hedge funds seem to suffer during stressful market conditions not only in terms of 
excess returns delivered to investors but also in terms of performance persistence. 
During “good” times there is smoothness in hedge fund (risk-adjusted) returns. On the 
contrary, during “bad” times this smoothness disappears. With respect to the market 
benchmark, with a few exceptions, there is no performance persistence. Regarding the 
persistence within each strategy group, for “good” times I found persistence up to one 
year whereas for “bad” times I found it for up to six months. In addition, there is strong 
evidence that the persistence is driven mainly by the top performers. This implies that 
there is fierce competition among bottom performers to be at least average in terms of 
performance; otherwise the fund will go out of business. An interesting aspect is that, 
contrary to the third chapter, recessions are harsher than down regimes. I rationalize this 
as hedge funds during down regimes producing very low (but steady) returns compared 
to recessions, when funds deliver low but sometimes relatively high (thus unsteady) 
returns.  
7.2.3.2 Connecting persistence’s findings with the literature 
The results confirm earlier studies (such as Agarwal and Naik, 2000a; Eling, 2009; 
Joenvaara, Kosowski, and Tolonen, 2012; Hentati-Kaffel, and Peretti, 2015) that there 
is short term persistence. However, I proceed further, by confirming my initial 
assumption that persistence depends also on the different business cycles and the 
different market conditions. More specifically, there is a negative impact concerning the 
spreads between hedge fund top and bottom performers and their performance 
299 
 
persistence. Also I showed evidence that some non-directional strategies (e.g. Relative 
Value) present more persistence than directional strategies (e.g. Short Bias or Long 
Only).  Nevertheless the difference in persistence is mainly related to the type of 
strategy each fund follows. There are some studies such as Kosowski, Naik and Teo 
(2007), Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov (2010), and Ammann, Huber and Schmid 
(2013) that indicated persistence beyond one year. However this study only examined 
persistence up to one year due to the limitation of data availability, especially during 
stressful market conditions.  
This study revealed that the persistence is driven mainly by the top performers, a 
finding that agrees with Jagannathan, Makakhov and Norvikov (2010), as there are 
reversals in bottom performers in most cases. Other authors (e.g. Capocci, 2007) 
suggest that bad performance is more likely to persist than good performance. This is 
intuitive as, in general, it is easier to identify fund characteristics that result in poor 
performance compared to identifying the “formula” for successful stock picking. 
Nevertheless, if there was consistently poor performance these bottom performers 
would soon be out of business unless they reversed their performance. This study 
extended the previous knowledge so that it provided a clear distinction between the 
different aspects of persistence. It is known now that hedge fund performance 
persistence changes depending on market conditions. By introducing a new framework 
and the “momentrarian” trading strategy there is now a new trading strategy that can be 
exploited not only in the hedge fund area but in the investment in general (e.g. stock 
trading).   
7.2.4 Hedge fund classification 
7.2.4.1 Main results 
The sixth chapter examined hedge fund index construction methodologies by presenting 
case studies from two well-known database vendors and evaluated them using 
numerical examples on the same dataset. The vendors use different classification 
techniques, however those quantitative techniques provide similar results. The 
differences are rather due to the use of different hedge fund universes and different 
inclusion criteria. I have found that the investor should worry more about different 
universes that database vendors use than the index construction itself.  
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7.2.4.2 Connection with the literature 
I examined and answered the research question of why there are such large differences 
between hedge fund indices from different vendors, even when they are supposed to 
represent the same strategy. It was a surprise to me that so far no or little work has been 
done in this direction. Amenc and Martellini (2003) were the first who examined in a 
systematic way the differences between hedge fund indices and their lack of success in 
accurate measuring, proposing the use of index of indices. My findings showed that the 
differences are mainly due to the use of different datasets rather than the use of different 
classification techniques. Based on the new knowledge provided, researchers should 
pay a lot more attention to the data that they use and the classification of the hedge 
funds as this can lead to distortions in empirical hedge fund research. Moreover, 
researchers now have a deeper understanding of the index constructions methods (in 
practical way), not just be “consumers” of the indices provided by the database vendors. 
As discussed later, I provide the basis for further academic research dealing with the 
identification and evaluation of the “best” possible construction practices in order to 
benefit investors.                    
7.3 Knowledge contribution 
In this section I discuss the contribution and implication of the above synthesis with 
respect the research questions and how they may encroach on existing theories or 
understanding.  
The novelty of this PhD thesis lies in the fact that it provides the first examination of 
hedge funds within multiple U.S. business cycles and different market conditions, using 
a holistic approach, so as to have a comprehensive explanation of hedge fund 
performance. Furthermore, unlike many previous studies, instead of only one general 
commodity factor, I use several specific ones. This is essential as commodities cannot 
be considered to behave in the same way in the market, as proposed by Bhardwaj and 
Dunsby (2014). I use a commodity factor related to the agriculture/food industry that to 
my knowledge has not been examined before. This study uses a custom piece-wise 
parsimonious model which can accurately identify changes in asset and portfolio 
allocations per strategy within different conditions, helping investors in their decision 
process as it enables them to know what to expect from different strategies, especially 
during multiple stressful financial conditions with different attributes. In addition, I 
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perform a systematic database merging and cleaning approach that can be used as a 
benchmark for future studies since this is not a trivial process. 
Another novelty of this doctoral thesis is that it examines hedge funds at the 
fundamental level and at the mixed level in a holistic approach under both multiple 
business cycles and different market conditions. The hedge fund performance 
investigation under this approach with different aspects revealed useful findings on 
hedge fund behaviour. Thus investors are assisted in their investment decision processes 
as they now know how these different aspects are related and what to expect from hedge 
funds. An extension of this is the analysis of ranking favorable economic states from the 
most desirable state to the least desirable that gives investor a deeper understanding of 
the association between funds’ performance, fundamental and mixed level 
characteristics, and market conditions. 
Beyond the above, this study is significant for the literature and to investors as well 
concerning performance persistence and trading strategies. I have revealed aspects that 
have not been examined before. More specifically, for the first time, I make a clear 
distinction between different aspects of performance persistence and I examine each of 
these aspects, at strategy level, within multiple business cycles and different market 
conditions, as these two different states do not coincide necessarily, having different 
implications for hedge funds (e.g. recessions periods are, on average, fiercer in terms of 
hedge fund performance persistence compared with down regimes). Investors know 
what to foresee from different strategies in terms of performance persistence. Past 
performance does not guarantee the same results for the future; however, most investors 
in their capital allocation process rely on past performance. One more contribution is 
that, for the first time, I develop a framework of using zero investment trading strategies 
that utilize the differences in spreads between top and bottom performing hedge funds. 
These mixed or synthetic trading strategies can be a guide to investors allowing them 
for potential higher returns, outperforming market returns.  
Lastly, this study contributes to the literature by filling an additional gap as, for the first 
time, I examine and explain the main principles and quantitative techniques used to 
build hedge fund indices through the use of real vendor cases. By providing a deeper 
understanding of how hedge fund indices and sub-indices are formed, the findings can 
benefit groups such as investors, database vendors and financial governance authorities. 
302 
 
The findings provide the basis for further academic research dealing with the 
identification and evaluation of the “best” possible construction practices in order to 
benefit investors.       
7.4 Managerial implications 
The findings from this thesis affect investors’ practices and policies. More specifically, 
concerning the third and fourth chapters, investors and fund of funds managers are 
helped in their investment decision process as now they know what to expect when 
dealing with hedge fund strategies under changing market conditions (this enables them 
to select hedge fund strategies that do not suffer a lot during “bad” times and select 
hedge fund strategies that exploit a lot the upward market movement during “good” 
times). However, this study assumes that investors are able (at least to some extent) to 
predict the next state of the market as this forecasting would be out of the scope of this 
Thesis. They are able to know what will be the implications on the asset and portfolio 
allocations of hedge funds (this enables active investors to have more risk hedging 
opportunities within equity and commodity asset classes in their portfolios). They have 
a clear understanding of the different ”forms” of changing market conditions and what 
are their exact implications, as growth and up regimes, recessions and down regimes do 
not necessarily coincide and they have different implications on hedge funds. This is 
because these states have different attributes and characteristics as has been already 
discussed. At the fundamental and mixed level, investors know also what to expect from 
funds with different characteristics and what is the impact of changing market 
conditions on funds behaviour when they take into consideration funds’ strategy and 
individual characteristics. They are now more conscious because, contrary to what was 
believed, investors may not receive what they pay for, but sometimes, they may lose 
money (e.g. hedge fund strategies with conditional negative excess returns). Fund 
administrators can benefit by applying more flexible fee policies that more accurately 
reflect fund managers’ performance under changing market conditions (e.g. high 
watermarks during “good” times) and government authorities to understand the 
implication of hedge fund strategies for the financial system.   
Concerning the fifth chapter, investors can have a clear picture about hedge fund 
performance persistence and its different aspects. Now, investors are familiar with what 
to expect from different strategies in terms of performance persistence and although past 
performance is no guide to the future, still most investors in their capital allocation 
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process rely on past performance. This study allows investors to implement mixed 
trading strategies utilizing spreads between top and bottom performers of different 
hedge fund strategies, although currently there are some constraints in implementing the 
short selling in hedge funds. However, these mixed trading strategies can be used in 
other markets as well. As with the previous cases, fund administrators can apply more 
appropriate and flexible fee polices by taking into consideration performance 
persistence. Fund managers should be rewarded for performance persistence. Last but 
not least, financial government authorities can benefit by better understanding of hedge 
funds in terms of their persistence and risks, in case there is any need for change in the 
legal framework or closer monitoring (e.g. monitoring of hedge funds that exhibit 
“unusual” persistence).  
Regarding the sixth chapter that deals with hedge fund index engineering, investors now 
have a deeper understanding of how indices are constructed in a practical way. They 
may feel more confident about choosing the right index benchmark for their 
investments (e.g. knowing their needs, how each index is constructed and what exactly 
shows helps them for the “right” decision). This is important as the selection of the right 
benchmark is not a trivial process and may affect the asset class and portfolio allocation 
decisions. This study can help database vendors to construct better indices by 
understanding the methods of their rivals and combining new methods in their index 
construction methodology, by collaborating with other vendors or even specializing in 
certain indices. A last implication of this study would be the desirability for 
collaboration between financial authorities and database vendors to create a common 
hedge fund pool, as the differences in indices are mainly due to different hedge fund 
universes used by the database vendors. Moreover, most of the problems regarding the 
hedge fund data (e.g. fragmented datasets or different kind of biases) could be 
minimized.     
7.5 Limitations 
The main limitations of this doctoral thesis are due to the nature of the hedge fund 
industry heterogeneity and the problem that there is with the data, as until to date there 
is no universal hedge fund database. I use, as other authors, different databases, 
different time periods, and different methodologies. Despite these issues there are some 
consistent trends and patterns in hedge fund behaviour. Another limitation of this study 
is that it focuses on funds that invest primarily in the North America region due to the 
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use of three U.S. business cycles. Whether similar results hold for the European and 
Asia-Pacific regions would be a valuable out of sample test, but the definition of 
business cycles in these regions may be dubious. Another limitation is the absence 
within my analysis of the lookback straddles that are appropriate for CTAs, due to data 
unavailability in the early 1990s (however in my robustness tests with post 1994 data I 
use these factors for comparison purposes).  
Due to data unavailability (e.g. time-series of long and short position holdings or 
leverage ratios), leverage is not considered, though this can play a role in hedge fund 
performance. Another limitation is the limited validation of the yearly persistence 
during stressful market conditions due to the small number of observations during these 
conditions. Concerning the application of the proposed mixed or synthetic trading 
strategies, I considered in the analysis lockup redemption costs; however there might be 
other costs (e.g. bid-ask spreads, short-selling costs) that may affect investors’ profits 
that are not captured. Due to the limitation of data availability, especially during 
stressful market conditions, I did not considered contrarian trading strategies for more 
than three years. Finally, another limitation regarding the hedge fund classification is 
that this took place on the strategy level where a more detailed analysis could be done at 
a hedge fund level. 
A final limitation (that can be an opportunity for further research) is that the prediction 
of the next stage of the market is not examined in this Thesis and can be a difficult task 
for investors in their asset and portfolio allocation process. However once they forecast 
(e.g. in a probabilistic way by using currently available lead macro indicators) the next 
stage of the market then they can use the findings of this Thesis in their investment 
decision process for higher returns.       
7.6 Avenues for further research 
The above limitations provide opportunities for future research. More specifically, as I 
focused on hedge funds investing in developed markets, there is a need to examine 
hedge funds that invest in the emerging markets within my approach. It would be very 
interesting for comparison reasons to examine the differences between these broad 
classes of hedge funds. In addition, by having access to time-series leverage data it 
would be interesting to examine this aspect in hedge fund performance within my 
approach. There is also a need to examine the return generating mechanism within the 
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hedge fund market microstructure. For instance, the way that the working processes in 
the hedge fund industry relate to transaction costs, quotes, volumes, prices and trading 
behavior needs to be considered. Those elements have an impact on hedge fund 
exposures and returns.  
Another avenue for future research is the development of models for forecasting 
purposes using machine learning techniques. Behavioural finance and Bayesian 
principles would be interesting and challenging elements incorporated into these 
models. All these models could incorporate business cycles and different market 
condition sub-models for purposes of the forecasting hedge fund returns.  
The trading strategy framework developed, and the introduction of the “Momentrarian” 
strategy which is a combination of a momentum and a contrarian strategy under 
different time periods, provide opportunities for further research in other markets, 
especially those that are dealing with systematic trading or technical analysis. This 
brings opportunities for researchers and practitioners to consider more sophisticated 
trading strategies with potential higher returns. I believe that under this framework, 
various trading sub-strategies could be constructed suitable for every investor operating 
within specific markets. 
Last but not least, an avenue for further research is the investigation of classification 
quantitative techniques beyond those used by the database vendors. This could include 
the evaluation and examination of the “optimal” construction methods or practices 
(similar to industry standard protocols) that are suitable for the hedge fund index 
engineering process. This could include either evaluating currently-available indices 
against other benchmarks such as an index of indices or fund of funds indices, or 
evaluating specific quantitative techniques within the construction process according to 
predefined criteria.    
7.7 Conclusion 
The prime purpose of this PhD thesis is to understand and explain the attribution of 
returns of different hedge fund strategies under changing market conditions. The 
existing knowledge had important gaps and investors were still confused or ignorant 
about certain aspects of hedge fund behaviour. This confusion and ignorance was an 
additional burden to the general complexity that the hedge fund industry encompasses, 
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having to do mainly with the private nature of hedge funds. This PhD thesis dealt with 
these gaps and has advanced the study of hedge funds having met its objectives. 
I have robust findings that contribute to the theoretical knowledge having managerial 
implications as well. More specifically, under my holistic approach there is a clearer 
understanding of the relationship between hedge fund strategies’ performance and 
changing market conditions. There is also a clear understanding of the relationship 
between funds’ performance, hedge fund strategies, and fund specific characteristics. 
Persistence is examined under different aspects in a holistic approach, also developing a 
new framework for investment trading strategies that can be used in other areas of 
finance. There was also a deep investigation of the fund classification problem that 
accompanies the hedge fund industry. From a practical point of view, investors have a 
clearer understanding of specific aspects of hedge funds, they know what to foresee 
from different investment decisions and they can have a guide to their asset and 
portfolio allocation process. Fund administrators can now apply more flexible fee 
policies that are more accurate, reflecting fund managers’ performance under changing 
market conditions. Financial authorities and database vendors are helped to work 
together so as to implement, a change in the legal framework, closer monitoring or the 
creation of one universal hedge fund database with the appropriate benchmark indices.   
Beyond the findings that contribute to the theoretical and practical knowledge, this 
study opens avenues for further research. These opportunities, relate to the examination 
of hedge funds investing in emerging markets, the impact of the market micro-structure 
on hedge fund performance, the application of the mixed trading strategies in other 
markets, and the development of forecasting models using machine learning techniques. 
After having understood hedge funds’ behaviour to a large extent, the next natural step 
(in my opinion) is to try to forecast their behaviour, providing knowledge “one step 
ahead” that can be better exploited by researchers and investors. Finally a promising 
research area is the optimization of the index construction methods, especially regarding 







8.1 Databases - Basic information 
This thesis uses more than one database from different database vendors. In particular, I 
use datasets from Eurekahedge and BarclayHedge database vendors. I selected those 
databases because they have been used by researchers containing live and dead hedge 
funds with a long time coverage according to my needs. Both Eurekahedge and 
BarclayHedge databases contain data before 1994 which comply with my research 
requirements. Many database vendors (such as CISDM) provide data from 1994 and 
afterwards thus reducing my candidate options. The underlying databases cover the 
period under examination from January 1990 to March 2014. However, my 
specifications required coverage from January 1988 to March 2014 due to the instant 
bias calculations. I use a graveyard database to eliminate the survivorship bias as many 
funds stop reporting at some point, due to liquidation or some other reason.  
Prior to merging, Eurekahedge database contained live and dead hedge funds (HF) with 
returns and assets under management (AUM) along with HF individual characteristics 
and manager details. It contained in total 13,015 hedge funds. Of these, 5,865 were 
considered dead funds. This database contained hedge funds and Commodity Trading 
Advisors (CTAs) as well. BarclayHedge database contained hedge fund information 
similar to the above but there were two separate datasets, one with live and another one 
with dead funds. The Live database contained hedge funds (only) information and 
counted for 3,885 funds. The BarclayHedge graveyard database contained hedge funds, 
Funds of Funds (FoFs), CTAs, and Multi-Asset Funds (MAFs) counting totally for 
14,844 funds. Hedge funds counted 7,438 and all other types for 7,406. Overall, after 
the merging process, there were 31,744 (13,015+3,885+14,844) funds (of all types) with 
2,418 duplicates, hence the single funds were 29,326. The overall percentage of hedge 
funds common between the two database vendors is 7.61% (2,418/31,744). However, it 
is essential to mention that the graveyard database contained FoFs, CTAs and MAFs as 
well, counting for 7,378 records. Hence, the actual ratio of common hedge funds 
(excluding the other fund types) is 9.92 % (2,418/24,366).  
It is important to mention that, as with other authors (Ramadorai, 2013), I treated 
multiple share classes of funds as separate funds; this is to make the selection bias 
correction robust to the variations in liquidity restrictions, returns, and fee structures 
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that described different share classes of the same fund. For example, different classes 
(or accounts) of the same hedge fund may have differences in the aggressiveness, and 
the fee structure or the liquidity restrictions. Even if I used the correlation technique to 
eliminate the second case (return variations), nevertheless there were some hedge funds 
with names ending LP or LTD having high correlation but different legal structures. 
These are issues that were taken into consideration by applying a strict fund selection 
process.  
8.2 Database merging and cleaning processes 
As I have already mentioned, I use more than one database from different database 
vendors. I contribute to the literature because this study is one of the few such as Patton 
and Ramadorai (2013), Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) or Joenvaara, Kosowski, and 
Tolonen, (2012) that convey a systematically merging approach that other researchers 
can follow. It is not trivial task to remove duplicate funds from the aggregate database 
due to the fact that there is no common identifier for the same hedge fund in different 
vendors’ databases. Thus, few of the existing papers provide transparent and detailed 
explanations of how their database is constructed. I use a strictly systematic way 
according to some criteria (mentioned below) and a specific algorithm in identifying 
unique hedge funds.  
The process and the algorithms that I followed are: 
1. Database auditing: Using filters and relational logic (trying to generalize from 
having a mass of propositional variables to representing the same information 
with relations), I inspected the three datasets from the two database vendors. 
2. Database pre-processing: I implemented a mapping between different database 
fields and I managed data in order to bring them in to the same format. These 
processes were concerned with transposing and reversing datasets and then 
consolidating them in the same file format. In the Eurekahedge database I had to 
split returns and AUM records so as to be compatible with the BarclayHedge 
format that keeps them in different work sheets.    
3. Sorting-Grouping the data using “keys”. The primary key was the hedge fund 
name; the second key was the management company and the third one the fund 
manager name. The combination of these three keys is mandatory as there are 
many funds run by the same manager company or fund manager. Also, I paid 
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attention to the legal structure of the fund/company name. All the above keys 
were parsed for punctuation, filler words or spelling errors. 
4. Identifying duplicates: This process has to do with distinguishing funds that 
have similar names, according to the previous step, but also the same inception 
date. There are many cases where a fund manager may run different classes (not 
explicitly stated) with different inception dates. These are treated as separate 
funds (see the previous section about share classes). 
5. The next step after identifying hedge funds having the same name and inception 
date is to measure correlations. There are cases where two similar funds with the 
same inception date appear in the dataset, and are run by the same manager 
having different designations such as “LP” and “Limited Partnership”. In these 
cases, if fund returns are similar (having correlation 0.99 or higher due to 
reporting errors) I eliminate one of the duplicates according to the criteria 
mentioned below. There are a few cases where companies are set up with a 
master-feeder fund structure. In that case I take into consideration feeder funds 
with more accurate AUMs (not aggregated).  
6. After having identified the duplicates, the next process is to eliminate one of 
them. As I merge and integrate databases from two database vendors I expect to 
find and examine duplicates that belong to these two different datasets. I select 
the fund that has the longest return track record. If the two hedge funds have the 
same track record, then I choose the one with the longest asset under 
management record (AUM). If both funds have the same AUM long record then 
I choose the BarclayHedge database records as it contains the most 
comprehensive (detailed) set of assets under management observations.  
Overall, the proposed matching algorithm takes into consideration first, administrative 
data (e.g. hedge fund name/legal structure, management company/legal structure, 
manager name, inception date) and second, quantitative data (return correlations). In 
order to be considered as a duplicate a fund, should –simultaneously- have very similar 
administrative data, the same inception date and returns with 0.99 correlation or higher. 
If so, I proceed by eliminating one fund according to the criteria already mentioned. 
I was very strict concerning the key names. If there was a major difference in name or in 
legal structure or domicile (e.g. LP vs LLC or offshore vs onshore) then I considered 
them as different funds. If there were minor differences due to spelling errors or 
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punctuation (e.g. just a dot difference or abbreviation) then I proceed to the next step 
(examining inception date, correlations etc.) in order to consider whether it is a 
duplicate or not.   
Another important matter that I examined is the issue of the zero or null values. Zero 
returns should reflect the accurate returns for the month. However, according to the 
database vendors (e.g. BarclayHedge), in some instances firms update their fund 
information with a zero return. In the use of the dataset I considered consecutive 
monthly zero returns at the start or at the end of the track record as null values. Also, in 
the middle of the track record, if there are more than two consecutive monthly returns 
equal to zero, then I consider them as null values. The same principle is applied for live 
and dead funds.  
As I have mentioned, since I am interested in the U.S. hedge fund industry, I take into 
consideration hedge funds that are either based in the U.S., or outside the U.S. but 
investing all in the U.S. This is because of the use of multiple business cycles from the 
U.S. economy. Furthermore, I report CTAs (Commodity Trading Advisors) separately 
and I exclude from the analysis FoFs (Fund of Funds). CTAs constitute a particular 
category in the hedge funds industry. Some studies (e.g. Fung and Hsieh, 1997) 
consider them as a part of the hedge fund world, whereas others (Fung and Hsieh, 2000; 
Capocci and Hubner, 2004), consider them on a stand-alone basis. FoFs cause a 
distortion from double counting of hedge funds returns and the extra expenses due to 
the fact that FoFs have an extra layer of management and performance fees. 
Concluding, I propose a benchmark in constructing an aggregate hedge fund database 
by following an approach that was based on transparent main steps that can be easily 
replicated even with more than two database vendors. In contrast to other studies that 
often describe that they “carefully” remove duplicate hedge funds without describing in 
detail their merging process, I detail exactly the steps and the criteria that I use in the 
database process. I do not take into consideration the share restriction information, the 
compensation structure or the strategy due to different reporting standards, the changing 
nature of some characteristics (for example Agarwal and Ray, 2012 document that 
hedge funds fees are changing), and the different strategy descriptions (no unified 
coding). An important issue that I am the first to take into consideration is the presence 
of null/zero values. Having communicated with the database vendors I applied specific 
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criteria about when a zero reported value is actually 0% return or a null (not verified) 
value. This high quality, reliable hedge fund data provide extra robustness strength in 
this PhD thesis.  
Last but not least, in the merged database, funds with correlation higher than 99% can 
exist. However, these funds have different administrative data (e.g. different name/legal 
structure) and/or different inception dates thus forming different records. These records 
usually represent different classes of a hedge fund kept in different accounts. Overall the 
proposed benchmark is a rigorous approach but an even more intense and integrated 
approach would require direct communication with the fund managers about the 
underlying issues that I mentioned before. Nevertheless, this would be an inefficient 
process because it would require a considerable amount of resources and time.  
8.3 Hedge fund selection 
In the consolidated hedge fund database, BarclayHedge’s records contain different types 
of funds -live and dead- such as hedge funds, fund of funds, CTAs (within the 
graveyard DB), Multi-Asset Funds and with Fund_Reporting_Style equal to “Net All 
Fees” or “Gross” or “Net Mgt”, or “Blank” that invest in one or many regions; 
Eurekahedge’s records contain -live and dead- hedge fund type of fund, “Net All Fees” 
that invest also to many regions.  
I examine hedge funds that focus on the North America region as I use multiple 
business cycles from the U.S economy. Thus, the “select” statements were based on 
transparent and strict criteria to avoid biases. For BarclayHedge’s records, I selected 
those funds that had Fund_Type equal to “hedge funds”; they had as a 
Fund_Reporting_Style equal to “Net All Fees” and as Fund_Geographical_Focus equal 
to “North America” region and/or “Global” (but with exposures to North America – as 
it is denoted by another field Fund_Exposure_North_America with at least 50 percent 
exposure). For the Eurekahedge records I selected those funds with a Geographical 
Mandate equal to “Canada” and/or “North America”. I also selected those funds with 
Geographical Mandate equal to “Global” but having “USA” and/or “Canada” and/or 
“North America” of the Country_Focus to the field (with at least 50 percent exposure). 
Due to the fact that all this fund-specific information (as with other data described later) 
was residing in different sheets than the “Performance All” and “AUM All” sheets, I 
used V-Lookup Excel conditional functions so as to find the appropriate hedge funds 
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from these sheets and to align them with the relevant attribute data. The key was the HF 
id. As I have previously mentioned, multiple share classes of funds were treated as 
separate funds. I proceed to this so as to eliminate selection bias due to different 
liquidity restrictions (lockups periods), legal structure, fee structures, and returns that 
characterize different share classes of the same fund. This is something that has also 
been done by other authors such Ramadorai (2012, 2013). In the dataset I included 
CTAs from the EurekaHedge database because it contains live and dead CTAs. I did not 
select CTAs from the BarclayHedge database as my sample would be downwardly 
biased (there were CTAs only in the graveyard database).  
8.4 Managing outliers 
An important issue is the management of outliers that can affect models’ results. This 
research is one of the few in the literature that deals with outliers in a systematic way 
(and not simply excluding those records above e.g. 50% on monthly basis). I used a 
“winsorized” technique (such as Ramadorai, 2012) and I ranked hedge funds returns 
(for every month) having percentiles (null values were excluded). Then these returns 
(extreme outliers) that were below to 0.5% were assigned value equal to that presented 
in the 0.5% percentile. Returns above 99.5% were assigned value equal to that 
represented in the 99.5% percentile. By applying this technique I did not lose 
information by eliminating the outliers (also making the time series non-continuous). 
Another typical technique such as excluding values more than 3 standard scores of z or 
standard deviations away from the mean, is not sufficient because hedge funds are 
skewed, as reported in the literature (e.g. Brooks and Kat, 2002) and verified by this 
study in this appendix. 
8.5 Bias calculations 
In general, hedge fund studies are subject to potential data biases. Briefly speaking, 
there are three kinds of biases: Self-selection/natural biases, instant history, and 
survivorship biases. Biases can affect performance results upwards; this is an issue that 
it is taken into consideration. Regarding the first bias, I did not limit this study to only 
one database vendor; concerning the second, I eliminated returns at the beginning of the 
lifetime of hedge funds; for the third bias I also took into consideration “dead” hedge 
funds. In Table 61, I present the results concerning the instant history and survivorship 
bias in the used dataset. The average monthly instant history bias for 12 months is 0.104 
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or 1.2% on average yearly basis. The average monthly instant history bias for 24 
months is 0.167 or 2.0% on average yearly basis. Hence, my estimation of biases lies 
between 1.2% and 2.0%. This is close to the 1.4% of Fung and Hsieh (2000), and the 
1.7% of Bali, Brown and Caglayan (2011). Regarding the survivorship biases there is an 
average monthly bias of 0.178 for all funds or 2.1% on yearly basis. This is close to the 
range of 2.2% to 2.4% (Liang, 2000, 2001), and 1.7% (Bali, Brown, and Caglayan, 
2011). Any differences are attributed to the different datasets and periods under 
examinations by the authors. 
Table 61. Instant History and Survivorship Biases 
This table shows the mean-return biases, instant history for 12 and 24 months, and the 
survivorship biases between live and dead/live funds (monthly data). These figures are 
average monthly percentage rates. 
  Average Return 










All returns 1.101 1.279 -0.178 
All minus first 12 months 0.997 1.201 -0.204 
Diff. b/n All returns and returns 
without the first 12 months  
0.104 0.078 
 
All minus first 24 months 0.934 1.134 -0.200 
Diff. b/n All returns and returns 




Table 62 presents the median monthly return instant history and survivorship biases. 
The average monthly instant history bias for 12 months is 0.079 or 0.95 % on average 
yearly basis. The average monthly instant history bias for 24 months is 0.127 or 1.5% 
on average yearly basis. Regarding the survivorship biases there is an average monthly 












Table 62. Instant History and Survivorship Biases 
This table shows the median-return biases, instant history for 12 and 24 months and the 
survivorship biases between live and dead/live funds (monthly data). These figures are 
average monthly percentage rates. 










All returns  1.221 1.392 -0.171 
All minus first 12 months 1.142 1.350 -0.208 
Diff. b/n All returns and returns 
without the first 12 months 
0.079  0.042  
  
All minus first 24 months 1.094  1.225  -0.131  
Diff. b/n All returns and returns 
without the first 12 months 
0.127  0.167  
  
 
I eliminated the survivorship bias by taking into consideration live and dead funds. It is 
essential to mention that the word “dead” is misleading because it includes funds that 
are liquidated, merged/restructured, and funds that ceased reporting returns to the 
database vendors but may have continued operations. However, in order to be 
consistent, I call them “dead funds”. I minimize the instant history bias by excluding the 
first 12 months of the dataset. Some authors (e.g. Bali, Brown, and Caglayan, 2011 or 
Ibbotson, Chen, and Zhu, 2011) exclude the first 12 months of returns; others like such 
as Ackerman, McEnnally, and Ravensceaft, (1999) exclude the first 24 or more months 
of returns. Others (e.g. Joenvara, Kosowski, and Tolonen, 2012) exclude the first 32 – 
as the average of the inception date and the date added to the database(s). In the dataset 
used I did not have all this information.  
The annual median life of a hedge fund is almost 5.5 years which is similar to 
Gregoriou (2002). If I exclude 24 or more months of hedge funds returns then I lose too 
much information (approx. 35% of the data). This also leads to another source of biases: 
the truncated database bias. In Figure 13, I provide the yearly returns (all, minus 12, 
minus 24 months) against the S&P 500 market index. The variance for monthly returns 
for all hedge funds is 3.46 (or standard deviation 1.86) whereas for the S&P 500 
composite index it is 22.66 (or standard deviation 4.76) (however, their difference is 
weakly significant – 10% significant using a t-stat two tailed test). Furthermore, as it is 
observed in Figure 13, the difference becomes significant during market busts such as in 
2000-2001 and 2008. The market index performs much worse compared to hedge funds.   
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Figure 13. Hedge Fund and Market Returns 
 
Average Hedge Fund Returns against S&P 500 Composite Index (annualized returns)  
 
8.6 Basic statistics on fund strategies 
In this appendix I provide some descriptive statistics (Figures 14 to 23) for each of the 
11 representative hedge fund strategies. These are excess risk-free monthly returns (%). 
Most hedge fund strategies are negatively skewed except for the Short Bias, Others, 
Global Market, and CTA strategies. All hedge fund strategies have high kurtosis 
compared to that of a standard normal distribution except for Global Macro, and Market 
Neutral strategies that have 3.731 and 4.723 respectively. Hedge funds data are non-
normal; an issue that is shared by many other authors as well. However the large 
number of observations do not affect the significance of the tests. 
In Figure 14, the Short Bias strategy delivers a mean monthly return equal to -0.207% 
(0.05% for absolute returns) with standard deviation 5.174 (5.197 for absolute returns). 
Skewness is equal to 0.439 (0.481 for absolute returns) and kurtosis is equal to 4.088 
(1.118 for absolute returns). Using the Jarque-Bera test and having P < 0.01, I reject the 











































Std. Dev.   5.173714
Skewness   0.438721




Descriptive Statistics RF Returns 
 
In Figure 15, the Long Only strategy delivers mean monthly return equal to 0.739% 
(0.999% for absolute returns) with standard deviation 3.451 (3.437 for absolute returns). 
Skewness is equal to -1.088 (-1.089 for absolute returns) and kurtosis is equal to 6.009 
(for 3.092 absolute returns). Using the Jarque-Bera test and having P < 0.01, I reject the 
null hypothesis that the distribution is normal. 











Mean       0.739485
Median   1.080000
Maximum  9.430000
Minimum -15.86000
Std. Dev.   3.450908
Skewness  -1.088231




Figure 15: Descriptive Statistics of RF Returns 
 
In Figure 16, the Sector strategy delivers mean monthly return equal to 0.891% (1.151% 
for absolute returns) with standard deviation 3.245 (3.259 for absolute returns). 
Skewness is equal to -0.628 (-0.568 for absolute returns) and kurtosis is equal to 5.103 
(2.094 for absolute returns). Using the Jarque-Bera test and having P < 0.01, I reject the 















Mean       0.891100
Median   1.210000
Maximum  12.18000
Minimum -14.42000
Std. Dev.   3.245305
Skewness  -0.627978




Figure 16: Descriptive Statistics of RF Returns 
 
In Figure 17, the Long Short strategy delivers mean monthly return equal to 0.765% 
(1.125% for absolute returns) with standard deviation 2.650 (2.663 for absolute returns). 
Skewness is equal to -0.388 (-0.343 for absolute returns) and kurtosis is equal to 4.097 
(1.135 for absolute returns). Using the Jarque-Bera test and having P < 0.01, I reject the 
null hypothesis that the distribution is normal. 












Mean       0.765361
Median   1.090000
Maximum  9.080000
Minimum -9.960000
Std. Dev.   2.650111
Skewness  -0.387861




Figure 17: Descriptive Statistics of RF Returns 
 
In Figure 18, the Event Driven strategy delivers mean monthly return equal to 0.777% 
(0.937% for absolute returns) with standard deviation 1.840 (1.839 for absolute returns). 
Skewness is equal to -1.378 (-1.475 for absolute returns) and kurtosis is equal to 8.888 
(6.148 for absolute returns). Using the Jarque-Bera test and having P < 0.01, I reject the 
















Mean       0.676907
Median   0.860000
Maximum  6.570000
Minimum -9.010000
Std. Dev.   1.840285
Skewness  -1.378411




Figure 18: Descriptive Statistics of RF Returns 
 
In Figure 19, Multi strategy delivers mean monthly return equal to 0.802 (1.062 for 
absolute returns) with standard deviation 1.696 (1.713 for absolute returns). Skewness is 
equal to -0.443 (-0.414 for absolute returns) and kurtosis is equal to 5.896 (2.977 for 
absolute returns). Using the Jarque-Bera test and having P < 0.01, I reject the null 
hypothesis that the distribution is normal. 












Mean       0.802440
Median   0.920000
Maximum  5.790000
Minimum -7.100000
Std. Dev.   1.695857
Skewness  -0.443274




Figure 19: Descriptive Statistics of RF Returns 
 
In Figure 20, the Others strategy delivers mean monthly return equal to 0.831% 
(1.349% for absolute returns) with standard deviation 1.321 (1.091 for absolute returns). 
Skewness is equal to 0.151 (0.202 for absolute returns) and kurtosis is equal to 4.489 
(1.728 for absolute returns). Using the Jarque-Bera test and having P < 0.01, I reject the 
null hypothesis that the distribution is normal. 
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Mean       0.830997
Median   0.720000
Maximum  5.330000
Minimum -4.000000
Std. Dev.   1.321007
Skewness   0.151456




Figure 20: Descriptive Statistics of RF Returns 
 
In Figure 21, the Global Macro strategy delivers mean monthly return equal to 0.674% 
(0.934% for absolute returns) with standard deviation 2.000 (2.017 for absolute returns). 
Skewness is equal to 0.471 (0.539 for absolute returns) and kurtosis is equal to 3.732 
(0.734 for absolute returns). Using the Jarque-Bera test and having P < 0.01, I reject the 
null hypothesis that the distribution is normal. 











Mean       0.673918
Median   0.550000
Maximum  7.830000
Minimum -4.610000
Std. Dev.   2.000443
Skewness   0.470952




Figure 21: Descriptive Statistics of RF Returns 
 
In Figure 22, the Relative Value strategy delivers mean monthly return equal to 0.561% 
(0.821% for absolute returns) with standard deviation 1.250 (1.238 for absolute returns). 
Skewness is equal to -1.711 (-1.728 for absolute returns) and kurtosis is equal to 11.198 
(9.084 for absolute returns). Using the Jarque-Bera test and having P < 0.01, I reject the 
null hypothesis that the distribution is normal. 
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Mean       0.561065
Median   0.680000
Maximum  3.900000
Minimum -7.430000
Std. Dev.   1.249693
Skewness  -1.710667




Figure 22: Descriptive Statistics of RF Returns 
 
In Figure 23, the Market Neutral strategy delivers mean monthly return equal to 0.267% 
(0.525% for absolute returns) with standard deviation 0.845 (0.874 for absolute returns). 
Skewness is equal to -0.467 (-0.220 for absolute returns) and kurtosis is equal to 4.723 
(1.361 for absolute returns). Using the Jarque-Bera test and having P < 0.01, I reject the 
null hypothesis that the distribution is normal. 











Mean       0.267285
Median   0.270000
Maximum  2.580000
Minimum -3.340000
Std. Dev.   0.844528
Skewness  -0.467225




Figure 23: Descriptive Statistics of RF Returns 
 
In Figure 24, the CTA strategy delivers mean monthly return equal to 0.924% (1.184% 
for absolute returns) with standard deviation 3.399 (3.415 for absolute returns). 
Skewness is equal to 1.191 (1.263 for absolute returns) and kurtosis is equal to 10.319 
(7.442 for absolute returns). Using the Jarque-Bera test and having P < 0.01, I reject the 
















Mean       0.924330
Median   0.560000
Maximum  23.87000
Minimum -12.02000
Std. Dev.   3.398929
Skewness   1.190563




Figure 24: Descriptive Statistics of RF Returns 
 
8.7 Four factor (Carhart) model 
In this section I briefly present the results for the robustness tests concerning the Carhart 
model that includes the market factor, the size factor, the book-to-market factor, and the 
momentum factor. Table 63 presents the results for the growth/recessions and Table 64 
presents the results for up/down regimes. For both tables all the regressors have the 
same sign with the proposed model and most are statistical significant. Moreover the 





Table 63. Carhart’s Model Results - Growth/Recessions 
This table shows the results of the Carhart model for growth (G) and recession (R) periods. The market index used is the Wilshire 5000 TRI including dividends (excess risk free returns). The risk free 
return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data library (Ibbotson Associates). Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. * denotes significance at P 
< 0.1, ** denotes significance at P < 0.05, and *** denotes significance at P<0.01. The left hand columns contain more directional strategies (Short Bias is extremely directional) and as I move to the 
right I get more strategies that are more non-directional (CTA strategy is extremely non-directional). For space reasons, I do not present standard errors and t-statistics. My findings in the thesis are 
based on significant (P<0.05) and strongly significant (P<0.01) results. In the appendix I present weakly significant results (P<0.1) for demonstration purposes only. 







C (G) (excess return) 0.6236** 0.2963** 0.4255** 0.3518** 0.4994 0.6468** 0.6905** 0.4516** 0.4757** 0.1744** 0.8389** 
C (R) (excess return) -0.4160 -0.5555 0.4834 0.2213 -0.0816 0.4029 0.6076* 0.5782 0.2608 0.0635 0.7416 
MAI (G) -0.9657** 0.6783** 0.6145** 0.5391** 0.3042** 0.2252** 0.1941** 0.2457** 0.1492** 0.0721** 0.0271 
MAI (R) -0.9854** 0.6799** 0.6334** 0.4925** 0.3309** 0.2950** 0.1830** 0.0033 0.2787** 0.0165 -0.1033 
SMB (G) -0.2368** 0.2547** 0.1660** 0.1901** 0.1632** 0.0897** -0.0225 0.0603 0.0806** 0.0090 -0.0376 
SMB (R) -0.3095 0.3565* 0.0024 0.1391 0.0019 -0.0328 0.0275 -0.0367 0.1182 -0.0756 -0.0111 
HML (G) -0.0027 0.2145** 0.0248 0.0745** 0.1774** 0.0617* -0.0109 -0.0160 0.0708** 0.0208 -0.0210 
HML (R) 0.2556 -0.1556 -0.3758** -0.1739* -0.0404 -0.1985* -0.0385 -0.0738 -0.1213 -0.0696 -0.0039 
MOM (G) -0.1915** 0.0478* 0.1243** 0.1052** -0.0035 0.0495** 0.0449** 0.0574* 0.0013 0.0781 0.1069 
MOM (R) -0.0715 -0.0094 0.0322 0.0294 -0.0306 0.0147 -0.0039 -0.0435 0.0159 0.0333 0.0143 
Adj. R-squared (G) 0.6758 0.8222 0.6883 0.7987 0.6687 0.3521 0.3710 0.2484 0.4264 0.2483 0.0036 
Adj. R-squared (R) 0.8118 0.8567 0.8227 0.8444 0.5203 0.4631 0.4893 0.0494 0.0494 0.0744 0.0789 
Prob (F-stat) (G) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2974 




Table 64. Carhart’s Model Results - Up/Down Regimes 
This table shows the results of the Carhart model for up (U) and down (D) regimes. The market index used is the Wilshire 5000 TRI including dividends (excess risk free returns). The risk free return is 
the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data library (Ibbotson Associates). Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. * denotes significance at P < 0.1, ** 
denotes significance at P < 0.05, and *** denotes significance at P<0.01.  The left hand columns contain more directional strategies (Short Bias is extremely directional) and as I move to the right I get 
more strategies that are more non-directional (CTA strategy is extremely non-directional). For space reasons, I do not present standard errors and t-statistics. My findings in the thesis are based on 
significant (P<0.05) and strongly significant (P<0.01) results. In the appendix I present weakly significant results (P<0.1) for demonstration purposes only. 







C (U) (excess return) 0.5553** 0.2954** 0.4762** 0.3562** 0.4879** 0.6445** 0.6921** 0.4086** 0.4931** 0.1526** 0.7740*
* C (D) (excess return) 0.5109 -0.4054 0.3067 0.0287 -0.0821 0.5916 0.8222** 0.8578** 0.1280 0.1963 0.8077 
MAI (U) -1.0175** 0.6792** 0.6146** 0.5504** 0.3067** 0.2287** 0.1941** 0.2394** 0.1591** 0.0744** 0.0540 
MAI (D) -0.8181** 0.6361** 0.6001** 0.4267** 0.2799** 0.2551** 0.2330** 0.1030* 0.1844** 0.0412 -0.1228 
SMB (U) -0.2587** 0.2641** 0.1802** 0.1887** 0.1687** 0.1005** -0.0175 0.0611 0.0833** 0.0094 -0.0479 
SMB (D) -0.2831* 0.4183** 0.1801* 0.2309** 0.1216 0.0384 0.0342 -0.0071 0.1746 -0.0080 -0.0049 
HML (U) -0.0296 0.2470** 0.0812 0.0837** 0.1980** 0.0891** 0.0149 0.0080 0.0819** 0.0390* -0.0247 
HML (D) 0.1275 0.0263 -0.2653** -0.0389 0.0571 -0.0712 -0.0683 -0.1464** 0.0071 -0.0772** 0.0062 
MOM (U) -0.1500** 0.0607** 0.1278** 0.1032** 0.0032 0.0587** 0.0374** 0.0637* 0.0058 0.0764** 0.0881 
MOM (D) -0.0928 0.0556 0.1410* 0.0656 0.0266 0.0415 0.0520 0.0189 0.0102 0.0967** 0.0326 
Adj.R-squared (U)  0.6629 0.8108 0.6635 0.7834 0.6403 0.3353 0.3340 0.2034 0.4330 0.2239 0.0026 
Adj.R-squared (D) 0.7839 0.8057 0.8264 0.8294 0.4111 0.3733 0.5235 0.3152 0.3682 0.3493 0.0012 
Prob (F-stat) (U) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3274 
Prob (F-stat) (D) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0009 0.0000 0.0031 0.001 0.0015 0.4169 
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8.8 The custom proposed model (at strategy level) omitting pre-1994 
data 
Despite the fact that the used dataset contains dead funds prior to 1994, I the repeated 
the analysis omitting pre-1994 data. Tables 65 and 66 shows the results. The regressors 
have the same sign and most are statistically significant. The results still hold as most 
hedge fund strategies deliver significant alphas to investors during “good” times. On the 
contrary, during “bad” times investors do not get significant alphas as hedge fund 















Table 65. Multi-Factor Model during Growth/Recessions Periods (post-1994 period) 
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model for growth (G) and recession (R) periods after omitting pre-1994 data. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus 
the risk free return. The Risk free (RF) return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and 
RLE are excess RF returns. * denotes significance at P < 0.1, ** denotes significance at P < 0.05, and *** denotes significance at P<0.01. For space reasons, I do not present standard errors and t-











C (G) (excess return) 0.6659*** 0.2789*** 1.2117*** 1.3352*** 0.4453*** 0.8925*** 1.2731*** 0.1753* 0.3119*** 0.5331*** 0.7018*** 
C (R) (excess return) 0.0281 0.1974 0.3261 0.2958 0.2244 0.2684 1.7623* -0.5661 0.4098 0.1981 0.7724* 
MAI (G) -0.8611*** 0.6645*** 0.5849*** 0.5177*** 0.3169*** 0.2123*** 0.2104*** 0.3297*** 0.1408*** 0.0706***  
MAI (R) -0.8565*** 0.6398*** 0.4955*** 0.4270*** 0.2882***    0.2469***  -0.1324* 
MOM (G) -0.1853*** 0.0460** 0.0939*** 0.0830***  0.0169 0.0496***   0.0639*** 0.0666 
MOM (R )          0.0491**  
SMB (G) -0.2194*** 0.2052*** 0.1120*** 0.1797*** 0.1507*** 0.0719***   0.0571***   
SMB (R )  0.2513*     0.1672**     
GEMI (G) -0.0866      0.0282     
GEMI (R )       0.1429***     
COIM (G) 0.0173           
COIM (R )     0.1289** 0.1142***  -0.0404    
HML (G)  0.1557***  0.0637** 0.1671*** 0.0759***   0.0548***   
HML (R )   -0.3404*** -0.1636**        
COEN (G)  0.0301*** 0.0504*** 0.0402***        
COEN (R ) 0.0751**      0.0114 0.0217   0.0785* 
COPM (G)   0.0742*** 0.0318*  0.0387***  0.1004***    




Table 65. Multi-Factor Model during Growth/Recessions Periods (post-1994 period) (continued) 
DEF (G)   -1.0543** -0.7503**  -0.4416* -0.7093***   -0.3640**  
DEF (R)            
TERM (G)    -0.2200***     0.0894**   
TERM (R )       -0.5686 0.6073*    
RLE (G)       -0.0329**     
RLE (R)            
DVIX (G)        0.0283***    
DVIX (R )      -0.0566***      
EXCH (G)           -0.3176** 
EXCH (R)            
COAG (G)            
COAG (R )  0.0963** 0.1501*** 0.0775**    0.1414***  0.0628***  
Adj.R-squared 
(G) 
0.7414 0.8550 0.7422 0.8236 0.6968 0.5275 0.5220 0.3840 0.4258 0.2740 0.0294 
Adj.R-squared 
(R) 
0.9116 0.8908 0.8728 0.8708 0.6265 0.6220 0.7085 0.5414 0.4979 0.3247 0.1009 
Prob (F-stat) 
(G) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0153 










Table 66. Multi-Factor Model during Up/Down Regimes (post-1994 period) 
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model for up (U) and down (D) regimes after omitting pre-1994 data. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk 
free return. The Risk free (RF) return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are 
excess RF returns. * denotes significance at P < 0.1, ** denotes significance at P < 0.05, and *** denotes significance at P<0.01. For space reasons, I do not present standard errors and t-statistics. My 
findings in the thesis are based on significant (P<0.05) and strongly significant (P<0.01) results. In the appendix I present weakly significant results (P<0.1) for demonstration purposes only. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Short Bias Long 
Only 





C (U) (excess return) 0.6636*** 0.2677*** 0.2903** 0.5747*** 0.4466*** 0.4912*** 1.1139*** 0.1148 -0.2027 0.1932*** 0.6762*** 
C (D) (excess return) -0.0068 0.0715 0.5159 0.0813 0.3109 0.5685* 0.6578*** 0.6768*** 0.4808* 0.1066 0.6890 
MAI (U) -0.8739*** 0.6728*** 0.5736*** 0.5845*** 0.2364*** 0.2205*** 0.2129*** 0.3424*** 0.1408*** 0.0827***  
MAI (D) -0.8093** 0.5611*** 0.4880*** 0.2746*** 0.1677***  0.2026*** 0.1144***   -0.1308* 
SMB (U) -0.2158*** 0.2062*** 0.0883*** 0.1676*** 0.1480*** 0.0614***   0.0481***   
SMB (D)  0.2857***  0.1702***     0.1051*   
MOM (U) -0.1550*** 0.0425** 0.0958*** 0.0842***  0.0273**  0.0383* 0.0172 0.0622***  
MOM (D)          0.0706***  
COIM (U) 0.0122           
COIM (D)     0.1932*** 0.1188**   0.1716***   
GEMI (U) -0.0914    0.0960***  0.0302     
GEMI (D)      0.0691      
HML (U)  0.1722***  0.0839*** 0.1644*** 0.0937***   0.0615*** 0.0399**  
HML (D)   -0.2182***     -0.1236***  -0.0634**  
COEN (U)  0.0375*** 0.0588*** 0.0554*** 0.0171**   0.0372***    
COEN (D) 0.0386   0.0350*    -0.0140   0.0296 
COPM (U)   0.0838***   0.0412***  0.1069***   0.1337*** 




Table 66. Multi-Factor Model during Up/Down Regimes (post-1994 period) (continued) 
TERM (U)    -0.2362***     0.0770*   
TERM (D)            
DVIX (U)    0.0172***    0.0368***    
DVIX (D)    -0.0311**  -0.0358**   -0.0247**   
DEF (U)       -0.4905**  0.5815***   
DEF (D)            
RLE (U)       -0.0360**     
RLE (D)            
COAG (U)            
COAG (D)  0.0957* 0.1171**       0.0487***  
EXCH (U)            
EXCH (D)       -0.1768*     
Adj.R-squared 
(U) 
0.7301 0.8487 0.7235 0.8148 0.7090 0.5184 0.4653 0.4235 0.4666 0.2726 0.0493 
Adj.R-squared 
(D) 
0.8533 0.8587 0.8239 0.8552 0.5826 0.6203 0.6534 0.6832 0.6632 0.4481 0.0388 
Prob (F-stat) 
(U) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 
Prob (F-stat) 
(D) 




8.9 The custom proposed model (at strategy level) with pre-1994 only 
data (Growth/Up) 
In this appendix I implement again the proposed model by using pre-1994 data. Table 
67 shows the results for the growth and up regimes. I did not implement the proposed 
model for recessions and down regimes as there were only 8 and 4 monthly 


















Table 67. Multi-Factor Model During Growth/Recessions Periods (pre-1994 period) 
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model for growth and up regimes using pre-1994 only data. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free 
return. The Risk free (RF) return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are 
excess RF returns. * denotes significance at P < 0.1, ** denotes significance at P < 0.05, and *** denotes significance at P<0.01. For space reasons, I do not present standard errors and t-statistics. My 
findings in the thesis are based on significant (P<0.05) and strongly significant (P<0.01) results. In the appendix I present weakly significant results (P<0.1) for demonstration purposes only. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Short Bias Long Only Sector Long Short Event 
Driven 







C (G) (excess return) -0.0617 0.2490 4.3993* 1.4414 0.7424** 7.9880** 3.2642 1.3176** -0.2172 0.8826 0.8935 
C (U) (excess return) 0.0123 0.0277 1.0792** 0.3720 0.6931** 1.1483** 1.6331 1.1150* -1.0674 -0.0251 1.6114 
MAI (G) -1.3092** 0.7957** 0.7569 0.6224** 0.2179** 0.2103* 0.0006 0.1812 0.1997** -0.0616  
MAI (U) -1.3779** 0.6787** 0.6937** 0.5345** 0.1827** 0.2286* -0.0298 0.0003 0.2034** -0.0447  
MOM (G) 0.1654 -0.0903 -0.0059 0.0427  0.2994* -0.0271   0.3395** 0.6938* 
MOM (U) 0.1708 0.0749 0.0641 0.0925*  0.3370**  0.1887 0.0389 0.2665**  
SMB (G) -0.5409* 0.5558** 0.5844** 0.4152** 0.2303** 0.2352   0.2148**   
SMB (UP) -0.5724* 0.5371** 0.5328** 0.4192** 0.1874** 0.2792*   0.2298**   
GEMI (G) -0.2561      0.1171*     
GEMI (U) -0.2306    -0.0036  0.1369**     
COIM (G) 0.3979**           
COIM (U) 0.3698**           
HML (G)  0.4839**  0.0249 0.2173** -0.1373   0.0895   
HML (U)  0.4896**  0.0039 0.2198** -0.0786   0.1012* -0.0628  
COEN (G)  -0.0366 0.087 0.0032        
COEN (U)  -0.0152 0.0582 -0.0024 0.0114   0.0466    
COPM (G)   0.1111 0.0534*  0.1371  0.0185    
COPM (U)   0.0948   0.1553  0.0189   0.2095 
DEF (G)   -3.8958 -0.7728  -8.0536** -2.5721   -1.2715  
DEF (D)       -0.6035  1.1674   
TERM (G)    -0.1144     0.2988*   
TERM (U)    0.031     0.2519   
RLE (G)       -0.0225     
RLE (U)       0.0324     
DVIX (G)        -0.0127    
DVIX (U)    -0.0114    -0.046    
EXCH (G)           -0.5978 




Table 67. Multi-Factor Model During Growth/Recessions Periods (pre-1994 period) (continued) 
Adj.R-squared 
(G) 
0.7032 0.7972 0.7686 0.9404 0.5277 0.4602 0.1566 0.0123 0.6915 0.5595 0.1086 
Adj.R-squared 
(U) 
0.7257 0.7460 0.7497 0.9239 0.4047 0.3354 0.2134 0.0355 0.6584 0.4267 0.0190 
Prob (F-stat) 
(G) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0534 0.3378 0.0000 0.0000 0.0450 
Prob (F-stat) 
(U) 













8.10 CTA post 1994 period 
Table 68 presents the results for the post 1994 period using straddles on bonds, 
currencies, commodities, short term interest rates and stock indices. As well as the 
lookback straddles, it can be seen that COAG, COEN, and COIM were significant for 
this hedge fund strategy. 
Table 68. CTA strategy using straddles (post-1994 period) 
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model for growth, recessions, up and 
down regimes periods for the CTA strategy using post-1994 only data. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the 
risk free return. The Risk free (RF) return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-
library (Ibbotson Associates). I applied my proposed model and, also including straddles on bonds, currency, 
commodity, short term interest rate term, and stock index (Fung and Hsieh, 2001). PTFSBD: Return of PTFS Bond 
lookback straddle, PTFSFX: Return of PTFS Currency Lookback Straddle, PTFSCOM: Return of PTFS Commodity 
Lookback Straddle, PTFSIR: Return of PTFS Short Term Interest Rate Lookback Straddle, PTFSSTK: Return of 
PTFS Stock Index Lookback Straddle. COEN, COIM, COAG are excess RF returns.  
Growth         Up         









C 0.7885 0.1674 4.7115 0.0000 C 0.7395 0.1692 4.3709 0.0000 
PTFSCOM 0.0494 0.0127 3.8735 0.0001 PTFSCOM 0.0530 0.0124 4.2772 0.0000 
PTFSFX 0.0387 0.0095 4.0560 0.0001 COEN 0.0599 0.0203 2.9538 0.0035 
COIM 0.1057 0.0316 3.3429 0.0010 PTFSFX 0.0343 0.0096 3.5823 0.0004 
COEN 0.0597 0.0206 2.9036 0.0041 COIM 0.1011 0.0300 3.3710 0.0009 
PTFSBD 0.0307 0.0116 2.6472 0.0087 PTFSBD 0.0368 0.0125 2.9365 0.0037 
      DVIX -0.0208 0.0101 -2.0465 0.0420 
Adj.R-
squared 
0.2676    Adj.R-
squared 
0.3009    
F-
statistic 
16.7816    F-statistic 16.0641    
Prob (F-
statistic) 
0.0000    Prob (F-
statistic) 
0.0000    
          
Recession         Down         









C 0.8321 0.3763 2.2116 0.0372       
PTFSCOM 0.0607 0.0218 2.7904 0.0104 C 1.0397 0.4344 2.3935 0.0229 
COAG 0.1117 0.0434 2.5748 0.0169       
Adj.R-
squared 




   
F-
statistic 
6.7465    F-statistic -    
Prob (F-
statistic) 
0.0049    Prob (F-
statistic) 
-    
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8.11 HAC/Newey-West Estimator – Strategy Level 
I tested the proposed mutifactor model by using the HAC/Newey-West estimator to deal 
with any unknown residual autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The results still valid 
as almost all the regressors are significant different from zero. Table 69 presents the 


















Table 69. Multi-Factor Model During Growth/Recessions Periods (HAC/Newey-West estimator) 
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model for growth and recession periods from 01/1990 to 03/2014. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk 
free return. The Risk free (RF) return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are 
excess RF returns. * denotes significance at P < 0.1, ** denotes significance at P < 0.05, and *** denotes significance at P<0.01. For space reasons, I do not present standard errors and t-statistics. My 
findings in the thesis are based on significant (P<0.05) and strongly significant (P<0.01) results. In the appendix I present weakly significant results (P<0.1) for demonstration only purposes. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Short Bias Long Only Sector Long Short Event Driven Multi 
Strategy 





C (G) 0.5741*** 0.2903*** 1.5764*** 1.4655*** 0.4965*** 1.4297*** 1.4816*** 0.3725*** 0.2545** 0.5242*** 0.8174*** 
C (R) -0.4633 -0.4417 0.5627** 0.3497 0.0696 0.3990 2.0808*** -1.1783* 0.3688 0.1356 0.8365*** 
MAI (G) -0.8544*** 0.6725*** 0.5930*** 0.5279*** 0.3045*** 0.2198*** 0.1552*** 0.3057*** 0.1483*** 0.0684***   
MAI (R) -1.0123*** 0.6094*** 0.5409*** 0.4663*** 0.2892***       0.2839***   -0.1474*** 
MOM (G) -0.1836** 0.0417 0.1020** 0.0899**   0.0429* 0.0397**     0.0760*** 0.1152* 
MOM (R)                   0.0559**   
SMB (G) -0.2556** 0.2502*** 0.1562 0.2006*** 0.1638*** 0.0910**     0.0703***     
SMB (R)   0.4291***         0.1491***         
GEMI (G) -0.1941**           0.0725***         
GEMI (R)             0.1349***         
COIM (G) 0.1126**                     
COIM (R)         0.1158** 0.1096***   -0.0858**       
HML (G)   0.2077***   0.0666** 0.1774*** 0.058*     0.0676***     
HML (R)     -0.3843*** -0.2013**               
COEN (G)   0.0224** 0.0436*** 0.0316***               
COEN (R) 0.1302***           0.0246*** 0.0735***     0.1045*** 
COPM (G)     0.0735*** 0.0319***   0.0427**   0.0888***       
COPM (R)                       
DEF (G)     -1.3262*** -0.9403***   -0.8946** -0.8748***     -0.3826**   
DEF (R)                       
TERM (G)       -0.1649***         0.1235***     
TERM (R)             -0.6613** 0.9206***       
RLE (G)             -0.0371**         
RLE (R)                       
DVIX (G)               0.0214**       
DVIX (R)           -0.0613***           
EXCH (G)                     -0.4015*** 




Table 69. Multi-Factor Model During Growth/Recessions Periods (HAC/Newey-West estimator) (Continued) 
COAG (G)                       
COAG (R)   0.1118*** 0.1445*** 0.0781***       0.1399***   0.0600***   
Adj.R-squared (G): 0.6971 0.8250 0.7201 0.8253 0.6699 0.3757 0.4287 0.2873 0.4507 0.2576 0.0417 
Adj.R-squared (R): 0.8561 0.8727 0.8830 0.8608 0.6323 0.5677 0.7258 0.5326 0.5459 0.2324 0.3261 
Prob (F-stat) (G): 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0016 












Table 70. Multi-Factor Model During Up/Down Regimes (HAC/Newey-West estimator) 
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model for up and down regimes from 01/1990 to 03/2014. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. 
The Risk free (RF) return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF 
returns. * denotes significance at P < 0.1, ** denotes significance at P < 0.05, and *** denotes significance at P<0.01. For space reasons, I do not present standard errors and t-statistics. My findings in 
the thesis are based on significant (P<0.05) and strongly significant (P<0.01) results. In the appendix I present weakly significant results (P<0.1) for demonstration only purposes. 
Dep. Var: Short Bias Long Only Sector Long Short Event Driven Multi 
Strategy 





C (U) 0.4899*** 0.2880*** 0.4838*** 0.6267*** 0.4967*** 0.6387*** 1.2702*** 0.2971** -0.2192 0.1528*** 0.8312*** 
C (D) 0.3522 -0.3603 0.4854** -0.0660 0.1778 0.5781*** 0.7432*** 0.8767*** 0.0502 0.1579 0.8324 
MAI (U) -0.9337*** 0.6690*** 0.5878*** 0.5737*** 0.2523*** 0.2256*** 0.1482*** 0.2846*** 0.1505*** 0.0751***   
MAI (D) -0.8491*** 0.5509*** 0.5016*** 0.3117*** 0.2028***   0.1858*** 0.0810***     -0.1562** 
SMB (U) -0.2704** 0.2581*** 0.1428 0.1990*** 0.1639*** 0.0949**     0.0696***     
SMB (D)   0.4113***   0.1976***         0.1987**     
MOM (U) -0.1431* 0.0517 0.1048*** 0.0923**   0.0565**   0.0503** 0.0237* 0.0751***   
MOM D)                   0.0780***   
COIM (U) 0.1067**                     
COIM (D)         0.1547** 0.1175***     0.1236**     
GEMI (U) -0.1477*       0.0561**   0.0806***         
GEMI (D)           0.0919**           
HML (U)   0.2348***   0.0856* 0.1838*** 0.0852*     0.0760*** 0.0347*   
HML (D)     -0.2175***         -0.1650***   -0.0702***   
COEN (U)   0.0338*** 0.0468*** 0.0420*** 0.0187**     0.0341**       
COEN (D) 0.1091**             0.0401*     0.0676*** 
COPM (U)     0.0757***     0.0434**   0.0931***     0.1373*** 
COPM (D)                       
TERM (U)       -0.1829***         0.1114**     
TERM (D)                       
DVIX (U)       0.0111**       0.0176*       
DVIX (D)       -0.0253**   -0.0313***     -0.0314***     
DEF (U)             -0.5920**   0.5683**     
DEF (D)                       
RLE (U)             -0.0318**         
RLE (D)                       
COAG (U)                       




Table 70. Multi-Factor Model During Up/Down Regimes (HAC/Newey-West estimator) (Continued) 
EXCH (U)                       
EXCH (D)             -0.2678***         
Adj.R-squared 
(U): 
0.6787 0.8182 0.6942 0.8082 0.6633 0.3499 0.3829 0.2761 0.4795 0.2260 0.0303 
Prob (F-stat) (U): 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0031 
Adj.R-squared 
(D): 
0.8385 0.8281 0.8218 0.8429 0.5600 0.6302 0.6266 0.4938 0.5639 0.4396 0.1962 





8.12 The custom proposed (fundamental) model omitting pre-1994 data 
In this appendix I show the results when I implement the proposed model at the 
fundamental (fund specific characteristic) level. Table 71 provides the results for growth 
and recessions whereas Table 72 provides results for the up and down regimes. All the 

























Table 71. Multi-Factor Model at fundamental level during 
Growth/Recessions Periods (post-1994 period) 
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model at fundamental level for 
growth periods and recessions after omitting pre-1994 data. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free 
return. The Risk free (RF) return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library 
(Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF returns. * denotes 
significance at P < 0.1, ** denotes significance at P < 0.05, and *** denotes significance at P<0.01. For space 
reasons, I do not present standard errors and t-statistics. My findings in the thesis are based on significant (P<0.05) 
and strongly significant (P<0.01) results. In the appendix I present weakly significant results (P<0.1) for 
demonstration purposes only. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Size Small Size Large Age Young Age Old Lockup-Yes Lockup-No 
C (G) (excess 
returns) 
0.9860*** 0.7934*** 1.7091** 0.8737** 1.0977*** 0.7252*** 
C (R) (excess 
returns) 
0.3208 0.3694 0.3066 0.3468 0.2640 0.3681 
MAI (G) 0.4110*** 0.3673*** 0.3930*** 0.3909*** 0.4296*** 0.3514*** 
MAI (R) 0.2518*** 0.3474*** 0.2944*** 0.3649*** 0.2669*** 0.3367*** 
SMB (G) 0.1040*** 0.1302***  0.1308*** 0.1499*** 0.1052*** 
SMB (R)       
MOM (G) 0.0649*** 0.0389*** 0.1029*** 0.0434*** 0.0418*** 0.0535*** 
MOM (R)       
COEN (G) 0.0326*** 0.0268*** 0.0288** 0.0275*** 0.0315*** 0.0263*** 
COEN (R) 0.0474***  0.0435**    
DEF (G) -0.7884*** -0.3952* -1.4060*** -0.5604** -0.7702*** -0.4350** 
DEF (R)       
COPM (G) 0.0344**   0.0330*** 0.0320**  
COPM (R)       
HML (G)  0.0880*** -0.0812** 0.0825*** 0.0836*** 0.0558*** 
HML (R)  -0.1613** -0.2533*** -0.1381*  -0.1230* 
DVIX (G)       
DVIX (R) -0.0265**    -0.0330*  
COAG (G)       
COAG (R) 0.0578* 0.0842** 0.0526** 0.0875** 0.0816** 0.0792** 
Adj.R-squared 
(G) 
0.8105 0.7887 0.6388 0.8199 0.7801 0.8073 
Adj.R-squared 
(R) 
0.8806 0.7603 0.9161 0.7980 0.7829 0.8245 
Prob (F-stat) 
(G) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 





Table 72. Multi-Factor Model at fundamental level during Up/Down 
Regimes (post-1994 period) 
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model at fundamental level for up 
and down regimes after omitting pre-1994 data. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. The 
Risk free (RF) return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library (Ibbotson 
Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF returns. * denotes significance at P 
< 0.1, ** denotes significance at P < 0.05, and *** denotes significance at P<0.01. For space reasons, I do not present 
standard errors and t-statistics. My findings in the thesis are based on significant (P<0.05) and strongly significant 
(P<0.01) results. In the appendix I present weakly significant results (P<0.1) for demonstration purposes only. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Size Small Size Large Age Young Age Old Lockup-Yes Lockup-No 
C (U) (excess 
returns) 
0.1646** 0.4156*** 0.3010*** 0.3549*** 0.3877*** 0.3184*** 
C (D) (excess 
returns) 
0.1462 0.249 0.3592* 0.1693 0.1747 0.1666 
MAI (U) 0.4763*** 0.3718*** 0.4032*** 0.3980*** 0.4281*** 0.3622*** 
MAI (D) 0.2309*** 0.1262** 0.2227*** 0.1621*** 0.1871*** 0.1500*** 
COEN (U) 0.0402*** 0.0349*** 0.0340*** 0.0344*** 0.0388*** 0.0329*** 
COEN (D) 0.0429**      
SMB (U) 0.1057*** 0.1186***  0.1205*** 0.1375*** 0.0967*** 
SMB (D) 0.1175** 0.1565** 0.1424*** 0.1431** 0.1882*** 0.1236** 
MOM (U) 0.0666*** 0.0412*** 0.1116*** 0.0429*** 0.0567*** 0.0443*** 
MOM (D)       
COPM (U) 0.0361***   0.0357*** 0.0362**  
COPM (D)       
HML (U) 0.0645** 0.0927***  0.0908*** 0.0961*** 0.0686*** 
HML (D) -0.0648*  -0.1760***    
DVIX (U) 0.0160***      
DVIX (D) -0.0236** -0.0285**  -0.0254** -0.0266* -0.0230** 
EXCH (G)       
EXCH (D) -0.1612*      
COIM (G)       
COIM (D)  0.1342*** 0.1132*** 0.1226*** 0.1263*** 0.1019*** 
Adj.R-squared 
(U) 
0.8050 0.7766 0.6060 0.8086 0.7662 0.7934 
Adj.R-squared 
(D) 
0.8765 0.7926 0.8981 0.8169 0.8244 0.8309 
Prob (F-stat) 
(U) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Prob (F-stat) 
(D) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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8.13 The custom proposed (fundamental) model with pre 1994 only data 
In this appendix I again implement the proposed model by using pre-1994 data. Table 
73 shows the results for the growth and up regimes only due to limited data availability. 
Overall there are the same qualitative results.  
Table 73. Multi-Factor Model at fundamental level during Growth/Up 
Periods (post-1994 period) 
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model at fundamental level for 
growth periods and up regimes using pre-1994 only data. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free 
return. The Risk free (RF) return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library 
(Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF returns. * denotes 
significance at P < 0.1, ** denotes significance at P < 0.05, and *** denotes significance at P<0.01. For space 
reasons, I do not present standard errors and t-statistics. My findings in the thesis are based on significant (P<0.05) 
and strongly significant (P<0.01) results. In the appendix I present weakly significant results (P<0.1) for 
demonstration purposes only. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Size Small Size Large Age Young Age Old Lockup-Yes Lockup-No 
C (G) 1.4060 1.5202** 4.5682** 1.5077*** 2.4617*** 0.9507 
C (U) 0.5318*** 0.5266**
* 
0.9809** 0.5137*** 0.8418*** 0.3538*** 
MAI (G) 0.0706 0.5079*** 0.5307*** 0.4017*** 0.4493*** 0.3702*** 
MAI (U) 0.0444 0.4803*** 0.5251*** 0.3711*** 0.3475*** 0.3745*** 
SMB (G) 0.2759*** 0.3794***  0.3456*** 0.3594*** 0.3325*** 
SMB (U) 0.2676*** 0.3987***  0.3524*** 0.3374*** 0.3488*** 
MOM (G) 0.2050*** 0.0282 0.0999** 0.0786*** 0.0080 0.1052*** 
MOM (U) 0.2175*** 0.0803*** 0.1847*** 0.1224*** 0.1518*** 0.1047*** 
COEN (G) -0.0355 0.0123 0.0498 0.0013 -0.0097 0.0017 
COEN (U) -0.0597** 0.0169 0.0431 -0.0040 0.0018 -0.0071 
DEF (G) -0.9541 -1.0996 -4.4659 -1.0924* -1.7741* -0.6590 
DEF (U)       
COPM (G) 0.0335   0.0310* 0.0496*  
COPM (U) 0.0092   0.0174 0.0386  
HML (G)  0.0831*** -0.0778 0.0507* 0.0125 0.0775** 
HML (U) 0.0104 0.0921**  0.0644** 0.0163 0.0902*** 
DVIX (G)       
DVIX (U) -0.0008      
Adj.R-squared 
(G) 
0.4995 0.9440 0.6994 0.9487 0.8828 0.9210 
Adj.R-squared 
(U) 
0.4461 0.9280 0.6772 0.9226 0.7810 0.9249 
Prob (F-stat) (G) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 





8.14 HAC/Newey-West Estimator – Fundamental Level 
I tested the proposed multifactor model by using the HAC/Newey-West estimator to 
deal with any unknown residual autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The results still 
valid as almost all the regressors are significant different from zero. Table 74 presents 
the results for growth/recessions and Table 75 shows the results for up/down regimes.   
Table 74. Multi-Factor Model During Growth/Recessions – Fundamental 
Level (HAC/Newey-West estimator) 
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model for growth and recession 
periods from 01/1990 to 03/2014 at fundamental level. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. 
The Risk free (RF) return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library (Ibbotson 
Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF returns. * denotes significance at P 
< 0.1, ** denotes significance at P < 0.05, and *** denotes significance at P<0.01. For space reasons, I do not present 
standard errors and t-statistics. My findings in the thesis are based on significant (P<0.05) and strongly significant 
(P<0.01) results. In the appendix I present weakly significant results (P<0.1) for demonstration only purposes. 
Dep. Var: Size Small Size Large Age Young Age Old Lockup-Yes Lockup-No 
C (G) 1.2188*** 0.9055*** 1.7091*** 1.0016*** 1.3220*** 0.8228*** 
C (R) 0.2516 0.4043 0.3066** 0.3417 0.2463 0.3849* 
MAI (G) 0.3756*** 0.3828*** 0.3930*** 0.3937*** 0.4297*** 0.3554*** 
MAI (R) 0.2277*** 0.3802*** 0.2944*** 0.3684*** 0.2774*** 0.3469*** 
SMB (G) 0.1266** 0.1536***   0.1523*** 0.1727*** 0.1284*** 
SMB (R)             
MOM (G) 0.0625** 0.0480** 0.1029* 0.0504** 0.0466 0.0603*** 
MOM (R)             
COEN (G) 0.0262*** 0.0206*** 0.0288*** 0.0217*** 0.0224** 0.0213*** 
COEN (R) 0.0483***   0.0435***       
DEF (G) -0.9408*** -0.4914** -1.4060** -0.6521*** -0.9207*** -0.5153** 
DEF (R)             
COPM (G) 0.0450***     0.0323*** 0.0348***   
COPM (R)             
HML (G)   0.0941*** -0.0812 0.0841*** 0.0815*** 0.0642*** 
HML (R)   -0.1897 -0.2533*** -0.1420*   -0.1312* 
DVIX (G)             
DVIX (R) -0.0269***       -0.0344**   
COAG (G)             
COAG (R) 0.0598*** 0.0855*** 0.0526*** 0.0914*** 0.0841*** 0.0811*** 
Adj.R-squared 
(G) 
0.7423 0.7902 0.6388 0.8207 0.7734 0.8069 
Adj.R-squared 
(R) 
0.8365 0.7811 0.9161 0.8182 0.7892 0.8426 
Prob (F-stat) 
(G) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Prob(F-stat) 
(R) 






Table 75. Multi-Factor Model During Up/Down Regimes – Fundamental 
Level (HAC/Newey-West estimator) 
This table shows the results in terms of alphas and exposures of my multi-factor model for up and down regimes from 
01/1990 to 03/2014 at fundamental level. Hedge funds returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. The Risk 
free (RF) return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data-library (Ibbotson 
Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF returns. * denotes significance at P 
< 0.1, ** denotes significance at P < 0.05, and *** denotes significance at P<0.01. For space reasons, I do not present 
standard errors and t-statistics. My findings in the thesis are based on significant (P<0.05) and strongly significant 
(P<0.01) results. In the appendix I present weakly significant results (P<0.1) for demonstration only purposes. 
Dep. Var: Size Small Size Large Age Young Age Old Lockup-Yes Lockup-No 
C (U) 0.3133*** 0.4757*** 0.3010*** 0.4283*** 0.5073*** 0.3719*** 
C (D) 0.2105 0.0729 0.3592** 0.0821 0.0367 0.0971 
MAI (U) 0.4101*** 0.3898*** 0.4032*** 0.3992*** 0.4222*** 0.3669*** 
MAI (D) 0.2366*** 0.1487*** 0.2227*** 0.1747*** 0.1961*** 0.1649*** 
COEN (U) 0.0325*** 0.0269*** 0.0340*** 0.0277*** 0.0304**** 0.0260*** 
COEN (D) 0.0434***           
SMB (U) 0.1329*** 0.1507***   0.1487*** 0.1645*** 0.1271*** 
SMB (D) 0.1027*** 0.1926*** 0.1424*** 0.1591*** 0.2055*** 0.1404*** 
MOM (U) 0.0696** 0.0515** 0.1116** 0.0521** 0.0665** 0.0528** 
MOM (D)             
COPM (U) 0.0435***     0.0320*** 0.0351***   
COPM (D)             
HML (U) 0.0692* 0.1001***   0.0950*** 0.0952** 0.0798*** 
HML (D) -0.0699   -0.1760***       
DVIX (U) 0.0102*           
DVIX (D) -0.0211*** -0.0315***   -0.0278*** -0.0344*** -0.0229** 
EXCH (U)             
EXCH (D) -0.1927**           
COIM (U)             
COIM (D)   0.0974 0.1132*** 0.1003** 0.0858* 0.0874** 
Adj.R-
squared (U) 
0.704964 0.773746 0.606014 0.804121 0.748608 0.791113 
Adj.R-
squared (D) 
0.872878 0.759409 0.898109 0.811228 0.808183 0.844068 
Prob (F-stat) 
(U) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Prob(F-stat) 
(D) 









8.15 Autocorrelation for 1, 2, 4, 6, and 12 periods 
In this appendix Tables 76, 77, 78 and 79 show the autocorrelation tests for 1, 2, 4, 6, 
and 12 months. There is a serial correlation for hedge fund strategies and in some cases 
(e.g. Market Neutral, Relative Value, Multi Strategy) it can be up to 12 months during 
“good” times. Serial correlation is a common problem when dealing with time-series 
data hence with hedge funds too (shared by many other authors as well). The estimated 
regression coefficients are still unbiased and consistent but may be inefficient. This 
means that the standard errors of the estimates of the regression parameters can be 
underestimated. However, in the analysis I consider significant and strongly significant 
results at the P < 0.05 and P < 0.01, levels. Finally, I found that the hedge fund data are 















Table 76. Hedge Fund Smoothness at Strategy Level – Growth Period 
This table shows the results of the regression-based parametric model for raw for raw returns, the Sharpe ratio, and the Information ratio during growth periods. A positive and significant slope 
coefficient indicates performance persistence. This suggests that a hedge fund (or group) that did well in specific period did well in the sub-sequent period and vice-versa. * denotes significance at P < 
0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. For space reasons, I present only the t-statistics in parentheses.   















Strategy 1 2 4 6 12 1 2 4 6 12 1 2 4 6 12 
Short Bias 0.036 0.016 -0.059 -0.015 -0.032 0.030 -0.061 -0.018 0.113 -0.032 0.091 0.120** -0.069* -0.053 0.019 
  (0.585) (0.255) (-0.963) (-0.244) (-0.536) (-0.476) (-0.958) (-0.274) (-1.765) (-0.529) (1.751) (3.672) (-2.065) (-1.583) (0.968) 
Long Only 0.269** 0.187** 0.079 0.174** 0.046 0.243** 0.266** 0.056 0.153** 0.045 -0.066 0.019 0.015 0.032 0.169** 
  (4.541) (3.115) (1.327) (2.948) (0.847) (3.973) (4.366) (0.882) (2.456) (0.722) (-1.051) (0.305) (0.262) (0.570) (3.001) 
Sector 0.214** 0.173** 0.140* 0.239** 0.032 0.148* 0.202** 0.140* 0.129* 0.103 0.031 0.001 0.038 0.043 0.102 
  (3.518) (2.842) (2.280) (3.973) (0.536) (2.407) (3.318) (2.289) (2.095) (1.699) (0.501) (0.012) (0.605) (0.699) (1.637) 
Long Short 0.267** 0.220** 0.123* 0.224** 0.075 0.225** 0.214** 0.096 0.144* 0.044 -0.054 0.051 0.067 -0.031 0.113 
  (4.490) (3.682) (2.014) (3.763) (1.274) (3.724) (3.529) (0.125) (2.324) (0.699) (-0.865) (0.807) (1.077) (-0.508) (1.850) 
Event 
Driven 
0.529** 0.393** 0.323** 0.322** 0.187** 0.541** 0.426** 0.341** 0.324** 0.245** -0.136* 0.054 -0.029 -0.077 0.051 
  (10.095) (7.018) (5.714) (5.666) (3.436) (10.341) (7.520) (5.828) (5.425) (3.972) (-2.198) (0.826) (-0.455) (-1.232) (0.859) 
Multi-
Strategy 
0.505** 0.472** 0.428** 0.414** 0.248** 0.464** 0.648** 0.489** 0.306** 0.126** -0.215** -0.197** -0.095 0.018 0.014 
  (9.641) (9.050) (8.049) (7.562) (4.441) (5.800) (8.704) (5.759) (3.519) (3.022) (-3.447) (-3.136) (-0.306) (0.211) (1.143) 
Other 0.516** 0.499** 0.478** 0.501** 0.417** 0.113** 0.058 0.090* 0.067* 0.113** 0.034 0.045 -0.084 0.038 0.036 
  (9.758) (9.485) (8.967) (9.585) (7.711) (3.158) (1.577) (2.485) (2.266) (4.308) (0.474) (0.611) (-1.172) (0.547) (0.521) 
Global 
Macro 
0.249** 0.224** 0.197** 0.159* 0.078 0.022 0.148* -0.023 0.051 -0.034 0.106 0.071 -0.009 0.218** -0.011 
  (4.129) (3.734) (3.195) (2.550) (1.253) (0.335) (2.230) (-0.349) (0.812) (-0.540) (1.602) (1.068) (-0.134) (3.434) (-0.165) 
Relative 
Value 
0.663** 0.569** 0.497** 0.487** 0.312** 0.650** 0.573** 0.476** 0.472** 0.357** -0.161** 0.049 -0.014 -0.050 0.017 




Table 76. Hedge Fund Smoothness at Strategy Level – Growth Period (continued) 
Market 
Neutral 
0.413** 0.405** 0.418** 0.408** 0.383** 0.308** 0.265** 0.2012** 0.182** 0.239** -0.024 0.044 0.014 0.020
8 
0.032 
  (7.141) (7.026) (7.240) (7.036) (6.504) (5.057) (4.309) (3.259) (2.902) (3.983) (-0.388) (0.711) (0.235) (0.346
) 
(0.553) 
CTA 0.051 -0.022 0.013 0.177** 0.041 0.030 -0.061 -0.018 0.113 -0.032 -0.017 -0.054 -0.020 0.089 -0.004 














Table 77. Hedge Fund Smoothness at Strategy Level - Recessions 
This table shows the results of the regression-based parametric model for raw for raw returns, the Sharpe ratio, and the Information ratio during recessions. A positive and significant slope coefficient 
indicates performance persistence. This suggests that a hedge fund (or group) that did well in specific period did well in the sub-sequent period and vice-versa. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** 
denotes significance at P < 0.01. For space reasons, I present only the t-statistics in parentheses.   















Strategy 1 2 4 6 12 1 2 4 6 12 1 2 4 6 12 
Short Bias 0.184 0.134 0.125 0.112 0.123 0.145 -0.014 -0.064 -0.256 -17.285** 0.150 -0.011 -0.085 -0.247 -9.641 
  (1.094) (0.772) (0.851) (0.819) (0.676) (0.819) (-0.070) (-0.314) (-1.289) (-3.606) (0.852) (-0.056) (-0.416) (-1.233) (-1.540) 
Long Only 0.551** 0.161 0.036 -0.452* -0.158 0.335 0.147 -0.034 -0.243 -0.058 0.437 0.121 0.084 -0.054 0.336 
  (3.741) (0.906) (0.188) (-2.556) (-0.497) (1.926) (0.783) (-0.168) (-1.205) (-0.243) (2.688) (0.767) (0.612) (-0.240) (1.872) 
Sector 0.538** 0.190 -0.062 -0.274 -0.248 0.604** 0.360* -0.091 -0.443** -0.038 0.141 -0.306 0.152 -0.112 0.603** 
  (3.601) (1.066) (-0.343) (-1.644) (-1.025) (4.159) (2.067) (-0.514) (-3.009) (-0.187) (0.799) (-1.789) (0.807) (-0.421) (2.911) 
Long Short 0.523** 0.204 -0.066 -0.396 -0.180 0.464** 0.260 -0.189 -0.317 -0.016 0.194 -0.287 0.177 -0.081 0.519* 
  (3.333) (1.076) (-0.340) (-2.193) (-0.668) (2.858) (1.419) (-1.045) (-1.827) (-0.076) (1.129) (-1.772) (0.993) (-0.378) (2.398) 
Event 
Driven 
0.623** 0.309 -0.002 -0.494** 0.081 0.366* 0.252 -0.111 -0.216 0.013 0.252 -0.222 -0.049 0.236 -0.077 
  (4.478) (1.743) (-0.008) (-2.857) ( 0.226) (2.162) (1.427) (-0.581) (-1.245) (0.066) (1.476) (-1.528) (-0.315) (1.474) (-0.296) 
Multi-
Strategy 
0.528** 0.191 0.087 -0.337 0.173 -0.028 -0.124 0.074 -0.046 0.217 0.206** 0.046 -0.022 0.041* 0.232 
  (3.291) (0.964) (0.445) (-1.951) ( 0.681) (-0.447) (-2.078) (1.263) (-0.786) (1.153) (2.784) (0.560) (-1.153) (2.305) (0.999) 
Other 0.390* 0.170 0.213 -0.008 0.271 0.266 -0.151 0.059 -0.019 0.106 0.325 -0.216 0.167 0.092 0.114 
  (2.506) (0.922) (1.124) (-0.039) (1.072) (1.423) (-0.727) (0.304) (-0.099) (0.637) (1.676) (-1.134) (0.748) (0.382) (0.520) 
Global 
Macro 
0.253 0.156 0.217 0.339* 0.170 0.094 0.004 0.386* 0.214 0.148 0.324 -0.158 0.136 -0.016 0.556 
  (1.381) (0.734) (1.239) (2.081) (0.815) (0.488) (0.018) (2.312) (1.219) (0.917) (1.732) (-0.823) (0.635) (-0.051) (1.722) 
Relative 
Value 
0.719** 0.240 -0.171 -0.504* -0.170 0.736** 0.272 -0.247 -0.408 -0.046 0.206 -0.283 0.060 0.069 0.200 




Table 77. Hedge Fund Smoothness at Strategy Level - Recessions (continued) 
Market 
Neutral 
-0.026 0.051 0.119 0.125 0.199 -0.193 0.004 0.035 0.170 0.221 0.546** 0.101 -0.171 -0.449 0.123 
  (-0.159) (0.296) (0.730) (0.745) (1.267) (-1.330) (0.025) (0.206) (1.039) (1.270) (3.823) (0.592) (-0.929) (-2.502) (0.468) 
CTA 0.184 0.134 0.125 0.112 0.123 0.151 0.135 0.071 -0.033 0.181 0.354* 0.020 -0.154 -0.019 0.066 
























Table 78. Hedge Fund Smoothness at Strategy Level – Up Regimes 
This table shows the results of the regression-based parametric model for raw returns, the Sharpe ratio, and the Information ratio during up regimes. A positive and significant slope coefficient indicates 
performance persistence. This suggests that a hedge fund (or group) that did well in specific period did well in the sub-sequent period and vice-versa. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes 
significance at P < 0.01. For space reasons, I present only the t-statistics in parentheses.   















Strategy 1 2 4 6 12 1 2 4 6 12 1 2 4 6 12 
Short Bias 0.046 -0.008 -0.132 -0.094 -0.021 0.418** 0.029 -0.058 -0.198** 0.002 0.383** 0.032 -0.068 -0.186** 0.017 
  (0.729) (-0.123) (-2.124) (-1.589) (-0.342) (-7.292) (0.793) (-1.575) (-5.652) ( 0.054) (6.586) (0.865) (-1.822) (-5.210) (0.454) 
Long Only 0.290** 0.193** 0.033 0.050 0.066 0.241** 0.275** 0.041 0.140* 0.053 0.042 0.039 -0.011 0.024 0.174** 
  (4.936) (3.209) (0.566) (0.882) (1.143) (3.936) (4.499) (0.643) (2.242) (0.834) (0.667) (0.648) (-0.195) (0.415) (3.125) 
Sector 0.260** 0.247 0.109 0.183** 0.087 0.180** 0.247** 0.124 0.090 0.125* -0.001 -0.048 0.026 0.042 0.101 
  (4.283) (3.994) (1.710) (3.053) (1.385) (2.904) (4.033) (1.961) (1.443) (2.041) (-0.013) (-0.801) (0.428) (0.681) (1.647) 
Long Short 0.297** 0.262** 0.087 0.163** 0.100 0.234** 0.241** 0.067 0.120 0.054 -0.075 -0.018 0.023 -0.048 0.130* 
  (4.978) (4.278) (1.389) (2.709) (1.560) (3.853) (3.914) (1.067) (1.918) (0.848) (-1.227) (-0.299) (0.379) (-0.793) (2.150) 
Event Driven 0.547** 0.405** 0.278** 0.169** 0.195** 0.541** 0.437** 0.329** 0.294** 0.241** -0.178** 0.037 -0.100 -0.053 0.075 
  (10.466) (7.078) (4.727) (2.887) (3.407) (10.238) (7.702) (5.509) (4.861) (3.896) (-2.910) (0.582) (-1.568) (-0.876) (1.246) 
Multi-Strategy 0.528** 0.493** 0.443** 0.344** 0.282** 0.404** 0.398** 0.245** 0.173** 0.136** -0.218** -0.018 -0.203 0.036** 0.014 
  (9.993) (9.228) (8.011) (6.058) (4.874) (6.976) (6.581) (5.509) (4.052) (3.223) (-3.564) (-0.084) (-0.963) (2.959) (1.195) 
Other 0.524** 0.512** 0.465** 0.479** 0.508** 0.115** 0.059 0.087* 0.066* 0.116** 0.014 -0.024 -0.138 0.028 0.030 
  (10.064) (9.725) (8.626) (8.844) (8.994) (3.163) (1.599) (2.365) (2.213) (4.399) (0.198) (-0.328) (-1.959) (0.414) (0.438) 
Global Macro 0.243** 0.222** 0.196** 0.161* 0.092 0.022 0.148* -0.019 0.049 -0.032 0.095 0.038 -0.026 0.219** -0.006 
  (3.974) (3.627) (3.196) (2.584) (1.394) (0.334) (2.272) (-0.283) (0.769) (-0.502) (1.442) (0.584) (-0.401) (3.416) (-0.089) 
Relative 
Value 
0.707** 0.601** 0.430** 0.280** 0.317** 0.663** 0.556** 0.416** 0.384** 0.353** -0.184** 0.010 -0.052 -0.042 0.032 
  (16.241) (12.294) (7.928) (5.177) (6.004) (14.401) (11.019) (7.513) (6.797) (6.243) (-3.025) (0.161) (-0.815) (-0.677) (0.520) 
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Table 78. Hedge Fund Smoothness at Strategy Level - Up Regimes (continued) 
Market 
Neutral 
0.339** 0.380** 0.380** 0.379** 0.372** 0.245** 0.253** 0.179** 0.193** 0.239** 0.007 0.046 -0.056 -0.042 0.037 
  (5.749) (6.597) (6.440) (6.463) (6.031) (4.021) (4.173) (2.916) (3.124) (3.938) (0.107) (0.762) (-0.948) (-0.721) ( 0.654) 
CTA 0.021 -0.035 0.001 0.1649*
* 
0.039 -0.009 -0.049 -0.034 0.076 -0.028 -0.043 -0.063 -0.130* 0.038 0.001 
























Table 79. Hedge Fund Smoothness at Strategy Level – Down Regimes 
This table shows the results of the regression-based parametric model for raw for raw returns, the Sharpe ratio, and the Information ratio during down regimes. A positive and significant slope 
coefficient indicates performance persistence. This suggests that a hedge fund (or group) that did well in specific period did well in the sub-sequent period and vice-versa. * denotes significance at P < 
0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. For space reasons, I present only the t-statistics in parentheses. 















Strategy 1 2 4 6 12 1 2 4 6 12 1 2 4 6 12 
Short Bias 0.475*
* 
0.126 0.258 0.196 -0.160 0.010 1.649 -8.441* 3.520 0.033 0.013 2.224 -9.920* 10.790 0.041 
  (3.316) (0.782) (1.611) (1.047) (-1.107) (0.060) (0.380) (-2.302) (6.467) (0.182) (0.076) (0.446) (-2.722) (2.011) (0.193) 
Long Only 0.528*
* 
0.140 0.234 -0.147 -0.221 0.374* 0.023 0.172 -0.114 -0.182 0.171 0.093 0.410* 0.089 0.245 
  (3.536) (0.790) (1.167) (-0.577) (-0.996) (2.198) (0.128) (0.883) (-0.523) (-0.863) (0.854) (0.473) (2.279) (0.435) (1.223) 
Sector 0.347*
* 
-0.108 0.085 -0.130 -0.339 0.326* -0.075 0.066 -0.170 -0.358* 0.546* 0.138 0.396 -0.058 0.740** 
  (2.203) (-0.684) (0.540) (-0.696) (-2.246) (2.158) (-0.482) (0.459) (-1.167) (-2.163) (2.664) (0.560) (1.605) (-0.244) (3.084) 
Long Short 0.394* -0.017 0.141 -0.167 -0.147 0.418* 0.009 0.068 -0.151 -0.146 0.290 0.033 0.422* 0.034 0.340 
  (2.503) (-0.103) (0.822) (-0.824) (-0.996) (2.636) (0.053) (0.414) (-0.888) (-0.832) (1.584) (0.165) (2.251) (0.159) (1.486) 
Event Driven 0.577*
* 
0.244 0.137 -0.119 -0.019 0.328* 0.069 0.001 -0.019 -0.022 0.270 -0.123 0.160 0.091 -0.092 
  (4.202) (1.477) (0.748) (-0.435) (-0.066) (2.086) (0.408) (0.003) (-0.109) (-0.112) (1.593) (-0.747) (0.990) (0.501) (-0.469) 
Multi-Strategy 0.398* 0.039 0.016 -0.187 -0.102 0.025 0.152 0.351 -0.810 -0.066 0.283 -0.199** -0.009 0.119 0.131 
  (2.595) (0.222) (0.100) (-1.022) (-0.508) (0.149) (0.946) (1.013) (-1.869) (-0.353) (1.710) (-9.128) (-0.219) (0.683) (0.574) 
Other 0.286 0.031 0.277 0.193 -0.078 0.103 -0.234 0.276 0.053 -0.066 0.321 0.163 0.401 0.129 0.150 
  (1.666) (0.177) (1.458) (1.054) (-0.564) (0.584) (-1.370) (1.835) (0.357) (-0.499) (1.704) (0.790) (1.910) (0.573) (0.628) 
Global Macro 0.344* 0.192 0.243 0.436* 0.018 0.078 0.007 0.067 0.294* 0.014 0.490* 0.214 0.542* 0.001 0.311 
  (2.181) (1.096) (1.254) (2.586) (0.183) (0.447) (0.039) (0.440) (2.243) (0.126) (2.636) (0.895) (2.279) (0.002) (1.119) 
Relative Value 0.597*
* 
0.097 -0.115 -0.034 -0.0186 0.654** 0.291 -0.079 0.304 -0.073 0.278 -0.003 0.233 -0.003 0.040 




Table 79. Hedge Fund Smoothness at Strategy Level – Down Regimes (continued) 
Market 
Neutral 
0.385* 0.125 0.321* 0.270 0.275* 0.261 -0.012 0.305 -0.016 0.218 0.513** 0.103 0.250 -0.218 0.056 
  (2.363
) 
(0.672) (2.126) (1.667) (2.377) (1.595) (-0.064) (1.536) (-0.077) (1.472) (3.268) (0.568) (1.115) (-0.890) (0.199) 
CTA 0.454
** 
0.222 0.243 0.201 0.149 0.478** 0.010 0.195 0.207 0.198 0.509** 0.058 0.290 0.223 0.010 
  (3.095
) 




8.16 Spread between top P1 and bottom P10 performers 
In this appendix Tables 80, 81, 82 and 83 show the spreads between top P1 and bottom 
P10 performers across all hedge fund strategies during “good” and “bad” market 
conditions. “Bad” market conditions have a negative impact on hedge fund performance 
persistence and the spreads between top and bottom performers are low. In all market 
conditions, on average, directional strategies present higher spreads between top P1 and 














Table 80. Persistence within Strategies - Spreads / Growth Period 
This table shows results of spreads between top P1 and bottom P10 performers for each hedge fund strategy, on a quarterly basis during growth periods. Using the regression based parametric model, a 
positive coefficient denotes persistence in the spread between top and bottom performers. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. The up-left side contains more 















































7.35% 3.646 0.915** 20.186 Sector 
Spread 
P1-P10 














6.37% 3.058 0.922** 21.539 Others 
Spread 
P1-P10 













4.83% 2.458 0.944** 24.100 CTA 
Spread 
P1-P10 
11.28% 3.225 0.933** 23.159 
  
        








6.19% 3.163 0.874** 11.240 Sector 
Spread 
P1-P10 














5.23% 2.397 0.881** 11.632 Others 
Spread 
P1-P10 













3.81% 2.005 0.855** 10.546 CTA 
Spread 
P1-P10 
8.70% 2.746 0.913** 14.055       








5.40% 2.639 0.862** 7.281 Sector 
Spread 
P1-P10 














4.15% 1.465 0.915** 10.14 Others 
Spread 
P1-P10 













3.24% 1.367 0.942** 11.25 CTA 
Spread 
P1-P10 
7.47% 2.643 0.854** 7.175           
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Table 81. Persistence within Strategies - Spreads / Recessions 
This table shows results of spreads between top P1 and bottom P10 performers for each hedge fund strategy, on a quarterly basis during recessions. Using the regression based parametric model, a 
positive coefficient denotes persistence in the spread between top and bottom performers. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. The up-left side contains more 


























































15.29% 6.255 0.856** 3.868 Sector 
Spread 
P1-P10 














9.95% 4.136 0.899** 4.555 Others 
Spread 
P1-P10 













7.02% 2.637 0.943** 5.453 CTA 
Spread 
P1-P10 
16.61% 7.846 0.768** 3.432 
  
    








10.16% 6.176 1.147* 3.412 Sector 
Spread 
P1-P10 














8.59% 4.263 0.892* 2.819 Others 
Spread 
P1-P10 













5.89% 2.644 1.038* 4.373 CTA 
Spread 
P1-P10 
14.81% 4.878 0.750* 3.144 
  
    








9.48% 5.328 1.314 1.202 Sector 
Spread 
P1-P10 














8.22% 4.274 1.653 2.642 Others 
Spread 
P1-P10 













6.00% 1.121 0.958 2.849 CTA 
Spread 
P1-P10 
10.58% 2.099 1.048 2.998 
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Table 82. Persistence within Strategies - Spreads / Up Regimes 
This table shows results of spreads between top P1 and bottom P10 performers for each hedge fund strategy, on a quarterly basis during up regimes. Using the regression based parametric model, a 
positive coefficient denotes persistence in the spread between top and bottom performers. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. The up-left side contains more 


























































7.37% 3.324 0.933** 22.160 Sector 
Spread 
P1-P10 














6.36% 2.737 0.909** 19.394 Others 
Spread 
P1-P10 













4.79% 2.155 0.900** 18.354 CTA 
Spread 
P1-P10 
10.98% 3.037 0.931** 23.25 
  
    








5.96% 2.506 0.919** 13.343 Sector 
Spread 
P1-P10 














4.86% 2.221 0.866** 10.249 Others 
Spread 
P1-P10 













3.90% 1.525 0.913** 13.363 CTA 
Spread 
P1-P10 
8.47% 2.010 0.969** 21.719 
  
    








5.16% 2.220 0.915** 8.794 Sector 
Spread 
P1-P10 














4.50% 1.858 0.871** 7.589 Others 
Spread 
P1-P10 













3.26% 1.342 0.962** 13.34 CTA 
Spread 
P1-P10 
7.17% 1.441 0.943** 14.71 
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Table 83. Persistence within Strategies - Spreads / Down Regimes 
This table shows results of spreads between top P1 and bottom P10 performers for each hedge fund strategy, on a quarterly basis during down regimes. Using the regression based parametric model, a 
positive coefficient denotes persistence in the spread between top and bottom performers. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01. The up-left side contains more 


























































13.45% 4.756 0.846** 5.181 Sector 
Spread 
P1-P10 














9.31% 3.899 0.867** 5.344 Others 
Spread 
P1-P10 













7.40% 3.187 0.840** 7.935 CTA 
Spread 
P1-P10 
14.14% 7.282 0.746** 3.577 
  
    








10.67% 4.722 0.895* 3.418 Sector 
Spread 
P1-P10 













9.10% 4.068 1.032* 3.370 Others 
Spread 
P1-P10 













6.88% 3.580 0.629* 3.477 CTA 
Spread 
P1-P10 
11.74% 5.478 0.869* 3.262 
  
    








8.18% 3.010 1.360 2.819 Sector 
Spread 
P1-P10 














8.25% 1.737 0.883 2.548 Others 
Spread 
P1-P10 













5.06% 1.216 0.815 2.425 CTA 
Spread 
P1-P10 
7.89% 2.569 1.249 1.830 
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8.17 Out-of-sample tests – Trading strategies 
In this appendix I show the results of the out-of-sample tests for growth and recessions 
for all hedge fund strategies and for the optimum theoretical trading strategies. During 
“good” market conditions the returns for trading strategies have mostly the same sign 
and are significant. During "bad" times the returns for the trading strategies have mostly 
the same sign although due to limited data availability I did not examine validity 
beyond one year. The insignificance can be ascribed to just not having enough data. 
However it can be tested in the future years when more data will be available. 
Table 84. Persistence within All Strategies - Spreads / Growths 
This table shows the spreads between top P1 and bottom P10 performers for all hedge fund strategies, on a quarterly, 
semi-annual and annual basis for the first and second half period during growths. HRE: high return exploitation, 
LRE: low return exploitation. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance at P < 0.01 using a two-
tailed t-statistic test. 
Momentum Trading Styles 
  
  
Contrarian Trading Styles 
  
  
  Average raw return 
  
  Average return 
  
  First half Second half   First half Second half 
Quarterly 0.43 0.98** 2 Year 0.07 0.02 
Semi annual 0.93** 0.91* 3 Years -0.35 -0.04 
Annual 0.27 0.77**     
Momentrarian Trading Styles (HRE) 
  
  
Momentrarian Trading Styles (LRE) 
  
  
  Average return 
  
  Average return 
  
  First half Second half   First half Second half 
1st order 0.07 0.35 1st order 0.31 0.39 





Table 85. Persistence within Optimum Strategies - Spreads / Growths 
This table shows the spreads (average raw returns) between top P1 and bottom P10 performers for optimum 
strategies, on a quarterly, semi-annual and annual basis for the first and second half period during growths. HRE: 
high return exploitation, LRE: low return exploitation. * denotes significance at P < 0.05 and ** denotes significance 
at P < 0.01 using a two-tailed t-statistic test. 










  Strategy OT 
  
  
 Strategies LO and SB 
Strategies LO and SB, average raw return 
  
  
  First half Second half     First half Second half   
Quarterly 1.28** 1.45**   Qu rterly 1.32 2.08**   
  Strategy OT 
  
  
                             Strategies OT and SB 
Strategies OT and SB 
  
  
  First half Second half   First half Second half   
Semi  Annual 2.18** 1.76**   emi Annual 2.22** 2.06**   
  Strategy OT 
  
  
                            Strategies SE and CT 
Strategies SE and CT 
  
  
  First half Second half   First half Second half   
Annual 0.85 1.65**   Annual 4.00** 2.80**   










  Strategy SB 
  
  
  Strategies LO and CT 
  
  
First half Second half   First half Second half   
2 Years -0.28 1.56*   2 Years 3.45** 1.99*   
  Strategy SE 
  
  
  Strategies ED and CT 
  
  
  First half Second half     First half Second half   
3 Years 0.82 0.10   3 Years 1.95** 1.25*   
3a. Momentrarian Trading Styles (same hedge fund 




3b. Momentrarian Trading Styles (mixed hedge fund 




  Strategy OT 
  
  
  Strategies SE and CT 
  
  
  First half Second half     First half Second half   
1st order 0.09 1.21   1st order 3.66** 2.62**   
  Strategy SE 
  
  
  Strategies SE and CT 
  
  
  First half Second half     First half Second half   
2nd order 1.74 1.00   2nd order 2.68* 1.96*   
4a. Momentrarian Trading Styles (same hedge fund 
strategy - LRE) 
  
  
4b. Momentrarian Trading Styles (mixed hedge fund 




  Strategy OT 
  
  Strategies SE and CT 
  
  
  First half Second half    First half Second half   
1st order 0.35 1.09  1st order 3.75** 1.97**   
  Strategy CT 
  
  Strategies ED and CT 
  
  
  First half Second half    First half Second half   





Table 86. Persistence within All Strategies - Spreads / Recessions 
This table shows the spreads between top P1 and bottom P10 performers for all hedge fund strategies, on a quarterly, 
semi-annual and annual basis for the first and second half period during recessions. HRE: high return exploitation, 
LRE: low return exploitation. “-“no computation due to limited data availability (I have not tested for significance 
due to the low number of observations). 
Momentum Trading Styles 
  
  
Contrarian Trading Styles 
  
  
  Average raw return 
  
  Average return 
  
  First half Second half   First half Second half 
Quarterly -1.03 2.03 2 Year - - 
Semi annual -1.22 -1.28 3 Years - - 
Annual - -       
Momentrarian Trading Styles (HRE) 
  
  
Momentrarian Trading Styles (LRE) 
  
  
  Average return 
  
  Average return 
  
  First half Second half   First half Second half 
1st order - - 1st order - - 
2nd order - - 2nd order - - 
 
Table 87. Persistence within Optimum Strategies - Spreads / Recessions 
This table shows the spreads (average raw returns) between top P1 and bottom P10 performers for optimum 
strategies, on a quarterly, semi-annual and annual basis for the first and second half period during recessions. HRE: 
high return exploitation, LRE: low return exploitation. “-“no computation due to limited data availability (I have not 
tested for significance due to the low number of observations). 








  Strategy SB 
  
  Strategies SB and ED 
  
  First half Second half   First half Second half 
Quarterly 0.89 4.03 Quarterly 1.39 5.93 
  Strategy RV 
  
  Strategies SB and RV 
  
Semi  Annual First half Second half   First half Second half 
  -0.21 2.13 Semi Annual -2.42 7.24 
  Strategy RV 
  
  Strategies GM and RV 
  
Annual First half Second half   First half Second half 
  - - Annual - - 








  Strategy RV 
  
  Strategies SB and RV 
  
  First half Second half   First half Second half 
2 Years - - 2 Years - - 
3a. Momentrarian Trading Styles (same hedge 
fund strategy - HRE) 
  
  
3b. Momentrarian Trading Styles (mixed hedge 
fund strategies - HRE) 
  
  
  Strategy RV 
  
  Strategies GM and RV 
  
  First half Second half   First half Second half 
1st order - - 1st order - - 
4a. Momentrarian Trading Styles (same hedge 
fund strategy - LRE) 
  
  
4b. Momentrarian Trading Styles (mixed hedge 
fund strategies - LRE) 
  
  
  Strategy RV 
  
  Strategies SB and RV 
  
  First half Second half   First half Second half 




ABS  Asset-Based Style 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
APT  Arbitrage Pricing Theory  
AUM  Assets Under Management 
BAFA  British Accounting and Finance 
CAPM  Capital Asset pricing Model 
CEGBI Centre for Evolution and Global Business and Institutions 
CFA  Common Factor Analysis 
CISDM Centre for International and Securities Markets 
CME  Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
COAG  Commodity Agricultural Index 
COEN  Commodity Energy Index 
COIM  Commodity Industrial Metals Index 
COPM  Commodity Precious Metals Index 
CPR  Cross Product Ratio 
CRSP  Centre from Research in Security Prices 
CS  Chi-Test 
CSFB/Tremont Credit Suisse First Boston 
CSR  Cross Sectional Regression 
CSWL  Centre for Evolution and Global Business and Institutions 
CTA/CT Commodity Trading Advisors 
DEF  Default Premium 
DS  Divergence Score 
EACM  Evaluation Associates Capital Market 
ECRI  Economic Cycle Research Institute 
ED  Event Driven Strategy 
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ETF  Exchange Trading Fund 
EXCH  Exchange 
FoFs  Fund of Funds   
GAV  Gross Asset Value 
GEMI  Global Market Index (excluding U.S.) 
GM  Global Macro Strategy 
GOEF  Global Equity Ownership Feed of Thomson Financial 
HFN  Evestment Com 
HFR  Hedge Fund Research 
HML  High Minus Low 
KS  Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
TERM  Term Spread Premium 
TRI  Total Return Index 
LL  Losers-Losers 
LO  Long Only Strategy 
LS  Long Short Strategy 
LW  Losers-Winners 
MAI  Market Index 
MAR  Managed Account Reports 
MBS  Mortgage-backed securities 
MN  market Neutral Strategy 
MOM  Momentum 
MS  Multi - Strategy 
NAV  Net Asset Value 
NBER  National Bureau of Economic Research  
OT  Others Strategy 
PCA  Principal Component Analysis 
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RIC  Rank Information Coefficient 
RLE  Real Estate 
RV  Relative Value Strategy 
SEC  Security Exchange Commission 
SB  Short Bias Strategy 
SDI  Strategy Distinctiveness Index 
SE  Sector Strategy 
SMB  Small Minus Big 
SRC  Spearman Rank Coefficient  
TAP  Thesis Advisory Panel 
TASS  Tremont Advisory Shareholders Services  
VIX  Volatility Index 
VOV  Volatility of the Aggregate Volatility of Equity Market Returns 
WW  Winners-Winners 
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